area handbook series 

South Africa 

a country study 




South Africa 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Rita M. Byrnes 
Research Completed 
May 1996 



On the cover: Cape Town skyline against Table Moun- 
tain 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1997. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

South Africa : a country study / Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress ; edited by Rita M. Byrnes. — 3d ed. 
[Rev. ed.] 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-93) 

"Supersedes the 1981 edition of South Africa : a coun- 
try study, edited by Harold D. Nelson." — T.p. verso. 

"Research completed May 1996." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 421-483) and 
index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0796-8 (alk. paper) 

1. South Africa. I. Byrnes, Rita M., 1943- . II. Library 
of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. 
Series: DA Pam ; 550-93. 



DT1719.S67 1997 
968— dc21 



96-48983 
CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 



DA Pam 550-93 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written 
by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors 
seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, 
striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular 
attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 
their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inter- 
ests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and 
extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the 
writers of the 1981 edition of South Africa: A Country Study, 
edited by Harold D. Nelson. The authors also wish to thank 
numerous individuals in various government agencies and pri- 
vate institutions who generously shared their expertise and 
research materials in the production of this book. Thanks are 
due to R.T.K. Scully, Medical Assistance Programs (MAP) Inter- 
national; Harvey Leifert, Medical Education for South African 
Blacks (MESAB), Inc.; James B. Parks, American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO); Sma- 
roula Georgina Stephens, United States Information Agency; 
and Witney Schneidman, Samuels International Associates. 
Valuable assistance was also provided by analysts Brenda Brana- 
man, Ed Campbell, Joe Dickie, Simon Dodge, W. Fitzpatrick, 
Thomas Ofcansky, and Rachel Warner. Specialists at the Inter- 
national Labor Organization; Investor Responsibility Research 
Center; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census International Programs Center; and World Bank- 
International Monetary Fund Joint Library also helped the 
authors acquire recent information on South Africa. None of 
these individuals is responsible for the work of the authors, 
however. 

Members of the diplomatic mission of South Africa provided 
valuable assistance despite the pressing demands of their coun- 
try's political transition. Juan A. Henriquez, of the South Afri- 
can Embassy Public Affairs Office, deserves particular thanks; 
he and several other embassy officials took time to explain the 
often complex transition as it unfolded in their country. The 
views presented in this book do not necessarily agree with 
theirs, however. 

Several employees of the Library of Congress made special 
efforts to acquire timely materials on South Africa for this vol- 
ume. Afaf S. McGowan, of the African/Middle Eastern Acquisi- 
tions Section; M. Laverne Page, of the African-Middle Eastern 
Division; and Joseph Rowe, of the Federal Research Division, 
deserve particular mention. 

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal 
Research Division staff who contributed directly to the prepara- 
tion of the manuscript. These people include Sandra W. Med- 



itz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the 
sponsoring agency; Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing and 
book production; Andrea Merrill, who reviewed tables and 
maps; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who performed 
word processing and initial typesetting; and David P. Cabitto 
and Janie L. Gilchrist, who prepared the camera-ready copy. 
Thanks also to Helen C. Metz for proofreading almost-final 
copy. 

Contributors to the preparation of this volume also included 
Mimi Cantwell, who edited chapters; Carolyn Hinton, who per- 
formed the prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, 
who compiled the index. Graphics were prepared by David P. 
Cabitto, who, along with the firm of Maryland Mapping and 
Graphics, prepared the final maps. Special thanks are owed to 
Sandra K. Ferrell, who designed the illustrations on the cover 
and the title page of the chapters. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of individu- 
als who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. Par- 
ticular thanks go to R.T.K. Scully for photographs taken during 
his extensive anthropological research and travels in South 
Africa. 



vi 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xv 

Table A. Selected Acronymns and Contractions xvii 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events xxiii 

Country Profile xxxv 

Introduction xlvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

William H. Worger 

SOUTHERN AFRICAN SOCIETIES TO ca. 1 600 5 

The Earliest South Africans 5 

The Arrival of Bantu-Speaking Africans 7 

EARLY EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT 10 

Origins of Settlement 10 

Establishing a Slave Economy 11 

Emergence of a Settler Society 13 

THE RISE OF AFRICAN STATES 18 

Background to the Mfecane 19 

Shaka and the Rise of the Zulu State 20 

Swazi, Sotho, and Ndebele States 23 

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT 24 

British Colonialism 24 

The Great Trek 26 

The Voortrekker Republics and British Policies ... 29 

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND IMPERIALISM, 1870-1910. . . 33 

The Mineral Revolution 33 

Africans and Industrialization 34 

British Imperialism and the Afrikaners 38 

Formation of the Union of South Africa, 1910 .... 43 

SEGREGATION, 1910-48 44 

vii 



Building the Legal Structure of Racial 

Discrimination 44 

Formation of the African National 

Congress, 1912 45 

World War I and Afrikaner Nationalism 46 

Conflict in the 1920s 48 

The Great Depression and the 1930s 50 

The Impact of World War II 52 

The 1948 Election 53 

APARTHEID, 1948-76 54 

The Legislative Implementation of Apartheid .... 54 

Black Resistance in the 1950s 58 

Consolidating Apartheid in the 1960s 61 

The Rise of Black Consciousness 63 

GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS, 1978-89 65 

The Contradictions of Apartheid 65 

Divisions in the White Community 68 

Limited Reforms 71 

DISMANTLING APARTHEID, 1990-94 74 

The Quest for Peace 76 

"Irreversible Progress" Toward Democracy 80 

Preparing for Elections 83 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 87 

Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes 

PHYSICAL SETTING 94 

Geographic Regions 95 

Lakes and Rivers 99 

Climate and Rainfall 100 

Environmental Trends 101 

POPULATION 103 

Size and Growth 103 

Distribution 106 

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGE 107 

Language Groups 109 

Nguni Ill 

Sotho 122 

Tsonga and Venda 127 

Afrikaans Speakers 129 

English Speakers 132 

Khoisan 134 



viii 



RELIGION 135 

Historical Background 136 

Religion and Apartheid 141 

Zion Christian Church 144 

Islam 145 

EDUCATION 146 

Early Development 147 

Education under Apartheid 150 

The School System in the 1990s 153 

Higher Education 154 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 156 

Incidence of Disease 156 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 

(AIDS) 159 

Health Care Services 160 

Social Welfare 162 

WOMEN IN SOCIETY 164 

Women and Apartheid 165 

Women in the 1990s 166 

Chapter 3. The Economy 171 

Nancy L. Clark 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 74 

POSTAPARTHEID RECONSTRUCTION 177 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 180 

Gross Domestic Product 180 

External Debt 182 

Inflation 185 

Economic Distortions and Apartheid 185 

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 186 

Legal Restrictions 188 

Parastatals 189 

Budgets 190 

FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT . : . ... 192 

Foreign Trade 193 

Investment 196 

Balance of Payments 197 

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR 198 

Labor Force 198 

Labor and Politics 199 

Education and Employment 203 

ix 



EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 205 

Gold 207 

Diamonds and Platinum 208 

Ferrous and Nonferrous Metals 210 

Energy Minerals and Petroleum 212 

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 214 

Crops 217 

Livestock 219 

Forestry 220 

Fishing 220 

MANUFACTURING 222 

Electric Power 224 

Heavy Industry 225 

Chemicals Industry 226 

Consumer Goods 227 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 228 

Railroads 229 

Ports and Shipping 231 

Road System and Transport 233 

Civil Aviation 234 

Pipelines 235 

Telecommunications and Postal Service 235 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND TOURISM 238 

Environmental Protection 238 

Tourism 240 

BANKING AND CURRENCY. 241 

Banking 241 

Currency 242 

GROWTH TRENDS AND POTENTIAL 244 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 247 

Joshua Sinai 

S\5TEM OF GOVERNMENT 252 

Historical Background 253 

Constitutional Change . . 255 

The Interim Constitution 258 

Executive and Legislative Authority 259 

Provincial and Local Government 265 

Drafting a Final Constitution 268 

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 269 

The Apartheid-Era Legal System 269 



x 



The New Legal System 270 

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 272 

The 1994 Elections 272 

Political Parties 275 

Interest Groups 293 

Political Elites 297 

COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA 301 

Radio and Television 302 

Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals 304 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 304 

Relations with African States 306 

Relations with Non-African States 316 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 325 

Chapter 5. National Security 329 

Joseph P. Smaldone 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 332 

Precolonial Warfare 332 

Early Development of the South African 

Military 334 

Rise of the Security Establishment 339 

Women in the Military 348 

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES 349 

Arms Trade and the Defense Industry 350 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 355 

Regional Issues 357 

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 362 

MILITARY ORGANIZATION 363 

Army 363 

Air Force 370 

Navy 373 

Medical Service 375 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 376 

Military Intelligence and Intelligence 

Coordination 377 

DEFENSE BUDGET 381 

INTERNAL SECURITY 382 

Police 382 

Crime and Violence 388 

Prison System 391 

Penal Code 392 

xi 



HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. . 394 

Appendix. Tables 399 

Bibliography 421 

Glossary 485 

Index 491 

Contributors 529 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of South Africa, 1996 xlvi 

2 400-millimeter Rainfall Line 8 

3 European Expansion, 1652-1848 16 

4 Major African Ethnic Groups, Eighteenth 

Century 20 

5 The Mfecane, 1817-28 22 

6 Southern Africa, 1870 32 

7 Topography and Drainage 96 

8 Population by Age and Gender, Based on 1991 

Census 106 

9 Comparison of Provinces: Area, Population, and 

Economic Output, 1994 108 

10 Government-Demarcated Language Areas, 1952 110 

11 Former African Homelands and Provinces, until 

1994 112 

12 Percentage of Population Using Each Official 

Language as First Language, 1994 114 

13 Origins of Gross Domestic Product, 1995 182 

14 Economic Growth, 1985-95 184 

15 Minerals and Mining Activity, 1996 206 

16 Major Agricultural Activity, 1996 216 

17 Transportation: Major Railroads and Ports, 1996 .... 230 

18 Transportation: Major Highways and Airports, 

1996 236 

19 Structure of Government, 1996 260 

20 Command Structure of the South African 

National Defence Force (SANDF), 1996 364 

21 Organization of the South African Army, 1996 366 

22 Organization of the South African Air Force, 1996. . . 372 

xii 



23 Organization of the South African Navy, 1996 374 

24 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1996 378 

25 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1996 379 



xiii 



HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. . 394 

Appendix. Tables 399 

Bibliography 421 

Glossary 485 

Index 491 

Contributors 529 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of South Africa, 1996 xlvi 

2 400-millimeter Rainfall Line 8 

3 European Expansion, 1652-1848 16 

4 Major African Ethnic Groups, Eighteenth 

Century 20 

5 The Mfecane, 1817-28 22 

6 Southern Africa, 1870 32 

7 Topography and Drainage 96 

8 Population by Age and Gender, Based on 1991 

Census 106 

9 Comparison of Provinces: Area, Population, and 

Economic Output, 1994 108 

10 Government-Demarcated Language Areas, 1952 110 

11 Former African Homelands and Provinces, until 

1994 112 

12 Percentage of Population Using Each Official 

Language as First Language, 1994 114 

13 Origins of Gross Domestic Product, 1995 182 

14 Economic Growth, 1985-95 184 

15 Minerals and Mining Activity, 1996 206 

16 Major Agricultural Activity, 1996 216 

17 Transportation: Major Railroads and Ports, 1996 .... 230 

18 Transportation: Major Highways and Airports, 

1996 236 

19 Structure of Government, 1996 260 

20 Command Structure of the South African 

National Defence Force (SANDF), 1996 364 

21 Organization of the South African Army, 1996 366 

22 Organization of the South African Air Force, 1996. . . 372 

xii 



23 Organization of the South African Navy, 1996 374 

24 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1996 378 

25 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1996 379 



xiii 



Preface 



South Africa's emergence from global isolation in the 1990s 
parallels its political and economic reorganization, as it works 
to eliminate vestiges of the notorious system of apartheid. That 
system provoked international condemnation and deprived 
society of much of its human potential, and coping with its leg- 
acies has complicated the process of establishing a new system 
based on nonracial norms. An interim constitution, first imple- 
mented in April 1994 to govern the political transition, is being 
replaced by a new constitution, intended to protect legal equal- 
ity for individuals regardless of racial identity after 1999. The 
transition has just passed the halfway mark as this book goes to 
press, and this volume reflects the fact that many political and 
social issues remain unresolved. 

This book replaces South Africa: A Country Study, also pro- 
duced in a time of turmoil in 1981, as the country began to rec- 
ognize some of the demands for broader political participation 
by all racial groups. Like its predecessor, this study is an 
attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the domi- 
nant historical, social, economic, political, and national secu- 
rity aspects of contemporary South Africa. Sources of 
information included scholarly books, journal articles, and 
monographs; official reports of governments and international 
organizations; foreign and domestic newspapers; the authors' 
previous research and observations; and numerous periodicals. 
Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on particularly valuable sources appear at the end of 
each chapter. 

Place-names follow the system adopted by the United States 
Board on Geographic Names (BGN), wherever possible. Nine 
new provinces have been designated to replace the four prov- 
inces and ten homelands of the apartheid era. Some other 
desigations — for historical landmarks, public holidays, as well 
as some public buildings and government offices — are still 
being changed in the mid-1990s in recognition of the country's 
new political dispensation. New names have been included as 
available. As of early 1997, the provincial capital of KwaZulu- 
Natal is still to be decided between Ulundi and Pietermaritz- 
burg. The apartheid-era designation for the racial category 



xv 



known as "coloured" is retained in this volume for historical 

accuracy. 

The country has eleven official languages, which include 
nine Bantu languages, selected to recognize the first language 
of almost all South Africans. The two previous official lan- 
guages, Afrikaans and English, remain important, but the 
former no longer dominates the public media and is being 
phased out in some official contexts, such as military training. 
Some provincial legislatures are considering language policies 
to be incorporated into provincial constitutions in the late 
1990s. 

All measurements in this book rely on the metric system; a 
conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are 
unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). 
A glossary is also included to explain terms with which the 
reader may not be familiar. The use of the term billion follows 
the American system; for example, one billion means 
1,000,000,000. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of May 
1996. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated: the Introduction concludes with a discussion of sig- 
nificant events that have occurred since the information cutoff 
date; the Country Profile and Chronology include updated 
information as available; and the Bibliography lists recently 
published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the 
reader. 



xvi 



Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions 



Acronym or Contraction 



Organization or Term 



AAC 

Aasac 

ABSA 

ACDP 

ADB 

ADM 

AEC 

AECI 

AHI 

AIDS 

ALUSAF 

Amcor 

AMCP 

AME 

AMP 

AMWU 

ANC 

ANCWL 

ANCYL 

AOW 

APIA 

ARM 

Armscor 

AVF 

AVK 

AWB 

Azanyu 
BBB 

BCM 

BCMA 

BDF 

BMATT 

BOSS 

BPC 

BWB 

CAAA 

CCI 

CDF 

cm 



All-African Convention 

All-African Student Committee 

Amalgamated Banks of South Africa 

African Christian Democratic Party 

African Development Bank 

African Democratic Movement 

Atomic Energy Corporation 

African Explosives and Chemical Industries 

Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Afrikaner Trade Institute) 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

Aluminum Corporation of South Africa 

African Metals Corporation 

African Moderates Congress Party 

African Methodist Episcopal Church 

Africa Muslim Party 

African Mineworkers' Union 

African National Congress 

African National Congress Women's League 

African National Congress Youth League 

African Organisation for Women 

Azanian People's Liberation Army 

African Resistance Movement 

Armaments Corporation of South Africa 

Afrikaner Volksfront 

Afrikanervroue-Kenkrag (Akrikaner Women's Organisa- 
tion) 

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement) 

Azanian National Youth Unity 

Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging (White Protection Move- 
ment) 

Black Consciousness Movement 

Black Consciousness Movement of Azania 

Bophuthatswana Defence Force 

British Military Advisory Training Team 

Bureau of State Security 

Black People's Convention 

Boere Weerstandsbeweging (Boer Resistance Movement) 

Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act 

Crime Combatting and Investigation Office 

Ciskei Defence Force 

Criminal Investigation Department 



Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions 



Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term 



CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe- 
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora 

CNETU Council of Non-European Trade Unions 

Codesa Convention for a Democratic South Africa 

Cosag Concerned South Africans Group 

COSAS Congress of South African Students 

COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 

CP Conservative Party 

CPSA Communist Party of South Africa 

CSO Central Selling Organisation 

CYL Congress Youth League (also ANCYL) 

DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa 

DCC Defence Command Council 

DP Democratic Party 

EAC Economic Advisory Council 

EC European Community 

ECC End Conscription Campaign 

EEC European Economic Community 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 

Eskom Electricity Supply Commission 

EU European Union 

FAK Federasievan Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (Federation 

of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations) 

FAWU Food and Allied Workers' Union 

FF Freedom Front 

FNLA Frente Nacionale de Libertacao de Angola (National 

Front for the Liberation of Angola) 

Foskor Phosphate Development Corporation 

FP Federal Party 

FRELIMO Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Front for the Lib- 
eration of Mozambique) 

FSAW Federation of South African Women 

FY Fiscal Year 

GDP gross domestic product 

Genmin General Mining Corporation 

GNP gross national product 

GST general sales tax 

HEU highly enriched uranium 

HNP Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party) 

HNP Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconsdtuted Nadonal Party) 

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

ICU Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South 

Africa 

IDA International Development Association 

IDC Industrial Development Corporation 



Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions 



Acronym or Contraction 



Organization or Term 



IDRC 

IEC 

IFC 

IFP 

IMF 

IOC 

rp 

Iscor 

ISL 

JATS 

JCI 

JMC 

JMCC 

JSE 

MARNET 

MDM 

MF 

MK 

MNR 

MPLA 

NACOSA 

Nactu 

NAFCOC 

NAM 

NDM 

NEC 

NEHAWU 
NGK 

NIA 

NICC 

NIDR 

NP 

NPKF 

NPP 

NPT 

NSMS 

NUM 

NUMSA 

NUSAS 

NWC 

OAU 

OPEC 



International Development Research Centre 
Independent Electoral Commission 
International Finance Corporation 
Inkatha Freedom Party 
International Monetary Fund 
International Olympic Committee 
Independent Party 

South African Iron and Steel Corporation 

International Socialist League 

Joint Air Training Scheme 

Johannesburg Consolidated Investments 

Joint Management Center 

Joint Military Coordinating Council 

Johannesburg Stock Exchange 

Military Area Radio Network 

Mass Democratic Movement 

Mnority Front 

Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nadon) 

Mozambican National Resistance (also Renamo) 

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) 

National AIDS Convention of South Africa 

National Council of Trade Unions 

National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 

Nonaligned Movement 

National Democradc Movement 

National Executive Committee 

National Education, Health, and Allied Workers' Union 

Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed 
Church) 

National Intelligence Agency 

National Intelligence Coordinating Committee 

Nadonal Institute for Defence Research 

Nadonal Party 

Nadonal Peacekeeping Force 

National Peoples' Party 

Nuclear Nonproliferadon Treaty 

National Security Management System 

National Union of Mineworkers 

National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 

Nadonal Union of South African Students 

National Working Committee 

Organization of African Unity 

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 



Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions 



Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term 



PAC Pan-Africanist Congress 

PASO Pan-Africanist Students' Organisation 

PFP Progressive Federal Party 

Popcru Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 

PSA Public Service Association 

PTA Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa 

Putco Public Utility Transport Corporation 

PWV Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 

RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme 

Renamo Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Mozambican 

National Resistance) 

RFC Royal Flying Corps 

RSC regional services council 

SAA South Af ri can Ai r ways 

SAA S ou th Af ri can Army 

SAAC South African Aviation Corps 

SAAF South African Air Force 

SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation 

SACC South African Council of Churches 

SACCOLA South African Employers' Consultative Committee on 

Labour Affairs 

SACOB South African Chamber of Business 

SACP South African Communist Party 

SACTU South African Congress of Trade Unions 

SACU Southern African Customs Union 

SADC Southern African Development Community 

SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Confer- 
ence 

SADF South African Defence Force (s) 

Safmarine South African Marine Corporation 

SAIC South African Indian Congress 

SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations 

Samcor South African Motor Corporation 

SAMS South African Medical Service 

SAN South African Navy 

SANAC South African Native Affairs Commission 

SANDF South African National Defence Force 

SANLAM South African National Life Assurance Company 

Sansco South African National Student Congress 

SANTAM South African National Trust Company 

SAP South African Party 

SAP South African Police 

SAPA South African Press Association 

SAPS South African Police Service 

SAPU South African Police Union 



XX 



Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions 



Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term 



SARCC South African Rail Commuter Corporation 

SASO South African Students' Organisation 

SASOL South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation 

SASS South African Secret Service 

Satour South African Tourism Board 

SATS South African Transport Services 

SDF Seaward Defence Force 

SEIFSA Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South 

Africa 

Soekor Southern Oil Exploration Corporadon 

Soweto Southwestern Townships 

SSC State Security Council 

SWAPO South-West Africa People's Organisation 

SWATF South-West Africa Territorial Force 

TEC Transitional Executive Council 

UDF Union Defence Force(s) 

UDF United Democratic Front 

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization 

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola 

(National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola) 

UNOMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique 

UNOMSA United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa 

UP United Party 

Usco Union Steel Company 

UWUSA United Workers Union of South Africa 

VAT value-added tax 

VOC Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India 

Company) 

WHO World Health Organization 

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 

ZCC Zion Christian Church 



xxi 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



EARLY HISTORY 
ca. 50,000 B.C. 

ca. 25,000 B.C. 
ca. 14,000 B.C. 

ca. 500 B.C. 

ca. AD. 300 

FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
1488 



1497 

SIXTEENTH CENTURY 

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
1652 

1658 

1659 

1663 

1673-77 

1688 

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
1713 
1779-81 
1793 
1795 
1799 

NINETEENTH CENTURY 
ca. 1800 
1803-06 
1806 
1807 

1809 
1810 
1814 

1815 



Date of archaeological remains of Homo sapiens in 
southern Africa. 

Earliest rock art paintings in southern Africa. 

Earliest archaeological evidence of San hunter- 
gatherers. 

Earliest archaeological evidence of sheep and cattle 
herding. 

Archaeological evidence of Iron-Age settlements 
south of the Limpopo River. 

Portuguese navigator Bartholomeu Dias rounds 
Cape of Good Hope. Khoisan-speaking herds- 
men and hunters establish trade with Europe- 
ans. 

Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama arrives at 
Cape of Good Hope en route to India. 

Portuguese ships land at Table Bay, Bantu-speaking 
farmers and herdsmen establish trade with Euro- 
peans. 

First permanent Dutch settlement at Cape of Good 
Hope. 

Dutch import slaves from Angola and West Africa. 
Khoikhoi revolt against Dutch encroachment. 
European settlement at Saldanha Bay. 
Warfare between Khoikhoi and Dutch. 
French Huguenots begin to settle at Cape. 

Smallpox epidemic devastates Khoikhoi. 
Frontier warfare; Afrikaners defeat Xhosa. 
Frontier warfare: Xhosa defeat Afrikaners. 
Britain seizes control of the Cape. 
First of a series of Xhosa-British wars. 



Drought- and famine-produced upheaval in Natal. 

Dutch Batavian Republic controls Cape. 

Britain regains control over Cape. 

Britain ends its slave trade; British missionaries 
arrive in southern Africa. 

Pass laws enacted. 

Shaka defeats Buthelezi chiefdom. 

London Convention; Dutch formally cede Cape to 
British. 

Afrikaner rebellion against British rule at Slachters 
Nek. 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1816 
1817-28 

1819 

1824 
1828 

1828-34 

1834-35 
1834-38 

1836-40 

1838 

1839 
1843 
1850 
1852 

1854 

1856-57 
1867 

1868 
1870 
1872 

1873 
1877 

1878 
1879 

1880 

1881 

1883 
1885 
1886 



Shaka assumes control over Zulu. 

Mfecane (or crushing); Zulu expansion, decade of 
upheaval. 

British defeat of Xhosa; expulsion of Africans 
between Great Fish and Keiskama rivers. 

First white settlement at Port Natal. 

Shaka assassinated, succeeded by Dingane. 

Mpondo repulse Zulu attacks; Zulu power wanes. 

Consolidation of Swazi kingdom under Sobhuza I, 
Sotho under Moshoeshoe I, Ndebele under Mzi- 
likazi. 

British and colonial forces defeat Xhosa. 

Emancipation of slaves in Cape Colony after Britain 
abolishes slavery in its possessions. 

Great Trek begins: 6,000 Afrikaners migrate east- 
ward from Cape Colony. 

Battle of Blood River on December 16 avenges Afri- 
kaner deaths earlier that year. 

Voortrekker Republic of Natalia established. 

Britain annexes Natalia, renamed Natal. 

Last surviving San rock artists killed. 

Sand River Convention; Britain recognizes Trans- 
vaal as the independent Afrikaner South African 
Republic. 

Bloemfontein Convention; Britain recognizes 
Orange Free State as independent Afrikaner 
republic. 

Xhosa catde sacrifices lead to famine. 

Diamonds discovered in Orange Free State and 
Kimberley 

Britain annexes Sotho territory of Basutoland. 

Death of Sotho King Moshoeshoe I. 

Introduction of pass laws to control labor force in 
Kimberley diamond mines. 

Diamond diggers exceed 50,000. 

Britain annexes South African Republic, renamed 
Transvaal. Xhosa-Mfengu warfare. 

Britain claims Walvis Bay. 

Zulu defeat invading British force; British and colo- 
nial forces destroy Zulu army at Isandhlwana. 
Griqualand East annexed to Cape Colony. 

First Anglo-Boer War erupts. Cecil Rhodes estab- 
lishes De Beers Consolidated Mines. 

Pretoria Convention recognizes Transvaal indepen- 
dence. 

Paul Kruger president of South African Republic. 

Cape-to-Kimberley railroad completed. 

Gold discovered at Witwatersrand; Johannesburg 
established. 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period Description 



1890 


Rhodes pnme minister of Cape Colony. 


1891 


German headquarters established in South-West 




AfrlCa ' 


1017.4 


x roperty qualifications reduce coloured voters in 




Cape. 


1894 


Cape Colony annexes Mpondo territory. 


1895-96 


Unsuccessful Jameson Raid against Afrikaner domi- 




nance in Transvaal. 


1897 


Part of Zululand incorporated into British colony 




of Natal; King Solomon ka Dinizulu exiled. 


1897-98 


Rinderpest epidemic decimates livestock. 


1899 


South African (Anglo-Boer) War. 


WENTTETH CENTURY 




iyuu 


Britain claims Transvaal (South African Republic). 


1 Qf»9 Mot 


British victory; Peace Treaty of Vereeniging ends 




South African War. 


1905-06 


Last Zulu uprising against Bridsh. 


1907 


White miners strike against Chinese labor. 


1909 


Bridsh Parliament enacts the South Africa Act, pro- 




posed constitution of Union of South Africa. 


1910 


Self-governing Union of South Africa established 




within Bridsh Commonwealth. 


1911 


Legisladon reserves skilled jobs for whites. 


1912 


Land Bank established to assist white farmers. 




South African Native National Congress (later 




African National Congress — ANC) formed. 


1913 


Natives Land Act limits black ownership to reserves. 


1913-14 


Campaign of civil disobedience led by Indian 




human rights activist Mohandas Gandhi. 


1914 


Government foils coup plot by Afrikaner military 




officers. South Africa invades German South- 




West Africa, Germans surrender. 


1914-19 


South Africa supports Allies in World War I. 


1918 


Founding of Afrikaner Broederbond. 




.... . _ XT . , 
ooutn Africa receives .League or i\ations mandate to 




administer former German colony, South-^^est 




Africa. 


1921 


Communist Party of South Africa established 




(later — after 1953 — the South African Commu- 




nist Party) . 


1922 


Army quells miners' strike, killing 214. 


1923 


Natives Urban Areas Act authorizes segregadon in 




urban areas. South African Indian Congress 




established. South African Nadve National Con- 




gress becomes African Nadonal Congress 




(ANC). 


1925 


Afrikaans recognized as South Africa's official lan- 




guage. 


1927 


Segregation compulsory in twenty-six urban areas. 



XXV 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 

Period Description 

1929 National Party wins national elections. 

1931 Britain's Statute of Westminster affirms autonomy 

of South African parliament. 

1934 South African parliament enacts Status of Union 

* Act claiming full sovereignty for South Africa. 

1936 Black voting rights revoked in Cape; black land 

ownership expanded, but still restricted to 13 
percent of land. 

1939 Ossewabrandwag (Ox-wagon Guard) Afrikaner 

paramilitary group established. 

1939-45 South Africa supports Allies in World War II. 

1943 ANC Youth League formed. United Party wins gen- 

eral elections. 

1946 Army quells gold mine strikes. 

1947 South Africa rejects United Nations (UN) oversight 

in South-West Africa. 

1948 May National Party (NP) election victory based on racial 

issues. 

August Government ends military training for blacks. 

1949 January Asian-Zulu clashes in Durban and Rand area. 

May South Africa rejects UN concern over treatment of 

Indians. 

June Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. 

December Opening of Voortrekker Monument. 

1950 April South Africa severs judicial appeals channels to 

British Privy Council. 

May Population Registration Act authorizes racial classi- 

fication. 

June Suppression of Communism Act bans anti-apart- 

heid activities. Communist Party of South Africa 
disbands (reemerges in 1953 as South African 
Commnunist Party). 

July International Court of Justice supports League of 

Nations oversight in South-West Africa. Group 
Areas Act authorizes residential segregadon. 

August South African Air Force assists UN in Korean war 

effort, flies 10,000 missions in three years. NP 
elecdon victory in South-West Africa. 

December South Africa rejects UN cridcism of apartheid, reas- 

serts claim to South-West Africa. Black polidcal 
organizations unite to oppose apartheid. 

1951 February Britain blocks incorporation of Botswana, Lesotho, 

Swaziland into South Africa. 

May Separate Representation of Voters Act separates vot- 

ing lists for whites, coloureds. 

November United States-South Africa military agreement 

under Mutual Defense Assistance Act. 

December ANC leaders petidon for direct parliamentary rep- 

resentation, end to apartheid. UN calls for 
South-West African independence. South Africa 
suspends participation in UN General Assembly. 



xxvi 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Descriptic 



1956 



1952 March 
June 

November 

1953 October 

1954 August 

1955 February 



April 

June 

February 
March 

May 

December 

September 

April 

April 

June 

November 

February 

March 

January 

March 

May 

June 



1957 
1958 
1959 



1960 



1961 



South African Supreme Court invalidates removal 
of coloureds from voting lists. 

Passive resistance campaign by ANC and South Afri- 
can Indian Congress; 8,000 arrested. 

Interracial violence flares. Black Defiance Cam- 
paign leaders convicted of "statutory commu- 
nism." 

Reservation of Separate Amenities Act strengthens 
apartheid in public places. Bantu Education Act 
limits black education. Communist Party of 
South Africa reactivated as South African Com- 
munist Party (SACP). 

South Africa proclaims South-West Africa a prov- 
ince. 

International condemnation of forcible resettle- 
ment of Sophiatown (most residents moved to 
area later named Soweto). 

South Africa quits United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
after protests over apartheid. 

Congress of the People adopts Freedom Charter 
based on UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; signers later charged with high treason. 

South Africa expels Soviet diplomats. 

Tomlinson Commission recommends formation of 
Bantustans in reserved areas. 

Industrial Conciliation Act reserves most skilled 
jobs for whites. 

Police arrest 156 for signing Freedom Charter. 

Forty die in Sotho-Zulu violence. 

Parliamentary elections increase NP majority. 

Pan-Africanist Congress established. 

Racial violence erupts in Durban, lasts several 
months. 

Queen Elizabeth II appoints Charles Swart gover- 
nor general of South Africa. 

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "Winds 
of Change" speech. 

Sharpeville protests over pass laws; at least sixty- 
seven deaths, several thousand arrested. 

UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold visits 
South Africa, expresses racial concerns. 

Pretoria court acquits twenty-eight activists, includ- 
ing ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Walter 
Sisulu. 

Republic of South Africa established on May 31, 

quits Commonwealth. Month-long police raids, 

8,000 arrested. 
ANC establishes military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe 

(Spear of the Nation); PAC establishes armed 

wing Poqo (blacks only) . 



xxvii 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



November 
December 

1962 November 

1963 May 

August 

October 

1964 January 

March 
June 

1966 June 

September 

October 



1967 



1968 
1969 



1970 



1971 



May 

September 
December 

September 
May 

October 
December 
February 
May 

December 



UN General Assembly refuses to recognize South 
Africa. 

ANC leader Albert Luthuli receives Nobel Peace 
Prize. Nelson Mandela announces campaign of 
sabotage against government buildings. 

UN General Assembly calls for sanctions against 
South Africa. Nelson Mandela sentenced to five 
years in prison for inciting unrest, travelling 
abroad without a passport. 

Military wings of ANC, PAC banned. 

Newly established Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) charter condemns apartheid. 

UN voluntary embargo on arms shipments to 

South Africa. Libya joins Algeria and Egypt, pro- 
hibits South African overflights. 

Rivonia trial of ANC activists begins. 

Odendaal Commission recommends apartheid in 
South-West Africa. 

OAU funds liberation fighters in southern Africa. 

Eight ANC activists, including Nelson Mandela, sen- 
tenced to life in prison in Rivonia trial. 

Government snubs visiting United States Senator 
Robert Kennedy. 

Prime minister Verwoerd assassinated, succeeded 
by John Vorster. Bechuanaland independence 
from Britain as Botswana. 

Basutoland independence from Britain as Lesotho. 
UN General Assembly terminates South Africa's 
mandate to administer South-West Africa. 

Last British-appointed governor general and first 
president, Charles Swart, steps down. 

Malawi first black African state to establish diplo- 
matic ties to South Africa. 

World's first heart transplant operation performed 
by South African surgeon, Dr. Christian Bar- 
nard, at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town. 

Swaziland independence from Britain. 

Pan-Africanist Congress founder Robert Sobukwe 
released after nine years in prison. 

Herstigte (Reconstituted) National Party estab- 
lished by white extremist wing of NP. 

International Monetary Fund agrees to $35-an- 
ounce "floor" for South African gold. 

Black Homelands Citizenship Bill authorizes with- 
drawal of South African citizenship from blacks. 

International Olympic Committee (IOC) refuses 
recognition of South Africa (participation sus- 
pended since 1964). 

Zulu Prince Goodwill Zwelithini installed as king. 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1972 

1973 November 
1974 



1975 



1981 
1982 



1983 



1984 



May 

November 



1976 June 
August 

1977 January 
March 
September 
November 

1978 
1979 

1980 June 



February 

February 

March 

September 

November 

March 

May 
August 



Black People's Convention founded to coordinate 
black, consciousness movement role in politics. 
Afrikaner intellectuals protest against apartheid. 

Sixteen Arab countries implement OAU embargo 
against oil to South Africa. 

NP increases parliamentary majority in April elec- 
tions. Coup in Portugal signals impending inde- 
pendence for colonies in Africa. UN General 
Assembly rejects South African participation. 

First television transmissions in South Africa. 

Reports of white South Africans killed in fighting in 
Angola. 

Worst racial violence in history in Soweto; 575 
reported dead. 

Turnhalle Constitutional Conference sets Namib- 
ian (South-West African) independence Decem- 
ber 1978 (subsequently postponed repeatedly 
until March 1990). 

Government acknowledges 2,000 South African 
troops in Angola. 

US corporations adopt Sullivan Principles to 
counter effects of apartheid. 

Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko dies in 
police detention; thousands attend funeral. 

UN mandatory embargo against arms shipments to 
South Africa. Pretoria adopts Total Strategy to 
counter internal and external threats. 

Ministry of Information scandal leads to Vorster res- 
ignation; succeeded by P. W. Botha. 

Government recognizes black labor unions. 

Largest conventional military assault since World 
War II on South-West Africa People's Organisa- 
tion (SWAPO) bases in Angola. 

Asian, coloured populations win representation on 
President's Council. 

Labor activist Neil Aggett first white to die in police 
custody. 

NP expels extremist wing; Andries Treurnicht 
forms Conservative Party of South Africa. 

Parliament approves multiracial representation, 
excluding blacks. 

New constitution approved by whites-only referen- 
dum. 

Extension of UN sanctions barring military pur- 
chases from South Africa. 

Koeberg nuclear power station operational after 
1982 sabotage. Nkomati Accord nonaggression 
pact with Mozambique. 

South Africa, Mozambique, Portugal agreement to 
build Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique. 

Elections for tricameral parliament; escalating 
township unrest. 



xxix 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



September 

October 
1985 June 



July 

1986 January 



1987 



1990 



May 

October 



November 



1988 December 

1989 January 

February 



July 

September 

October 

November 
February 

March 

April 

July 

August 
October 



P. W. Botha named state president. Implementation 
of 1983 constitution establishing tricameral par- 
liament. 

Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu awarded Nobel 
Peace Prize. 

United States ban on computer, nuclear exports to 
South Africa for security forces. South African 
commando attacks on ANC in Botswana. First in 
a series of nationwide states of emergency. 

Britain blocks Commonwealth sanctions. 

President Botha opens Parliament with reference to 
"outdated concept of apartheid." Parliament 
repeals Pass Laws, Prohibition of Mixed Mar- 
riages Act. 

Military attacks on ANC in Botswana, Zambia, Zim- 
babwe. 

US Congress passes Comprehensive Antiapartheid 
Act (CAAA) over presidential veto. Mozambican 
President Samora Machel killed in plane crash 
in South Africa. Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project undertaken to provide water to South 
Africa. Dutch Reformed Church synod declares 
apartheid an error. 

United States bans direct US-South Africa air travel. 

United States bans new investments, bank loans to 
South Africa. National (white) elections name 
Conservative Party as parliamentary opposition. 
Mineworkers strike by 250,000. 

Angola-Namibia Accords signed in New York. 

Botha suffers stroke, Frederik W. (F. W.) de Klerk 
succeeds him as NP leader in February; as state 
president in August. 

Democratic Party established as alternative to ANC. 
UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
prepares for Namibian elections. 

President Botha, ANC leader Nelson Mandela meet 
for first talks in person. 

White, coloureds, Indians vote in parliamentary 
elections. 

Walter Sisulu and other activists released after 25 
years in prison. 

Last South African troops withdraw from Namibia. 

Mandela released on February 11, after twenty- 
seven years in prison. 

Violent antigovernment demonstrations in Ciskei, 
Bophuthatswana. 

ANC exiles begin return to South Africa. 

First official meeting of Mandela and de Klerk. 

ANC declares end of armed struggle. 

Parliament repeals Reservation of Separate Ameni- 
ties Act. 



XXX 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1991 June 

July 

September 
December 

1992 January 

March 
April 

June 
July 

September 

1993 March 
April 
June 

July 

August 
September 

October 
November 

December 



Repeal of Population Registration Act, Land Acts, 
Group Areas Act; and release of political prison- 
ers. 

Most sanctions under US CAAA lifted. 

"Inkathagate" revelations of government fund- 
ing for IFP. Nelson Mandela elected ANC presi- 
dent. IOC readmits South Africa. 

National Peace Accord agreement. 

Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codesa) begins on December 20. 

Most European sanctions lifted; UN General 

Assembly ends restrictions on cultural, academic 
exchanges. 

Whites support political reforms in referendum. 

Arms manufacturing company, Denel, formed out 
of portion of Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa (Armscor) and subsidiaries. 

Kenyan president Moi visits, signals end of African 
boycott. ANC withdraws from Codesa because of 
IFP attack on Boipatong and sub-rosa support 
for IFP by police. Negotiations suspended. 

Mandela charges government with state terrorism 
before UN and OAU; fact-finding visit by UN 
envoy Cyrus Vance; arrival of UN observers. 

Ciskei Defence Force fires on ANC protesters; at 
least 29 deaths, 200 injured. 

Government proclaims nuclear weapons disman- 
tled. Constitutional negotiations resume. 

SACP leader Chris Hani murdered by white radical. 
Death of ANC president Tambo. 

White radicals storm constitutional negotiations. 

President de Klerk, ANC leader Mandela visit US, 
jointly receive Liberty Medal. IFP, conservatives 
withdraw from constitutional negotiations. 

Political violence surges. US citizen Amy Biehl 
killed in township unrest. ANC acknowledges 
human rights' abuses in Angola, Tanzania. 

De Klerk, Mandela visit United States. Joint mission 
of ANC and South African Defence Forces 
(SADF) to United States to discuss military reor- 
ganization. 

Most UN sanctions lifted. Two whites sentenced to 
death for Hani murder. 

US CAAA repealed. Interim constitution signed by 
nineteen political parties, provides for 5-year 
Government of National Unity. 

Constitudon of the Republic of South Africa rati- 
fied on December 22. Transitional Executive 
Council (TEC) established. 

De Klerk, Mandela receive Nobel Peace prize. 



xxxi 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1994 January 

February 
March 



April 



May 



June 



July 

August 
September 

October 

November 

December 

1995 January 
February 



National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) mobilized, 
disbanded in May. PAC suspends armed strug- 
gle, agrees to participate in national elecdons. 

South Africa formally relinquishes Walvis Bay to 
Namibia. 

TEC assumes control over Bophuthatswana after 
deaths in pre-election violence, and over Ciskei 
after police mutiny. Zulu demonstration erupts 
into violence at ANC headquarters (Shell 
House), Johannesburg; eight demonstrators 
killed. State of emergency in Natal, KwaZulu. 
Goldstone Commission report forces senior 
police suspensions. 

First democratic national elections held April 26- 
29 (April 27 first day of nationwide voting) . 
Interim constitution implemented for five-year 
transition period on April 27. Violence subsides. 

Legislators elect Mandela president. Government 
announces Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. UN Security Council lifts arms 
embargo. 

South Africa joins Organization of African Unity, 
rejoins British Commonwealth of Nations, 
resumes participation in United Nations. British 
Military Advisory and Training Team assists mili- 
tary integration. Government proposes Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission to consider 
amnesty, compensation for human rights viola- 
tions under apartheid. 

French president Francois Mitterrand first foreign 
head of state to visit. Resignation of Minister of 
Finance Derek Keys. South African Operation 
Mercy shipments to Rwanda. Mandela's first 
state visit (Mozambique). 

Mandela speech marking 100 days in office inter- 
rupted by labor unrest. 

New Air Force Headquarters opened in Pretoria. 
British Prime Minister's first address to South 
African parliament since 1960. Violent protests 
by coloureds against government racial bias. 

President Mandela on state visit to United States, 
addresses joint session of Congress. South Afri- 
can officials accept salary cuts to help fund 
development. 

Soweto forgives US$400 million unpaid rent, utility 
fees. South Africa hosts first conference in Africa 
on implementing Convention on Chemical 
Weapons. 

ANC conference reelects Mandela as president. 
South African Ambassador Franklin Sonn arrives 
in Washington. 

Death of Joe Slovo, minister of housing, former 
SACP leader. 

Constitutional Court sworn in by President Man- 
dela. Mandela disavows reelection plans in 1999. 



xxxii 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 




Description 




March 


Winnie Mandela dismissed as deputy minister for 
arts, culture, science, and technology. Unifica- 
tion of two-tier exchange rate; financial rand 
abolished. Pretoria- Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 
(PWV) province renamed Gauteng (Place of 
Gold). 




June 


Mandela claims responsibility for March 1994 Shell 




House shootings of IFP demonstrators. Constitu- 
tional Court abolishes death penalty. 




August 


South Africa agrees to lease oil storage space to 
Iran. 




November 


Archbishop Desmond Tutu named chair of Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. Mandela 
denounces Nigeria's execution of human rights 
activists, including Ken Sarowiwa. 


1996 


January 


Mandela initiates urgent peace talks in KwaZulu- 




Natal aimed at ending political violence and 
resuming IFP participation in Constitutional 
Assembly. 




April 


First public hearing of Truth and Reconciliation 




Commission, in East London, April 15. White 
extremists sentenced to prison for 1994 bomb- 
ings intended to derail national elections. 




May 


Parliament approves draft final constitution. Con- 




stitutional Assembly Chair Cyril Ramaphosa 
resigns from parliament to join private sector. 




June 


NP cjuits Government of National Unity to become 




official parliamentary opposition. Nearly 28,000 
striking platinum mineworkers fired for defying 
court order to return to work. 




September 


Former police colonel implicates former govern- 
ment and security officials in wide-ranging atroc- 
ities, illegal acts under apartheid. 




October 


Former senior military officials (including a former 
minister of defense) acquitted of charges related 
to murders of antiapartheid activists. 




November 


Free State provincial premier and Executive Com- 
mittee resign following allegations of corruption 
and nepotism. 




December 


President Mandela signs legislation approving final 
constitution, to be implemented in stages by 
1999. South Africa announces plans to sever dip- 
lomatic ties with Republic of China (Taiwan) 
and to recognize People's Republic of China 
(Beijing), 1997. 


1997 


January 


Five former policemen apply for amnesty before 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 1977 
killing of Steve Biko. 




February 


South Africa's first offshore oil field, south of Mos- 
sel Bay, begins production. 




March 


South African Navy celebrates seventy-fifth anniver- 
sary in joint naval exercises with Argentina, Bra- 
zil, Uruguay. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, in 
Zaire, urges rebel-government cease-fire. 



xxxiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of South Africa. 
Short Form: South Africa. 
Term for National(s): South African (s). 
Administrative Capital: Pretoria. 
Legislative Capital: Cape Town. 
Judicial Capital: Bloemfontein. 

Independence: May 31, 1910, as Union of South Africa, self- 

xxxv 



governing British dominion; sovereignty recognized May 1, 
1934, under Britain's Statute of Westminster. Republic of South 
Africa, May 31, 1961. 

Public Holidays: New Year's Day (January 1), Human Rights 
Day (March 21), Good Friday, Family Day (Easter Monday), 
Freedom Day (April 27), Workers' Day (May 1), Ascension Day, 
Youth Day (June 16), Women's Day (August 9), Heritage Day 
(September 24), Day of Reconciliation (December 16), 
Christmas Day (December 25), and Day of Goodwill 
(December 26). 

Geography 

Size: South Africa occupies 1,227,200 square kilometers at the 
southern tip of Africa; seventh largest African country; twice 
the size of Texas. Coastline nearly 3,000 kilometers. 
Extraterritorial holdings: Prince Edward Island and Marion 
Island (Indian Ocean). 

Topography: Interior highlands continuation of African 
plateau stretching north to Sahara, 1,200 meters average 
elevation. Plateau rises to Drakensberg Mountains (3,300 
meters) south and east; Great Escarpment descends to coastal 
lowlands. Marginal coastal lowlands vary from eighty to 240 
kilometers wide. Regular coastline, few natural harbors. 

Climate: Variable; warm temperate climate overall; 
Mediterranean conditions far southwest; subtropical northeast; 
desert northwest. Moderating influence of ocean currents: East 
coast warmed by Agulhas current, west coast cooled by 
Benguela current. Dry, sunny winters (April-October), 
summer rains (November-March) except in southwest, where 
rainfall yearround; average annual rainfall 484 millimeters. 

Time: 2 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time. 

Society 

Population: 41.2 million, 1995 estimate (1996 census not yet 
final). Annual population growth 2.2 percent. Fertility: 4.4 
births per female; crude birth rate: 23.4 per 1,000; 12 percent 



xxxvi 



of births to teenagers. Population to double in twenty-five 
years. Life expectancy: sixty-three years males, sixty-eight years 
females, marked racial differences. Crude death rate: 9.4 per 
1,000. Median age 19.2, declining; 37 percent under age 
fifteen. Density 33.8 persons per square kilometer, uneven 
distribution; concentrations in KwaZulu-Natal (21 percent of 
population), Gauteng (17 percent), Eastern Cape (17 
percent). Estimated urban population, 57 to 63 percent; rural, 
37 to 43 percent. Major urban areas: Cape Town, 2.2 million; 
Johannesburg, 1.9 million; Durban, 1.1 million; Pretoria, 1.1 
million; Port Elizabeth, 854,000. Ethnic heterogeneity: 
estimated 76 percent black Africans — Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa, 
Swazi, Ndebele), Sotho-Tswana, Venda, Tsonga-Shangaan, 
Khoisan; 13 percent whites — Afrikaners, British, other 
Europeans; 11 percent Asians and others. Government 
estimates at least 2 million foreign workers (1996). 

Languages: Eleven official languages. Most widely used: isiZulu, 
isiXhosa, Afrikaans, English, and sePedi; also seSotho, 
seTswana, xiTsonga, siSwati, tshiVenda (luVenda), and 
isiNdebele. English important in commerce. 

Religion: No government restrictions. Population 80 percent 
Christians, mostly Protestant. Of these, 8 million members of 
African Independent churches; 4 million, of Dutch Reformed 
churches. Traditional African beliefs remain important, 
especially in rural areas. Asians almost equally Hindu and 
Muslim; Islamic community growing rapidly. 

Education and Literacy: Superior education system primarily 
served racial minority until 1990s. Nine years compulsory 
education universal after 1994; shortages of schools, teachers. 
Estimated 7.17 million primary pupils, 4.59 million secondary 
pupils; 20,780 primary and secondary schools, of which 20,303 
government operated; 336,653 primary and secondary 
teachers. Adult literacy estimated 61 percent. Nineteen major 
universities, two correspondence; extensive vocational and 
technical training available. 

Health: Health problems reflect racial, class differences. 
Physicians 1 per 1,200 people in wealthy areas (1 per 10,000 in 
poor, rural areas). Acquired immune deficiency syndrome 



xxxvii 



(AIDS): 10,351 reported cases (1996); human immunodefi- 
ciency virus (HIV) infection estimated close to 1 million. Infant 
mortality declining: 43.1 deaths first year per 1,000 live births 
(54.3 blacks, 7.3 whites). National health insurance system 
being phased in. 

Economy 

Character and Structure: Economy based on market-oriented, 
private enterprise, bolstered by state subsidies; traditionally 
strong public sector undergoing initial privatization. Industry 
and manufacturing crucial to growth. Government's five-year 
Reconstruction and Development Programme emphasizes 
public services, job creation to ameliorate most severe impacts 
of apartheid. Gross domestic product (GDP) estimated 
US$133.6 billion; US$3,010 per capita (1995). Major 
contributions to GDP: manufacturing, 25.2 percent; trade, 
15.5; finance, 15.3; general government, 14.1; mining, 8.9. 
Economic growth, 3.1 percent (1996), predicted 2.5 percent 
(1997). Inflation, 8.7 percent (1995); 7.4 percent (1996). 

Government budget: FY1997-98 proposed expenditures, 
R186.7 billion; revenues R162.0 billion; projected deficit R24.7 
billion. Budget allocations: military, 5.7 percent; police, 7.0 
percent; interest on government debt, 20.4 percent; education, 
21.3 percent; allocations to provinces, 43.2 percent. Proposed 
relaxation of exchange controls, tax reductions in lower 
income brackets (1997). 

Mining and Minerals: Mining based on unparalleled reserves: 
gold, diamonds, platinum, chromium, manganese, vanadium; 
also coal, iron ore, uranium, copper, silver, fluorspar, asbestos, 
limestone. Mineral concentrations greatest in Gauteng, 
Northern Province, Mpumalanga. One offshore oilfield, 
further exploration underway. 

Manufacturing: Steel, steel products, chemicals, electronics, 
automobiles, textiles, paper, food processing. Strong growth in 
export-oriented manufacturing, increasing capacity 
utilization, mid-1990s. Substantial foreign investment. Factors 
favoring investment: broad technological base, highly trained 



xxxviii 



managerial class, abundant labor supply, specialized financial 
institutions. Factors countering investment: abundance of 
unskilled, uneducated workers; crime, violence; labor 
militancy. Industrial interests protected by South African 
Chamber of Business (SACOB), Steel and Engineering 
Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA), Afrikaner 
Trade Institute (Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut — AHI), National 
African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC). 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Arable land roughly 11 
percent of total, mostly eastern provinces, far southwest. 
Principal crops: cereals and grains, especially corn; wool; sugar; 
peanuts; tobacco; fruits and vegetables; affected by early 1990s 
periods of drought. Flourishing wine industry. Livestock, dairy 
farming. Government marketing boards being phased out. 
Land claims disputes arising out of apartheid era being 
adjudicated, could affect 30 percent of farm land. Small timber 
industry meets most domestic demand. Large commercial 
fishing industry exports more than 60 percent of catch. 

Energy: Extensive coal reserves expected to last through most 
of twenty-first century; uranium plentiful. Limited 
hydroelectric potential, plans to import electric power from 
cooperative ventures in Lesotho, Mozambique. Imported 
petroleum, refined domestically. World leader in coal 
liquefaction to synthesize oil and gas; one nuclear power 
facility, plans for additional nuclear facilities after 2000. 

Labor: Work force estimated 14.5 million (1995). Employment 
in manufacturing (16.6 percent), agriculture (12.2 percent), 
commerce and trade (11 percent), domestic service (8.5 
percent), education (7.8 percent), mining (6.9 percent). 
Unemployment, 29-32 percent of formal work force. Job 
creation proceeding slowly. Looming shortage of skilled labor, 
oversupply of unskilled labor. Public-sector employment 
increasing, especially in provincial governments. At least 194 
recognized trade unions; roughly 25 percent of labor force. 
Wage disparities among racial groups persist, especially in 
manufacturing. 

Tourism: More than 4.6 million international arrivals (1995), 
including more than 3.4 million Africans; also British, 



xxxix 



Germans; growing Asian interest. Well-developed tourism 
industry; key attractions Kruger National Park, Western Cape, 
Blue Train (Pretoria-Cape Town) . 

Foreign Economic Relations: Major exports: gold, precious 
metals, precious stones, base metals, textiles, chemicals, paper 
products, agricultural products. Increasing coal exports. Major 
imports: machinery, vehicles, petroleum products, chemicals, 
scientific instruments, base metals, textiles. Early 1990s growth 
in imports slowed in mid-1990s; exports rose steadily, but 
declining value of rand reduced impact on trade balance. 
Value of exports US$27.9 billion, value of imports US$27.1 
billion (1995). Major trading partners: United States, Britain, 
Germany, Japan, Italy. Trade with United States: exports 
US$2.21 billion, imports US$2.75 billion (1995). Binational 
Commission with United States, binational chambers of 
commerce in other countries promote trade, investment. 
Southern African Customs Union with Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, and Swaziland. Trade with other African countries: 
exports US$2.5 billion, imports US$664 million (1994). Major 
South African investments in Africa: tourism, telecom- 
munications, railways, ports, breweries, mining. Pursuing 
stronger trade, investment ties to China, Japan, Singapore, 
India, Australia. 

Currency: Rand (R) = 100 cents. As of March 1, 1997, 
US$1=R4.66; conversely, R1=US21.4 cents, following uneven 
decline through 1996. 

Fiscal Year: April 1 through March 31. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Transportation System: Government corporation, Transnet 
Ltd., embarking on privatization. Transnet divisions: Spoornet 
(railroads), Portnet (ports), Autonet (roads), Petronet 
(pipelines), South African Airways (SAA), PX (parcel delivery 
service). 

Railroads: Well-developed rail network: 21,303 kilometers, 
almost all narrow-gauge (regional standard), 1.067-meter; 314 
kilometers, 0.610-meter gauge. 18,241 kilometers electrified; 



xl 



3,009 bridges; 625 stations. Reliance on steam power or steam- 
generated electricity; hauled 164 million tons of freight, 600 
million intercity passengers, 1994. Urban commuter lines 
managed by South African Rail Commuter Corporation 
(SARCC); more than 2 million urban commuters daily. 

Roads: Extensive national, provincial, and municipal road 
system: 5,943 kilometers freeways; 93,000 kilometers all- 
weather, paved roads; 130,000 kilometers unpaved, gravel or 
earth roads. More than 3.5 million passenger cars, 2.5 million 
commercial vehicles. Bus, private van service vital to urban 
commuters. World record accident fatality rates in urban areas. 

Ports: Six major ports: Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, 
Richards Bay, East London, Saldanha Bay; secondary ports: 
Mossel Bay, Simonstown. First-class facilities and services. At 
least 104 million tons of cargo shipped and more than 16 
million tons landed per year. 

Civil Aviation: South African Airways (SAA) national carrier 
(forty-eight aircraft), increasing competition from smaller 
airlines. Nine major airports: three international — 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban; plus Bloemfontein, 
East London, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, George, and 
Upington. Five runways more than 3,659 meters; ten runways 
2,440 meters to 3,659 meters. In addition, at least 140 
permanent surface runways and 250 landing strips, private and 
commercial use. 

Pipelines: 931 kilometers crude oil; 1,748 kilometers other 
petroleum products; 322 kilometers natural gas. 

Telecommunications: Advanced, modern system managed by 
Telkom SA Ltd., served racial minority until mid-1990s. 
Carrier-equipped, open-wire lines, coaxial cables, radio relay 
links, fiber optic cable, and radiocommunication stations. Key 
centers: Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, 
Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria. State-owned South African 
Broadcasting Corporation subject to independent review for 
political neutrality; increasing competition from independent 
stations. Radio service from fourteen amplitude modulation 
(AM) stations, 286 frequency modulation (FM) stations; near- 



xli 



universal access; estimated 7 million radios, not licensed. 
Government funds Channel Africa, 203 hours weekly 
broadcasts outside South Africa. At least 2.2 million televisions. 
Three main TV channels; English, Afrikaans, five African 
languages, Hindi, Tamil. M-Net (880,000 subscribers) 
broadcasts in above languages plus Hebrew, Greek, 
Portuguese. Three satellite earth stations. Telephones: more 
than 5.3 million (1996), priority on service to rural areas; 
cellular telephone service expanding rapidly. 

Government and Politics 

Political System: Federal state consisting of central government 
and nine provincial governments. Interim constitution: 
approved December 22, 1993, implemented April 27, 1994, 
intended to be in force until 1999, being replaced by final 
constitution in phases, 1997-99. Interim constitution provides 
for Government of National Unity: bicameral parliament 
includes 400-member National Assembly (popularly elected by 
party, list-system proportional representation based on 
universal suffrage at age eighteen), ninety-member Senate 
(indirectly elected by provincial legislators). President elected 
by parliament; deputy presidents named by parties winning 20 
percent of popular vote (minimum two). Executive branch 
under interim constitution: president, Nelson Mandela 
(African National Congress — ANC), two deputy presidents — 
Thabo Mbeki (ANC) and Frederik Willem de Klerk (National 
Party — NP). President appointed twenty-eight cabinet 
ministers from parties with 5 percent of popular vote. 
Executive, legislative officials normally serve five-year terms. 
Final constitution drafted by Constitutional Assembly (both 
houses of parliament), 1996; replaces Government of National 
Unity with majoritarian rule: Party winning majority of popular 
vote names executive officials; also replaces Senate with 
National Council of Provinces: six permanent members 
indirectly elected by each provincial legislature; each province 
fills additional four seats on national council by rotation from 
provincial legislature. NP abandoned Government of National 
Unity, June 1996, to become parliamentary opposition. Status 
of KwaZulu-Natal unresolved. Parliamentary Volkstaat Council 



xlii 



considering proposals for self-determination by proapartheid 
whites in separate volkstaat. 

Major political parties: ANC, NP, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 
Freedom Front (FF), Democratic Party (DP), Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC), African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP); 
several smaller parties. Next national elections scheduled 1999. 

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces, provisional 
boundaries subject to change by referendum. Provinces (and 
capitals): Eastern Cape (Bisho), Mpumalanga (Nelspruit), 
Gauteng (Johannesburg), KwaZulu-Natal (Ulundi or 
Pietermaritzburg), Northern Cape (Kimberley), Northern 
Province (Pietersburg), North-West Province (Mmabatho) , 
Free State (Bloemfontein), Western Cape (Cape Town). 

Provincial and local government: Nine provincial governments 
formed by list-system proportional representation. Provincial 
premier (executive) appoints Executive Council (cabinet) 
based on party strength; provincial assemblies, 30 to 100 
legislators based on party strength. November 1995 elections 
for 688 metropolitan, town, and rural councils, except in 
KwaZulu-Natal (violence), areas of Western Cape (boundary 
disputes). Low voter turnout; ANC 66.3 percent, NP 16.2 
percent, Freedom Front 5 percent. Western Cape elections, 
May 29, 1996; NP won control of all contested councils; ANC 
second. KwaZulu-Natal elections, June 26, 1996, IFP 44.5 
percent, ANC 33.2 percent (concentration in urban areas). 
Provincial authority still being defined; provincial 
constitutions, once approved by Constitutional Court, could 
give provincial governments most responsibility for agriculture, 
education (except universities), health and welfare, housing, 
police, environmental affairs, language use, media, 
transportation, sports and recreation, tourism, urban and rural 
development, and role of traditional leaders. Status of volkstaat 
not yet determined. 

Judicial System: Based on Roman-Dutch law, altered by British 
rule and post-independence constitutions. Interim 
constitution of 1993 empaneled eleven-judge Constitutional 
Court to rule on legislative constitutionality. Supreme Court: 
Appellate Division (Bloemfontein); six provincial division 



xliii 



headquarters: Cape Town, Grahamstown, Kimberley, 
Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria; local divisions. 
Lower courts: district magistrates hear cases concerning lesser 
offenses. Judges or magistrates decide guilt or innocence; jury 
system abolished 1969. Penalties include corporal punishment 
(whipping). Death penalty abolished in 1995. 

Foreign Affairs: Global diplomatic isolation ended in early 
1990s. Foreign policy goals: independence from foreign 
interference; desire to balance friendships with powerful 
donor nations against loyalty to former antiapartheid allies; 
desire for close political ties to Africa, close economic ties to 
Asian "tigers." 

International Memberships: Participation in United Nations 
restored, June 1994. Membership: British Commonwealth of 
Nations, International Labour Organisation, International 
Telecommunications Union, Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency, Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), Universal Postal Union, World Health 
Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property 
Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World 
Trade Organization. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Armed forces renamed South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF). Military reorganization in mid-1990s 
to integrate national armed services with former homeland 
and liberation forces. Active-duty forces (1996): 137,900. Army 
118,000, of whom 4,000 women; air force 8,400, of whom 800 
women; navy 5,500, of whom 350 women; medical service 
6,000, of whom 2,000 women. Commandos 76,000. Reserves: 
approximately 474,700, of which army 453,000, air force 
20,000, navy 1,700. Downsizing to reduce SANDF to 90,000 by 
1999. Civilian minister of defense; president commander in 
chief. Conscription ended, 1994; voluntary service of two to six 
years, followed by ten-year part-time service (maximum sixty 
days training per two-year period). Military budget (R10. 7 



xliv 



billion), less than 2 percent of GDP, 1997. 

Police: 147,000: 110,000 active, 37,000 reserves (1997). 
Reorganized in 1994 as South African Police Service under 
minister for safety and security. President appoints national 
police commissioner, nine provincial police commissioners. 
Emphasis on ending violence, reducing crime, improving 
community relations, racial tolerance, decentralization of 
leadership, demilitarization of ranks and symbols. Vigilantism 
increasing in response to continued violence. Senior ranks still 
predominantly white; some racial biases persist. Police budget 
(R13.1 billion), 2.1 percent of GDP, 1997. 

Prisons: 129,000 prisoners (1996), severe overcrowding, 
manpower shortages in prisons. More than 200 deaths in 
police custody (1995). Laws amended in 1995 to prohibit 
detention of children under eighteen in prisons. 

National Reconciliation: Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
investigating human rights violations 1960-93. Hearings since 
early 1996 considering victim compensation, amnesty for most 
political crimes, to be completed in 1997 or 1998. Several 
senior security officials indicted for murders committed under 
apartheid; others implicated in testimony before commission. 
Government-appointed Human Rights Commission to 
investigate, assist aggrieved individuals seeking redress against 
government officials and others. 



xlv 




22 Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



30 / 



BOTSWANA 



/ 



M0ZA8 



MBIQUE 

Pietersburg 

Gatorom ^northern province^ 
Mbabane } 



Mma^ath^ ohannesbu r^ .^pumalanga 



NORTH-WEST 



"^^GAUTENG 



\ PROVINCE 



/ FREE STATE 

Kimberley ® 

/ ® 
{ Bloemfontein 

NORTHERN CAPE \ 



-v SWAZILAND/"" 

/ Ulundi J. 

® r 

KWAZULU- 




WESTERN CAPE 

hiCape Town 



Indian Ocean 



100 200 Kilometers 



International boundary 

Province boundary 

® National capital 
® Province capital 
NOTE— National capitals: Pretoria, 
administrative; Cape Town, legislative; 
Bloemfontein, judicial. KwaZulu-Natal 
capital not decided (1996). 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of South Africa, 1996 



xlvi 



Introduction 



DURING FOUR DAYS IN APRIL 1994, more than 19 million 
South Africans, roughly 91 percent of registered voters, went to 
the polls, most for the first time, and elected South Africa's first 
democratic government. The establishment of a government 
led by the African National Congress (ANC), under the presi- 
dency of Nelson Mandela, signaled emphatically the demise of 
apartheid and the return of South Africa from the pariah status 
it had occupied for decades to a respected place in the world 
community. The change was as swift as it was dramatic. Only 
five years earlier, in 1989, barely one-eighth as many voters 
(roughly 69 percent of an electorate restricted by law to mem- 
bers of the white, mixed-race "coloured," and Asian communi- 
ties) had returned to power those who were committed to 
maintaining apartheid. The African majority was, until then, 
explicitly denied full citizenship rights on the basis of skin 
color. The ANC was an illegal organization, as it had been since 
April 1960. Nelson Mandela in 1989 was spending his 
twenty-sixth year in prison. The fact that South Africa went on 
to overturn the apartheid ideology and, in large part, apart- 
heid practices between 1989 and 1994 was a stunning develop- 
ment, unforeseen by political forecasters and paralleling the 
overthrow of communism in Eastern Europe. 

Yet the repudiation of apartheid did not mean the end of 
racial divisions. Although the electors voted in 1994 to end 
apartheid, they still cast their ballots largely along racial and 
ethnic lines. Most African voters supported the ANC, except in 
KwaZulu-Natal where Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi's 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) secured a majority of Zulu votes 
and won control of the newly established provincial govern- 
ment. Most whites — Afrikaners and English speakers alike — 
voted for F. W. de Klerk's newly an ti apartheid National Party 
(NP), avoiding both the ANC and the Democratic Party (which 
in a previous form, as the Progressive Federal Party, had led the 
parliamentary fight to end apartheid). Coloured voters, largely 
concentrated in the Western Cape province, were concerned 
that their interests might be ignored by an African majority 
government. Hence, they voted for the NP, thereby ensuring 
that it won control of the Western Cape provincial govern- 
ment. 



xlvii 



Nor did the repudiation of apartheid mean the end of the 
economic and social problems that have increasingly bedeviled 
South African society since the 1980s. Racially discriminatory 
policies enforced by successive governments throughout the 
twentieth century have left the African majority of the popula- 
tion in possession of only about 13 percent of the nation's land, 
and most of that of poor quality. Unable to achieve sustainable 
agricultural development, Africans continue, as they have for 
decades, to flock to cities. Urban migration, in turn, has cre- 
ated enormous squatter encampments, particularly in and 
around Gauteng. Most of these squatters, as well as nearly one- 
half of the adult African population nationwide, cannot find 
work within the formal sector of the economy. The results are 
widespread poverty, appalling living conditions, and an increas- 
ing incidence of crime. South Africa's per capita crime rate, 
overall, has exceeded that of almost any other country since 
1992. The government has acknowledged the seriousness of 
the problem but has not been able to end the wave of crimes 
against persons and property that is fueled by lingering pov- 
erty. 

Even for many South Africans who have jobs, economic con- 
ditions are difficult, as black wages remain low compared to 
those of white workers. Mandela's government said in 1995 that 
it could not afford to equalize pay scales across public-sector 
jobs in order to compensate for past discrimination. Given 
these circumstances, one of the most difficult tasks facing the 
new government is to balance the high expectations of its black 
supporters against economic realities. Initially, after the his- 
toric 1994 elections, President Mandela's personal charisma 
and the great respect in which he is held by most South Afri- 
cans — both black and white — helped to ensure political stabil- 
ity. But Mandela has said that he would not remain in office 
after 1999, and the question of succession, therefore, lingers 
over many 1990s political debates about the future. 

South Africa's contemporary problems have deep historical 
roots. Although human settlement in the subcontinent extends 
back thousands of years, racial conflict dates from the Dutch 
arrival at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, when the Dutch East 
India Company established a resupply station at Cape Town for 
its fleets traveling between Holland and its empire in South 
and Southeast Asia. During the first 150 years of European con- 
trol of the Cape, the company, a commercial operation, estab- 
lished some of the most enduring features of colonial society. 



xlviii 



The company was not interested in expanding European settle- 
ment across Africa, but only in acquiring goods (fresh water, 
foodstuffs, replacement masts) to resupply its ships. When local 
Khoisan peoples refused to provide these goods on terms set by 
the company, the Europeans took up arms and drove most of 
the local population into the interior. In place of local produc- 
ers, the company relied on a combination of European farmers 
(mostly former employees of the company) and imported Afri- 
can slave labor to work the land that had been seized from 
local residents. 

When the European farmers (known as Boers) attempted to 
escape the monopolistic trading practices and autocratic rule 
of the company by moving into the interior, the company pro- 
hibited further expansion, ended the emigration of Europeans 
to the Cape, and expanded the use of slave labor. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, society in the Cape was marked by 
antagonism between the local white community (mostly 
descended from the same small group of seventeenth-century 
Dutch, French, and German settlers) and a largely disinter- 
ested and exploitative metropolitan ruler. The racial divide was 
reflected in the pattern of land ownership and the authoritar- 
ian structure of labor relations, based largely on slavery. 

British acquisition of the Cape at the beginning of the nine- 
teenth century accentuated divisions between local settlers and 
metropolitan rulers and widened the racial divide between 
whites and blacks. The British conquered the Cape largely to 
prevent it from falling into the hands of Napoleon, and thus to 
protect their only sea route to their empire in South Asia. Like 
the Dutch East India Company, the British were not interested 
in expanding settlement but wanted to keep down the expense 
of maintaining their strategic resupply station at Cape Town. 
Initially, they continued to import African slaves to meet the 
labor needs of white farmers, and they did not interfere with 
the farmers' harsh treatment of black workers. But the British 
also tried to prevent further white expansion in South Africa — 
with its attendant costs of greater levels of colonial government 
and the risk of wars with Africans — by closing the borders of 
the Cape and importing British settlers to create a loyal buffer 
in the east between expansionist Boers and densely settled Afri- 
can communities. Moreover, the British, influenced by strong 
humanitarian groups at home, took steps to eliminate the 
racially discriminatory features of colonial society, first by 
reforming the judicial system and punishing white farmers who 



xlix 



assaulted black workers, and later by freeing all slaves through- 
out the British empire. 

Desperate for more land and fearful of losing all of their 
black labor, many Boer families in the 1830s marched into the 
interior of South Africa on the Great Trek, skirting the densest 
African populations. These Voortrekkers, or trekkers, hoped to 
establish their own communities, free of British rule. Prevented 
by the British from establishing a republic on the Indian Ocean 
coast, where the British colony of Natal helped protect the sea 
route to India, the Boers formed two republics in the interior, 
the South African Republic (the region known as the Trans- 
vaal) and the Orange Free State. Both republics' economies 
were based on near-subsistence farming and hunting, and both 
limited political rights to white males. Thus, white settlement 
expanded across the region, but almost entirely into areas with 
few local inhabitants. The majority of black Africans still lived 
in their own autonomous societies. 

The discovery of minerals in the late nineteenth century — 
diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 — dramatically altered the 
economic and political structure of southern Africa. The grow- 
ing mineral industry created ever-greater divisions between 
British and Boer, white and black, rich and poor. At the turn of 
the century, for the first time, South Africa had an extremely 
valuable resource that attracted foreign capital and large-scale 
immigration. Discoveries of gold and diamonds in South Africa 
exceeded those in any other part of the world, and more for- 
eign capital had been invested in South Africa than in the rest 
of Africa combined. In the Transvaal, the site of the gold dis- 
coveries, the white population expanded eightfold, while hun- 
dreds of thousands of Africans sought work each year in the 
newly developed mines and cities of industrializing areas. Yet 
not all shared equally in this newfound wealth. Diamond and, 
in particular, gold mining industries required vast amounts of 
inexpensive labor in order to be profitable. To constrain the 
ability of African workers to bargain up their wages, and to 
ensure that they put up with onerous employment conditions, 
the British in the 1870s and 1880s conquered the 
still-independent African states in southern Africa, confiscated 
the bulk of the land and imposed cash taxation demands. In 
this way, they ensured that men who had chosen previously to 
work in the mines on their own terms were now forced to do so 
on employers' terms. In the new industrial cities, African work- 
ers were subjected to a bewildering array of discriminatory laws 



1 



and practices, all enforced in order to keep workers cheap and 
pliable. In the much diminished rural areas, the wives and chil- 
dren of these migrant laborers had to survive in large part on 
the limited remittances sent back by their absent menfolk. In 
short, many of the discriminatory features so typical of twenti- 
eth-century South Africa — pass laws, urban ghettos, impover- 
ished rural homelands, African migrant labor — were first 
established in the course of South Africa's industrial revolu- 
tion. 

But the discovery of minerals also exacerbated tensions 
between the British and the Boers. Gold had been discovered 
in the Transvaal, and that was beyond the reach of British rule. 
Yet the capital invested in the mines, and thus the ownership of 
the gold industry, was primarily British controlled. Lacking 
investment capital, the Boers found themselves excluded from 
ownership and thus from the profits generated in their midst. 
Indeed, most profits from the mines were reinvested in Europe 
and the Americas and did not contribute to the growth of addi- 
tional industries in South Africa. The Boers sought to gain 
access to some of this wealth through taxation policies; these 
policies, however, incurred the wrath of the mine magnates 
and their supporters in England. The South African War, 
fought by the Boers and the British between 1899 and 1902, 
was primarily a struggle for the control of gold. Although the 
Boers lost the war, in large part they won the peace. The British 
realized that in order for the diamond and gold industries to 
be operated profitably, they had to have a local administration 
sympathetic to the financial and labor needs of mining. They 
also realized — given demographic trends at the time — that 
Boers would always constitute a majority of the white popula- 
tion. With these factors in mind, the British abandoned their 
wartime anti-Boer and pro-African rhetoric and negotiated a 
long-term political settlement that put the local white commu- 
nity in charge of a self-governing united South Africa. 

The Union of South Africa, established on May 31, 1910, as a 
self-governing state within the British Empire, legislatively 
restricted political and property rights to whites at the expense 
of blacks. With the exception of a very small number of voters 
in the Cape Province and Natal, Africans were kept off elec- 
toral rolls throughout most of the country. By the terms of the 
Mines and Works Act (1911), only whites were permitted to 
hold skilled jobs in the mining industry. The Natives Land Act 
(1913) prohibited Africans from owning land in any part of 



South Africa outside a small area (7.5 percent, expanded to 13 
percent in the 1930s) set aside for their use. These laws 
ensured that Africans would have to seek jobs from white 
employers, that their jobs would be the lowest paid available, 
and that without the right to vote they could do little to change 
the laws that excluded them from the political process and rel- 
egated them to the bottom of the economy. 

Two nationalist movements emerged in the aftermath of the 
formation of the union, one racially and ethnically exclusivist, 
the other much more disparate in its membership and aims. 
The Afrikaner nationalist movement, built around the 
National Party, appealed to Afrikaners (as they increasingly 
referred to themselves after the South African War), who were 
still bitter about their suffering in the war and frustrated by the 
poverty in which most of them lived. The black nationalist 
movement, led primarily by the African National Congress 
(formed in 1912), addressed the myriad injustices against black 
South Africans. 

Although Afrikaner generals helped unite South Africa's 
first government, most Dutch speakers did not share in the 
fruits of victory. Much of their land had been confiscated by 
the British during the war and was not returned after it ended. 
The main source of employment, the mines, was owned by 
English speakers. Rural Afrikaners moving to the cities had nei- 
ther capital nor marketable skills, and thus they found them- 
selves competing with Africans for low-paid unskilled work. As 
a result, they often supported racially discriminatory legisla- 
tion, such as the Mines and Works Act, that gave them privi- 
leged access to jobs solely on the basis of their color. But 
because Afrikaners wanted a greater share of the economy 
than they could earn as employees of English speakers, they 
pooled their funds and resources to establish banks, insurance 
companies, and other businesses in order to wrest a portion of 
the economy out of the control of English businessmen. A few 
Afrikaner leaders then led in the denunciation of the business 
community in increasingly extreme, anticapitalist, and 
anti-Semitic terms. 

Afrikaner nationalists spoke of themselves as a chosen peo- 
ple, ordained by God to rule South Africa. They established 
their own cultural organizations and secret societies, and they 
argued that South Africa should be ruled in the interests of 
Afrikaners, rather than English businessmen or African work- 
ers. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the Afrikaner 



In 



nationalist movement grew in popularity, fueled by fears of 
black competition for jobs, by antipathy toward the 
English-speaking mine magnates, by the memory of past suffer- 
ing, and by the impact of World War II (especially massive 
black urbanization). In 1948, with the support of a majority of 
Afrikaners (who constituted about 60 percent of the white elec- 
torate), the NP won the election on its apartheid platform. 
Henceforth, South Africa was to be governed by a party that 
hoped to shape government policies to work in favor of whites, 
in general, and Afrikaners, in particular. Moreover, the NP 
denied that Africans, Asians, or coloureds could ever be citi- 
zens or full participants in the political process. 

The black nationalist movement had no such success. For 
most blacks, lack of access to the vote meant that they could 
not organize an effective political party. Instead they had to 
rely on appeals, deputations, and petitions to the British gov- 
ernment asking for equal treatment before the law. The British 
responded by pointing out that South Africa was now 
self-governing and that the petitioners had to make their case 
to the local white rulers. Although Africans, Asians, and 
coloureds shared common grievances, they were not united in 
their organizations or their aims. Physically separated and 
legally differentiated in practically every aspect of their lives, 
they formed separate organizations to represent their interests. 
Moreover, their leaders, with few exceptions, adopted accom- 
modationist rather than confrontational tactics in dealing with 
the state. Failing to gain any real concessions from increasingly 
hard-line governments, none of the black political movements 
succeeded in building a solid mass following. Even the ANC 
had a membership of only a few thousand (out of an African 
population of about 8 million) in 1948. 

With the introduction of apartheid, the NP extended and 
systematized many of the features of entrenched racial discrim- 
ination into a state policy of white supremacy. Every person res- 
ident in South Africa was legally assigned, largely on the basis 
of appearance, to one racial group — white, African, coloured, 
or Asian. South Africa was proclaimed to be a white man's 
country in which members of other racial groups would never 
receive full political rights. Africans were told that eventually 
they would achieve political independence in perhaps nine or 
ten homelands, carved out of the minuscule rural areas already 
allocated to them, areas that even a government commission in 



liii 



the 1950s had deemed totally inadequate to support the black 
population. 

Coloureds and Asians, too, were to be excluded from South 
African politics. By law, all races were to have separate living 
areas and separate amenities; there was to be no mixing. Edu- 
cation was to be provided according to the roles that people 
were expected to play in society. In that regard, Hendrik F. Ver- 
woerd, the leading ideologue of apartheid and prime minister 
of South Africa from 1958 until his assassination in 1966, stated 
that Africans would be "making a big mistake" if they thought 
that they would live "an adult life under a policy of equal 
rights." According to Verwoerd, there was no place for Africans 
"in the European community" (by which he meant South 
Africa) above the level of certain forms of labor. 

Expecting considerable opposition to policies that would 
forever exclude the black majority from any role in national 
politics and from any job other than that of unskilled — and 
low-paid — laborer, the NP government greatly enlarged police 
powers. People campaigning to repeal or to modify any law 
would be presumed guilty of one of several crimes until they 
could prove their innocence. The government could "list," or 
ban, individuals, preventing them from attending public meet- 
ings, prohibiting them from belonging to certain organiza- 
tions, and subjecting them to lengthy periods of house arrest. 

The most draconian piece of security legislation, the Sup- 
pression of Communism Act (1950), adopted an extraordinar- 
ily broad and vague definition of communism — i.e., the aim to 
"bring about any political, industrial, social, or economic 
change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or 
disorder." Also included under the act was anyone who encour- 
aged "feelings of hostility between the European and the 
non-European races of the Union." This legislation enabled 
the police to label almost any opponent of apartheid as a sup- 
porter of the outlawed Communist Party of South Africa (reac- 
tivated in 1953 as the South African Communist Party — SACP). 

Blacks rose up in protest against apartheid in the 1950s. Led 
by Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, the ANC sought to 
broaden its base of support and to impede the implementation 
of apartheid by calling for mass noncompliance with the new 
laws. Working together with white, coloured, and Indian oppo- 
nents of apartheid, the ANC encouraged people to burn their 
passes (identity documents, then required of all African males 
and soon to be required of all African females in South Africa). 



liv 



The ANC also urged people to refuse to use the separate amen- 
ities (such as public toilets, park benches, and entrances to 
post offices) set aside for them, to use those intended for 
whites instead, and to boycott discriminatory employers and 
institutions. Such tactics, all of them purposely nonviolent, 
although not successful in changing NP policies, did attract 
large-scale support and won new members for the ANC. 

In 1955 representatives of the ANC, as well as white, 
coloured, and Indian organizations opposed to apartheid, 
drafted a Freedom Charter as a basic statement of political 
principles. According to the charter, South Africa belonged to 
all who lived within its boundaries, regardless of race. The char- 
ter stated that no particular group of people should have spe- 
cial privileges, but that all should be treated equally before the 
law It also stated that all who lived in South Africa should share 
in the country's wealth, an ambiguous statement sometimes 
interpreted by supporters of the ANC, and more frequently by 
its opponents, to mean a call for nationalization of 
private-sector enterprises. 

The NP government dealt harshly with all those who 
opposed its policies. Tens of thousands were arrested for partic- 
ipating in public demonstrations and boycotts, hundreds of 
thousands were arrested each year for pass-law offenses, and 
many of the delegates who drew up the Freedom Charter were 
arrested and tried for treason in a trial that lasted nearly five 
years. Repression became harsher as opposition grew. In 1960 
police at Sharpeville, a black township south of Johannesburg, 
fired into a crowd of Africans peacefully protesting against the 
pass laws, and killed sixty-seven. In the aftermath of the shoot- 
ing, which attracted worldwide condemnation, the government 
banned the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and 
other organizations opposed to apartheid; withdrew from the 
British Commonwealth of Nations; and, after a referendum 
among white voters only, declared South Africa a republic. 

During the 1960s, the implementation of apartheid and the 
repression of internal opposition continued despite growing 
world criticism of South Africa's racially discriminatory policies 
and police violence. Thousands of Africans, coloureds, and 
Asians (ultimately numbering about 3.5 million by the 1980s) 
were removed from white areas into the land set aside for other 
racial groups. Some of these areas, called black homelands, 
were readied for independence, even though they lacked the 
physical cohesiveness — Bophuthatswana, for example, con- 



lv 



sisted of some nineteen non-contiguous pieces of land — to 
make political or economic independence a viable or believ- 
able concept. None of the four homelands declared indepen- 
dent received any form of world recognition. The ANC and the 
PAC, banned from operating within South Africa, turned to 
violence in their struggle against apartheid — the former organ- 
ization adopting a policy of bombing strategic targets such as 
police stations and power plants, the latter engaging in a pro- 
gram of terror against African chiefs and headmen, who were 
seen as collaborators with the government. 

Verwoerd's government crushed this internal opposition. 
Leaders of the ANC and PAC within South Africa were tracked 
down, arrested, and charged with treason. Nelson Mandela was 
sentenced in 1964 to imprisonment for life. Oliver Tambo had 
already fled the country and led the ANC in exile. Despite 
growing international criticism, the government's success in 
capturing its enemies fueled an economic boom. Attracted by 
the apparent political stability of the country, and by rates of 
return on capital running as high as 15 to 20 percent annually, 
foreign investment in South Africa more than doubled 
between 1963 and 1972. Soaring immigration increased the 
white population by as much as 50 percent during the same 
period. Apartheid and economic growth seemed to work in 
tandem. 

Yet a number of contradictory developments during the 
1970s displayed the shaky foundations of the apartheid edifice. 
In 1973 wildcat strikes broke out on the Durban waterfront and 
then spread around the country. Because Africans were prohib- 
ited from establishing or belonging to trade unions, they had 
no organizational leaders to represent their concerns. Fearful 
of police repression, strikers chose not to identify publicly any 
of their leaders. Thus employers who considered negotiations 
had no worker representatives with whom to negotiate and 
none to hold responsible for upholding labor agreements. Sev- 
eral hundred thousand work hours were lost in labor actions in 
1973. That same year, in a sign of growing world opposition to 
state-enforced racial discrimination, the United Nations (UN) 
declared apartheid "a crime against humanity," a motion that 
took on real meaning four years later, in 1977, when the UN 
adopted a mandatory embargo on arms sales to South Africa. 

In 1974 a revolutionary movement overthrew the Portu- 
guese dictatorship in Lisbon, and the former colonial territo- 
ries of Angola and Mozambique demanded independence 



lvi 



from Portugal. Their liberation movements-turned-Marxist 
governments were committed to the eradication of colonialism 
and racial discrimination throughout southern Africa. Follow- 
ing the 1980 independence of Zimbabwe, a nation now led by a 
socialist government opposed to apartheid, South Africa found 
itself surrounded by countries hostile to its policies and ready 
to give refuge to the exiled forces of the ANC and the PAC. 
Internal and external opposition to apartheid was fueled in 
1976, when the Soweto uprising began with the protests of 
high-school students against the enforced use of Afrikaans — 
viewed by many Africans as the oppressor's language. The pro- 
tests led to weeks of demonstrations, marches, and boycotts 
throughout South Africa. Violent clashes with police left more 
than 500 people dead, several thousand arrested, and thou- 
sands more seeking refuge outside South Africa, many with the 
exiled forces of the ANC and the PAC. 

Fearful of growing instability in South Africa, many foreign 
investors began to withdraw their money or to move it into 
short-term rather than long-term investments; as a result, the 
economy became increasingly sluggish. In order to cope with 
labor unrest and to boost investor confidence, the government 
decided in 1979 to allow black workers to establish unions as a 
necessary step toward industrial peace. This decision was a cru- 
cial step in the growing perception that apartheid would have 
to end. It undercut a basic ideological premise of apartheid, 
that blacks were not really full citizens of South Africa and, 
therefore, were not entitled to any official representation. It 
also implied an acceptance by employers, many of whom had 
called for the change in policy, that in order for labor relations 
to operate effectively, disgruntled workers would have to be 
negotiated with, rather than subjected to arbitrary dismissal 
and police arrest, as in the past. 

Pretending otherwise had already become increasingly diffi- 
cult. A national census in 1980 showed that whites were declin- 
ing as a proportion of South Africa's population. From more 
than 20 percent of the population at the beginning of the cen- 
tury, whites accounted for only about 16 percent of the popula- 
tion in 1980 and were likely to constitute less than 10 percent 
by the end of the century. By the end of the 1980s, almost one- 
half of black South Africans — according to apartheid theory, a 
rural people — would be living in cities and towns, accounting 
for nearly 60 percent of South Africa's urban dwellers. Demo- 



lvii 



graphic facts, alone, made it increasingly difficult to argue that 
South Africa was a white man's country. 

In the early 1980s, NP reformers tinkered with the basic 
structure of apartheid. Concerned about demographic trends, 
Prime Minister P. W. Botha led his government in implement- 
ing a new constitutional arrangement, one that embraced the 
concept of multiracial government but, at the same time, per- 
petuated the concept of racial separation. The new constitu- 
tion established three racially segregated houses of parliament, 
for whites, Asians, and coloureds, but excluded blacks from full 
citizenship. Botha and his allies hoped that such a change 
would bolster NP support among coloureds and Asians, and 
thereby give the party enough numerical strength to counter 
growing dissent. 

The constitution implemented in 1984 only inflamed fur- 
ther opposition to apartheid. It was denounced inside and out- 
side South Africa as anachronistic and reactionary. Opponents 
argued that by further institutionalizing the exclusion of the 
majority black population, the new constitution only extended 
apartheid and did not undercut it in any significant way. Within 
South Africa, protests against apartheid far exceeded earlier 
levels of opposition. In many black townships, police stations 
and other government buildings were destroyed, along with 
the homes of black policemen and town councilors, who were 
denounced as collaborators with the apartheid regime. 

Newly legalized black trade unions took a leading role in the 
opposition, particularly by organizing strikes that combined 
economic and political complaints. The number of work days 
lost to strikes soared to more than 5.8 million in 1987. Armed 
members of the ANC and PAC infiltrated South Africa's bor- 
ders from their bases in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe 
and carried out a campaign of urban terror. With South Africa 
on the verge of civil war, the government imposed a series of 
states of emergency, used the police and the army against 
opponents of apartheid, and dispatched military forces on 
armed raids into neighboring countries. 

Although the government's repressive actions strengthened 
state control in the short term, they backfired in the long run. 
Police repression and brutality in South Africa, and military 
adventures elsewhere in southern Africa, only heightened 
South Africa's pariah status in world politics. As events in the 
country grabbed world headlines and politicians across the 
globe denounced apartheid, the costs for South Africa of such 



lviii 



widespread condemnation were difficult to bear. Foreign inves- 
tors withdrew; international banks called in their loans; the 
value of South African currency collapsed; the price of gold fell 
to less than one-half of the high of the 1970s; economic output 
declined; and inflation became chronic. 

In the face of such developments, it was clear to most South 
African businessmen, and to a majority of NP party leaders, 
that apartheid itself had to undergo substantial reform if eco- 
nomic prosperity and political stability were to be regained. In 
1989 a stroke precipitated Botha's resignation, and he was suc- 
ceeded by F. W. de Klerk, formerly a hard-line supporter of 
apartheid but by the end of the 1980s the candidate of those 
who regarded themselves as moderates within the National 
Party. 

De Klerk moved faster and farther to reform apartheid than 
any Afrikaner politician had done before him, although in 
many instances it seemed that events rather than individuals 
were forcing the pace and scale of change. De Klerk released 
Nelson Mandela from twenty-seven years of imprisonment in 
February 1990, and rescinded the banning orders on the ANC, 
the PAC, the SACP, and other previously illegal organizations. 
Reacting to demands from within and outside South Africa, de 
Klerk in 1990 and 1991 repealed the legislative underpinnings 
of apartheid: gone were the Reservation of Separate Amenities 
Act, which had enforced petty apartheid; the Natives Land Act, 
which had made it illegal for Africans to own land in urban 
areas; the Group Areas Act, which had segregated people by 
race; and the Population Registration Act, which had assigned 
every resident of South Africa to a specific racial group. The 
pace of change was so rapid that many within the Afrikaner 
community questioned the wisdom of de Klerk's moves, and he 
came under increasing attack from right-wing proponents of a 
return to apartheid. For most critics of apartheid, however, the 
pace of change was not fast enough. They wanted to see apart- 
heid not reformed, but overthrown entirely. Indeed, once it 
had been accepted that black Africans were, in fact, South Afri- 
cans, the real question for de Klerk and his allies was whether 
they could be incorporated into the country in any fashion 
short of giving them equal rights. The answer was no. 

With this realization, from the end of 1991 onward, govern- 
ment negotiators met regularly with representatives from other 
political organizations to discuss ways in which some form of 
democracy could be introduced and the remaining structures 



lix 



of apartheid dismantled. Those involved called their forum the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). The 
negotiations were neither clear-cut nor easy, in part because 
each participating group brought a different past and different 
demands to the bargaining table. An official commission of 
inquiry in 1990, for example, found evidence that de Klerk's 
government had turned a blind eye to clandestine death 
squads within the security forces that were responsible for the 
deaths of many opponents of apartheid. Moreover, elements 
within the government were found to have surreptitiously 
funded Zulu leader Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
and to have supplied weapons that were used to attack ANC 
members in KwaZulu and in a number of mining compounds. 

The ANC's armed struggle against apartheid also lingered in 
popular memory during the negotiations. ANC leader Man- 
dela raised fears among white businessmen with talk about the 
need for the nationalization of industries and for the redistri- 
bution of wealth to the victims of apartheid. Yet there was more 
common ground than difference in Codesa. De Klerk and 
Mandela and their respective supporters were united in the 
belief that continued violence would destroy all hope of eco- 
nomic recovery. Such a recovery was vital for the attainment of 
peace and prosperity. They were also united in their belief that 
there was no alternative to a negotiated settlement. 

Codesa's negotiations were assisted by the decline of left- 
and right-wing alternatives to parliamentary democracy. The 
fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the failures of social- 
ism in Africa essentially eliminated the likelihood of a socialist 
state in South Africa. Although radical redistribution of prop- 
erty had much support among black youth, there were few 
leaders in the antiapartheid forces who spoke for that point of 
view. Joe Slovo, the leader of the SACP, argued for compromise 
with the government rather than for the immediate introduc- 
tion of a workers' state. Chris Hani, the charismatic general sec- 
retary of the SACP and the head of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear 
of the Nation) — the ANC's armed wing — was assassinated in 
April 1993. Winnie Mandela, long a proponent of more radical 
solutions to the problems of poverty and discrimination in 
South Africa, saw her influence decline as her marriage to 
Mandela fell apart. Nor did the PAC, long an adherent of the 
view that South Africa was a black man's country in which 
whites were merely guests, win much support for its continued 



Ix 



support of armed struggle and its slogan, "One settler, one bul- 
let" 

The white right wing was weakened by a series of inept 
maneuvers that discredited the movement in the eyes of its 
most likely supporters in the police and in the defense forces. 
Two members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afri- 
kaner Resistance Movement — AWB) were quickly arrested and 
convicted of the murder of Chris Hani. Television cameras cap- 
tured scenes of AWB leader Eugene Terreblanche leading an 
unruly band of armed followers in an attack on the building 
that housed the Codesa negotiations. The scenes broadcast 
were of crowd violence and anarchy, bringing to mind images 
of pre-World War II fascism. The final straw, and the one that 
caused leaders within the security establishment to disavow any 
links with white extremists, was the botched attempt by AWB 
members to reinstate Lucas Mangope as leader of the 
Bophuthatswana homeland in early 1993. Again television cam- 
eras were the right wing's undoing, as they broadcast worldwide 
the execution of several AWB mercenaries, lying beside their 
Mercedes Benz sedan, by professionally trained black soldiers. 
For South Africans, the telling image was not of blacks killing 
whites (although that was significant), but of the ineptness of 
the right. 

The members of Codesa sped up the pace of negotiations 
and of plans to implement the interim constitution. South 
Africa was to have a federal system of regional legislatures, 
equal voting rights regardless of race, and a bicameral legisla- 
ture headed by an executive president. The negotiators also 
agreed that the government elected in 1994 would serve for 
five years, and that a constitutional convention, sitting from 
1994 onward and seeking input from all South Africans, would 
be responsible for drawing up a final constitution to be imple- 
mented in 1999. 

The election in April 1994 was viewed by most participants as 
a remarkable success. Although several parties, especially the 
IFP, had threatened to boycott the election, in the end no sig- 
nificant groups refused to participate. The polling was 
extended to four days to allow for logistical and bureaucratic 
problems. In the end, it was carried out peacefully, for the most 
part, and there were few complaints of interference with any- 
one's right to vote. No political party got everything that it 
wanted. The ANC won nearly 62.6 percent of the vote, but it 
did not get the two-third's majority needed to change unilater- 



lxi 



ally the interim constitution, and it therefore had to work with 
other parties to shape the permanent constitution. The NP, as 
expected, no longer led the government, but it did succeed in 
winning the second largest share of votes, with 20.4 percent. 
The IFP did not do well nationally, but with a much stronger 
base of support in KwaZulu-Natal than most commentators 
expected, it came in third, with 10.5 percent, and won for 
Buthelezi control of the provincial government. The Freedom 
Front, a right-of-center, almost exclusively white party led by 
former members of the security establishment, got 2.2 percent 
of the votes; the PAC, appealing solely for the support of 
blacks, won 1.2 percent. On May 9, 1994, Nelson Mandela was 
unanimously elected president by the National Assembly, with 
Thabo Mbeki, deputy leader of the ANC and Mandela's likely 
successor, and F.W. de Klerk named deputy presidents. South 
Africa had made a peaceful political transition from an apart- 
heid police state to a democratic republic. 

As the new government is established in the mid-1990s, 
South Africa's leaders face the daunting challenges of meeting 
the expectations of black voters while fulfilling the economic 
potential of the country. Half a century of apartheid and a 
much longer period of legally enforced racial discrimination 
have left most black South Africans poor and undereducated. 
The reliance on a low-wage work force, especially in the coun- 
try's mines but also in other areas of the economy, left South 
Africa without a significant consumer class among its black 
majority. Instead, nearly one-half of the population in the mid- 
1990s lives below internationally determined minimum-subsis- 
tence levels. Nearly fifty years of Verwoerdian "Bantu educa- 
tion" left the country short of skills and unable to generate the 
sort of labor force that could produce an "Asian miracle" along 
the lines of the skilled-labor-dependent industries of South 
Korea or Taiwan. 

Demands for immediate economic improvements intensi- 
fied in 1995 and 1996. Labor unions pressed demands on 
behalf of organized workers, many of whom feared that their 
interests would be ignored, lost amid the government's con- 
cerns for alleviating severe poverty and for bolstering investor 
confidence in a stable workforce. Many labor unions were also 
weakened, at least temporarily, by the loss of key leaders who 
were elected or appointed to government office. 

After these chapters were completed in May 1996, the Con- 
stitutional Court approved the new ("final") constitution, 



lxii 



intended to govern after the five-year transition. President 
Mandela signed the new constitution into law on December 10, 
1996, and the government began phasing in provisions of the 
new document in February 1997. The final constitution con- 
tains a Bill of Rights, modeled on the chapter on fundamental 
rights in the interim constitution. It also ends the powersharing 
requirements that were the basis for the Government of 
National Unity under the interim constitution. NP deputy pres- 
ident de Klerk left office in June 1996, after legislators voted to 
forward the new constitution to the Constitutional Court, and 
the NP vacated its offices in the national and provincial execu- 
tive branches, which had been based on the interim constitu- 
tion's powersharing provisions. The NP in 1997 is attempting 
to establish a new political identity as an active participant in 
the national political debate; it will challenge ANC initiatives it 
opposes and compete with the ANC for political support 
among all racial groups. 

South Africa conducted its first postapartheid census in 
October 1996. The process of enumeration proved even more 
difficult than expected, in part because provincial govern- 
ments are still establishing their functions and authority, and 
administrative boundaries are still in dispute in a few areas. 
The final results — likely to reveal a population of more than 45 
million — are not yet available as of April 1997. 

The government has made substantial progress in expand- 
ing social services, health care, and education, but the backlog 
in demand for these services has been impossible to meet. 
These inadequacies continue to erode confidence in the new 
government, despite impressive progress in areas such as the 
provision of potable water and electricity, and the expansion of 
educational opportunities in previously underserved areas. 
The demand for housing is proving particularly difficult to 
meet; foreign construction firms are participating in the effort, 
and the pace of new home construction is expected to increase 
steadily during 1997 and 1998. 

South Africa's culturally diverse society has not yet negoti- 
ated acceptable compromises for dealing with controversial 
aspects of individual behavior, such as women's rights to abor- 
tion or contraceptive use and behavior related to the spread of 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). ANC legisla- 
tors successfully voted to liberalize public policy in many areas, 
most notably concerning abortion, despite strong opposition 
from some Christian and Muslim groups. The campaign 



lxiii 



against AIDS continues to be mired in political debate, funding 
controversies, and personal acrimony, as of 1997. 

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has heard more 
than 2,000 testimonials and received nearly 4,000 applications 
for amnesty for acts committed during the apartheid era. Grisly 
stories have emerged from the commission's hearings; a few 
lingering questions about apartheid-era deaths and disappear- 
ances have been answered, but others have arisen in response 
to allegations of official collusion in unrestrained violence. 
Commission chair Archbishop Desmond Tutu expressed confi- 
dence in early 1997 that the commission's long-term impact 
will be to further reconciliation among racial groups. Others, 
including survivors of victims, however, have expressed grow- 
ing anger and stepped up demands for vengeance. Outside of 
the commission's purview, the courts have convicted a few 
former security officers and former freedom fighters for crimes 
committed before May 1994, although some of those found 
guilty in the courts may also apply for amnesty before the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. 

Violence, both political and criminal, continues to plague 
the country. The newly organized South African Police Service 
has not yet eliminated the corruption and racial biases that 
characterized some segments of the police force during the 
apartheid era. Vigilante groups are emerging in response to 
popular demands for stricter law enforcement. The best-known 
of these, a Muslim-based coalition — People against Gangster- 
ism and Drugs (PAGAD) — has attacked, and even killed, 
accused drug-dealers and others deemed to be outlaws, espe- 
cially in Cape Town and surrounding areas of the Western 
Cape. Vigilantism is also increasing in crime-ridden areas 
around Johannesburg, and elsewhere. 

The continuing violence and political uncertainty contrib- 
uted to a steady decline in the value of the rand (for value of 
the rand — see Glossary) in late 1996 and early 1997. Levels of 
foreign investment have lagged behind that needed for eco- 
nomic growth, and the government is offering incentives to 
increase foreign participation in South Africa's business and 
manufacturing sectors. The Ministry of Finance outlined new 
economic strategies aimed at liberalizing foreign-exchange 
controls and imposing stricter fiscal discipline, in a framework 
document entitled Growth, Employment and Redistribution. The 
1996 document describes investment incentives and steps 
toward restructuring the tax base to help stimulate new growth 



lxiv 



without substantially increasing public spending. It also out- 
lines further steps toward the lifting of import tariffs and 
exchange controls to expand foreign trade. 

As of April 1997, the most likely successor to President Man- 
dela appears to be deputy president Thabo Mbeki; Mandela 
signaled his approval of this choice several times in the past 
year. A respected ANC diplomat and trained economist, Mbeki 
is expected to press for fiscal responsibility. Private-sector devel- 
opment, already a high priority, is likely to receive even greater 
emphasis in the early twenty-first century. At the same time, any 
new government will face the challenge of narrowing the gap 
between rich and poor, which will be crucial to furthering the 
goals of peace and reconciliation. Any new government also 
will face obstacles created by political extremists and economic 
opportunists hoping to reap their own gains in the new, post- 
apartheid South Africa. 

April 2, 1997 William H. Worger and Rita M. Byrnes 



lxv 



Chapter t. Historical Setting 




Sheer cliffs overlooking the Valley of Desolation near Graaff-Reinet 



HISTORY HAS A COMPELLING IMPORTANCE in South 
Africa. Political protagonists often refer to historical events and 
individuals in expounding their different points of view. The 
African National Congress (ANC), for example, has as one of 
its symbols the shield of Bambatha, a Zulu chief who died lead- 
ing the last armed uprising of Africans against the British in 
1906. Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, leader of the former 
KwaZulu homeland (see Glossary) and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP), often refers to Shaka Zulu, the first great monarch 
to arise in South Africa, who created a vast military state in the 
1820s. Afrikaners (see Glossary) have frequently called them- 
selves a "chosen people," ordained by God to rule in South 
Africa. They have argued that their ancestors settled the sub- 
continent before any African, but that for the past 200 years 
they have had to fight against the treachery of Africans and the 
oppression of British imperialists. The study of the history of 
South Africa, therefore, is a highly contentious arena marked 
by wide variations of interpretation and infused with politics. 

South Africa did not exist as a unified self-governing state 
until 1910. Indeed, before the discovery of minerals — dia- 
monds and gold — in the late nineteenth century, the emer- 
gence of such a country appeared unlikely because the early 
history of the subcontinent was marked by economic and polit- 
ical fragmentation. Black African settlement of southern 
Africa, which archaeologists have dated back to thousands of 
years before the arrival of whites, produced a great number of 
African societies that ruled much of what we now know as 
South Africa until the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
White settlement, beginning in the seventeenth century, was 
confined primarily to a small area of the southwestern coast 
throughout the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. 
Slaves imported from outside southern Africa were the colo- 
nists' laborers. White settlers expanded into the interior and 
along the southeastern coast in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, but they usually skirted areas heavily populated by 
Africans. Moreover, the white settlers in the interior — Afrikan- 
ers, as they became known at the end of the nineteenth cen- 
tury — engaged in the same cattle-farming and hunting 
activities as their African neighbors. Although African and Afri- 



3 



South Africa: A Country Study 



kaner often competed — for pastureland and game — a balance 
of power prevented one from conquering the other. 

Mineral discoveries in the 1860s and 1880s revolutionized 
the economic and political settings. Diamonds and gold fueled 
economic growth in southern Africa, creating both new market 
opportunities and a great demand for labor. To meet these 
labor needs, the British conquered most of the African peoples 
of the region in a rapid series of campaigns in the 1870s and 
1880s and subjected the defeated people to controls that per- 
sisted practically to the present day: pass laws regulating the 
movement of people within urban areas and between urban 
and rural areas; discriminatory legal treatment of blacks com- 
pared with whites; and the establishment of "locations," for 
rural Africans, that were much smaller than the original land- 
holdings of autonomous African societies in the nineteenth 
century. When the Union of South Africa was instituted in 
1910, its constitutional provisions reflected a society in which 
whites had achieved a monopoly on wealth and power. 

The rise of an industrial economy also brought about con- 
flict between English-speaking whites — primarily mine owners 
and industrialists, and Dutch-speaking whites — mostly farmers 
and impoverished urban workers, who competed for control 
over African land and labor and for access to the great mineral 
wealth of the country. Between 1910 and 1948, Afrikaner politi- 
cians organized and developed a powerful ethnic identity, por- 
traying Africans as savage and threatening and building 
especially upon white fears of economic competition from 
cheaper black workers manipulated by unscrupulous English- 
speaking businessmen. In 1948 the Afrikaner nationalists won 
control of the government and implemented apartheid (apart- 
ness — see Glossary), a policy that reinforced existing segrega- 
tionist practices securing white supremacy but that also aimed 
at ensuring Afrikaner domination of political power. 

After 1948, black Africans, "coloureds" (mixed-race — see 
Glossary), and Asians fought against Afrikaner domination and 
white supremacy, denying the apartheid dictum that South 
Africa is a white man's country in which other races should find 
economic and political autonomy within their own geographi- 
cally separated communities. Peaceful and violent protests 
alternated with periods of official repression, but during forty- 
five years of apartheid, the boundaries the Afrikaners had con- 
structed to ensure their own survival proved intolerable for 
them as well as for other racial groups. Apartheid bred a cli- 



4 



Historical Setting 



mate of intolerance that was repugnant to many people of all 
races and a social system that turned out to be an economic 
disaster. The deliberately inferior living conditions and oppor- 
tunities for a majority of citizens fueled frustration with govern- 
ment, deprived South Africa of a significant domestic market, 
and made it a pariah among civilized states. By the fourth 
decade of apartheid, the pressures for reform both from within 
South Africa and elsewhere, the growing realization that the 
system was intolerable, and the crumbling economy embold- 
ened political leaders on all sides to take steps to dismantle 
apartheid. 

Nelson (Rolihlahla) Mandela, South Africa's most popular 
anti-apartheid leader, had witnessed the rise and decline of 
apartheid firsthand. In the mid-1980s, after more than twenty 
years in prison for opposing apartheid, he assumed a central 
role in helping to end it. Government and opposition leaders 
met for talks — tentative ones at first, and then with greater con- 
fidence and amid more publicity — and they agreed on a gen- 
eral approach to political reform. Four years of difficult and 
uneven progress, amid escalating violence and competing 
political pressures, finally paid off in 1994, when South Africa 
held its first multiracial democratic elections. And while both 
sides could claim some of the success in achieving this historic 
goal, both sides also faced even greater challenges in trying to 
establish a stable multiracial society in the decades ahead. 

Southern African Societies to ca. 1600 

The Earliest South Africans 

The oldest evidence in the world documenting the emer- 
gence of humankind has been found in South Africa; fossils of 
the earliest hominids (Australopithecus africanus) date back at 
least 2.5 million years, and remains linked to modern Homo 
sapiens date back more than 50,000 years. Roughly 20,000 
years ago, South Africa, still in the grip of the world's last Ice 
Age, was occupied by people now known as San. Remnants of 
San communities still survive today as so-called Bushmen (now 
considered a pejorative term) in the Kalahari Desert. The San, 
who developed their society over thousands of years in isola- 
tion, speak a language that includes unique "click" consonants, 
are smaller statured, and have lighter skin pigmentation than 
the Bantu (see Glossary) speakers who later moved into south- 
ern Africa. However, older notions that such differences indi- 



5 



South Africa: A Country Study 



cate that San are a distinct "race" of people have now been 
discredited and replaced by arguments that all the black inhab- 
itants of South Africa are closely related, sharing a common 
gene pool, and that any physical differences among them can 
be attributed to geographical distribution and extent of con- 
tact rather than to race. 

San obtained a livelihood from often difficult environments 
by gathering edible plants, berries, and shellfish; by hunting 
game; and by fishing. Gathering was primarily the task of 
women, who provided approximately 80 percent of the food- 
stuffs consumed by the hunter-gatherer communities. Men 
hunted, made tools and weapons from wood and stone, pro- 
duced clothing from animal hides, and fashioned a remarkable 
array of musical instruments. San also created vast numbers of 
rock paintings — South Africa contains the bulk of the world's 
prehistoric art still extant — which express an extraordinary 
esthetic sensibility and document San hunting techniques and 
religious beliefs. The rock paintings also demonstrate that con- 
siderable interaction took place among hunter-gatherer com- 
munities throughout southern Africa. 

The primary social unit among the San was the nuclear fam- 
ily. Families joined together to form hunter-gatherer bands of 
about twenty to fifty people. Men and women had equal status 
in these groups and there was no development of a hereditary 
chiefship, although the male head of the main family usually 
took a leading role in decision making. Such bands moved 
about the countryside seeking foodstuffs, sometimes remain- 
ing for long periods in particularly productive environments, 
sometimes splitting apart and joining other groups when food 
was scarce. Because they made such limited demands on their 
environment, San managed to provide a living for themselves 
for thousands of years. Population numbers did remain small, 
however, and settlement was generally sparse. 

Approximately 2,500 years ago, some San in the northern 
parts of present-day Botswana acquired fat-tailed sheep and 
long-horned cattle, perhaps through trade with people from 
the north and the east, and became pastoralists. Their descen- 
dants, called "Hottentots" by early Dutch settlers, are now more 
accurately termed Khoikhoi, "men of men," or Khoi, in their 
own language. Although Europeans often considered San and 
Khoikhoi distinct races culturally and physically, scholars now 
think they are essentially the same people, distinguished only 
by their occupations. Differences in size — Khoikhoi are gener- 



6 



Historical Setting 



ally taller than San — are now attributed to the greater protein 
intake of pastoralists. Moreover, occupational status could 
often change in an individual's lifetime: San hunter-gatherers 
who found a particularly well-watered and fertile area might 
well acquire livestock through trade, settle down, and become 
relatively sedentary Khoikhoi pastoralists; pastoralists in times 
of drought or other ecological disaster might turn to hunting 
and gathering to survive. 

Because the southern Cape is fertile and well-watered, many 
Khoikhoi settled along the coast between the Orange River and 
the Great Fish River. With the greater and more regular sup- 
plies of food that they derived from their herds, Khoikhoi lived 
in larger settlements than those of the San, often numbering 
several hundred people in a single community. Still, as pasto- 
ralists, Khoikhoi moved with the seasons among coasts, valleys, 
and mountains in search of pastureland. Such movement con- 
tributed to the fissiparous nature of Khoikhoi society, in which 
groups of people, usually in patrilineally related clans, periodi- 
cally broke away and formed their own communities. The 
larger size of Khoikhoi communities as compared with those of 
the San did, however, lead to the development of more hierar- 
chical political structures. A Khoikhoi group was generally pre- 
sided over by a khoeque (rich man). The khoeque was not an 
autocrat, but rather could only exercise power in consultation 
with other male elders. 

The Khoikhoi engaged in extensive trade with other peoples 
in southern Africa. In exchange for their sheep and cattle, they 
acquired copper from the north and iron from Bantu-speaking 
Africans in the east and fashioned these metals into tools, 
weapons, and ornaments. They also acquired dagga (cannabis) 
from the coast of what is modern-day Mozambique, cultivated 
it themselves, and traded it for other goods. With San, too, they 
bartered sheep and cattle products for game and hides. 

By 1600 most of the Khoikhoi, numbering perhaps 50,000 
people, lived along the southwest coast of the Cape. Most San, 
their numbers practically impossible to determine, lived in 
drier areas west of the 400-millimeter rainfall line (the limit for 
cultivation), including present-day Northern Cape province, 
Botswana, Namibia, and southern Angola (see fig. 2). 

The Arrival of Bantu-Speaking Africans 

Bantu-speaking Africans, whose descendants make up the 
overwhelming majority of the present-day inhabitants of South 



7 



South Africa: A Country Study 




Figure 2. 400-millimeter Rainfall Line 



Africa, had moved south of the Limpopo River by about 1,500 
years ago. Farmers who combined knowledge of cattle-keeping 
and slash-and-burn (swidden) cultivation with expertise in 
metal-working, the Bantu speakers came from West Central 
Africa north of the Congo River near present-day Cameroon. 
Historians and archaeologists now argue that this movement 
took place not in any single great migration but rather in a slow 
southward shift of people throughout sub-Saharan Africa that 
resulted from the gradual drying up of the Sahara beginning 
about 8,000 years ago. The southward movement involved not 
the conquering hordes previously imagined but rather a mov- 
ing frontier of farmers seeking new fields and pastures who 
interacted with pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, sometimes 
trading, sometimes incorporating people in client relation- 



8 



Historical Setting 



ships, sometimes fighting for access to the same crucial 
resources. The farmers settled throughout southern Africa east 
of the 400-millimeter rainfall line and as far as the southwest- 
ern limits of cropping along the Great Kei River. 

The Bantu-speaking farmers chose to minimize risks rather 
than to maximize production in their use of the environment. 
They kept large herds of cattle and invested these animals with 
great material and symbolic value. Cattle provided a means to 
acquire and to display considerable wealth, and they were used 
for significant social and political transactions, such as 
bridewealth compensation (lobola) and tribute demands. Cattle 
were also valued for their milk and for their hides, but they 
were seldom killed for their meat except on ceremonial occa- 
sions. Hunting of game continued to provide a major source of 
protein, while additional supplies came from domesticated 
goats and sheep. Bantu speakers also cultivated a range of 
indigenous crops, including millet, sorghum, beans, and mel- 
ons along with other grains and vegetables. Those close to the 
sea collected shellfish and fished. By utilizing such a great 
range of food sources, the farmers spread their risks in a diffi- 
cult ecological system constantly subject to drought, disease, 
and crop failure. 

Still, the accumulation of large herds and the cultivation of 
extensive fields produced greater concentrations of population 
and considerably more stratification among Bantu speakers 
than among their San and Khoikhoi neighbors. Archaeologists 
have found evidence of settlements established more than 
1,400 years ago comprising several thousand people each. 
Toutswe, in eastern Botswana, consisted of a series of commu- 
nities built on large flat-topped hills with fields cultivated below 
and cattle pastured locally. The residents smelted iron and 
engaged in extensive trade with people as far east as the Indian 
Ocean. Similar large communities emerged at least 1,000 years 
ago just south of the Limpopo River where Bambandyanalo 
and then Mapungubwe arose as significant early states (both 
situated at the intersection of the present-day borders of 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa). Cultivating extensive 
fields and holding large numbers of cattle, the residents of 
these states also produced finely worked gold and copper orna- 
ments, hunted for ivory, and engaged in extensive long-dis- 
tance trade. They were generally presided over by chiefs who 
held considerable — although never total — power; elders always 
had to be consulted about major decisions. Compared with the 



9 



South Africa: A Country Study 

smaller-scale communities of San and Khoikhoi, the Bantu- 
speaking societies were marked by greater degrees of stratifica- 
tion: of old over young, men over women, rich over poor, and 
chiefs over commoners. 

There were, however, significant differences between the set- 
tlement patterns and the degree of political centralization 
established by Bantu speakers who settled inland and by those 
who lived closer to the coast. The inland Bantu speakers, 
termed Sotho-Tswana on the basis of their dialects, concen- 
trated in greater numbers around water sources and trading 
towns. By the late sixteenth century, a series of powerful hered- 
itary chiefs ruled over the society known as the Rolong, whose 
capital was Taung. The capital and several other towns, centers 
of cultivation and livestock raising as well as major trading com- 
munities, had populations of 15,000 to 20,000. By contrast, the 
Bantu-speakers termed Nguni, who settled on the coastal plains 
between the Highveld (see Glossary) and the Indian Ocean, 
lived in much smaller communities and had less hierarchical 
political structures. Moving their cattle often in search of fresh 
pastureland, they lived in small communities scattered across 
the countryside. In many cases, a community identified itself 
on the basis of descent from some ancestral founder, as did the 
Zulu and the Xhosa. Such communities could sometimes grow 
to a few thousand people, as did the Xhosa, the Mpondo, the 
Mthethwa, and others, but they were usually far smaller. 

By 1600 all of what is now South Africa had been settled: by 
Khoisan peoples in the west and the southwest, by Sotho- 
Tswana in the Highveld, and by Nguni along the coastal plains. 
Portuguese travelers and sailors shipwrecked along the coast in 
the seventeenth century reported seeing great concentrations 
of people living in apparent prosperity. 

Early European Settlement 

Origins of Settlement 

Portuguese mariners explored the west coast of Africa 
throughout the latter half of the fifteenth century. Two ships 
under Bartholomeu Dias eventually rounded the Cape of Good 
Hope in 1488 and traveled more than 600 kilometers along the 
southwestern coast. In 1497 an expedition under Vasco da 
Gama rounded the Cape, sailed up the east African coast to the 
Arab port of Malindi (in present-day Kenya), and then crossed 
the Indian Ocean to India, thereby opening up a way for Euro- 



10 



Monument to Portuguese 
navigator Bartholemeu Bias, 
who sailed around the Cape 
of Good Hope in 1488 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 




peans to gain direct access to the spices of the East without hav- 
ing to go through Arab middlemen. The Portuguese 
dominated this trade route throughout the sixteenth century. 
They built forts and supply stations along the west and east 
African coasts, but they did not build south of present-day 
Angola and Mozambique because of the treacherous currents 
along the southern coast. At the end of the sixteenth century 
and in the early seventeenth century, English and Dutch mer- 
chants challenged the Portuguese monopoly in West Africa 
and Asia and saw the Cape peninsula as a source of fresh water, 
meat, and timber for masts, all of which they could obtain 
through trade with the local Khoikhoi. The English govern- 
ment refused its mariners' requests that it annex land there 
and establish a base, but in 1652 the Dutch East India Com- 
pany (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie — VOC) established 
a supply station in Table Bay on the Cape peninsula, instruct- 
ing its station commander, Jan van Riebeeck, and his eighty 
company employees to build a fort and to obtain supplies of 
foodstuffs for the Dutch fleets. 

Establishing a Slave Economy 

The VOC's directors intended that the settlement at Table 
Bay should amount to no more than a small supply station able 



11 



South Africa: A Country Study 

largely to pay for itself. European settlement was to be limited 
to VOC employees only, and their numbers were to be kept as 
small as possible. Company ships could stop to take on water, to 
get supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables grown by VOC 
employees, and to trade for fresh meat and milk from the local 
Khoikhoi. The Khoikhoi were also expected to supply the labor 
needs of the settlement — building wharves and warehouses, 
putting up offices, and laying out roads. Within its first half 
decade, however, the Cape Colony was growing in ways unfore- 
seen at its establishment. Most Khoikhoi chose not to labor for 
the Dutch because of low wages and harsh conditions; and, 
although ready initially to trade with the Dutch, they became 
increasingly unwilling to sell their farm products at the prices 
offered by the VOC. As a result, three processes were set in 
motion in the 1650s that were to produce a rapidly expanding, 
racially stratified society. First, the VOC decided to import 
slaves to meet local labor needs, and it maintained that policy 
for more than 100 years. Second, the VOC decided to free 
some of its employees from their contracts and to allow them 
to establish farms of their own to supply the Dutch fleets, 
thereby giving rise to a local settler population. Third, to sup- 
ply the needs of the fleets as well as of the growing local popu- 
lation, the Dutch expanded ever farther into the lands of the 
Khoikhoi, engaging in a series of wars that, together with the 
effects of imported diseases, decimated the indigenous popula- 
tion. 

Van Riebeeck had concluded within two months of the 
establishment of the Cape settlement that slave labor would be 
needed for the hardest and dirtiest work. Some thought was 
given to enslaving Khoikhoi men, but the idea was rejected on 
the grounds that such a policy would be both costly and dan- 
gerous. With a European population that did not exceed 200 
during the settlement's first five years, war against neighbors 
numbering more than 20,000 would have been foolhardy. 
Moreover, the Dutch feared that Khoikhoi people, if enslaved, 
could always escape into the local community, whereas foreign- 
ers would find it much more difficult to elude their "masters." 

Between 1652 and 1657, a number of unsuccessful attempts 
were made to obtain men from the Dutch East Indies and from 
Mauritius. In 1658, however, the VOC landed two shiploads of 
slaves at the Cape, one containing more than 200 people 
brought from Dahomey (later Benin), the second with almost 
200 people, most of them children, captured from a Portu- 



12 



Historical Setting 



guese slaver off the coast of Angola. Except for a few individu- 
als, these were to be the only slaves ever brought to the Cape 
from West Africa. Thereafter, all the slaves imported into the 
Cape until the British stopped the trade in 1807 were from East 
Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar, and South and Southeast 
Asia. Large numbers were brought from India, Ceylon, and the 
Indonesian archipelago. Prisoners from other countries in the 
VOC's empire were also enslaved. The slave population, which 
exceeded that of the European settlers until the first quarter of 
the nineteenth century, was overwhelmingly male and was thus 
dependent on constant imports of new slaves to maintain and 
to augment its size. 

Emergence of a Settler Society 

In 1657 nine European men were released from the VOC's 
service, given the status of "free burghers," and granted blocks 
of land. They were exempted from taxation for twelve years, 
but the VOC held a mortgage on their lands. They were free to 
trade with Khoikhoi for sheep and cattle, but they were prohib- 
ited from paying higher prices for the stock than did the VOC, 
and they were told not to enslave the local pastoralists. They 
were encouraged to grow crops, especially grains, for sale to 
the VOC, but they were not allowed to produce anything 
already grown in the company's own gardens. By such mea- 
sures, the VOC hoped not only to increase local production 
and thereby to pay the costs of the settlement, but also to pre- 
vent any private producers from undercutting the VOC's con- 
trol over prices. 

Conflict between Dutch farmers and Khoikhoi broke out 
once it became clear to the latter that the Dutch were there to 
stay and that they intended to encroach on the lands of the pas- 
toralists. In 1659 Doman, a Khoikhoi who had worked as a 
translator for the Dutch and had even traveled to Java, led an 
armed attempt to expel the Dutch from the Cape peninsula. 
The attempt was a failure, although warfare dragged on until 
an inconclusive peace was established a year later. During the 
following decade, pressure on the Khoikhoi grew as more of 
the Dutch became free burghers, expanded their landhold- 
ings, and sought pastureland for their growing herds. War 
broke out again in 1673 and continued until 1677, when 
Khoikhoi resistance was destroyed by a combination of supe- 
rior European weapons and Dutch manipulation of divisions 
among the local people. Thereafter, Khoikhoi society in the 



13 



South Africa: A Country Study 

western Cape disintegrated. Some people found jobs as shep- 
herds on European farms; others rejected foreign rule and 
moved away from the Cape. The final blow for most came in 
1713 when a Dutch ship brought smallpox to the Cape. Hith- 
erto unknown locally, the disease ravaged the remaining 
Khoikhoi, killing 90 percent of the population. 

The community at Table Bay grew larger and more diverse 
throughout the late 1600s, particularly after the VOC decided 
in 1679 that European settlement should be boosted in order 
to expand agricultural production. German and Dutch settlers 
were offered free farms if they would come to the Cape. In 
1688 several hundred Huguenots fleeing persecution by the 
French were offered free passage to the Cape and grants of 
land. These settlers, all of whom soon assimilated Dutch cul- 
ture and language, grew large crops of wheat as well as other 
grains for sale to the VOC, although they found such crops 
barely profitable. They also planted grapevines, so that they 
could make wine and brandy — products much in demand for 
Dutch sailors and capable of being exported to Europe, unlike 
other, perishable items. The mainstay of most settlers, however, 
was livestock farming, which required large areas of pasture- 
land because the soil was generally poor. By the end of the cen- 
tury, pressures for land in and around the Cape peninsula had 
become intense. There were approximately 1,500 Europeans in 
the Cape settlement and a slightly larger number of slaves, and 
the area of settlement had extended well beyond the original 
base at Table Bay to include freehold farms reaching sixty kilo- 
meters inland. 

The rise of an expanding settler society fueled tensions 
between free burghers and the VOC. Free burghers criticized 
the autocratic powers of the local VOC administration, in 
which the governor had full control and the settlers had no 
rights of representation. They denounced the economic poli- 
cies of the VOC that fixed the prices at which settlers could sell 
their agricultural products. They called attention to the cor- 
rupt practices of VOC officers, who granted themselves prime 
land and then sold their own crops at higher prices to the com- 
pany. Above all, they complained about the VOC's failure — at 
least in their eyes — to police the frontier boundaries and to 
protect the settlers' crops and herds from Khoikhoi and San 
raiders. 

Trekboers (semi-migrant farmers of primarily Dutch, Ger- 
man, and French ancestry; more commonly known as Boers — 



14 



Historical Setting 



see Glossary) played a key role in the eighteenth century in the 
expansion of the settlement and in the growth of frontier con- 
flict. With much of the better land close to the Cape in the 
hands of VOC officials and rich burghers, poorer whites sought 
to make a living beyond the boundaries of the settlement. Trav- 
eling by wagon inland and along the southwestern coast, indi- 
vidual farmers, along with their immediate families (if any), a 
few slaves, several Khoikhoi herdsmen, and small numbers of 
livestock, set out to establish farms on large tracts of land (aver- 
aging 2,500 hectares) granted on loan by the VOC (see fig. 3). 
Because much of this land was already occupied by Khoikhoi 
pastoralists near the coast and by San hunter-gatherers in the 
interior, considerable warfare resulted. Trekboers raided the 
herds of the Khoikhoi and seized control of the springs on 
which pastoralists and hunter-gatherers alike depended for 
water, while Khoikhoi and San counterraided the herds of the 
Trekboers. 

In the face of burgher agitation, growing frontier conflict, 
and increasing overproduction of agricultural goods for the 
local market, the VOC in 1717 attempted to limit the growth of 
European settlement. It stopped all assisted immigration of 
Europeans and decided that thereafter only slaves should be 
used in the future development of the settlement. Moreover, it 
ended the granting of freehold title to land, although it did 
continue to make farms available on loan. 

Such measures had only a limited impact on the growth of 
the settlement. Throughout the eighteenth century, the settle- 
ment continued to expand through internal growth of the 
European population and the continued importation of slaves. 
The approximately 3,000 Europeans and slaves at the Cape in 
1700 had increased by the end of the century to nearly 20,000 
Europeans, almost 25,000 slaves, and another 15,000 Khoikhoi 
and mixed-race people living within the boundaries of the set- 
tlement. 

In the west, the economy was dominated by the bustling port 
at Table Bay and the wheat farms and vineyards of Stellenbosch 
and Swellendam, which depended almost totally on slave labor. 
Politically, the VOC governor continued to be in firm control, 
although a number of wealthy burghers exercised considerable 
informal influence. Socially, the community was marked by 
considerable stratification and diversity. Most wealth was con- 
centrated in the hands of a few company officials and a minor- 
ity of burghers. The majority of Europeans earned a living as 



15 



South Africa: A Country Study 



1798 




Port Elizabeth 



CAPE OF 
GOOD HOPE 



Dutch, 1652-1 795, 1803-6; 
British, 1795-1803, 1806 onward. 



■ Boundary of Cape Colony 
• Trekboer migration 
Populated place 

100 200 Kilometers 



100 



200 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Michael Kwamena-Poh et al., African History in 
Maps, Essex, United Kingdom, 1982, 25-27, 42-43; and Leonard Thompson, 
A History of South Africa, New Haven, 1995, 89. 



Figure 3. European Expansion, 1652-1848 



artisans, traders, and innkeepers, although almost all whites 
owned at least one or two slaves. A small community of mixed- 
race people had also emerged, the offspring of relationships 
among whites, Khoikhoi, Asians, and African slaves. 

In the eastern areas of the Cape, beyond the Cape Colony 
itself, Trekboers predominated with their extensive pastoral 
economy. Most owned some slaves, but they depended more 
on Khoikhoi and San to meet their labor needs. Although 
nominally under the jurisdiction of the VOC, the Trekboers 
largely ruled themselves. They did not believe that Khoikhoi 
and San should be treated equally with Europeans in the 
courts, and they established harsh labor regimes on their 
farms. To deal with frontier problems, they periodically raised 



16 



Historical Setting 



armed bands of men to protect their herds and to carry out 
punitive expeditions against Khoikhoi and San. They devel- 
oped a consciousness of themselves as a distinct community set- 
tled permanently in South Africa and, unlike the employees of 
the VOC, they did not plan to return to Europe. 

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, both western 
and eastern areas of the Cape were undergoing a period of 
stress. Continued overproduction for the local market in the 
west and resulting economic hardship led burghers to identify 
the VOC as the source of all their problems. The discontents of 
the Trekboers were even greater. Their continuing expansion* 
was blocked by a number of barriers: by aridity 500 kilometers 
north of the Cape peninsula, by hunter-gatherer raiders in the 
northeast, and, most important, by large numbers of Bantu- 
speaking farmers (Xhosa) settled roughly 700 kilometers to 
the east of Cape Town and just south of the Great Fish River. 
Throughout much of the eighteenth century, Xhosa and Trek- 
boers had peacefully traded with one another, with the Dutch 
exchanging glass beads, nails, and other manufactured items 
for African cattle and ivory. By the late 1770s, however, tensions 
rose as Xhosa farmers were expanding west of the Great Fish 
River at the same time that the Trekboers were moving east- 
ward. 

Demand for the same resources — land and water — brought 
Trekboers and Xhosa into conflict, and a series of frontier wars 
erupted in 1779 to 1781, and in 1793. In the second war, the 
Xhosa avenged their defeat in the first. Their capture of thou- 
sands of head of Boer cattle and their occupation of large areas 
of land previously claimed by the Dutch were officially recog- 
nized and accepted by a local representative of the VOC. 
Enraged by what they considered the treachery of the com- 
pany, Trekboers in Graaff-Reinet rebelled in 1795, expelling 
the VOC magistrate and proclaiming an independent republic. 
This attempt at autonomy ended, however, with the British 
takeover of the Cape settlement in 1795. 

Fearing that the strategic port at Table Bay might fall into 
the hands of Napoleon, the British seized the Cape to defend 
their sea route to India. They sent troops to the eastern Cape 
to prevent Boer insurrection and to establish order on the 
frontier, but they made no attempt to extend the boundaries of 
the settlement. Like the VOC before them, the British 
intended that the Cape settlement should remain as small as 
possible. Its value lay in its strategic position, not in its produc- 



17 



South Africa: A Country Study 

tion. Moreover, the British had no wish to become embroiled 
in costly local struggles between European settlers and African 
farmers in the interior. 

In 1802 the Treaty of Amiens, which ended a decade of 
upheaval in Europe, called for the return of the Cape Colony 
to Dutch control. This was accomplished in 1803, but the 
Dutch Batavian Republic in Europe had done little to imple- 
ment this claim when the treaty began to break down in 1805. 
Britain again seized control of the Cape in 1806 and defied 
Dutch claims by occupying and expanding its presence in the 
Cape region. Finally, in 1814 the former Batavian Republic — 
the Kingdom of Holland — agreed to abandon its claim to the 
Cape in return for a grant of roughly 2 million British pounds. 

The Rise of African States 

By the eighteenth century, several groups of immigrants 
from the north, known for their skill in smelting iron and in 
metalworking, had occupied the mountains along the Lim- 
popo River (see fig. 4). This heterogeneous population had 
coalesced into a number of chiefdoms, known as the Venda, or 
VaVenda. In the southern Highveld, the powerful Tswana- 
speaking kingdom known as the Rolong had split, giving rise to 
the Tlhaping (BaTlhaping) and the Taung. The Taung were 
named for a legendary military leader (Tau) among the 
Rolong. 

One of several Khoisan-European populations in the inte- 
rior in the eighteenth century was that of the Griqua, most of 
whom spoke Dutch as their first language and had adopted 
Christianity. A unique Griqua culture emerged, based on hunt- 
ing, herding, and trade with both Africans and Europeans 
along the Orange River. 

The Xhosa and related groups were the westernmost of the 
Nguni-speaking societies between the southern Highveld and 
the coast. Rivalries among Xhosa chiefs were common, how- 
ever, and their society was weakened by repeated clashes with 
Europeans, especially over land between the Sundays River and 
the Great Fish River. By the late eighteenth century, the 
Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and Ngwane were emerging as power- 
ful kingdoms south of the Highveld. The Zulu were still a small 
group among the Mthethwa and had not yet begun the con- 
quest and assimilation of neighboring groups that would char- 
acterize much of the early nineteenth century. 



18 



Historical Setting 



Background to the Mfecane 

A combination of local factors — population growth, the 
depletion of natural resources, and devastating drought and 
famine — led to revolutionary changes in the political, eco- 
nomic, and social structure of Bantu-speaking communities in 
southern Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Thousands of people died because of ecological catastrophe 
and warfare; thousands more were displaced. Large centralized 
states of tens of thousands of people with standing armies of up 
to 40,000 men and autocratic leaders emerged where before 
there had been only small-scale political entities and no chief 
had had total power. This period of revolutionary change — 
known as the mfecane (or crushing — see Glossary) by the Zulu 
and the difaqane (see Glossary) by the Sotho — is also often 
referred to as "the time of troubles" (see fig. 5). 

The causes of the mfecane were emerging by the end of the 
eighteenth century, when population levels increased rapidly, 
and ecological resources were sometimes scarce. Communities 
that previously had often spread across the countryside or had 
repeatedly divided and moved along the frontier became more 
settled and more concentrated. The introduction of corn from 
the Americas through the Portuguese in Mozambique was one 
major reason for this trend. Corn produced more food than 
indigenous grasses on the same land, and thus could sustain a 
larger population. Trade in ivory with the Portuguese in Dela- 
goa Bay was another factor that induced people to settle just 
south of Mozambique. Moreover, possibilities for population 
movement had become much more limited by the end of the 
eighteenth century because land was in short supply. Bantu- 
speaking farmers had reached the margins of arable land on 
the edge of the Kalahari Desert in the northwest and in the 
mountains on the southern border of the Highveld, and peo- 
ple settling in the area found their access to water more and 
more limited. 

Declining rainfall in the last decades of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, followed by a calamitous ten-year drought that began 
about 1800, caused massive disruption and suffering. The 
adoption of corn as a major staple gave this drought an even 
greater impact than those of the past because corn needed 
much more water than local grains in order to produce. When 
the rains failed, therefore, the effect was devastating. People 
fought one another for meager supplies of grain and cattle, 
hunted down whatever game they could find, and sought out 



19 



South Africa: A Country Study 




100 200 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Kevin Shillington, History of Southern Africa, 

London, 1987, 16; and Reader's Digest Association, Reader' s Digest Illustrated 
History of South Africa, Pleasantville, New York, 1989, 63. 

Figure 4. Major African Ethnic Groups, Eighteenth Century 

any remaining water supplies in a desperate attempt to survive. 
Warfare erupted, and two kingdoms — the Ndwandwe under 
the leadership of Zwide, and the Mthethwa under Ding- 
iswayo — battled for control of resources. Both kingdoms 
became more centralized and militarized, their young men 
banded together in age regiments that became the basis for 
standing armies, and their kings became more autocratic as 
they fought for survival. The Ndwandwe appeared victorious in 
1818 when Dingiswayo was killed and his forces scattered, but 
they were soon overcome by Shaka, founder of the Zulu state. 

Shaka and the Rise of the Zulu State 

Shaka Zulu was born in 1787, the illegitimate son of Senzan- 



20 



Historical Setting 



gakona, chief of the Zulu clan. An outcast as a child, Shaka was 
brought up among a number of neighboring groups, finally 
ending with the Mthethwa where he distinguished himself as a 
skilled warrior in Dingiswayo's army. Dingiswayo was so 
impressed by Shaka that in 1816 he helped him become chief 
of the Zulu upon the death of Senzangakona. Among the Zulu, 
Shaka consolidated a number of military innovations — some 
developed by Dingiswayo, some dating back to the eighteenth 
century — to produce a powerful military machine. All young 
men were incorporated into age regiments and given military 
training. A short stabbing spear was introduced in addition to 
the traditional long throwing spears, giving Shaka's army an 
advantage in close combat. Military strategies, such as the 
"horn" formation by which Zulu regiments encircled their ene- 
mies, were perfected. When Dingiswayo was killed, Shaka with 
his military machine avenged his mentor's death, destroying 
the Ndwandwe in battle (two of Zwide's generals, Shoshangane 
and Zwangendaba, fled north and established kingdoms in 
present-day Mozambique and southern Tanzania, respectively). 
Shaka then incorporated the Mthethwa under his rule, and 
established the Zulu state as the dominant power among the 
northern Nguni. 

By the mid-1 820s, Shaka ruled a kingdom of more than 
100,000 people with a standing army of 40,000 men. He cen- 
tralized power in the person of the king and his court, col- 
lected tribute from regional chiefs, and placed regiments 
throughout his state to ensure compliance with his orders. 
These regiments also looked after the royal herds and carried 
out public works. Women, too, were incorporated into their 
own age regiments, which were paired with male regiments to 
provide food and other services for the soldiers. Shaka forbade 
members of these regiments to marry, however, until they had 
completed their military service. For men this meant their late 
thirties, and for women their late twenties. Only after marriage 
could men and women leave their regiments and set up their 
own homesteads. 

Shaka fostered a new national identity by stressing the Zulu- 
ness of the state. All subjects of the state became Zulu and 
owed the king their personal allegiance. Zulu traditions of ori- 
gin became the national traditions of the state. Customary 
Nguni festivals, such as planting and harvest celebrations, 
became occasions on which Shaka gathered vast numbers of 
his people and extolled the virtues of the state. Through such 



21 



South Africa: A Country Study 





Boundary of Zulu heartland 
Boundary of Shaka's war zone 
Chiefdom or clan migration 



• Populated place 
100 200 Kilom eters 
100 200 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Michael Kwamena-Poh et al., African History in 

Maps, Essex, United Kingdom, 1982, 36-37; Leonard Thompson, A History of 
South Africa, New Haven, 1995, 82; and Reader's Digest Association, leader's 
Digest Illustrated History of South Africa, Pleasantville, New York, 1989, 91. 

Figure 5. The Mfecane, 1817-28 

means, Shaka developed a Zulu consciousness that tran- 
scended the original identities and lineages of the various peo- 
ples who were his subjects. 

During most of the 1820s, Shaka consolidated his power 
through a series of wars against neighboring peoples. His 
armies raided for cattle and food; they attacked any who chal- 
lenged the authority of the Zulu monarch; and they extended 
the limits of Shaka's realm north to the borders of present-day 
Mozambique, west across the Drakensberg Mountains, and 
south to the margins of the area that would later become the 
Transkei homeland. He also welcomed British traders to his 
kingdom and sent diplomatic emissaries to the British king. 



22 



Historical Setting 



Shaka was assassinated at the height of his powers in 1828 
and was succeeded by Dingane, his half-brother and one of the 
assassins. Dingane was a much less accomplished ruler than the 
founder of the Zulu state. His weak claim to the throne and his 
constant fear of assassination made him a despotic ruler. Din- 
gane maintained the centralized and militarized organization 
of the Zulu state and sent his armies out on raiding missions. 
Victories, however, were few because of the growing strength of 
neighboring African kingdoms, and by the end of the 1830s 
Dingane's hold on power was being challenged by internal dis- 
content and external threats. 

Swazi, Sotho, and Ndebele States 

Indeed, as a result of the mfecane, a series of states formed 
throughout southern Africa as people banded together to 
secure access to foodstuffs and to protect themselves from Zulu 
marauders. Sobhuza, leader of the Ngwane people to the north 
of the Zulu, built a defensive state that eventually took the 
name of his son and heir Mswati to form the basis of the mod- 
ern Swazi nation, Swaziland. Sobhuza secured the boundaries 
of his state through a combination of diplomacy and force. He 
negotiated marriage alliances with Ndwandwe and later Zulu 
chiefs and cemented similar arrangements with his own chiefs. 
He paid tribute to the Zulu kings when he thought it necessary, 
but he also built a powerful army with which the Swazi were 
able to repel Dingane's incursions in the 1830s. 

Moshoeshoe, another contemporary (b. 1786) of Shaka, 
forged a strong Sotho kingdom on the southern Highveld in 
the 1820s and 1830s. This kingdom became the foundation for 
the modern state of Lesotho. Moshoeshoe, seeking in the 
1820s to protect his people from the worst ravages of the 
difaqane, fortified a large mesa, Thaba Bosiu, that proved 
impregnable to attack for decades thereafter. With this natural 
fortress as his base, he built a large kingdom, welcomed in par- 
ticular refugees from famine and wars elsewhere, and provided 
them with food and shelter. These refugees, once incorporated 
into the state, were considered Sotho like their hosts; thus, as 
with the Zulu, ever larger numbers were integrated into a 
group with a consolidated ethnic identity, a practice that fur- 
thered the process of nation building. Moshoeshoe also sought 
to strengthen his kingdom militarily, especially by acquiring 
guns and horses from the Cape. A superb diplomat, he sought 
to maintain cordial relations with all his neighbors, even paying 



23 



South Africa: A Country Study 

tribute on occasion to Shaka and seeking always to avoid war. 
Believing that they could act as emissaries on his behalf to the 
intruding European powers while also teaching his children to 
read and write, he welcomed French Protestant missionaries. 
By the mid-1830s, Moshoeshoe's kingdom comprised about 
30,000 people and was the largest state on the southern High- 
veld. 

A fourth major African state formed in South Africa during 
the 1820s and 1830s was the Ndebele state ruled by Mzilikazi. 
Mzilikazi had been a subject chief of Shaka, but in 1821 he had 
sought to demonstrate his independence by refusing to send 
tribute cattle to the king. Fleeing from a punitive force sent by 
Shaka, Mzilikazi and a few hundred followers crossed the Drak- 
ensberg Mountains and established a series of armed settle- 
ments on the Highveld. Raiding for cattle and grain and 
forcibly incorporating Sotho-Tswana people into his forces, 
Mzilikazi built a powerful kingdom in the 1830s near present- 
day Johannesburg and Pretoria. 

Although the mfecane in many ways promoted the political 
development of southern Africa, it also caused great suffering. 
Thousands died because of famine and warfare, and thousands 
more were uprooted from their homes and were forced to 
travel great distances, many to become refugee laborers in the 
Cape who sought work at any wage. Perhaps the most signifi- 
cant result in terms of the future was that large areas of South 
Africa were temporarily depopulated, making it seem to Euro- 
peans that there were unclaimed lands in the interior into 
which they could expand. 

The Expansion of European Settlement 

British Colonialism 

The British adopted contradictory policies in ruling their 
newly acquired Cape Colony in the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century. Having seized the Cape from the VOC in 
1795, the British returned the colony to the Dutch government 
in 1803 when peace had been concluded with the French. In 
1806, however, with the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, the 
British again took the Cape in order to protect the sea route to 
their Asian empire. Like the VOC before them, the British 
tried to keep the costs low and the settlement small. Local offi- 
cials continued the policy of relying on imported slave labor 
rather than encouraging European immigration with the lat- 



24 



Historical Setting 



ter's implication of permanent and expanding settlement. 
They also introduced racially discriminatory legislation to force 
Khoikhoi and other so-called "free" blacks to work for as little 
as possible. The Hottentot Code of 1809 required that all 
Khoikhoi and other free blacks carry passes stating where they 
lived and who their employers were. Persons without such 
passes could be forced into employment by white masters. 

The British attempted to alleviate the land problems of 
Boers in the eastern Cape by sending imperial armies against 
the Xhosa of the Zuurveld (literally, "sour grassland," the 
southernmost area of Bantu-speaking settlement, located 
between the Sundays River and the Great Fish River). They 
attacked the Xhosa from 1799 to 1803, from 1811 to 1812, and 
again from 1818 to 1819, when at last, through ruthless war- 
fare, they succeeded in expelling the Africans into the area 
north of the Great Fish River. Thereafter, the British sought to 
create a fixed frontier by settling 5,000 British-assisted immi- 
grants on smallholder farms created out of land seized from 
the Xhosa south of the Great Fish River and by clearing all 
lands between the Great Fish River and the Keiskama River of 
all forms of African settlement. 

But other policies and developments worked against these 
measures. In 1807 Parliament in London ordered an end to 
British participation in the slave trade everywhere in the world. 
This decision threatened the basis of the Cape's labor supply, 
for farmers in the eastern areas as well as in the west. 

British missionaries, who were active in South Africa for the 
first time in the 1810s and who had a sympathetic audience in 
Britain, condemned the cruel labor practices often adopted by 
Trekboers against their slave and Khoikhoi workers and 
decried the discriminatory provisions of the Hottentot Code. 
Although British officials did not rescind the legislation, they 
did respond to this criticism by establishing a circuit court to 
monitor conditions in the western Cape. This court offended 
many Boer sensibilities by giving equal weight to the evidence 
of "servants" and "masters," black and white alike. The British 
also raised a force of colonial police, including Khoikhoi regu- 
lars, to enforce the court's authority. In 1815 a Dutch-speaking 
Afrikaner farmer who refused to answer a court summons for 
mistreating a Khoikhoi employee was shot dead while resisting 
arrest. Relatives and neighbors rose in what became known as 
the Slachter's Nek Rebellion, but their resistance was soon 
crushed, and the British hanged five of the rebels. 



25 



South Africa: A Country Study 

British policies on the eastern frontier also engendered 
growing Boer hostility. The attempt to close the frontier in 
1819-20 following the defeat of the Xhosa and the importation 
of British immigrants only exacerbated land shortages. British 
settlers found that they could not make a living from small 
farms, and they competed with the Dutch pastoralists for the 
limited arable land available, thereby intensifying Boer-British 
tensions. 

The British government, acting largely at the behest of the 
missionaries and their supporters in Britain in the 1820s, abol- 
ished the Hottentot Code. Ordinance 50 of 1828 stated that no 
Khoikhoi or free black had to carry a pass or could be forced to 
enter a labor contract. Five years later, the British Parliament 
decreed that slavery would no longer be permitted in any part 
of the empire. After a four-year period of "apprenticeship," all 
slaves would become free persons, able, because of Ordinance 
50, to sell their labor for whatever the market would bear. 
Moreover, slaveowners were to receive no more than one-third 
of the value of their slaves in official compensation for the loss 
of this property. The Boers felt further threatened when, in 
1834 and 1835, British forces, attempting to put a final stop to 
Boer-Xhosa frontier conflict, swept across the Keiskama River 
into Xhosa territory and annexed all the land up to the 
Keiskama River for white settlement. In 1836, however, the Brit- 
ish government, partly in response to missionary criticism of 
the invasion, returned the newly annexed lands to the Xhosa 
and sought a peace treaty with their chiefs. 

The Great Trek 

Dutch speakers denounced these actions as striking at the 
heart of their labor and land needs. Those living in the eastern 
Cape, most of them among the poorer segment of the Dutch- 
speaking population, were particularly impassioned in their 
criticisms, and many decided to abandon their farms and to 
seek new lands beyond the reach of British rule. 

Beginning in 1836, Boer families, together with large num- 
bers of Khoikhoi and black servants, gathered up their belong- 
ings and traveled by ox-wagon up into the Highveld interior to 
the north of the eastern Cape frontier. (Travel farther east was 
blocked by the Xhosa.) All told, some 6,000 Boer men, women, 
and children, along with an equal number of blacks, partici- 
pated in this movement in the late 1830s. Fewer Boer families 
migrated from the western Cape, where they were more pros- 



26 



Voortrekker monument overlooking Pretoria; its friezes depict the Great 

Trek and the Battle of Blood River. 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

perous on their grain and wine farms and therefore less con- 
cerned about land shortages and frontier pressures. The 
exodus from the Cape was not organized in a single movement 
at the time, but it was later termed the Great Trek by national- 
ist historians, and its participants were called Voortrekkers 
(pioneers). 

The first groups of Voortrekkers moved into the southern 
Highveld, skirted the powerful Lesotho kingdom of Moshoe- 
shoe to the east, and pastured their herds on lands between the 
Orange River and the Vaal River. A large group moved farther 
north to the grasslands beyond the Vaal River into territory 
where Mzilikazi had recently established a powerful Ndebele 
state. Competing for the same resources — pasturelands, water, 
and game — the Voortrekkers and the Ndebele soon came into 
conflict. In 1836 the Voortrekkers fought off an Ndebele 



27 



South Africa: A Country Study 



attempt to expel them from the Highveld. In the following 
year, the northern Voortrekkers allied with the Rolong and the 
Griqua, who were known for their fighting skills. This time the 
northern Voortrekkers succeeded in defeating Mzilikazi and 
forcing him and most of his followers to flee north into 
present-day Zimbabwe, where he conquered the Shona and 
established a new state. 

The majority of Voortrekkers, however, neither settled 
between the Orange and the Vaal nor trekked to the north, but 
moved northeastward around Lesotho and traveled down 
toward the sea into Zulu-ruled areas of southeastern Africa. 
The leader of this group, Piet Retief, attempted to negotiate 
with Dingane for permission to settle in relatively sparsely pop- 
ulated areas south of the Tugela River. Dingane was at first 
receptive to Retief s entreaties, but then, apparently fearing 
that the introduction of European settlers would undermine 
his authority, he had Retief and seventy of his followers killed 
while they were at his capital in February 1838. Dingane then 
sent out Zulu regiments to eliminate all Voortrekkers in the 
area; they killed several hundred men, women, and children 
and captured more than 35,000 head of cattle and sheep. 

Not all of the settlers were killed, however, and in December 
the survivors, reinforced by men from the Cape Colony, 
marched 500 strong to avenge the deaths of Retief and his fol- 
lowers. Commanded by Andries Pretorius, the Voortrekkers 
pledged that they would commemorate a victory as a sign of 
divine protection. They then met and defeated Dingane's army 
at the Battle of Blood River. Their victory is celebrated each 
year on December 16, the Day of the Vow. 

The Zulu kingdom split into warring factions after this 
defeat. One group under Mpande, a half-brother of Shaka and 
Dingane, allied with Pretorius and the Voortrekkers, and 
together they succeeded in destroying Dingane's troops and in 
forcing him to flee to the lands of the Swazi, where he was 
killed. The Voortrekkers recognized Mpande as king of the 
Zulu north of the Tugela River, while he in turn acknowledged 
their suzerainty over both his kingdom and the state that they 
established south of the Tugela. The Voortrekker Republic of 
Natalia (the basis of later Natal Province) was established in 
1839, and by 1842 there were approximately 6,000 people 
occupying vast areas of pastureland and living under a political 
system in which only white males had the right to vote. 



28 



Historical Setting 



The British, however, feeling that their security and author- 
ity were threatened, annexed the republic as Natal. They did 
not want the Dutch speakers to have independent access to the 
sea and thereby be able to negotiate political and economic 
agreements with other European powers. They also feared that 
harsh treatment meted out to Africans — such as Voortrekker 
attempts to clear the land by removing Africans from the 
Republic of Natalia — would eventually increase population 
pressures on the eastern Cape frontier. Although acquiescing 
in the annexation, the great majority of the Voortrekkers effec- 
tively abandoned Natal to the British and moved back to the 
Highveld in 1843. The British, having taken Natal for strategic 
purposes, then had to find a way to make the colony pay for its 
administration. After experimenting with several crops, they 
found that sugar grew well and could be exported without 
deteriorating. Attempts to force Africans to endure the oner- 
ous labor in the sugar fields failed, however, and in 1860 the 
British began importing indentured laborers from India to 
provide the basic work force. Between 1860 and 1866, 6,000 
Indians (one-quarter of them women) were brought to the col- 
ony on five-year contracts. 

The Voortrekker Republics and British Policies 

The Voortrekkers established two states in the 1840s and the 
1850s: the Orange Free State between the Orange and the Vaal 
rivers and the South African Republic (Zuid Afrikaansche 
Republiek, a union of four Boer republics founded by the 
Voortrekkers) to the north of the Vaal River in the area later 
constituting the Transvaal. Like the Africans among whom they 
settled, the Voortrekkers in both states made their living from a 
combination of extensive pastoralism and hunting. Ivory was 
the most important product at first, and the search for it 
engendered great competition between African and European 
hunters. In the 1860s, ostrich feathers also became an impor- 
tant export. All processed foods and manufactured goods were 
acquired by trading ivory, skins, and feathers to British mer- 
chants at the Cape. 

Politically, the two states were republics, with constitutions 
modeled in part on that of the United States, each with a presi- 
dent, an elected legislature, and a franchise restricted to white 
males. Africans could not vote, or own land, or carry guns 
because the laws of both republics, unlike those of the British 
colonies, did not recognize racial equality before the law. By 



29 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the end of the 1860s, there were approximately 50,000 whites 
settled in the two republics, practically all of them living in 
rural areas, although small capitals had been established at 
Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State and at Pretoria in the 
South African Republic. 

Initially, the British attempted to strengthen their own posi- 
tion by extending colonial control beyond the Cape Colony's 
boundaries. In 1848, after the northern frontier was threat- 
ened by fighting between Voortrekkers and Griqua on the 
Orange River and by continued competition for resources 
among settlers and Africans, the governor of the Cape Colony, 
Sir Harry Smith, annexed all the land between the Orange and 
the Vaal rivers. This area, which the British called the Orange 
River Sovereignty, comprised large numbers of Voortrekker 
communities and practically all of the Sotho state, Lesotho. 
Smith, urged on by land-hungry white settlers, also annexed 
the Xhosa lands between the Keiskama and the Great Kei rivers 
that the British had first taken and then returned in 1835 and 
1836. Moreover, he sought to win a decisive military victory 
over the Xhosa and to break forever the power of their chiefs 
by pursuing a ruthless war against them from 1850 to 1852. 

The British had mixed success. Their attempts to tax the 
Orange River Voortrekkers produced almost no revenue. 
Claims to Sotho lands were met with opposition from Moshoe- 
shoe, who in 1851 and 1852 successfully defeated British 
attempts to extend their authority into his lands. As a result of 
the Sotho resistance, the British decided to withdraw from the 
Highveld, but in so doing they recognized the primacy of Euro- 
pean rather than African claims to the land. The Sand River 
Convention of 1852 and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 
recognized the independence of the South African Republic 
and the Orange Free State, respectively, as Voortrekker repub- 
lics so long as their residents agreed to acknowledge the ulti- 
mate sovereignty of the British government, agreed not to 
allow slavery in their territories, and agreed not to sell ammu- 
nition to Africans. It was not until 1868 that the British again 
attempted to extend their power onto the Highveld, and that 
was only when Lesotho's defeat by the Orange Free State was so 
complete that the total destruction of the Sotho people 
seemed likely. 

On the eastern Cape frontier, however, British policies 
brought about enormous destruction for the Xhosa. Smith was 
recalled by the British government in 1852 for instigating con- 



30 



Historical Setting 



flict with the Xhosa, but the Colonial Office decided to pursue 
the war to victory nonetheless in 1853. Large areas of Xhosa 
land were annexed, and thousands of head of cattle were con- 
fiscated. Drought and disease further reduced the Xhosa's 
remaining herds. Defeated in war, their lands greatly reduced 
and food supplies in decline, the Xhosa turned for salvation to 
a young girl, Nongqawuse, who prophesied that if the people 
purified themselves through sacrifice — by destroying their cat- 
tle and their grain, and by not planting new crops — then their 
ancestors would return to aid them, the herds would reappear, 
and all the whites would be driven into the sea. Although not 
all Xhosa believed the prophecies, by 1857 more than 400,000 
head of cattle had been killed and vast quantities of grain had 
been destroyed. As a result, 40,000 Xhosa died from starvation, 
and an equal number sought refuge in the Cape Colony, where 
most became impoverished farm laborers. 

By the end of the 1860s, white settlement in South Africa was 
much more extensive than it had been at the beginning of the 
century. There were now two British colonies on the coast 
(Cape Colony and Natal) instead of one, and two Voortrekker 
republics on the southern and the northern Highveld (the 
Orange Free State and the South African Republic) (see fig. 6). 
The white population had also increased considerably, from 
the 20,000 or so Europeans resident in the Cape Colony in 
1800 to 180,000 reported in the 1865 census. There were 
another 18,000 whites living in Natal and perhaps 50,000 more 
whites in the Voortrekker states. 

Yet there were evident constraints to growth. Economically, 
South Africa was little different from what it had been when 
the British first arrived. The Cape produced wine, wheat, and 
wool, none of them particularly profitable items on the world 
market in the 1860s, especially because of competition from 
American, Argentine, and Australian farmers. Natal's sugar 
kept the colony going, but it was not an expanding industry. In 
the interior, the Voortrekkers engaged in the same economic 
activities as their African neighbors — pastoralism, limited culti- 
vation of grain crops, and hunting — and whereas these pro- 
vided a living for the people involved, they were not the basis 
on which an expanding economy could be built. Perhaps the 
best indicator of the limited attractions of South Africa's econ- 
omy was the fact that fewer Europeans emigrated there than to 
the United States, Canada, Australia, or even New Zealand. 



31 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Orange 




\ Pietermaritzburg 
(NATAL? Durban 



CAPE COLONY 



Orange j> 

\Thembu 
\ Xhosa 



Atlantic 
Ocean 

Cape Town 



Port Elizabeth 



Indian Ocean 





Boundary of European territory 




Colonial capital 


® 


Republic capital 


• 


Populated place 


Xhosa 


African territory 





100 200 Kilometers 





100 200 Miles 



Source: Based on information from Kevin Shillington, History of Southern Africa, 
London, 1987, 84. 

Figure 6. Southern Africa, 1870 

Moreover, areas of white and black settlement and political 
control were largely separate. In 1865 the Cape contained 
200,000 Khoikhoi and people of mixed ancestry (the basis of 
today's coloured population), as well as 100,000 Bantu speak- 
ers. Several hundred thousand blacks lived in Natal and in the 
Voortrekker republics. The vast majority of South Africa's black 
inhabitants, however, continued to live in independent African 
states ruled by their own kings and chiefs. In the 1860s, 
Mpande's Zululand was a still powerful state in which most 
Zulus lived. Moshoeshoe's Lesotho, although it had been 
attacked by the Orange Free State and its borders contracted, 
contained most of the Sotho people. To the northeast of the 
South African Republic, the Pedi under their king Sekhukhune 
had a well-armed state, and the Swazi kingdom continued to be 



32 



Historical Setting 



a powerful entity. Any observer traveling in South Africa in the 
late 1860s would have had little reason to assume that this bal- 
ance of power between blacks and whites would change dra- 
matically during the remainder of the nineteenth century. 

Industrialization and Imperialism, 1870-1910 

The Mineral Revolution 

Mineral discoveries in the 1860s, the 1870s, and the 1880s 
had an enormous impact on southern Africa. Diamonds were 
initially identified in 1867 in an area adjoining the confluence 
of the Vaal and the Orange rivers, just north of the Cape Col- 
ony, although it was not until 1869 to 1870 that finds were suffi- 
cient to attract a "rush" of several thousand fortune hunters. 
The British government, attracted by the prospect of mineral 
wealth, quickly annexed the diamond fields, repudiating the 
claims of the Voortrekker republics to the area. Four mines 
were developed, and the town of Kimberley was established. 
The town grew quickly and became the largest urban society in 
the interior of southern Africa in the 1870s and the 1880s. 
Although the mines were worked initially by small-scale claims- 
holders, the economics of diamond production and marketing 
soon led to consolidation. Within two decades of the first dia- 
mond find, the industry was essentially controlled by one 
monopolistic company — Cecil Rhodes's De Beers Consolidated 
Mines. 

The diamond industry became the key to the economic for- 
tunes of the Cape Colony by providing the single largest source 
of export earnings, as well as by fueling development through- 
out the colony. Whereas the Cape's exports in 1870 had been 
worth little more than £2,000,000, with wool providing the bulk 
of earnings, by the end of the century the value of exports had 
risen to more than £15,000,000, with diamonds alone account- 
ing for £4,000,000. There was also substantial growth in popula- 
tion, much of it from immigration. As a result, there were close 
to 400,000 resident Europeans in the Cape Colony by 1900, 
twice the number who had lived there in 1865. 

Gold soon eclipsed diamonds in importance. Africans had 
mined gold for centuries at Mapungubwe (in South Africa, on 
the border with Zimbabwe) and later at the successor state of 
Great Zimbabwe, and they had traded with Arabs and Portu- 
guese on the east coast of Africa. In the 1860s and the 1870s, 
Europeans made a number of small finds of their own, but the 



33 



South Africa: A Country Study 

major development took place in 1886 when potentially enor- 
mous deposits of gold were found on the Witwatersrand (liter- 
ally, "Ridge of White Waters" in Afrikaans, commonly 
shortened to Rand — see Glossary) near present-day Johannes- 
burg. English-speaking businessmen who had made their for- 
tunes in the diamond industry quickly bought up all the 
auriferous claims and established a series of large gold-mining 
companies that were to dominate the industry well into the 
twentieth century. 

Rhodes, who had succeeded in monopolizing the diamond 
industry, was much less successful on the Rand, where his com- 
panies proved to be poorer producers than those of his com- 
petitors. In the 1890s, he sought to compensate for his 
lackluster performance by carving out a personal empire in 
present-day Zimbabwe, original site of the fifteenth-century 
gold industry of Great Zimbabwe. There he ruled the Ndebele 
and the Shona people through his British South Africa Com- 
pany. 

Although beset by a number of technological problems in its 
early days, gold mining on the Rand grew rapidly, with output 
increasing from £80,000 in 1887 to nearly £8,000,000, or one- 
fifth of the world's gold production, in 1895. By the end of the 
century, more than £60,000,000 of capital had been invested in 
the gold industry, most of it by European investors, who 
thereby continued the pattern developed at Kimberley that 
southern Africa received more foreign investment than the rest 
of Africa combined. The gold mines employed 100,000 African 
laborers, five times as many as did the diamond mines, and 
drew these men from throughout southern Africa, although 
most came from Portuguese-ruled areas of Mozambique. 
Johannesburg, the newly established hub of this industry, had a 
population of 75,000 Europeans by the end of the century, 
which made it the largest city in southern Africa. 

Africans and Industrialization 

African Enterprise 

Africans participated actively in the new industrial economy. 
Thousands came to Kimberley in the early 1870s, some to 
obtain diamond claims, the majority to seek jobs in the mines 
and thereby to acquire the cash that would enable them to 
rebuild cattle herds depleted by drought, disease, and Boer 
raids. In the early 1870s, an average of 50,000 men a year 



34 



Historical Setting 



migrated to work in the mines, usually for two to three months, 
returning home with guns purchased in Kimberley, as well as 
cattle and cash. Many who lived in the area of the diamond 
finds chose to sell agricultural surpluses, rather than their 
labor, and to invest their considerable profits in increasing pro- 
duction for the growing urban market. African farmers in Brit- 
ish Basutoland (the British protectorate established in 
Lesotho), the Cape, and Natal also greatly expanded their pro- 
duction of foodstuffs to meet rising demand throughout south- 
ern Africa, and out of this development emerged a relatively 
prosperous peasantry supplying the new towns of the interior 
as well as the coastal ports. The growth of Kimberley and other 
towns also provided new economic opportunities for 
coloureds, many of whom were skilled tradesmen, and for Indi- 
ans, who, once they had completed their contracts on the sugar 
plantations, established shops selling goods to African custom- 
ers. 

Extending European Control 

Mineowners struggling to make a profit in the early days of 
the diamond industry sought, however, to undercut the bar- 
gaining strength of the Africans on whom they depended for 
labor. In 1872 Kimberley's white claimsholders persuaded the 
British colonial administration to introduce a pass law. This 
law, the foundation of the twentieth-century South African pass 
laws, required that all "servants" be in possession of passes that 
stated whether the holders were legally entitled to work in the 
city, whether or not they had completed their contractual obli- 
gations, and whether they could leave the city. The aim of this 
law, written in "color-blind" language but enforced against 
blacks only, was to limit the mobility of migrant workers, who 
frequently changed employers or left the diamond fields in a 
constant (and usually successful) attempt to bargain wages 
upward. 

Other restrictions followed the pass law. These included the 
establishment of special courts to process pass law offenders as 
rapidly as possible (the basis of segregated courts in the twenti- 
eth century), the laying out of special "locations" or ghettos in 
Kimberley where urban blacks had to live (the basis of munici- 
pal segregation practices), and, finally, in 1886 the formation 
of "closed compounds," fenced and guarded institutions in 
which all black diamond mine workers had to live for the dura- 
tion of their labor contracts. 



35 



South Africa: A Country Study 

The institutionalization of such discriminatory practices pro- 
duced in Kimberley the highest rate of incarceration and the 
lowest living standards for urban blacks in the Cape Colony. It 
also marked a major turnabout in the British administration of 
law. The previous official policy that all people irrespective of 
color be treated equally, while still accepted in legal theory, was 
now largely ignored injudicial practice. South Africa's first 
industrial city thus developed into a community in which dis- 
crimination became entrenched in the economic and social 
order, not because of racial antipathies formed on the frontier, 
but because of the desire for cheap labor. 

Because blacks would not put up with such conditions if they 
could maintain an autonomous existence on their own lands, 
the British embarked on a large-scale program of conquest in 
the 1870s and the 1880s. Mine owners argued that if they did 
not get cheap labor their industries would become unprofit- 
able. White farmers, English- and Dutch-speaking alike, inter- 
ested in expanding their own production for new urban 
markets, could not compete with the wages paid at the mines 
and demanded that blacks be forced to work for them. They 
argued that if blacks had to pay taxes in cash and that if most of 
their lands were confiscated, then they would have to seek work 
on the terms that white employers chose to offer. As a result of 
such pressures, the British fought wars against the Zulu, the 
Griqua, the Tswana, the Xhosa, the Pedi, and the Sotho, con- 
quering all but the last. By the middle of the 1880s, the major- 
ity of the black African population of South Africa that had still 
been independent in 1870 had been defeated, the bulk of their 
lands had been confiscated and given to white settlers, and 
taxes had been imposed on the people, who were now forced 
to live on rural "locations." In order to acquire food to survive 
and to earn cash to pay taxes, blacks now had to migrate to 
work on the farms, in the mines, and in the towns of newly 
industrialized South Africa. 

African Initiatives 

The final quarter of the nineteenth century was marked also 
by the rise of new forms of political and religious organization 
as blacks struggled to attain some degree of autonomy in a 
world that was rapidly becoming colonized. Because the right 
to vote was based on ownership of property rather than on race 
in the Cape, blacks could participate in electoral politics, and 
this they did in increasing numbers in the 1870s and the 1880s, 



36 



Historical Setting 



especially in the towns. In 1879 Africans in the eastern Cape 
formed the Native Educational Association (NEA), the pur- 
pose of which was to promote "the improvement and elevation 
of the native races." This was followed by the establishment of 
the more overtly political Imbumba Yama Nyama (literally, 
"hard, solid sinew"), formed in 1882 in Port Elizabeth, which 
sought to fight for "national rights" for Africans. 

In 1884 John Tengo Jabavu, a mission-educated teacher and 
vice president of the NEA, founded his own newspaper, Imvo 
Zabantsundu (Native Opinion). Jabavu used the newspaper as a 
forum through which to express African grievances about the 
pass laws; "location" regulations; the unequal administration of 
justice; and what were considered "anti-native" laws, such as the 
one passed in 1887 by the Cape Parliament at Rhodes's behest 
that raised the property qualification for voters and struck 
20,000 Africans off the rolls. Through these organizations and 
newspapers, and others like them established in the late nine- 
teenth century, Africans protested their unequal treatment, 
pointing out in particular contradictions between the theory 
and practice of British colonialism. They called for the eradica- 
tion of discrimination and for the incorporation of Africans 
into colonial society on an equal basis with Europeans. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, after property qualifications 
had again been raised in 1892, there were only about 8,000 
Africans on the Cape's voting roll. 

Africans sought to bypass what they considered the discrimi- 
natory practices of the established Christian churches (which 
often preached to segregated audiences and seldom promoted 
Africans within their ranks) by founding separate organizations 
of their own. Starting in 1884 with Nehemiah Tile, a Thembu 
(Tembu) Methodist preacher from the eastern Cape who left 
the Methodists and established the Tembu National Church, 
Africans built their own churches throughout South Africa. 
Many of these churches were termed "Ethiopian" by their 
founders, on the basis of the biblical prophecy "that Ethiopia 
shall soon stretch out her hands to God," and because for cen- 
turies an African-run independent Christian church had 
existed in Ethiopia. A strong influence on these churches in 
the 1890s and the early 1900s was the United States-based Afri- 
can Methodist Episcopal Church (AME), which sent missionar- 
ies to South Africa and trained many blacks from South Africa 
at its own institutions in the United States. Members of these 
independent churches called not so much for the elimination 



37 



South Africa: A Country Study 



of racial discrimination and inequality as for an "Africa for the 
Africans," that is, a country ruled by blacks. 

British Imperialism and the Afrikaners 

Minerals and the Growth of Boer-British Antipathy 

British pressures on the Dutch-speaking population of the 
South African Republic became intense in the aftermath of 
industrialization. In seizing the diamond fields in 1870, the 
British had swept aside many Boer land claims. In 1877, fearing 
a collapse of the South African Republic in the face of defeat 
by a Pedi army, the British had formally annexed the Boer 
state, as the Transvaal. They then set about destroying the Pedi 
to obtain laborers for the Kimberley mines, and they com- 
pleted the task in 1879. In 1880, however, the Transvaalers 
rose, and at the Battle of Majuba Hill in 1881, they defeated a 
British army. The British then withdrew, leaving the Boers vic- 
torious in what they would later call their First War of Indepen- 
dence. 

The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand greatly 
increased Boer-British tensions. Here was vast mineral wealth 
beyond British control. Moreover, the president of the South 
.African Republic, Paul Kruger, attempted to lessen his state's 
long-term dependence on Cape merchants by developing a rail 
link to Portuguese East .Africa. Such a link threatened British 
commercial interests and revived old fears of the Boers' gaining 
direct access to the sea and thus to other European powers. At 
the same time, the mine owners were, without exception, 
English speakers who exhibited no loyalty to the South African 
Republic and who did not seek to reinvest their gold profits in 
the local community. Indeed, they complained bitterly about 
all attempts to tax the gold industry. 

These economic tensions lay at the base of a political issue: 
the right of English speakers to have the vote. With the rise of 
the gold industry and the growth of Johannesburg, the South 
African Republic had been inundated by so many English- 
speaking immigrants (called uitlanders by the Boers), most of 
them skilled mine workers, that by the 1890s they constituted a 
majority of the white male population. The state's constitution 
limited the vote to males who had lived in the South African 
Republic for at least seven years, and Kruger feared that 
expanding the franchise would only enable mine owners to 
manipulate their workers and to thereby win political power. 



38 



Historical Setting 



British mine owners and officials constantly decried Kruger's 
refusal to extend the franchise. In December 1895, Cecil 
Rhodes took matters a step further by sending 500 armed men, 
employees of his British South Africa Company, into the South 
African Republic under the leadership of Dr. Leander Starr 
Jameson. Rhodes hoped that the uitlanders would rise and join 
the invaders to help overthrow Kruger's government. The inva- 
sion, however, was a fiasco: Boer commandos disarmed Jame- 
son and his men with little resistance, and the uitlanders took 
no action. Rhodes resigned the premiership of the Cape Col- 
ony in disgrace. The British government denied having 
advance knowledge of the invasion and claimed that it had no 
expansionist plans of its own. 

Distrusting the mine owners and the British government, 
Kruger sought to build his country's strength. He engaged in 
diplomatic relations with Germany, imported arms from 
Europe, and continued to deny the vote to uitlanders. He also 
cemented relations with the Orange Free State and sought sup- 
port from Dutch speakers in the Cape. In these endeavors, fie 
was assisted by a growing sense of Afrikaner identity that had 
developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This 
nationalistic identity had emerged clearly in the early 1880s, 
after the victory of Majuba Hill, when S.J. du Toit, a Dutch 
Reformed minister in the Cape, had published a newspaper, 
Die Afrikaanse Patriot (The Afrikaner Patriot), and a book, Die 
Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk (The History of 
our Land in the Language of our People), which argued that 
Afrikaners were a distinct people with their own fatherland in 
South Africa and that they were fulfilling a special mission 
determined expressly by God. Du Toit had gone on to found a 
political party in the Cape, the Afrikanerbond, to represent the 
interests of Dutch speakers. The Jameson Raid and anti-Boer 
sentiments expressed by gold magnates and British officials fur- 
ther cemented an Afrikaner sense of distinctiveness, which in 
the 1890s reached across political boundaries to include Dutch 
speakers in the Cape and the citizens of the Orange Free State 
as well as the Transvaalers. 

Rhodes, together with his fellow gold mining magnates and 
the British government (in the persons of Joseph Chamberlain, 
secretary of state for the colonies, and Alfred Milner, high com- 
missioner in South Africa) , continued to denounce Kruger and 
his government. Rhodes and his peers called attention to what 
they considered rampant official corruption while also com- 



39 



South Africa: A Country Study 

plaining that taxes were too high and that black labor was too 
expensive (because of perceived favoritism by the government 
regarding the labor needs of Afrikaner farmers). Chamberlain 
had concluded by the second half of the 1890s that the British 
needed to take direct action to contain Afrikaner power, and 
he had at first used diplomatic channels to pressure Kruger, 
although with little success. Milner pointed out what he consid- 
ered the appalling condition of British subjects in the South 
African Republic, where, without the vote, they were, he 
argued, "kept permanently in the position of helots." In 1899 
Milner advised Chamberlain that he considered the case for 
British intervention "overwhelming." Ignoring attempts by 
Kruger to reach a compromise, Chamberlain in September 
1899 issued an ultimatum requiring that Kruger enfranchise 
British residents of the South African Republic. At the same 
time, Chamberlain sent troop reinforcements from Britain to 
the Cape. Kruger, certain that the British were bent on war, 
took the initiative and, allied with the Orange Free State, 
declared war on the British in October 1899. 

The South African War 

The South African War (1899-1902), fought by the British to 
establish their hegemony in South Africa and by the Afrikaners 
to defend their autonomy, lasted three years and caused enor- 
mous suffering. Ninety thousand Afrikaners fought against a 
British army that eventually approached 500,000 men, most 
from Britain but including large numbers of volunteers also 
from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Approximately 
30,000 Africans were also employed as soldiers by the British, 
while thousands more labored as transport workers. Kruger's 
forces, taking advantage of initial superiority in numbers 
(before the British regulars arrived) and of surprise, won a 
number of victories at the beginning of the war. In 1900, how- 
ever, British forces overwhelmed the Boers, took Bloemfontein 
(capital of the Orange Free State), Johannesburg, and Pretoria 
(capital of the South African Republic), and forced Kruger 
into exile. Resistance continued, however, in the countryside, 
where the Boers fought a ferocious guerrilla war. The British 
ultimately succeeded in breaking this resistance, but only by 
adopting a scorched-earth policy. In 1901 and 1902, the British 
torched more than 30,000 farms in the South African Republic 
and the Orange Free State and placed all the Afrikaner women 
and children in concentration camps, where, because of over- 



40 



Reproduction of painting by R. Caton Woodville of the ill-fated 

Jameson Raid, 1895-96 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

crowding and unsanitary conditions, more than 25,000 per- 
ished. 

Peace was finally concluded at the town of Vereeniging on 
May 21, 1902. Milner, who drew up the terms, intended that 
Afrikaner power should be broken forever. He required that 
the Boers hand over all their arms and agree to the incorpora- 
tion of their territories into the British empire as the Orange 
River Colony and the Transvaal. However, he made one signifi- 
cant concession to Boer sentiments by agreeing that the fran- 
chise would not be extended to Africans throughout South 
Africa (they had no vote in the Boer republics) until the local 
white population could decide that issue themselves. Since Mil- 
ner himself believed that "political equality" of blacks and 
whites was "impossible" and that South Africa was really a white 
man's country in which the role of blacks should essentially be 
limited to that of "well-treated" labor, the concession was not a 
large one for him to make. 

Milner 's Peace 

Milner sought to consolidate the military victory by adopting 



41 



South Africa: A Country Study 



three policies. He planned to encourage large numbers to emi- 
grate from Britain so that English speakers would attain a 
numerical majority among South Africa's white population. He 
wanted to institute policies of denationalization and of anglici- 
zation so that Afrikaners would lose their sense of a separate 
identity and would assimilate into British culture. To ensure 
the successful implementation of both policies, he intended to 
rule South Africa directly without local representation. 

Milner also believed that the successful development of a 
loyal colonial society rested above all on ensuring the profit- 
ability of the gold industry even if that meant great strains for 
the African population. To that end, he sought to address the 
postwar labor needs of the gold mines by strictly enforcing pass 
laws in the cities and by collecting taxes from Africans in the 
countryside. 

Relations between Africans and Europeans were increasingly 
strained as Milner's policies were implemented. Pressures in 
Natal were particularly severe. Most of Zululand had been 
annexed to Natal in 1897, a decade after approximately one- 
third of Zululand had been incorporated into the South Afri- 
can Republic. These strains erupted into violence in 1905, 
when a Zulu chief, Bambatha, invoking the memory of King 
Shaka, led an armed uprising. British firepower was too great, 
however, and in 1906 Bambatha and several thousand of his fol- 
lowers were killed in central Natal. His was the last armed 
struggle against colonial rule. 

Despite opposition from local whites, who feared the addi- 
tion of yet another racial group to their community, Milner 
also supported the gold magnates' plans to import large num- 
bers of indentured Chinese laborers to work in the mines. The 
first men arrived in 1904, and by 1906 there were 50,000 Chi- 
nese at work, comprising one-third of the gold mines' labor 
force. 

Milner's belief expressed before the war that blacks and 
whites could never be recognized as equal in South Africa 
received official sanction in 1905 with the final report of the 
South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC). The Brit- 
ish had gone to war in 1899 stating their abhorrence of the 
racially discriminatory policies adopted in the Afrikaner repub- 
lics and because of such sentiments had received the active sup- 
port of thousands of Africans. Between 1903 and 1905, the 
SANAC commissioners looked into the question of developing 
a common "native policy" for all of South Africa. Despite the 



42 



Historical Setting 



testimony of numerous members of the educated African elite 
decrying discriminatory policies, the commissioners concluded 
that there should be no political equality between blacks and 
whites, that separate voters' rolls should be established, and 
that territorial separation was advisable for the races. 

Yet none of Milner's policies met with real success. The gold 
industry, burdened with the costs of rebuilding after the devas- 
tation of the war, produced only limited profits, and South 
Africa continued to be economically depressed for much of the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Few immigrants were 
attracted by such poor prospects, and fewer than 1,200 British 
settler families came, less than one-eighth of the number Mil- 
ner had hoped for. His denationalization policy was a complete 
failure. Indeed, Afrikaners, already imbued with a sense of col- 
lective suffering by their nineteenth-century experiences at the 
hands of British imperialists, were even more united after the 
South African War (which they termed the Second War of 
Independence). They celebrated their language, Afrikaans, 
and demonstrated its beauty in an outpouring of poetry. They 
set up their own schools, insisting that their children should be 
taught in Afrikaans and not be limited to the English-only 
instruction of government schools. In addition, they estab- 
lished new political parties to push for self-government: Oranje 
Unie (Orange Union) formed by Abraham Fischer and Gene- 
ral James "Barry" Munnik (J.B.M.) Hertzog in the Orange 
River Colony and Het Volk (The People) founded by General 
Louis Botha and Jan C. Smuts in the Transvaal. The greatest 
blow to Milner's plans, however, came in 1905 with the victory 
of the Liberal Party in the British general election and the for- 
mation of a government led by men who had opposed the 
scorched-earth policy in the South African War as no more 
than "methods of barbarism." 

Formation of the Union of South Africa, 1910 

Accepting the fact that English speakers would never consti- 
tute a majority in white South Africa, the Liberal government 
sought to come to terms with the Afrikaner majority. In 1907 
the British granted limited self-government to both the Trans- 
vaal and the Orange River Colony, and in subsequent elections, 
Het Volk and the Oranje Unie swept to victory. In the following 
year, the South African Party (SAP), led by an English-speaking 
critic of British imperialism and dependent on the support of 
the Afrikaner Bond, came to power in the Cape Colony. Reas- 



43 



South Africa: A Country Study 

sured by the readiness of Het Volk's leaders, Botha and Smuts, 
to assist the gold-mining industry in obtaining larger supplies 
of cheap black labor (although without the Chinese workers 
who were repatriated in 1908) and in repressing militant white 
miners (who protested conditions of labor and job competition 
from blacks), the British government encouraged negotiations 
in South Africa among white representatives of the four self- 
governing colonies with the aim of establishing a single state. 

Negotiations held in 1908 and in 1909 produced a constitu- 
tion that embodied three fundamental principles: South Africa 
would adopt the Westminster style of government and would 
become a unitary state in which political power would be won 
by a simple majority and in which parliament would be sover- 
eign; the question of voting rights for blacks would be left up to 
each of the four self-governing colonies to decide for itself (the 
Cape and Natal based their franchise on a property qualifica- 
tion; the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal denied all 
blacks the vote); and both English and Dutch would be official 
languages. The constitution also provided for future incorpora- 
tion of the British-governed territories of Southern Rhodesia, 
Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana), Basutoland (present- 
day Lesotho), and Swaziland into the union. 

In May 1910, Louis Botha became the first prime minister of 
the newly established Union of South Africa, a dominion of the 
British Empire, and Jan Smuts became his deputy. Just eight 
years earlier, both men had been generals in Kruger's army; 
now, through the SAP, they governed a country of 4 million 
Africans, 500,000 coloureds, 150,000 Indians, and 1,275,000 
whites. 

Segregation, 1910-48 

Building the Legal Structure of Racial Discrimination 

Several pieces of legislation marked the establishment of the 
Union of South Africa as a state in which racial discrimination 
received official sanction. The Native Labour Regulation Act 
(No. 15) of 1911 made it a criminal offense for Africans, but 
not for whites, to break a labor contract. The Dutch Reformed 
Church Act of 1911 prohibited Africans from becoming full 
members of the church. The Mines and Works Act (No. 12) of 
1911 legitimized the long-term mining practice by which whites 
monopolized skilled jobs by effectively restricting Africans to 
semi-skilled and unskilled labor in the mines. Most important, 



44 



Historical Setting 



the Natives Land Act (No. 27) of 1913 separated South Africa 
into areas in which either blacks or whites could own freehold 
land: blacks, constituting two-thirds of the population, were 
restricted to 7.5 percent of the land; whites, making up one- 
fifth of the population, were given 92.5 percent. The act also 
stated that Africans could live outside their own lands only if 
employed as laborers by whites. In particular, it made illegal 
the common practice of having Africans work as sharecroppers 
on farms in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 

Formation of the African National Congress, 1912 

Milner's pro-white policies followed by the discriminatory 
legislation enacted by the Union of South Africa engendered 
considerable resistance from blacks and led to the formation 
and growth of new political bodies. In 1902 coloureds in Cape 
Town had formed the African Political Organisation to repre- 
sent the interests of "educated . . . Coloured people." Abdullah 
Abdurahman, a Scottish-trained doctor, became president of 
the organization in 1904, and, by stressing the political discrim- 
ination to which coloureds were subjected, he had built it into 
a vital body with 20,000 members by 1910. Mohandas Gandhi 
began a passive resistance campaign against the pass laws in 
1906, leading Indians in Natal and the Transvaal (they were 
legally prohibited from living in or entering the Orange Free 
State) in demonstrations and organizing stop-work protests 
that won the support of thousands of people. Numerous meet- 
ings were held by Africans, coloureds, and Indians to protest 
the whites-only nature of the constitutional discussions that 
took place in 1908 to 1909. These activities culminated in 
March 1909 in a South African Native Convention, which 
called for a constitution giving "full and equal rights" for all 
blacks, coloureds, and Indians. 

But it was opposition to the Natives Land Act, preliminary 
drafts of which were debated in 1911, that led to the formation 
in 1912 of the most significant organization, the South African 
Native National Congress (renamed the African National Con- 
gress [ANC] in 1923). Several hundred members of South 
Africa's educated African elite met at Bloemfontein on January 
8, 1912, and established a national organization to protest 
racial discrimination and to appeal for equal treatment before 
the law. The founding president was John L. Dube, a minister 
and schoolteacher who had studied in the United States and 
who had been strongly influenced by Booker T Washington. 



45 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, a lawyer with degrees from Columbia 
University and Oxford University and a prime mover in orga- 
nizing the meeting to establish the congress, was appointed 
treasurer. Solomon T. Plaatje, a court translator, author, and 
newspaper editor who had worked in Kimberley and Johannes- 
burg, became secretary general. The meeting opened and 
closed with the singing of the hymn "Nkosi sikelel'i Afrika" 
("God Bless Africa"), which had been composed at the end of 
the nineteenth century by a Xhosa poet. 

The congress was moderate in composition, tone, and prac- 
tice. Its founders were men who felt that British rule had 
brought considerable benefits, especially Christianity, educa- 
tion, and the rule of law, but who also considered that their 
careers as teachers, lawyers, and court translators were hin- 
dered by the racial discrimination so endemic in South Africa. 
They called not for an end to British rule but for respect for 
the concept of equality for all, irrespective of color. They 
respected "traditional" authorities in African societies and 
made chiefs and kings office-holders as of right within the con- 
gress. They believed that they could best achieve their aims by 
dialogue with the British. As John Dube said, the congress pur- 
sued a policy of "hopeful reliance on the sense of common jus- 
tice and love of freedom so innate in the British character." 
Such reliance, however, proved unfounded. When the congress 
sent a deputation to London in 1914 to protest the Natives 
Land Act, the colonial secretary informed them that there was 
nothing that he could do. Members of another deputation that 
went to London in 1919 were received sympathetically by 
Prime Minister Lloyd George, but they were also told that their 
problems would have to be resolved in South Africa by the 
South African government. 

World War I and Afrikaner Nationalism 

In August 1914, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, amid much con- 
troversy, took South Africa into World War I on the side of the 
British. Botha and Smuts considered that South Africa, as a 
British dominion, had no choice in the matter, and they sent 
troops to conquer the German protectorate of South-West 
Africa (present-day Namibia, mandated by the League of 
Nations to South Africa following World War I) . More soldiers, 
including a corps of coloured volunteers, were later sent to 
fight in German East Africa and in France. Many Afrikaners felt 
no loyalty to Britain and opposed going to war with Germany, 



46 



Historical Setting 



which had aided them during the South African War. An 
attempted coup against Botha's government in September was 
aborted when one of the leaders, an Afrikaner hero from the 
South African War, was killed by police. An armed uprising of 
nearly 10,000 men in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal 
later in the year, led by another war hero, was crushed by 
Botha's forces. 

The political opposition to Botha's entry into the war was led 
by J.B.M. Hertzog and his newly formed National Party of 
South Africa (NP). Hertzog was a former close ally of Botha 
who had split with the SAP over three issues: he felt that the 
SAP worked too closely with English mine owners (whom he 
considered "fortune-hunters"); he thought that only lip-service 
was being given to the policy of making Dutch equal with 
English as an official language; and he wanted more done to 
separate blacks and whites. The National Party was established 
in January 1914 to take up these issues. Support for the party 
grew, especially with South African entry into the war, and by 
1915 there were branches in the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State led by Hertzog and by Tielman Roos, respectively, 
and in the Cape, where Daniel F. (D.F.) Malan edited the 
party's newspaper, Die Burger (The Citizen). 

Hertzog and his allies took various steps to strengthen the 
basis of Afrikaner nationalism. They stressed the richness and 
importance of Afrikaans rather than Dutch, and supported 
publication of books and magazines in the former language. 
They also sought to alleviate the poverty that had become 
endemic among Afrikaners, many of whom had been driven 
off the land into the cities in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and during the South African War. Because almost all 
commercial enterprises and banks were run by English speak- 
ers, these people had little success in obtaining jobs or loans 
from such institutions. Many found work as unskilled laborers 
in the mines, where their color alone assured that they got 
higher pay than blacks. 

Using the concept of helpmekaar (mutual aid), initially 
adopted to assist the unsuccessful rebels of 1914 and their fam- 
ilies, relatively wealthy Afrikaner wine farmers in the western 
Cape pooled their resources and in 1918 established the South 
African National Trust Company (San tarn) and the South Afri- 
can National Life Assurance Company (Sanlam). These new 
companies, a credit institution and a life insurance business, 
respectively, acquired their capital from Afrikaners and 



47 



South Africa: A Country Study 

invested their funds only with Afrikaners. Also in 1918, another 
exclusively Afrikaner organization was formed, the Afrikaner 
Broederbond (later the Broederbond, or Brotherhood — 
although this literal translation has never been used as a term 
of reference). This organization, which in 1921 became a 
secret society, was established by young professionals — teach- 
ers, clerks, and ministers in the Dutch Reformed Church — who 
believed that they, too, needed to act to protect and to cele- 
brate Afrikaner culture. 

Conflict in the 1920s 

In 1922 the interaction of economic and ethnic factors pro- 
duced armed conflict among whites. Strikes had been orga- 
nized by white miners in 1907, 1913, and 1914 over the 
conditions of labor and the threat of black competition, with 
the result that mine owners had agreed to reserve some semi- 
skilled work for whites. In addition, white miners split politi- 
cally; many of the English-speaking mine workers joined the 
Labour Party (formed in 1909), while the Afrikaners supported 
the National Party. Some of the more radical workers left the 
Labour Party in 1915 to form the International Socialist 
League of South Africa, which in turn became the Communist 
Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1921. 

In the context of postwar depression, the mine owners pro- 
posed in 1922 that wages be reduced, that several thousand 
white semi-skilled and unskilled workers be dismissed, and that 
the statutory "colour bar" be lifted, thereby enabling the 
employers to increase the ratio of black workers to white. The 
white workers, supported by the Labour and National parties, 
went on strike. With militant Afrikaner nationalists taking a 
leading role and organizing commandos, the strikers marched 
through Johannesburg behind banners proclaiming "Workers 
of the World Unite, and Fight for a White South Africa," occu- 
pied fortified positions in the mines, and announced the estab- 
lishment of a White Workers' Republic. Smuts, prime minister 
since Botha's death in 1919, struck back with 20,000 troops and 
with artillery, tanks, and bomber aircraft. In the ensuing con- 
flict, seventy-six strikers were killed, 4,748 were arrested, and 
eighteen were sentenced to death, of whom only four were 
hanged. 

Smuts won only a temporary victory because in the 1924 
general election he was swept out of office by an alliance of the 
National and Labour parties and was replaced as prime minis- 



48 



Historical Setting 



ter by J.B.M. Hertzog. The new government took immediate 
steps to protect the privileged position of white labor by enact- 
ing the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of 
1925. The former law gave legal recognition to white trade 
unions but not to black; the latter enabled the minister of labor 
to force employers to give preference to the hiring of white 
workers. In addition, the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 
1926 reinforced the color bar in the mining industry. Together, 
these laws became the cornerstone of what Hertzog termed his 
"civilised labour" policy. Hertzog also introduced measures to 
provide whites with greater job opportunities by instituting 
higher protective tariffs to encourage local manufacturing; by 
opening up new overseas trade relations, especially with Ger- 
many; and by establishing the state-owned South African Iron 
and Steel Corporation (Iscor). He proposed as well a number 
of "native bills" to restrict the voting rights of Africans, removed 
the property qualification for all white voters, and enfranchised 
white women, thereby more than doubling the number of eligi- 
ble white voters while reducing black voters to a negligible 
number. He also introduced legislation replacing Dutch with 
Afrikaans as an official language. 

Black opposition to these measures took a variety of forms, 
the most important of which was the growth of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). The ICU had been 
established in 1919 as a trade union for coloured dockworkers 
in Cape Town by Clements Kadalie, a mission-educated African 
from Nyasaland (present-day Malawi). Kadalie's organization 
grew enormously in the 1920s, in rural as well as in urban 
areas, as it tapped the great discontent that blacks already felt 
for the segregationist policies of Botha and Smuts and their 
increased disturbance over Hertzog's "civilised labour" legisla- 
tion. ICU organizers, often men with links to the independent 
African churches who had little time for the overly "moderate" 
policies of the ANC and who were strongly influenced by the 
back-to-Africa movement of Marcus Garvey, galvanized mass 
support with calls for an immediate end to discrimination and 
to colonial rule. By 1928 the ICU's claimed membership, pre- 
dominantly rural-based, had grown to between 150,000 and 
200,000 Africans, 15,000 coloureds, and 250 whites, making it a 
far larger political body than the ANC. Yet the organization 
soon collapsed, brought down by the contradiction between 
the near-millennial expectations of its followers and the refusal 
of Hertzog's government to offer any concessions, and by the 



49 



South Africa: A Country Study 



inability of blacks to force the government to change any of its 
policies. By the end of the 1920s, only a few regional branches 
of the ICU remained, and Kadalie was no longer at the head of 
the organization. 

The Great Depression and the 1930s 

The onset of the Great Depression brought about consider- 
able political change. Hertzog, whose National Party had won 
the 1929 election alone, after splitting with the Labour Party, 
received much of the blame for the devastating economic 
impact of the depression. Fearing electoral defeat in the next 
election (1934), he sought a partnership with his former oppo- 
nent, Jan Smuts, and the latter's South African Party. In 1933 
Hertzog and Smuts made an alliance, and in the following year 
they merged their two parties to form the United South Afri- 
can National Party, also known as the United Party (UP). Hert- 
zog and Smuts then won the general election; Hertzog 
continued as prime minister and Smuts became his deputy. 
Many Afrikaners criticized Hertzog's move, especially because 
they considered Smuts to be an opponent of Afrikaner nation- 
alism who was too closely allied with the English mine owners; 
under the leadership of D.F. Malan and the Broederbond, they 
split away to form their own political party, the Purified 
National Party. 

Malan built his political appeal by stressing the particular 
sufferings of the Afrikaner people. Their economic problems 
had become especially evident during the depression, when 
the Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites had concluded in 
1931 that nearly one-third of Afrikaners lived as paupers, 
whereas few English-speaking whites lived below the poverty 
line. To deal with this problem, Malan and his allies in the 
Broederbond encouraged the development of an Afrikaner 
economic movement. The Volkskas (People's Bank) was 
founded in 1934; and exclusively Afrikaner trade unions, which 
espoused a Christian-National ethic combining devout Calvin- 
ism with ethnic nationalism, were established at the same time. 
In subsequent years, the Broederbond worked closely with San- 
lam/Santam to pool whatever wealth was available and to invest 
it in new economic opportunities for the volk (people). Malan 
and his allies also drew attention to the past sufferings of the 
Afrikaner people by organizing a commemorative reenactment 
in 1938 of the Great Trek. Ox-wagon parades through the 
country culminated in a festival held in Pretoria on December 



50 



Afrikaans Language 
Monument (Afrikaans e 
Taalmonument) atPaarl, 
Western Cape 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 




16, the exact day on which, 100 years earlier, the Zulu had been 
defeated at the Battle of Blood River. A massive Voortrekker 
Monument, replete with friezes depicting the heroism of the 
Voortrekkers and the treachery of the Africans, was officially 
opened while Malan made a speech in which he said that it was 
the duty of Afrikaners "to make South Africa a white man's 
land." 

Hertzog and Smuts, while rejecting the ethnic nationalism of 
Malan, hardly differed with him in their policies toward blacks. 
In the mid-1980s, the United Party government introduced leg- 
islation to remove Africans from the common voters' roll in the 
Cape, to limit them to electing white representatives to Parlia- 
ment, and to create a Natives Representative Council that had 
advisory powers only (Representation of Natives Act [No. 12] 
of 1936). The government increased the amount of land set 
aside for blacks from 7.5 percent to 13 percent of South Africa, 
but confirmed the policy that the country should always be seg- 
regated unequally by race (the Native Trust and Land Act [No. 
18] of 1936) and enforced even stricter regulation of the pass 
laws (the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937). In response to 
growing anti-Semitic sentiments among Afrikaners — usually 
directed at the mine owners, many of whom were Jewish — the 
government introduced legislation to prevent the immigration 
of Jews into South Africa (the Aliens Act [No. 1] of 1937). The 



51 



South Africa: A Country Study 

same law also prohibited the entry of any immigrant who could 
not quickly assimilate into the white population. 

Organized black responses to these measures were muted. 
The ANC, under the conservative leadership of Pixley Seme 
since 1930, concentrated on advising Africans to try to better 
themselves and to respect their chiefs rather than engaging in 
an active condemnation of Hertzog's policies. Membership in 
the congress fell to a few thousand. In December 1935, some 
ANC members, dissatisfied with this approach, together with 
representatives of Indian and coloured political organizations, 
met in Bloemfontein and formed the All-African Convention 
(AAC) to protest the proposed new laws as well as segregation 
in general. But even this organization, composed largely of 
members of the black professional class along with church 
leaders and students, avoided the confrontational approach of 
the ICU. The AAC leaders stressed their loyalty to South Africa 
and to Britain and called yet again for the British Parliament to 
intervene to ameliorate the condition of blacks. 

The Impact of World War II 

The outbreak of World War II in 1939 proved a divisive fac- 
tor in the white community. Smuts favored entry into the war 
on the side of the British. Hertzog supported neutrality. Many 
of Malan's supporters wanted to enter the war on Germany's 
side. German National Socialism, with its emphasis on the 
racial superiority of Germanic peoples, its anti-Semitism, and 
its use of state socialism to benefit the "master race," had gar- 
nered many Afrikaner admirers in the 1930s. A neo-Nazi Grey- 
shirt organization had been formed in 1933 that drew 
increasing support, especially among rural Afrikaners, in the 
late 1930s. In 1938 Afrikaners participating in the commemo- 
ration of the Great Trek had established the Ossewabrandwag 
(Oxwagon Sentinel) as a paramilitary organization aimed at 
inculcating a "love for fatherland" and at instituting, by armed 
force if necessary, an Afrikaner-controlled republic in South 
Africa. By the end of the decade, the Ossewabrandwag claimed 
a membership of 250,000 out of a total Afrikaner population of 
a little more than 1 million. Oswald Pirow, Hertzog's minister 
of defense until the end of 1939, formed a movement within 
the National Party called the New Order, a fascist program for 
remaking South African society along Nazi lines. Smuts pre- 
vailed, however, winning the support of a majority of the cabi- 
net and becoming prime minister. Hertzog resigned and 



52 



Historical Setting 



joined with Malan in forming the Herenigde (Reunited) 
National Party (HNP). South Africa sent troops to fight on the 
British side in North Africa and in Europe. In South Africa, sev- 
eral thousand members of the Ossewabrandwag, including a 
future prime minister, John Vorster, were interned for antiwar 
activities. 

Economically and socially, the war had a profound effect. 
While gold continued to be the most important industry, pro- 
viding two-thirds of South Africa's revenues and three-quarters 
of its export earnings, manufacturing grew enormously to meet 
wartime demands. Between 1939 and 1945, the number of peo- 
ple employed in manufacturing, many of them African women, 
rose 60 percent. Urbanization increased rapidly: the number of 
African town dwellers almost doubled. By 1946 there were 
more Africans in South Africa's towns and cities than there 
were whites. Many of these blacks lived in squatter communi- 
ties established on the outskirts of major cities such as Cape 
Town and Johannesburg. Such developments, although neces- 
sary for war production, contradicted the segregationist ideol- 
ogy that blacks should live in their rural locations and not 
become permanent urban residents. 

More unsettling still to the segregationists was the develop- 
ment of new black organizations that demanded official recog- 
nition of their existence and better treatment of their 
members. In Johannesburg, for example, James Mpanza pro- 
claimed himself king of his Orlando squatter encampment, set 
up his own system of local government and taxation, and estab- 
lished the Sofasonke ("We shall all die together") Party. Urban 
black workers, demanding higher wages and better working 
conditions, also formed their own trade unions and engaged in 
a rash of strikes throughout the early 1940s. By 1946 the Coun- 
cil of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), formed in 1941, 
claimed 158,000 members organized in 119 unions. The most 
important of these new trade unions was the African Mine- 
workers Union (AMWU), which by 1944 claimed a member- 
ship of 25,000. In 1946 the AMWU struck for higher wages in 
the gold mines and succeeded in getting 60,000 men to stop 
work. The strike was crushed by police actions that left twelve 
dead, but it demonstrated the potential strength of organized 
black workers in challenging the cheap labor system. 

The 1 948 Election 

Smuts's governing United Party and Malan's HNP went into 



53 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the 1948 general election campaign on opposing platforms. 
The United Party based its platform on the report of the Native 
Laws Commission chaired by Judge Henry Fagan. The Fagan 
commission argued that because of the influx of Africans into 
the cities and because of the impoverishment of the African 
reserves, total segregation was impossible. Although it did not 
recommend social or political integration, the commission sug- 
gested that African labor should be stabilized in the cities, 
where the needs of industrial and commercial operations were 
greatest. The HNP's platform, based on a report by Paul Sauer, 
argued to the contrary, that only total separation of the races 
would prevent a move toward equality and the eventual over- 
whelming of white society by black. 

The HNP stated that Africans should be viewed as only tem- 
porary dwellers in the cities and should be forced periodically 
to return to the countryside to meet the labor needs of farmers 
(primarily Afrikaners). In addition, the HNP platform declared 
that Africans should develop political bodies in "their true 
fatherland," the African reserves, and should have no form of 
parliamentary representation in South Africa. 

Malan also called for the prohibition of mixed marriages, for 
the banning of black trade unions, and for stricter enforce- 
ment of job reservation. Running on this platform of apart- 
heid, as it was termed for the first time, Malan and the HNP, 
benefiting from the weight given to rural electorates, defeated 
Smuts and the United Party. The HNP won a majority of the 
seats contested but only a minority of the votes cast. The HNP 
became the government and, renamed the National Party 
(NP), ruled South Africa until 1994. 

Apartheid, 1948-76 

The Legislative Implementation of Apartheid 

Malan and the National Party, fearing that they might lose 
office in the next election, immediately set about introducing 
laws to give apartheid a legislative reality that could not easily 
be overturned. Such laws aimed at separating whites and 
blacks, at instituting as a legal principle the theory that whites 
should be treated more favorably than blacks and that separate 
facilities need not be equal, and at providing the state with the 
powers deemed necessary to deal with any opposition. 



54 



Historical Setting 



Separating Black from White 

The Population Registration Act (No. 30) of 1950 provided 
the basis for separating the population of South Africa into dif- 
ferent races. Under the terms of this act, all residents of South 
Africa were to be classified as white, coloured, or native (later 
called Bantu) people. Indians, whom the HNP in 1948 had 
refused to recognize as permanent inhabitants of South Africa, 
were included under the category "Asian" in 1959. The act 
required that people be classified primarily on the basis of 
their "community acceptability"; later amendments placed 
greater stress on "appearance" in order to deal with the prac- 
tice of light-colored blacks "passing" as whites. The act also pro- 
vided for the compilation of a population register for the 
whole country and for the issuing of identity cards. 

Other laws provided for geographic, social, and political sep- 
aration. The Group Areas Act (No. 41) of 1950 extended the 
provisions of the Natives Land Act (No. 27) of 1913, and later 
laws divided South Africa into separate areas for whites and 
blacks (including coloureds), and gave the government the 
power to forcibly remove people from areas not designated for 
their particular racial group. The Tomlinson Commission in 
1954 officially concluded that the areas set aside for Africans 
would support no more than two-thirds of the African popula- 
tion even under the best of conditions, but the government 
ignored its recommendation that more land be allocated to the 
reserves and began removing Africans from white areas. 

The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No. 55) of 1949 
made marriages between whites and members of other racial 
groups illegal. The Immorality Act (No. 21) of 1950 extended 
an earlier ban on sexual relations between whites and blacks 
(the Immorality Act [No. 5] of 1927) to a ban on sexual rela- 
tions between whites and any non-whites. The Bantu Authori- 
ties Act (No. 68) of 1951 established Bantu tribal, regional, and 
territorial authorities in the regions set out for Africans under 
the Group Areas Act, and it abolished the Natives Representa- 
tive Council. The Bantu authorities were to be dominated by 
chiefs and headmen appointed by the government. The gov- 
ernment also sought in 1951 to remove coloured voters in the 
Cape from the common roll onto a separate roll and to require 
that they elect white representatives only (Separate Representa- 
tion of Voters Act [No. 46] of 1951). The Supreme Court 
immediately declared the act invalid on constitutional 
grounds, but after a long struggle it was successfully reenacted 



55 



South Africa: A Country Study 

(the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act [No. 
30] of 1956). 

Separate and Unequal 

The concept of unequal allocation of resources was built 
into legislation on general facilities, education, and jobs. The 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (No. 49) of 1953 stated 
that all races should have separate amenities — such as toilets, 
parks, and beaches — and that these need not be of an equiva- 
lent quality. Under the provisions of this act, apartheid signs 
were erected throughout South Africa. 

The Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 decreed that 
blacks should be provided with separate educational facilities 
under the control of the Ministry of Native Affairs, rather than 
the Ministry of Education. The pupils in these schools would 
be taught their Bantu cultural heritage and, in the words of 
Hendrik F. Verwoerd, minister of native affairs, would be 
trained "in accordance with their opportunities in life," which 
he considered did not reach "above the level of certain forms 
of labour." The act also removed state subsidies from denomi- 
national schools with the result that most of the mission-run 
African institutions (with the exception of some schools run by 
the Roman Catholic Church and the Seventh Day Adventists) 
were sold to the government or closed. The Extension of Uni- 
versity Education Act (No. 45) of 1959 prohibited blacks from 
attending white institutions, with few exceptions, and estab- 
lished separate universities and colleges for Africans, 
coloureds, and Indians. 

The Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 28) of 1956 enabled 
the minister of labour to reserve categories of work for mem- 
bers of specified racial groups. In effect, if the minister felt that 
white workers were being pressured by "unfair competition" 
from blacks, he could recategorize jobs for whites only and 
increase their rates of pay. Under the terms of the Native Laws 
Amendment Act (No. 54) of 1952, African women as well as 
men were made subject to influx control and the pass laws and, 
under Section 10 of the act, neither men nor women could 
remain in an urban area for longer than seventy-two hours 
without a special permit stating that they were legally 
employed. The Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Docu- 
ments Act (No. 67) of 1952, which was designed to make the 
policy of pass restrictions easier, abolished the pass, replacing it 
with a document known as a "reference book." The act stated 



56 



Historical Setting 



that all Africans had to carry a reference book containing their 
photograph, address, marital status, employment record, list of 
taxes paid, influx control endorsements, and rural district 
where officially resident; not having the reference book on 
one's person was a criminal offense punishable by a prison sen- 
tence. 

Security Legislation 

Whereas the above laws built largely on existing legislation, 
police powers underwent a much greater expansion. The Sup- 
pression of Communism Act (No. 44) of 1950 had declared the 
Communist Party and its ideology illegal. Among other fea- 
tures, the act defined communism as any scheme that aimed 
"at bringing about any political, industrial, social, or economic 
change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or 
disorder" or that encouraged "feelings of hostility between the 
European and the non-European races of the Union the conse- 
quences of which are calculated to further ..." disorder. The 
act allowed the minister of justice to list members of such orga- 
nizations and to ban them, usually for five-year periods, from 
public office, from attending public meetings, or from being in 
any specified area of South Africa. The Public Safety Act (No. 
3) of 1953 gave the British governor general power to suspend 
all laws and to proclaim a state of emergency. The Criminal 
Law Amendment Act (No. 8) of 1953 stated that anyone 
accompanying a person found guilty of offenses committed 
while "protesting], or in support of any campaign for the 
repeal or modification of any law," would also be presumed 
guilty and would have the burden of proving his or her inno- 
cence. The Native Administration Act (No. 42) of 1956 permit- 
ted the government to "banish" Africans, essentially exiling 
them to remote rural areas far from their homes. The Customs 
and Excise Act of 1955 and the Official Secrets Act (No. 16) of 
1956 gave the government power to establish a Board of Cen- 
sors to censor books, films, and other materials imported into 
or produced in South Africa. During the 1950s, enforcement of 
these various laws resulted in approximately 500,000 pass-law 
arrests annually, in the listing of more than 600 inhabitants as 
communists, in the banning of nearly 350 inhabitants, and in 
the banishment of more than 150 other inhabitants. 

White Politics 

The National Party's legislative program received increasing 



57 



South Africa: A Country Study 

support from the white electorate. The NP won re-election in 
1953 and in 1958, each time with increased majorities. Malan 
retired in 1955 and was replaced as prime minister byJ.G. Stry- 
dom, leader of the Transvaal branch of the party. After Stry- 
dom's death in 1958, Hendrik F. Verwoerd, the Dutch-born 
minister of native affairs as well as a former professor of 
applied psychology and the preeminent proponent of apart- 
heid, became prime minister. The United Party (UP) com- 
peted aggressively for white votes by adopting a pro-white 
platform, by rejecting government expenditures on acquiring 
more land for African reserves, and by supporting the removal 
of coloured voters from the common roll. In 1959 the more lib- 
eral members of the UP broke away to form the Progressive 
Federal Party (PFP) but with little impact. Practically all Afri- 
kaners and increasing numbers of English-speaking whites 
voted for the National Party. In 1960 a majority of white voters, 
irritated by growing world condemnation of apartheid, espe- 
cially by the newly independent Asian and African members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations, supported Verwoerd's 
proposal to make South Africa a republic, whereupon it left the 
Commonwealth. In the 1961 general election, the NP won 105 
seats, the UP forty-five, and the PFP only one. 

Black Resistance in the 1950s 

The Congress Youth League and the Programme of Action 

In 1943, during World War II, young members of the ANC, 
critical of what they considered its passivity, formed their own 
organization, the Congress Youth League (CYL). Anton Lem- 
bede, president of the CYL from 1944 until his death in 1947, 
stressed that South Africa was "a black man's country," in which 
the concerns of Africans should take precedence. He argued 
that African society was socialistic, but, because he considered 
the conflict in South Africa to be primarily a racial rather than 
a class struggle, he repudiated any alliance with the Commu- 
nist Party in bringing about "national liberation." After the war 
and Lembede's death, and faced by the implementation of 
apartheid, the CYL's leaders, Peter Mda, Jordan Ngubane, Nel- 
son Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and Walter Sisulu, strove to take 
charge of the ANC. They called on the organization to adopt 
the use of strikes, boycotts, stay-at-homes, and various forms of 
civil disobedience and non-cooperation to make the apartheid 
system unworkable. Overcoming the opposition of ANC presi- 



58 



Historical Setting 



dent Alfred Xuma, the CYL succeeded in 1949 in electing 
James Moroka to the presidency, in seating three CYL members 
(Sisulu, Tambo, and Mandela) on the party's national execu- 
tive body, and in persuading the congress formally to adopt the 
program of action. 

The ANC's new leaders formed a Joint Planning Council 
with leaders of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) 
(unlike Lembede, the Mandela, Sisulu, and Tambo team 
believed strongly in working with other groups) and in Febru- 
ary 1952 called on the government to repeal all unjust laws or 
face a Defiance Campaign starting on April 6, the tercentenary 
of Jan van Riebeeck's arrival at the Cape. Malan rejected the 
ultimatum. The ANC and the SAIC, led by Yusuf Dadoo, then 
organized mass rallies and stay-at-homes for April 6 and June 
26. These actions drew the support of thousands of men and 
women. The government reacted by banning leaders and news- 
papers under the Suppression of Communism Act and by 
arresting participants in the demonstrations. By December 
1952, approximately 8,500 people had been arrested, most of 
them in the Cape, and the Defiance Campaign had largely 
come to an end without bringing about any change in the laws. 
The ANC had grown enormously, however: its paid member- 
ship had increased from fewer than 7,000 at the beginning of 
1952 to more than 100,000 by the end of the year. Its leader- 
ship had also changed: James Moroka had been dismissed in 
disgrace for having pleaded guilty to charges placed under the 
Suppression of Communism Act, and Albert Luthuli had been 
made president. 

The Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter 

House arrests, bannings, and other forms of government 
restriction limited the ability of ANC and SAIC leaders to orga- 
nize publicly in 1953 and 1954, but in 1955, approximately 
3,000 delegates met on June 25 and June 26 near Soweto in a 
Congress of the People. They represented black (the ANC), 
white (the Congress of Democrats), Indian (the SAIC), and 
coloured (the Coloured People's Congress) political organiza- 
tions and the multiracial South African Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU). The congress was held to develop a new 
vision for a future South Africa, one that reached beyond pro- 
test politics. The prime document discussed was the Freedom 
Charter, which had been drafted several weeks before the con- 
gress met. The charter emphasized that South Africa should be 



59 



South Africa: A Country Study 

a nonracial society with no particular group assumed to have 
special rights or privileges. The charter stated that all people 
should be treated equally before the law, that land should be 
"shared among those who work it," and that the people should 
"share in the country's wealth," a statement that has sometimes 
been interpreted to mean a call for nationalization. The con- 
gress delegates had ratified almost all the sections of the char- 
ter when the police surrounded the meeting, announced that 
they suspected treason was being committed, and recorded the 
names and addresses of all those in attendance. 

The Pan-Africanist Congress and Sharpeville 

Struggles over apartheid legislation continued through the 
remainder of the 1950s. In 1956 the police arrested 156 lead- 
ers, including Luthuli, Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu, and others, 
and put them on trial for treason in a court case that dragged 
on for five years. Mass resistance, however, continued in a vari- 
ety of forms. Thousands of people participated in bus boycotts 
on the Rand, preferring to walk to work rather than to pay high 
fares to travel on substandard vehicles. Thousands of African 
women, organized by the newly formed Federation of South 
African Women (FSAW), protested the extension of the pass 
laws. In 1956, 20,000 of them marched on the Parliament 
buildings in Pretoria and presented a petition with the signa- 
tures of tens of thousands of people opposed to the pass laws. 
Yet these efforts had little effect on the Nationalist govern- 
ment, which was determined to implement apartheid. 

The failure to achieve any real success caused a major split in 
black resistance in 1959. Critics within the ANC argued that its 
alliance with other political groups, particularly the white Con- 
gress of Democrats, caused their organization to make too 
many compromises and to fail to represent African interests. 
Influenced by the writings of Lembede, the Africanists, led by 
Robert Sobukwe, called on the ANC to look to African interests 
first and to take more action to challenge the government. 
They were, however, forced out of the ANC, and they formed 
their own organization, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) . In 
March 1960, the PAC began a national campaign against the 
pass laws and called on Africans to assemble outside police sta- 
tions without their passes and to challenge the police to arrest 
them. One such demonstration outside the police station at 
Sharpeville, a "native" township in the industrial area of 
Vereeniging to the south of Johannesburg, ended in violence 



60 



Historical Setting 



when the police fired on the demonstrators, killing at least 
sixty-seven of them and wounding 186. Most of the dead and 
wounded were shot in the back. Stoppages and demonstrations 
continued, including a peaceful march of 30,000 Africans on 
the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town. Verwoerd's govern- 
ment reacted by declaring a state of emergency, by arresting 
approximately 18,000 demonstrators, including the leaders of 
the ANC and the PAC, and by outlawing both organizations. 

Consolidating Apartheid in the 1960s 

The ANC and the PAC Turn to Violence 

Prohibited from operating peacefully or even having a legal 
existence in South Africa, both the ANC and the PAC estab- 
lished underground organizations in 1961 to carry out their 
struggle against the government. The militant wing of the 
ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK — Spear of the Nation, also 
known as Umkhonto), targeted strategic places such as police 
stations and power plants but carefully avoided taking any 
human lives. Poqo (Blacks Only), the militant wing of the PAC, 
engaged in a campaign of terror, targeting in particular Afri- 
can chiefs and headmen believed to be collaborators with the 
government and killing them. Some young white students and 
professionals established their own organization, the antiapart- 
heid African Resistance Movement, and carried out bomb 
attacks on strategic targets, including one at the Johannesburg 
railway station that killed at least one person. 

By 1964 the police had succeeded in crushing all of these 
movements. Seventeen Umkhonto leaders, including Walter 
Sisulu, had been arrested at a farmhouse at Rivonia near 
Johannesburg in July 1963 and, along with Nelson Mandela — 
who had already been imprisoned on other charges — were 
tried for treason. Eight of them, including Mandela, were sent 
to prison for life. Albert Luthuli had been awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1960, but the government confined him to his 
rural home in Zululand until his death in 1967. Tambo 
escaped from South Africa and became president of the ANC 
in exile. Robert Sobukwe of Poqo was jailed on Robben Island 
until 1969 and then placed under a banning order and house 
arrest in Kimberley until his death in 1978. The Johannesburg 
railway station bomber, John Harris, was hanged. He marched 
to the gallows singing "We shall overcome." 



61 



South Africa: A Country Study 

The government campaign to crush internal resistance was 
orchestrated by John Vorster, then minister of justice, and by 
General HendrikJ. (H.J.) van den Bergh, head of the Bureau 
of State Security (BOSS). Both were former members of the 
Ossewabrandwag who had been interned for pro-Nazi activities 
during World War II. Vorster and van den Bergh used new 
security legislation to put down the resistance. In particular, 
the General Law Amendment Act of 1963 allowed the police to 
detain people for ninety days without charging them and with- 
out allowing them access to a lawyer. At the end of that period, 
the police could re-arrest and re-detain them for a further 
ninety days. During the period of detention, no court could 
order a person's release; only the minister of justice had that 
authority. Because of his success in defeating the ANC and the 
PAC, John Vorster became prime minister of South Africa in 
1966 when Verwoerd was assassinated by a coloured parliamen- 
tary messenger. 

Consolidating Apartheid 

The government took several measures in the 1960s to make 
the theory of apartheid work in practice. The Nationalists 
wanted particularly to establish alternative political structures 
for Africans in the homelands or reserves (see Glossary), and 
to eliminate the squatter camps that had grown up around the 
major cities in the 1930s and the 1940s. In 1963 the Transkei 
homeland, poverty-stricken and overpopulated, was made self- 
governing, and in 1976 it was declared "independent," 
although no country except South Africa recognized the new 
state. Other homelands were even less economically viable. 
Bophuthatswana consisted of nineteen separate pieces of land 
spread hundreds of kilometers apart, and KwaZulu (formed 
out of Zululand and other parts of Natal in 1972) was divided 
into at least eleven fragments interspersed with white farms 
and coastal lands allocated to whites. The South African gov- 
ernment, nonetheless, moved ahead with preparing them for 
independence. 

Under the provisions of the Group Areas Act, urban and 
rural areas in South Africa were divided into zones in which 
members of only one racial group could live; all others had to 
move. In practice, it was blacks who had to move, often under 
the threat or use of force. Between 1963 and 1985, approxi- 
mately 3.5 million blacks were removed from areas designated 
for whites and were sent to the homelands, where they added 



62 



Historical Setting 



to the already critical problem of overpopulation. Still, even 
though the homeland population rose by 69 percent between 
1970 and 1980, the numbers of blacks in the cities continued to 
rise through natural growth and evasion of influx control, so 
that by 1980, after twenty years of removals, there were twice as 
many blacks in South Africa's towns as there were whites. 

South Africa enjoyed an economic boom in the 1960s. For- 
eign investors had withdrawn their funds and white immigra- 
tion had come to a halt in the immediate aftermath of 
Sharpeville, but Vorster's harsh measures rebuilt confidence in 
the security of investments and the stability of the state, and 
money and people returned. Foreign investment in South 
Africa, attracted by rates of return on capital often running as 
high as 15 to 20 percent, more than doubled between 1963 and 
1972, while high immigration levels helped the white popula- 
tion to increase by 50 percent during the same period. Invest- 
ment and immigration fueled an impressive economic boom. 

The Rise of Black Consciousness 

Steve Biko and the South African Students ' Organisation 

With the ANC and the PAC banned and African political 
activity officially limited to government-appointed bodies in 
the homelands, young people sought alternative means to 
express their political aspirations. In the early 1960s, African 
university students looked to the multiracial National Union of 
South African Students (NUSAS) to represent their concerns, 
but, as this organization adopted an increasingly conservative 
stance after Vorster's crackdown, they decided to form their 
own movement. Led by Steve Biko, an African medical student 
at the University of Natal, a group of black students established 
the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) in 1969 with 
Biko as president. Biko, strongly influenced by the writings of 
Lembede and by the Black Power movement in the United 
States, argued that Africans had to run their own organiza- 
tions; they could not rely on white liberals because such people 
would always ally in the last resort with other whites rather than 
with blacks. He argued that blacks often oppressed themselves 
by accepting the second-class status accorded them by the 
apartheid system, and he stressed that they had to liberate 
themselves mentally as well as physically. He rejected, however, 
the use of violence adopted by the ANC and the PAC in the 



63 



South Africa: A Country Study 



early 1960s and emphasized that only nonviolent methods 
should be used in the struggle against apartheid. 

Biko's message had an immediate appeal; SASO expanded 
enormously, and its members established black self-help 
projects, including workshops and medical clinics, in many 
parts of South Africa. In 1972 the Black Peoples' Convention 
(BPC) was set up to act as a political umbrella organization for 
the adherents of black consciousness. Although the govern- 
ment had at first welcomed the development of black con- 
sciousness because the philosophy fit in with the racial 
separation inherent in apartheid, it sought to restrict the activi- 
ties of Biko and his organizations when these took a more 
overtly political turn. In 1972, SASO organized strikes on uni- 
versity campuses resulting in the arrest of more than 600 stu- 
dents. Rallies held by SASO and the BPC in 1974 to celebrate 
the overthrow of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and 
Mozambique resulted in the banning of Biko and other black 
consciousness leaders and their arraignment on charges of 
fomenting terrorism. 

Soweto, 1976 

In 1974 the newly appointed minister of Bantu education, 
Michael C. Botha, and his deputy, Andries Treurnicht, decided 
to enforce a previously ignored provision of the Bantu Educa- 
tion Act that required Afrikaans to be used on an equal basis 
with English as a medium of instruction. A shortage of Afri- 
kaans teachers and a lack of suitable textbooks had resulted in 
English and African languages being used as the languages of 
instruction. Because Afrikaans was identified by Africans, espe- 
cially by the young and by those sympathetic to black con- 
sciousness, as the language of the oppressor, opposition to this 
new policy grew throughout 1975 and into 1976. Some African 
school boards refused to enforce the policy and saw their mem- 
bers dismissed by the government. Students began to boycott 
classes. 

On June 16, 1976, hundreds of high-school students in 
Soweto, the African township southwest of Johannesburg, 
marched in protest against having to use Afrikaans. The police 
responded with tear gas and then with gunfire that left at least 
three dead and a dozen injured. The demonstrators, joined by 
angry crowds of Soweto residents, reacted by attacking and 
burning down government buildings, including administrative 
offices and beer halls. The government sent in more police 



64 



Historical Setting 



and troops and quelled the violence within a few days but at 
the cost of several hundred African lives. 

Similar outbreaks occurred elsewhere in South Africa, and 
violence continued throughout the rest of 1976 and into 1977. 
By February 1977, official figures counted 494 Africans, sev- 
enty-five coloureds, one Indian, and five whites killed. In 
August of that year, Steve Biko, who had been held in indefi- 
nite detention, died from massive head injuries sustained dur- 
ing police interrogation. By that time, SASO and the BPC had 
been banned and open black resistance had been brought to a 
halt. 

Government in Crisis, 1978-89 

The Contradictions of Apartheid 

By the middle of the 1970s, apartheid was clearly under 
strain. The popularity of black consciousness and the massive 
levels of participation in the Soweto demonstrations illustrated 
profound discontent among the black population, particularly 
the young, and an increasing readiness to challenge the system 
physically. Indeed, hundreds of young Africans slipped across 
South Africa's northern borders in the aftermath of Soweto 
and volunteered to fight as guerrilla soldiers for the ANC and 
the PAC. In the late 1970s, some of these people began to reen- 
ter South Africa secretly and to carry out sabotage attacks on 
various targets that were seen as symbols of apartheid. 

Labor discontent had also grown. The combination of dis- 
criminatory legislation and employer reliance on the use of 
inexpensive labor meant that African workers were poorly paid 
and were subjected to an enormous number of restrictions (see 
Legal Restrictions, ch. 3). Economic recession in the early 
1970s, followed by inflation and a contraction in the job mar- 
ket, resulted in a dramatic upsurge in labor unrest. In the first 
three months of 1973, some 160 strikes involving more than 
60,000 workers took place in Durban; in the early 1970s, no 
more than 5,000 African workers had struck annually, and in 
the 1960s the average had been closer to 2,000. Labor unrest 
spread to East London and the Rand and continued. In addi- 
tion to the high level of participation they engendered, the 
strikes were also noteworthy for other features. Fearing that the 
police would arrest any person who organized a strike, the 
workers chose not to form representative bodies or to elect a 
leadership. Rather than entering protracted negotiations, they 



65 



South Africa: A Country Study 

also engaged in sudden "wildcat" strikes, thereby limiting the 
ability of employers and police to take preventive measures. 
Over time, an African union movement developed out of these 
strikes, but it did so on a factory-by-factory basis rather than 
through the establishment of a mass-based industrial move- 
ment as had been the case in the 1940s. 

Urban-based African strikes drew attention to the fact that, 
despite the segregationist ambitions of apartheid, the South 
African economy depended on blacks living and working in 
supposedly white areas. Nearly three-quarters of South Africa's 
urban population in 1980 was black. Only half of the African 
population lived in the homelands, and even then the rural 
land available was so inadequate that population densities were 
far greater than they were in the rest of the country. At least 
four-fifths of the homeland dwellers lived in poverty 

Yet the South African government persisted in arguing that 
Africans were really rural dwellers and that they should exer- 
cise political rights only in the homelands. In 1976 the govern- 
ment proclaimed the Transkei an independent nation-state 
and followed this move by granting independence to 
Bophuthatswana in 1977, to Venda in 1979, and to Ciskei in 
1981. Citizens of these states, including the half who lived out- 
side their borders, were then deemed aliens in South Africa. 
Another six ethnically based homelands were granted limited 
self-government in preparation for eventual independence: 
they were KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, QwaQwa, KaNgwane, 
and KwaNdebele (see System of Government, ch. 4). None of 
these states received international recognition. 

Within South Africa, there was great opposition. Blacks 
viewed the homelands as a way for whites to perpetuate a form 
of "divide and rule." Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, the gov- 
ernment-appointed head of the KwaZulu homeland, while 
building up an ethnically oriented power base with his Inkatha 
Freedom Party, argued that independence should not be 
accepted on the government's terms because that would mean 
Africans would be giving up claims to the bulk of South Africa 
forever. He proposed instead the development of a unified 
multiracial South African state (see The Interim Constitution, 
ch. 4). 

South Africa's international borders also became much less 
secure. Until 1974 South Africa had been part of a largely 
white-ruled subcontinent, with the Portuguese still governing 
their empire in Angola and Mozambique, and Ian Smith and 



66 



Historical Setting 



his white-settler regime controlling Southern Rhodesia 
(present-day Zimbabwe). Botswana had achieved indepen- 
dence soon after Lesotho in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968; how- 
ever, they were surrounded by white-ruled areas, and their 
economies depended on that of South Africa. 

The 1974 overthrow of the government of Premier Marcello 
Caetano in Portugal dramatically changed matters. Portugal 
withdrew from Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and both 
countries gained independence with governments that were 
avowedly Marxist and that strongly denounced apartheid. 
These events directly threatened South African control of 
South-West Africa (called Namibia by the United Nations 
[UN], which in 1969 had terminated South Africa's trusteeship 
over the territory and had demanded its return to the interna- 
tional organization). South African forces invaded Angola in 
1975 but were forced to pull back by the arrival of Cuban 
troops. Seeking both to destabilize the Angolan government 
and to prevent infiltration of guerrilla fighters into Namibia 
where the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) 
was fighting actively against South African forces, South Africa 
maintained a military force in southern Angola. 

In Rhodesia, Africans fighting against Ian Smith's govern- 
ment began to turn the tide, and by 1979 Smith was forced to 
the negotiating table. In 1980 Robert Mugabe and his Zimba- 
bwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party 
won a landslide election victory and formed a government 
that, like those in Angola and Mozambique, was Marxist and 
antiapartheid. The South African government thereafter pur- 
sued a policy of occasional armed intervention in Zimbabwe 
and other frontline states and sent in strike teams periodically 
to destroy what it considered to be bases for guerrillas planning 
to infiltrate South Africa. South Africa also expanded military 
support for the Mozambican National Resistance movement 
(Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana — MNR or Renamo), an 
organization originally formed by Ian Smith's security forces to 
destabilize the Mozambique government (see Relations with 
African States, ch. 4; Regional Issues, ch. 5). 

Crackdowns on opposition groups in South Africa and the 
country's readiness to invade neighboring states led to increas- 
ing international condemnation of the apartheid regime. The 
administrations of United States presidents Richard Nixon and 
Gerald Ford, including United States secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger, had favored working with the National Party govern- 



67 



South Africa: A Country Study 

ment. They saw South Africa as a key strategic ally in the Cold 
War and had both encouraged the invasion of Angola and 
promised United States military support. President Jimmy 
Carter, however, considered South Africa a liability for the 
West. His vice president, Walter Mondale, told John Vorster 
that the United States wanted South Africa to adopt a policy of 
one person, one vote, a principle that the ANC upheld but that 
no white group in South Africa, not even those opposed to 
apartheid, supported. Antiapartheid sentiments also grew in 
Britain and in Europe, while the UN, composed of a majority 
of Third World states, had in 1973 declared apartheid "a crime 
against humanity" and in 1977 had declared mandatory the 
existing embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. 

Such criticism had a considerable material impact. South 
Africa had to invest large sums in the development of its own 
armaments industry (see Arms Trade and the Defense Indus- 
try, ch. 5). Because of an embargo by the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it also had to pay 
more for oil and purchased most of its supplies from the shah 
of Iran until his overthrow in 1979. Foreign investment in 
South Africa, on which the country depended for much of its 
economic growth, also became increasingly expensive and 
uncertain in the second half of the 1970s. A growing sluggish- 
ness in the South African economy, coupled with concerns 
about the country's political stability in light of the Soweto 
demonstrations, caused most investors to seek out more attrac- 
tive ventures for their capital in other countries. Foreign capi- 
tal still flowed into South Africa, but it was primarily in the 
form of short-term loans rather than investments. In 1976, for 
example, two-thirds of the foreign funds entering South Africa 
were in short-term loans, usually of twelve months' duration 
(see External Debt, ch. 3). 

Divisions in the White Community 

Increasing economic and political pressures caused splits in 
the white political parties. In 1968 Vorster had dismissed three 
conservatives from his cabinet. One of these, Albert Hertzog, a 
son of J.B.M. Hertzog, founded the Reconstituted National 
Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party — HNP). Hertzog and the 
HNP argued that no concessions should be made in pursuing 
the full implementation of apartheid, whereas Vorster and his 
allies argued that compromise was necessary. The split was 
commonly labeled a division between the verligtes (the enlight- 



68 



Historical Setting 



ened) and the verkramptes (the narrow-minded), although the 
differences often seemed to be primarily tactical rather than 
ideological. The HNP contested elections in 1970 and in 1974 
but without winning a single seat from Vorster. In 1978, how- 
ever, the unfolding of a major national scandal brought about 
Vorster's downfall. An official investigation determined that 
Vorster, together with a small group of supporters including 
the head of the Security Police, General HJ. van den Bergh, 
had secretly and illegally used government funds to manipulate 
the news media in South Africa and to try to purchase newspa- 
pers overseas, including the Washington Star. Vorster resigned 
his position as prime minister for the largely ceremonial post 
of president; his preferred successor, Connie Mulder, was 
purged from the National Party, and P.W. Botha, minister of 
defence since 1966, became prime minister. 

Botha, strongly supported by Afrikaner businessmen and by 
the armed forces leaders, initiated a self-styled program of 
reform. He tried to do away with aspects of "petty" apartheid 
that many had come to regard as unnecessarily offensive to 
blacks and to world opinion, such as the allocation of separate 
public facilities and the use of racially discriminatory signs to 
designate who could use the facilities. Hoping to develop a 
black middle class that would be impervious to the socialist 
message of the ANC, Botha also accepted in large part the rec- 
ommendations of two government commissions appointed to 
investigate the way labor and pass laws were applied to Africans. 

The Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (Wie- 
hahn Commission), established in the aftermath of the strike 
wave of the early 1970s, argued that blacks should be allowed to 
register trade unions and to have them recognized as part of 
the official conciliation process. The commission also recom- 
mended the elimination of statutory job reservation. Legisla- 
tion incorporating these recommendations was passed in 1979 
and resulted in a huge growth in African trade unionism in the 
early 1980s. 

The Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the 
Utilisation of Manpower (Riekert Commission), accepting the 
fact that poverty in the homelands would continue to push tens 
of thousands of Africans into the cities, recommended in 1979 
that instead of using the pass laws to punish Africans who were 
illegally entering urban areas, the government should prose- 
cute employers and landlords if they gave jobs or housing to 
blacks who lacked documentary proof of their right to live in 



69 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the cities. Botha accepted this recommendation, although it 
was not until eight years and more than 1 million arrests later 
that he introduced legislation abolishing the pass laws. 

At the same time, Botha pursued harsh measures against 
those he deemed his enemies in order to ensure the mainte- 
nance of white power. The late 1970s and early 1980s were 
marked by numerous military interventions in the states bor- 
dering South Africa and by an extensive military and political 
campaign to eliminate SWAPO in Namibia. Within South 
Africa, vigorous police action and strict enforcement of secu- 
rity legislation resulted in hundreds of arrests and bannings 
and an effective end to the ANC's stepped-up campaign of sab- 
otage in the 1970s. Botha also continued to support the home- 
land policy, arguing as his predecessors had done that Africans 
should exercise political rights only within what were deemed 
to be their own communities, which in the 1980s continued to 
be as small and fragmented as they had been in the 1950s. 

Yet one issue loomed ever larger in the eyes of apartheid's 
architects, and that was the matter of demographics. Whereas 
whites had accounted for 21 percent of South Africa's popula- 
tion in 1936, by 1980 they constituted only 16 percent. Future 
projections estimated that by 2010 the white proportion would 
be less than 10 percent and falling, while the African popula- 
tion would make up 83 percent of the total and would be 
increasing. In light of these projections, Botha's government 
proposed in 1983 that political power in South Africa be shared 
among whites, coloureds, and Indians, with separate houses of 
parliament to be established for each racial group. This pro- 
posal caused angry opposition among a number of National 
Party members, sixteen of whom, including Andries Treur- 
nicht, were expelled when they refused to sign a motion of con- 
fidence in Botha's leadership. 

Treurnicht formed the Conservative Party of South Africa 
(CP), bringing together old enemies of Botha such as Connie 
Mulder and supporters of the verkrampte faction of the NP. 
Botha proceeded with his plans, calling for a referendum in 
which only white voters would be asked whether or not they 
approved of the prime minister's plans for constitutional 
change. Some liberal opponents of the government, such as 
Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the Progressive Federal 
Party (PFP), and Harry Oppenheimer, head of the Anglo 
American Corporation, denounced Botha's plans because they 
would permanently exclude Africans from having any political 



70 



Historical Setting 



role in South Africa. Many other politicians and businessmen, 
English- and Afrikaans-speaking alike, argued that any change 
in apartheid would be an improvement. Most white voters 
agreed, and two-thirds of those who participated in the referen- 
dum voted "yes." 

Limited Reforms 

The new constitution came into force in 1984. In place of 
the single House of Parliament, there were three constituent 
bodies: a 178-member (all-white) House of Assembly, an eighty- 
five-member (coloured) House of Representatives, and a forty- 
five-member (Indian) House of Delegates. Whites thus 
retained a majority in any joint session. Presiding over the 
three houses was the state president, a new office quite unlike 
the ceremonial position that it replaced. The state president 
was chosen by an eighty-eight-member electoral college that 
preserved the 4:2:1 ratio of whites:coloureds:Indians. The pres- 
ident could dissolve Parliament at any time and was authorized 
to allocate issues to each of the three houses (see System of 
Government, ch. 4). P.W. Botha became the first state presi- 
dent, occupying the position from the beginning of 1984 until 
late 1989. 

Most blacks strongly condemned the new constitution. 
Rather than viewing it as a major step toward reform, they saw 
it as one more effort to bolster apartheid. It reinforced the 
apartheid notion that Africans were not, and could never be 
considered as, citizens of South Africa, despite the fact that 
they constituted 75 percent of the country's population and 
the vast bulk of its labor force. The constitution's negative 
impact was compounded by the fact that Africans could not 
buy land outside the homelands and that government services 
for blacks, especially in education, were deliberately inferior 
(see Education under Apartheid, ch. 2). 

Indians and coloureds argued that the continued existence 
of a white majority in Parliament and effective white monopoli- 
zation of the state presidency made their incorporation into 
the political process little more than window-dressing. 
Although the (coloured) Labour Party of Allan Hendrickse 
and the (Indian) National Peoples' Party of Amichand Rajbansi 
participated in elections in 1984 for the House of Representa- 
tives and the House of Delegates, only 30 percent of registered 
coloured voters and only 20 percent of registered Indian voters 
cast ballots. 



71 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Opposition to the government's plans consolidated. The 
United Democratic Front (UDF), which was formed in late 
1983 as 1,000 delegates representing 575 organizations — rang- 
ing from trade unions to sporting bodies — aimed to use nonvi- 
olent means to persuade the government to withdraw its 
constitutional proposals, to do away with apartheid, and to cre- 
ate a new South Africa incorporating the homelands. In early 
1984, the UDF claimed a membership of more than 600 orga- 
nizations and 3 million individuals; and two respected religious 
leaders, Bishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boe- 
sak, emerged as its prime spokesmen. 

Black trade unions, many formed after the Wiehahn Com- 
mission, took an increasingly prominent role in economic and 
political protests in the mid-1980s. They organized strikes in 
East London and on the Rand protesting economic conditions 
as well as the constitutional proposals. The National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), newly formed under the leadership of 
Cyril Ramaphosa, successfully enlisted the support of almost all 
African miners in bringing work to a stop in a dispute over 
wage increases. NUM also joined with thirty other nonracial 
unions in December 1985 to form the Congress of South Afri- 
can Trade Unions (COSATU), an umbrella organization that 
represented more than 500,000 trade union members and won 
new members almost every month. By the end of 1985, there 
had been more than 390 strikes involving 240,000 workers, and 
industrial unrest was increasing. 

Conflict was even more intense in the townships, where resi- 
dents attacked and burned government buildings and sought 
to destroy all elements of the apartheid administration. 
Numerous attacks were made on the homes of black policemen 
and town councillors, whose participation was necessary to the 
government's operation of township administration. Violence 
broke out in some of the homelands, particularly in Lebowa, 
KwaNdebele, and Bophuthatswana, involving struggles 
between supporters and opponents of homeland "indepen- 
dence." Sabotage also increased, including bombings of police 
stations, power installations, and — in one particularly dramatic 
instance in May 1983 — the headquarters of the South African 
Air Force in Pretoria. Deaths from violence increased, many of 
them at the hands of the police. Whereas in 1984 there had 
been 174 fatalities linked to political unrest, in 1985 the num- 
ber increased to 879, and it continued to rise after that. 



72 



Historical Setting 



International pressures on the South African government 
also intensified in the mid-1980s. Antiapartheid sentiment in 
the United States, fueled in large part by television coverage of 
the ongoing violence in South Africa, heightened demands for 
the removal of United States investments and for the imposi- 
tion of official sanctions. In 1984 forty United States companies 
pulled out of South Africa, with another fifty following suit in 

1985. In July 1985, Chase Manhattan Bank caused a major 
financial crisis in South Africa by refusing to roll over its short- 
term loans, a lead that was soon followed by most other inter- 
national banks, fueling inflation and eroding South African liv- 
ing standards (see Historical Development, ch. 3). In October 

1986, the United States Congress, overriding a presidential 
veto, passed legislation implementing mandatory sanctions 
against South Africa; these included the banning of all new 
investments and bank loans, the ending of air links between 
the United States and South Africa, and the banning of many 
South African imports. 

President Botha activated security legislation to deal with 
these crises. In mid-1985 he imposed the first in a series of 
states of emergency in various troubled parts of South Africa; 
this was the first time such laws had been used since the 
Sharpeville violence in 1960. The state of emergency was 
extended throughout the nation the following year. The emer- 
gency regulations gave the police powers to arrest without war- 
rants and to detain people indefinitely without charging them 
or even allowing lawyers or next of kin to be notified. It also 
gave the government even greater authority than the consider- 
able powers it already possessed to censor radio, television, and 
newspaper coverage of the unrest. Botha deployed police and 
more than 5,000 troops in African townships to quell the 
spreading resistance. By February 1987, unofficial estimates 
claimed that at least 30,000 people had been detained, many 
for several months at a time. 

South Africa's complex and fragmented society became 
increasingly polarized around antiapartheid groups, who 
expressed a growing sense of urgency in their demands for an 
end to the failed system of racial separation, and white conser- 
vative defenders of apartheid, who intensified their resistance 
to change. Facing mounting international disapproval and eco- 
nomic stagnation, the government tentatively began to signal 
its awareness that its plan for separate development by race 
would have to be substantially altered or abandoned. 



73 



South Africa: A Country Study 



In January 1986, President Botha shocked conservatives in 
the all-white House of Assembly with the statement that South 
Africa had "outgrown the outdated concept of apartheid." The 
government undertook tentative, incremental change, at a 
carefully controlled pace, and, as it began to yield to demands 
for racial equality, it severely limited the activities of antiapart- 
heid agitators. The government tightened press restrictions, 
effectively banned the UDF and other activist organizations, 
and renewed a series of states of emergency throughout the 
rest of the 1980s. 

As the inevitability of political change became apparent, 
conservative whites expressed new fears for the future. The CP 
swamped the PFP in parliamentary by-elections in May 1987, 
making the CP the official parliamentary opposition. Liberal 
whites and other opponents of apartheid reorganized to 
broaden their popular appeal, first as the National Democratic 
Movement (NDM) and later as a new United Party. This coali- 
tion tried unsuccessfully to win support from the progressive 
wing of the NP. Within the NP, progressives were outmaneu- 
vered by conservatives, who bolted from the party to join the 
CP in an attempt to prolong apartheid. In early 1988, the gov- 
ernment, seeking to stem the erosion of its NP support, tight- 
ened press restrictions and further restricted political activity 
by antiapartheid organizations. Still excluded from national 
politics, blacks sought new avenues for pressing their demands, 
and their demonstrations often erupted in violence. Support- 
ers of the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and 
the banned ANC clashed in an upsurge of "black-on-black" vio- 
lence that would cause as many as 10,000 deaths by 1994. 

President Botha suffered a stroke in January 1989. Choosing 
his successor almost split the NP, but when Botha resigned as 
party leader a month later, NP moderates managed to elect 
Minister of Education Frederik W. (F.W.) de Klerk to succeed 
him. A few weeks later, the NP elected de Klerk state president, 
too, but Botha stubbornly refused to step down for several 
months. Soon after he resigned under pressure on August 14, 
1989, the electoral college named de Klerk to succeed him in a 
five-year term as president. 

Dismantling Apartheid, 1990-94 

President de Klerk recognized the urgent need to bring the 
black majority of South Africans into the political process, and 
most NP moderates agreed with him in principle. He had held 



74 



Historical Setting 



secret talks with the imprisoned ANC leader Mandela to begin 
preparations for this major policy shift. De Klerk nonetheless 
surprised some supporters and critics alike when he 
announced on February 2, 1990, not only the impending 
release of Mandela, but also the unbanning of the ANC, the 
PAC, and the SACP, and the removal of restrictions on the UDF 
and other legal political organizations. De Klerk also lifted the 
four-year-old media restrictions, and he invited former libera- 
tion fighters to join the government at the negotiating table to 
prepare for a new multiracial constitution. De Klerk pledged 
that his government would investigate alleged human rights 
abuses by the security forces. He also sought improved rela- 
tions with the rest of Africa by proposing joint regional devel- 
opment planning with neighboring states and by inviting other 
African leaders to increase trade with South Africa. 

Widely hailed as historic, de Klerk's speech was nonetheless 
attacked by antiapartheid critics for what it lacked — it did not 
mention the two most despised legislative pillars of apartheid, 
the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. It 
did not lift all of the security provisions that had been imposed 
under states of emergency. At the same time, CP leader Treur- 
nicht, calling for de Klerk's resignation, said de Klerk lacked 
the authority to carry out such sweeping changes, and he 
accused de Klerk of helping to destroy the Afrikaner volk. 

As Mandela was released on February 11, 1990, at age sev- 
enty-one after twenty-seven years in prison, South Africans 
poured into the streets in celebration. His first words were to 
assure his supporters in the ANC that his release was not part 
of a "deal" with the government, and to reassure whites that he 
intended to work toward reconciliation. He also quoted his 
well-known statement at the Rivonia trial in 1964, "I have 
fought against white domination, and I have fought against 
black domination. I have cherished the idea of a democratic 
and free society in which all persons live together in harmony 
and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live 
for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am 
prepared to die." 

In the flurry of receptions and public statements that fol- 
lowed, Mandela enunciated other objectives that were less wel- 
come in political and business circles. He reaffirmed ANC 
policies in favor of nationalization of major sectors of the econ- 
omy. He refused to renounce the armed struggle immediately, 
refused to call for the lifting of international sanctions against 



75 



South Africa: A Country Study 

South Africa until further progress was achieved, and refused 
to accept an interim power-sharing arrangement proposed by 
the government. ANC officials elected Mandela deputy presi- 
dent in March 1990, giving him effective control over policy 
decisions in consultation with their ailing president, Oliver 
Tambo. 

Despite the ANC's strong symbolic displays of unity, like 
other political organizations facing new challenges, it showed 
widening internal fractures. Blacks who had been unanimous 
in their demands for Mandela's release from prison, nonethe- 
less differed sharply in the extent of their willingness to recon- 
cile peacefully over past injustices. In addition, militant black 
consciousness leaders, especially in the Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC), rejected outright Mandela's proposals for multiracial 
government and demanded black control over future decision- 
making institutions. At PAC offices in Zimbabwe, PAC leader 
Zephania Mothopeng rejected appeals by Mandela and by Zim- 
babwe's President Robert Mugabe for the PAC leader to join 
Mandela in discussions in Pretoria. 

Some of the ANC's estimated 40,000 exiles began returning 
to South Africa in the early 1990s, and as organizational leaders 
debated their future role, many militant former exiles and oth- 
ers rejected Mandela's conciliatory approach and insisted on 
continuing the armed struggle. Left-wing ANC factions pressed 
Mandela to demand the immediate nationalization of private- 
sector conglomerates. The ANC was also accused of abuse and 
brutality against dissidents during its nearly three decades of 
operating underground and outside South Africa — accusations 
Mandela acknowledged were based in fact. Old and young lib- 
eration fighters appeared capable of warring even against one 
another as the end of apartheid approached. 

The Quest for Peace 

Amid rising tensions and unrest, representatives of the gov- 
ernment and the ANC — with strong misgivings — met in Cape 
Town in May 1990 to begin planning for constitutional negotia- 
tions. Even holding "talks about talks" was risky. The govern- 
ment had to grant immunity from prosecution to many 
formerly banned or exiled ANC members before they could 
safely appear in public. In a few antiapartheid strongholds, 
political moderates were attacked for being too conciliatory. 

President de Klerk faced an increasingly divided constitu- 
ency of his own. Conservatives intensified their demands for 



76 



Historical Setting 



him to step down, while NP progressives pressured him to 
move more boldly toward multiracial government. Planning 
sessions for eventual negotiations were postponed repeatedly 
as Mandela and de Klerk had to reassure their constituencies of 
their determination to set aside the past and to work peacefully 
toward a broadly legitimate government. 

De Klerk's credibility was low among his former opponents. 
The talks snarled over his insistence on defending what he 
termed the "rights of minorities" — a phrase the ANC viewed 
simply as a ploy to preserve white control. De Klerk's standing 
in the negotiations was further weakened in late 1990, when 
the government-appointed Commission of Inquiry into Cer- 
tain Alleged Murders (Harms Commission), which he had 
established earlier that year, found evidence — but not 
"proof — that clandestine death squads had operated within 
the security services. The commission's hearings were often 
marred by violence and by claims of witness intimidation. 

The international response to change in South Africa was 
cautious. Several African countries, visited by Mandela within 
weeks of his release from prison, held to their pledge to await 
his signal of progress toward ending apartheid before they 
began to lift sanctions against South Africa. Several European 
countries, visited by de Klerk in May 1990, broke with Euro- 
pean Community (EC — see Glossary) sanctions agreements 
and immediately lifted their bans on investment and travel to 
South Africa. International athletic teams were drawn into the 
controversy, as some sports organizations tried to adhere to 
international boycotts, while in South Africa, sports enthusiasts 
and athletes demanded readmission to world competitions. In 
late 1990, both de Klerk and Mandela again went abroad seek- 
ing political and financial support. De Klerk traveled to the 
United States in September 1990 and to Britain and the Neth- 
erlands in October; at about the same time, Mandela traveled 
to India, Japan, and other Asian countries. 

Popular pressure for lifting sanctions increased in the 
United States. The US Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act of 
1986 had specified that five conditions would have to be met 
before sanctions could be lifted. By late 1990, three of them 
had been accomplished — the government had entered into 
multiracial negotiations, had removed bans on multiracial 
political organizations, and had lifted the state of emergency in 
Natal. The remaining two conditions — freeing political prison- 



77 



South Africa: A Country Study 

ers and repealing the Group Areas Act and the Population Reg- 
istration Act — were not met until 1991. 

The climate of uncertainty spread to the homelands during 
1990 and 1991. These arid patches of land were despised by 
many as symbols of the apartheid system. Several homeland 
leaders, who depended heavily on Pretoria for their legiti- 
macy — and their budgets — faced growing dissent and demands 
for reincorporation into South Africa. Zulu residents of the 
wealthiest and most populous homeland, KwaZulu, increas- 
ingly feared that their interests and culture would be sub- 
merged in the groundswell of support for Mandela and the 
ANC, and that their past cooperation with the NP would be for- 
gotten. 

ANC and government leaders tried to find common ground 
for negotiating a new constitution, but they managed only 
incremental progress while they worked to rein in the extrem- 
ist fringes of their respective constituencies. In June 1990, de 
Klerk and Mandela met officially for the first time to set the 
agenda for further talks. The two sides moved cautiously 
toward each other. In August Mandela announced the suspen- 
sion of the ANC's thirty-year armed struggle. The government 
continued lifting apartheid restrictions, and in October — at de 
Klerk's prompting — the NP opened its ranks to all races. On 
October 15, 1990, parliament repealed the Reservation of Sep- 
arate Amenities Act of 1953, which had sanctioned "petty apart- 
heid" in public places such as beaches, libraries, and places of 
entertainment. 

The talks were threatened by escalating violence throughout 
1990, and in August Mandela accused the government of doing 
little to end it. De Klerk and Mandela continued their political 
tug-of-war. De Klerk sought domestic and international 
approval for the changes already under way, while Mandela 
pressed for change at a faster pace. A series of legislative deci- 
sions and political breakthroughs in 1990 moved South Africa 
closer to multiracial democracy, but at the end of the year, it 
was clear that many obstacles remained. 

The ANC gradually accepted the notion of a coalition 
interim government, but ANC leaders insisted on determining 
the rules for forming that coalition. In early 1991, debates 
raged over various formulas for multiracial government, and 
over the allocation of powers between regional and national 
authorities, as political leaders on all sides realized that it was 
easier to define an illegitimate government than to construct a 



78 



Historical Setting 



legitimate one. They agreed that an all-party congress would 
have responsibility for the most onerous organizational tasks: it 
would draw up broad principles on which a new constitution 
would rest, would determine the makeup of the constitution- 
making body, and would establish an interim government to 
oversee the transition itself. 

In January 1991, Mandela met for the first time in nearly 
thirty years with Zulu leader Buthelezi in an effort to allay Zulu 
fears of ANC domination. This historic meeting did little to 
quell escalating ANC-IFP violence, however, and the weak 
police response only fueled ANC suspicions of covert police 
support for the IFP. Amid rising unrest, the government imple- 
mented a new security crackdown in the townships, dubbed 
"Operation Iron Fist." Mandela faced new demands from his 
militant younger generation of followers to abandon the nego- 
tiations entirely. 

Finally, in February 1991, de Klerk and Mandela reached a 
compromise over efforts to reduce both violence and the 
smuggling of arms into South Africa, and to achieve the release 
of political prisoners. The ANC was anxious to repatriate its 
remaining exiles, many of whose skills were needed in the 
negotiations, but the logistical problems of returning refugees 
from countries that lacked diplomatic ties with South Africa 
seemed insurmountable until the United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was persuaded to intervene 
on behalf of the ANC. 

On June 5, 1991, the government repealed two more legisla- 
tive pillars of apartheid, the Land Act of 1913 (and 1936) and 
the Group Areas Act of 1950. The 1991 legislation gave all races 
equal rights to own property anywhere in the country, enabled 
some 300,000 black householders to convert ninety-nine-year 
leases to full ownership, enabled suburban residents of all races 
to set (racially nondiscriminatory) residency standards for 
their neighborhoods, authorized the establishment of new 
townships and the extension of services to their residents, and 
encouraged the development of farmland and rural communi- 
ties. This legislation did not authorize compensation for blacks 
who had been displaced from their land in the preceding thirty 
years; instead, it left their complaints to be dealt with by a spe- 
cial court or commission to be established for that purpose. 

On June 17, 1991, the government repealed the Population 
Registration Act of 1950, the most infamous pillar of apartheid, 
which had authorized the registration by race of newborn 



79 



South Africa: A Country Study 



babies and immigrants. Its repeal was hailed as historic 
throughout the world, although critics pointed to related laws 
still on the books that permitted inequitable treatment in vot- 
ing, in pensions, in social services, and in many other areas of 
public behavior. 

The National Peace Accord of September 1991 was a critical 
step toward formal negotiations. The thirty-three-page accord, 
signed by representatives of twenty-seven political organiza- 
tions and national and homeland governments, set codes of 
conduct for all parties to the process, including the police. The 
accord also established a network of "peace committees," to 
contain the violence that continued to plague the townships. 
Ironically, the most important results of the National Peace 
Accord turned out to be the establishment of networks of com- 
mitted individuals, the opening of communications channels, 
and the trust that began to be sown through discussion. The 
accord itself failed to accomplish its immediate goal; the vio- 
lence continued and increased sporadically throughout 1992. 

"Irreversible Progress" Toward Democracy 

Through dogged perseverance, amid claims and counter- 
claims of sabotage and brutality, key political leaders began for- 
mal constitutional negotiations on December 20, 1991. Calling 
themselves the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codesa), delegations from nineteen governmental and politi- 
cal organizations began planning the creation of a transitional 
government and a representative parliament. They established 
five working groups, each made up of thirty-eight delegates 
and thirty-eight advisers, to take the lead in creating a climate 
for free political activity; in determining basic constitutional 
principles; in establishing transitional procedures for the nom- 
inally independent homelands of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, 
Transkei, and Venda; in setting and overseeing timetables for 
the transition; and in dealing with new problems that would 
arise during the transition itself. 

International organizations and other countries were torn 
between recognizing South Africa's impressive accomplish- 
ments and encouraging further progress. Most international 
sanctions were lifted soon after the Population Registration 
Act, Group Areas Act, and Land Acts were repealed. In July 
1991, the United States Congress lifted remaining sanctions 
under its Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, although laws 
restricting commercial ties with South Africa remained on the 



80 



Historical Setting 



books in many states and cities in the United States. The EC 
lifted most trade and investment bans in January 1992 and 
remaining restrictions on sporting, scientific, and cultural links 
three months later. On April 6, 1992, the EC lifted its oil 
embargo. Other countries gradually lifted a range of boycotts, 
and many African governments — under pressure from their 
own business communities — reestablished diplomatic ties with 
South Africa. The United Nations General Assembly would wait 
until late 1993 to lift remaining UN sanctions. 

Much of de Klerk's effort in 1992 was directed toward 
appeasing and weakening his right-wing opponents — staunch 
defenders of apartheid who had broken with the NP during the 
1980s. He first tried reassuring them about the future. Then, as 
conservative resistance hardened, he called for a referendum 
among white voters to test his mandate for change. The ques- 
tion posed in the March 17, 1992, referendum was carefully 
worded: "Do you support continuation of the reform process 
which the State President began on February 2, 1990, and 
which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?" 
The outcome was a resounding 68.6 percent "yes." Election 
analysts reported that support among Afrikaners was even 
slightly higher than among English speakers. Only one region 
of the country — the northern Transvaal (later Northern Prov- 
ince) — voted "no." A few militant defenders of apartheid boy- 
cotted the referendum. 

Buoyed by the outcome, de Klerk presented Codesa with 
proposals for a two-phase transition, the first phase managed 
by transitional councils appointed by Codesa, and the second 
phase — the constitution-writing process — managed by an 
elected transitional government headed by a multiperson pres- 
idency and a bicameral legislature. The ANC's counterpropos- 
als called for a single-stage transition, a committee elected by 
proportional representation to draft the constitution, with a 
two-thirds majority needed to pass constitutional provisions. 
Negotiations were suspended as both sides sought to refine 
their proposals and to unify their constituencies. 

In mid-1992 escalating violence, allegations of police brutal- 
ity, and government financial scandals threatened to derail 
negotiations. After a particularly brutal attack on June 17, 
1992, by IFP supporters on ANC sympathizers in Boipatong, a 
township near Johannesburg, the ANC suspended negotiations 
and threatened to withdraw entirely unless the government 
made greater efforts to end the violence and to curtail covert 



81 



South Africa: A Country Study 

police support for the IFP. Mandela took his complaint to the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN, where, on 
July 15, 1992, he accused the government of "a cold-blooded 
strategy of state terrorism." Finally, in September 1992, de 
Klerk and Mandela arrived at a Record of Understanding 
affirming police responsibility for protecting residents in work- 
ers' hostels, where support for the ANC was high. ANC fears 
lingered, however, especially in late 1992, when the Commis- 
sion of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation (Goldstone Commission) released its find- 
ings of a "dirty tricks" campaign against the ANC, apparently 
sanctioned by senior figures within the South African Defence 
Forces (SADF). 

In protest against the Record of Understanding, Zulu leader 
Buthelezi established an alternative to Codesa to include the 
leaders of groups disadvantaged by the ANC's strong lead in 
the Codesa forum — i.e., white conservatives and black home- 
land leaders, whose power bases were eroding. The resulting 
Concerned South Africans Group (Cosag) pressed for a federal 
constitution to preserve the rights of ethnic minorities, espe- 
cially the Zulu and whites. 

Negotiations resumed on March 5, 1993, but the fragile pro- 
cess was again threatened a month later, when Chris Hani, the 
popular general secretary of the South African Communist 
Party (SACP), was murdered. ANC leaders joined the govern- 
ment in trying to stem outbreaks of retaliatory violence, and 
several white extremists were arrested within weeks after the 
murder. With a new sense of urgency, political negotiators tried 
to speed the process and set the date for nationwide elections 
no later than April 27, 1994. 

The draft constitution published on July 26, 1993, contained 
concessions to all sides — a federal system of regional legisla- 
tures, equal voting rights regardless of race, and a bicameral 
legislature. Negotiators were undeterred by the storm of pro- 
tests that followed, and they went on to establish a Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC), a multiracial body that would share 
executive responsibilities with President de Klerk during elec- 
tion preparations. Cosag boycotted the TEC and formed the 
Freedom Alliance to demand equal status with the government 
and the ANC. Sensing new momentum, however, the govern- 
ment cracked down on right-wing violence and tried to reason 
with white extremists, without slowing the pace of election 
preparations. 



82 



Historical Setting 



Preparing for Elections 

In November 1993, negotiators endorsed the draft of the 
interim constitution calling for a five-year transitional govern- 
ment, and the tricameral parliament endorsed the draft in 
December (see The Interim Constitution, ch. 4). The timeta- 
ble for elections remained firm after that. Mandela and the 
ANC, sensing their imminent rise to power and to responsibil- 
ity for the country's welfare, called for the immediate lifting of 
remaining international sanctions and sought new donors and 
investors for South Africa. But the ongoing violence, which was 
frightening away investors, also threatened to delay the April 
elections. 

In December 1993, the multiracial TEC was installed as part 
of the executive branch of government — over the objections of 
the Freedom Alliance and the PAC. The TEC quickly estab- 
lished seven subcouncils with specific responsibilities during 
the transition. It also approved the formation of an eleven- 
member Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to organize 
and to verify the planned elections, and it deployed police and 
army units to northern Natal to try to end the violence. 

Other countries and international organizations began 
mobilizing support for South Africa's historic vote. The United 
Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), which 
had deployed in small numbers to quell township violence in 
August 1992, expanded its mission to about 2,000 personnel to 
coordinate the teams of election observers that were being sent 
by the OAU, the European Union (EU — see Glossary), the 
British Commonwealth, and several individual countries. 

The antielection Freedom Alliance began to unravel in early 
1994. White conservatives stepped up their demands for a sepa- 
rate, whites-only homeland — dispelling any illusions of support 
for their Freedom Alliance partners. The government of 
Ciskei, a homeland where the ANC's popularity exceeded that 
of the appointed president, broke away from its alliance part- 
ners and declared its intention to permit homeland residents 
to vote. The government in Bophuthatswana — another Free- 
dom Alliance partner facing strong popular opposition — 
sought armed support from the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging — AWB), prompt- 
ing the SADF to intervene and to remove Bophuthatswana 
President Lucas Mangope from office. With the Freedom Alli- 
ance severely weakened, PAC President Clarence Makwetu — 
another election holdout — announced that group's suspension 



83 



South Africa: A Country Study 



of its armed struggle, thus opening the way for election partici- 
pation by its members. 

Violence continued, mostly between supporters of the IFP 
and the ANC, and the TEC authorized rapid training for a 
10,000-member national peacekeeping force — an effort that 
eventually failed. The force was disbanded as the elections 
began. The Goldstone Commission found evidence of serious 
police complicity in the continuing unrest, and the govern- 
ment suspended several officers pending investigations. The 
country appeared poised to launch into violence-wracked bal- 
loting, when de Klerk imposed a state of emergency in Natal 
and KwaZulu on March 31, 1994, deploying 3,000 SADF troops 
to allow residents of the area to defy the IFP election boycott 
and to go to the polls. 

On April 12, 1994, a team of international mediators headed 
by former British foreign secretary Lord Carrington and 
former United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger arrived 
to attempt to break the logjam that was keeping the IFP out of 
the elections. After two days of fruitless discussions, their effort 
was declared a failure, and the mediators left. Only days later, 
however, on April 19, Buthelezi — under intense pressure from 
trusted local and international figures — relented and agreed to 
allow the IFP to be placed on the ballot. 

When the elections finally took place on schedule, begin- 
ning on April 26, 1994, the government and the ANC had sev- 
eral thousand security forces, with varying degrees of training 
and authority, in place to prevent serious outbreaks of violence. 
Remarkably, the violence subsided. A few "exceptional" votes 
were cast by voters who were disabled or were living outside 
South Africa on April 26. During the next two days, more than 
22 million voters stood in line for hours at some 9,000 polling 
places to exercise their newly won right to vote. Balloting was 
extended through April 29. There was no voter registration list, 
so IEC officials marked voters' fingers with indelible ink to pre- 
vent fraud. 

For days after the elections, tensions remained high, and 
some accusations of election fraud surfaced — especially in 
Natal. As the counting proceeded, the IEC prompted party 
leaders to negotiate agreements over disputed results that 
would allow the IEC to certify the elections as "substantially 
free and fair." The official results, released on May 6, 1994, 
gave the ANC 62.6 percent of the vote; the NP, 20.4 percent; 
and the IFP, 10.5 percent. Seven political parties won seats in 



84 



Historical Setting 



the National Assembly (see table 17, Appendix). Three parties 
won the 5 percent of votes necessary to participate in the cabi- 
net of the coalition government. 

Mandela was unanimously elected president by the National 
Assembly on May 9, 1994, in Cape Town. His two deputy presi- 
dents, former ANC chairman Thabo Mbeki and former presi- 
dent de Klerk, stood with Mandela when he was inaugurated 
on May 10 at ceremonies in Pretoria. Representatives of 140 
countries were present. Mandela's inaugural address stressed 
the need for reconciliation, both within South Africa and with 
other countries, and once again he quoted his own words at 
the Rivonia trial that had preceded his long imprisonment, and 
he reaffirmed his determination to forge a peaceful, nonracial 
society. 

* * * 

Two excellent histories of South Africa have recently been 
published. Leonard M. Thompson's A History of South Africa 
provides a well-written and scholarly survey by the foremost his- 
torian of the country. Reader's Digest's An Illustrated History of 
South Africa: The Real Story offers much more detailed coverage 
but without any sacrifice of scholarly quality. Useful chapters 
surveying the history of South Africa can also be found in the 
multi-volume Cambridge History of Africa and in the two-volume 
Oxford History of South Africa. Richard Elphick and Hermann 
Giliomee's The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 is 
essential reading on the early history of the Cape. Martin Hall's 
Farmers, Kings, and Traders provides an innovative study that 
shifts the focus of pre-1870 history away from the Cape and 
toward developments in southern Africa at large. T. Dunbar 
Moodie's The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afri- 
kaner Civil Religion is still the basic text on Afrikaner national- 
ism. Willem A. de Klerk's The Puritans in Africa: The Story of 
Afrikanerdom is also interesting, in large part because it was writ- 
ten by the brother of the former president of South Africa. 

Tom Lodge's Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 provides a 
very detailed study of resistance movements up to the early 
1980s, although for a thorough analysis of black consciousness 
the reader needs to consult Gail M. Gerhart's Black Power in 
South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology. Three studies co-edited 
by Shula Marks and others bring together the most recent writ- 
ings by "radical" authors who have dominated much of the 



85 



South Africa: A Country Study 



scholarship produced on South Africa in the 1970s and the 
1980s: Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa', Industri- 
alisation and Social Change in South Africa; and The Politics of Race, 
Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa. Finally, 
Joseph Lelyveld's Pulitzer Prize-winning Move Your Shadow: 
South Africa, Black and White is the finest journalistic study ever 
written about South Africa. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



86 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Farmhouse with familiar windmill beneath flat-topped ridges along the south- 
ern edge of the Great Karoo 



SOCIETY IS STILL BEING FORMED in South Africa in the 
1990s. The region's earliest cultures have long since been dis- 
placed, and most people living in South Africa today are 
descendants of Africans who came to the region in the first mil- 
lennium A.D. These early populations did not remain in one 
place over the centuries, however. Instead, their settlement pat- 
terns changed as numerous small chiefdoms were thrown into 
upheaval by increasing conflicts over land, the arrival of Euro- 
pean settlers after the seventeenth century, and nineteenth- 
century Zulu expansionism. During the twentieth century, sev- 
eral million South Africans were displaced by the government, 
especially after the country's system of apartheid (see Glossary) 
• invalidated many of their land claims. 

South Africa's turbulent social history should not obscure 
the fact that this region probably was home to some of the ear- 
liest humans on earth. Archaeological evidence suggests that 
human populations evolved in the broad region of south cen- 
tral and eastern Africa, perhaps as early as 2 million years ago, 
but at least 200,000 years ago. Fossil remains of Homo sapiens 
in eastern South Africa have been tentatively dated to 50,000 
years ago, and other remains show evidence of iron smelting 
about 1,700 years ago in the area that became the northern 
Transvaal. The evolutionary links between the earliest inhabit- 
ants and twentieth-century African populations are not well 
known, but it is clear that San and Khoikhoi (also called Khoi) 
peoples have been in southern Africa longer than any other liv- 
ing population. 

San hunters and gatherers and Khoikhoi herdsmen, known 
together as Khoisan because of cultural and linguistic similari- 
ties, were called "Bushmen" and "Hottentots" by early Euro- 
pean settlers. Both of these terms are considered pejorative in 
the late twentieth century and are seldom used. Most of the 
nearly 3 million South Africans of mixed-race ancestry (so- 
called "coloureds") are descendants of Khoisan peoples and 
Europeans over the past three centuries. 

Bantu language speakers who arrived in southern Africa 
from the north during the first millennium A.D. displaced or 
killed some Khoisan peoples they encountered, but they 
allowed many others to live among them peacefully. Most 
Bantu societies were organized into villages and chiefdoms, 



89 



South Africa: A Country Study 



and their economies relied primarily on livestock and crop cul- 
tivation. Their early ethnic identities were fluid and shifted 
according to political and social demands. For example, the 
Nguni or Nguni speakers, one of the largest Bantu language 
groups, have been a diverse and expanding population for sev- 
eral centuries. When groups clashed with one another, or their 
communities became too large, their political identity could 
easily shift to emphasize their loyalty to a specific leader or 
descent from a specific forebear. 

Historians believe that the ancestors of the Nguni-speaking 
Xhosa peoples were the first Bantu speakers to reach the south- 
ern tip of the continent. The Zulu, a related group of small 
chiefdoms, arrived soon after, and by the early nineteenth cen- 
tury they had evolved into a large, predatory kingdom. Zulu 
armies displaced or destroyed many small chiefdoms, and in 
the upheaval some of those who fled north probably retraced 
the pathways their ancestors had used centuries earlier as they 
moved into the region. Others were subjugated and assimilated 
into Zulu society, and a few — the forebears of today's Swazi and 
Sotho peoples — resisted Zulu advances and withdrew into 
mountainous regions that would later become independent 
nations. 

European travelers and explorers visited southern Africa 
over the centuries and, after the mid-seventeenth century, 
began settling near the Cape of Good Hope. Dutch immigrants 
moved inland from the coast in search of farmland and inde- 
pendence, especially during the nineteenth century, when 
their migration became known as the "Great Trek." British 
merchants, farmers, and missionaries arrived in large numbers 
during the nineteenth century. Asians, including merchants 
and traders as well as laborers and slaves, arrived from India, 
China, Malaya, and the Indonesian archipelago. South Africa 
began to develop a multiethnic mercantile, trading, and finan- 
cial class, based primarily on the country's mineral wealth after 
the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1880s. 

The South African War of 1899-1902, one of the Anglo-Boer 
Wars, hastened the process of assimilation that made South 
Africa one of the twentieth century's most diverse populations. 
After the war, East Europeans arrived in growing numbers, 
many of them fleeing religious or political persecution. South 
Africans of African descent were increasingly marginalized as 
the concept of racial separation became a central theme in 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



political debate and a key factor in government strategies for 
economic development. 

The mining industry fueled the development of the interior 
plateau region as the nation's industrial heartland. Agriculture 
was made possible in this relatively arid land scattered with 
rocky outcrops only by employing indigenous or imported 
laborers at low wages and by the extensive use of irrigation. 
These measures allowed rural whites to achieve living stan- 
dards that would have been impossible elsewhere and contrib- 
uted to the growth of flourishing urban centers. The earliest of 
these were Cape Town, where the relatively dry hinterland 
proved ideal for grain farming and vineyards, and Durban, 
where agricultural development centered around sugarcane, 
forestry, and a variety of food crops. 

The government adopted elements of legally entrenched 
racial supremacy in the twentieth century that culminated in 
the legal separation of the races, or apartheid, after 1948. 
Some believed that apartheid would allow parallel develop- 
ment of all ethnic and racial groups, but it was soon clear to 
most South Africans and to others that apartheid was an intol- 
erable system of racial privilege and subordination bolstered by 
the frequent use of force. 

Until the mid-twentieth century, white South Africans' views 
on race were relatively consistent with those of other Western 
nations. But after World War II, when the rest of the world 
began working toward greater integration among races and 
nations, South Africa veered in the opposite direction. By the 
1960s, white domination had become entrenched, even as 
colonial rule was ending in the rest of Africa and racial segrega- 
tion was condemned throughout much of the world. 

As a result, South Africa became increasingly marginalized 
within the international community. Apartheid became so 
repugnant to so many people worldwide that this wealthy 
nation faced mounting economic and political pressures to 
end it. South Africa's growing isolation, together with the disas- 
trous effects of apartheid, convinced most whites that racial 
separation would, in the long run, not guarantee their safety or 
prosperity. The government began dismantling racial barriers 
in the early 1990s, but apartheid-era distinctions left lasting 
marks on South African society, and the new, multiracial gov- 
ernment in the mid-1990s faced too many pressing needs to 
spend much time celebrating its country's newfound character. 



91 




92 



Cape Town set against Table Mountain, which rises more than 1, 000 

meters above sea level 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 



93 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Physical Setting 

South Africa occupies the southern tip of the African conti- 
nent, stretching from 22°S to 35°S latitude and from 17°E to 
33°E longitude. The northeastern corner of the country lies 
within the tropics, astride the Tropic of Capricorn. South 
Africa covers 1.2 million square kilometers of land, one-seventh 
the area of the United States, or roughly twice the area of 
Texas. Nearly 4,900 kilometers of international boundaries sep- 
arate South Africa from Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and Swaziland — from northwest to northeast — 
and South Africa completely surrounds the small nation of 
Lesotho. In addition, the 2,881-kilometer coastline borders the 
Atlantic Ocean on the west and the Indian Ocean on the south 
and east. South Africa's extraterritorial holdings include 
Robben Island, Dassen Island, and Bird Island in the Atlantic 
Ocean, and Prince Edward Island and Marion Island about 
1,920 kilometers southeast of Cape Town in the Indian Ocean. 
Marion Island, at 46°S latitude, is the site of an important 
weather research station. 

South Africa forms a distinct region, or subcontinent, 
divided from the rest of Africa by the rivers that mark its north- 
ern border. In the northwest, the Orange River cuts through 
the Namib Desert and divides South Africa from Namibia. In 
the east, the Limpopo River traverses large areas of arid grass- 
land along the common border with Zimbabwe and southeast- 
ern Botswana. Between these two, the Molopo River winds 
through the southern basin of the Kalahari Desert, also divid- 
ing South Africa from Botswana. Populations have moved 
across these rivers almost continuously over the centuries, but, 
in general, the northern border region of South Africa is 
sparsely populated. 

The geological substratum of the subcontinent was formed 
at least 3.8 billion years ago, according to geologists, and most 
of the country's natural features evolved into their present 
form more than 200 million years ago. Especially since the 
early twentieth-century writings of Alfred Wegener, geologists 
have hypothesized that South Africa was once part of a large 
land mass, now known as Gondwana, or Gondwanaland, that 
slowly fractured along the African coastline millions of years 
ago. Theories of such a supercontinent are bolstered by geo- 
logical continuities and mineral similarities between South 
Africa and South America, by fossil similarities between South 
Africa and the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar, and by the 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



sharp escarpments, or geological fractures, that encircle most 
of southern Africa near the coast. 

The ancient rock substratum is overlain by sedimentary and 
volcanic rock formations. Because ground cover is sparse, only 
about 11 percent of the land in South Africa is arable. More 
than 20 percent of the land is too arid or the soil is too poor for 
any agricultural activity without irrigation; roughly 66 percent 
is suitable only for livestock grazing. Even the thin soil cover 
has been severely eroded, especially in the country's most over- 
populated and impoverished rural areas. The relatively poor 
land conceals enormous wealth in minerals, however, includ- 
ing gold, diamonds, copper, platinum, asbestos, and coal. 

Geographic Regions 

Like much of the African continent, South Africa's land- 
scape is dominated by a high plateau in the interior, sur- 
rounded by a narrow strip of coastal lowlands. Unlike most of 
Africa, however, the perimeter of South Africa's inland plateau 
rises abruptly to form a series of mountain ranges before drop- 
ping to sea level. These mountains, known as the Great Escarp- 
ment, vary between 2,000 meters and 3,300 meters in elevation. 
The coastline is fairly regular and has few natural harbors. 
Each of the dominant land features — the inland plateau, the 
encircling mountain ranges, and the coastal lowlands — exhib- 
its a wide range of variation in topography and in natural 
resources (see fig. 7). 

The interior plateau consists of a series of rolling grasslands 
("veld," in Afrikaans), arising out of the Kalahari Desert in the 
north. The largest subregion in the plateau is the 1,200-meter 
to 1,800-meter-high central area known as the Highveld. The 
Highveld stretches from Western Cape province to the north- 
east, encompassing the entire Free State (formerly, Orange 
Free State). In the north, it rises into a series of rock forma- 
tions known as the Witwatersrand (literally, "Ridge of White 
Waters" in Afrikaans, commonly shortened to Rand — see Glos- 
sary). The Rand is a ridge of gold-bearing rock, roughly 100 
kilometers by thirty-seven kilometers, that serves as a watershed 
for numerous rivers and streams. It is also the site of the world's 
largest proven gold deposits and the country's leading indus- 
trial city, Johannesburg. 

North of the Witwatersrand is a dry savanna subregion, 
known as the Bushveld, characterized by open grasslands with 
scattered trees and bushes. Elevation varies between 600 meters 



95 



South Africa: A Country Study 




- 

not necessarily authoritative 
15 

—35 1 

Figure 7. Topography and Drainage 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 




South Africa: A Country Study 



and about 900 meters above sea level. The Bushveld, like the 
Rand, houses a virtual treasure chest of minerals, one of the 
largest and best known layered igneous (volcanic) mineral 
complexes in the world. Covering an area roughly 350 kilome- 
ters by 150 kilometers, the Bushveld has extensive deposits of 
platinum and chromium and significant reserves of copper, flu- 
orspar, gold, nickel, and iron. 

Along the northern edge of the Bushveld, the plains rise to a 
series of high plateaus and low mountain ranges, which form 
the southern edge of the Limpopo River Valley in Northern 
Province. These mountains include the Waterberg and the 
Strypoortberg ranges, and, in the far north, the Soutpansberg 
Mountains. The Soutpansberg range reaches an elevation of 
1,700 meters before dropping off into the Limpopo River Val- 
ley and the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
Kruger National Park, which is known for its diverse terrain 
and wildlife, abuts most of the north-south border with Mozam- 
bique. 

West of the Bushveld is the southern basin of the Kalahari 
Desert, which borders Namibia and Botswana at an elevation of 
600 meters to 900 meters. Farther south, the Southern Namib 
Desert stretches south from Namibia along the Atlantic coast- 
line. Between these two deserts lies the Cape Middleveld subre- 
gion, an arid expanse of undulating plains that sometimes 
reaches an elevation of 900 meters. The Cape Middleveld is 
also characterized by large depressions, or "pans," where rain- 
fall collects, providing sustenance for a variety of plants and 
animals. 

The southern border of the Highveld rises to form the 
Great Escarpment, the semicircle of mountain ranges roughly 
paralleling South Africa's coastline. The Drakensberg Moun- 
tains, the country's largest mountain range, dominate the 
southern and the eastern border of the Highveld from the 
Eastern Cape province to the border with Swaziland. The high- 
est peaks of the Drakensberg Mountains in KwaZulu-Natal 
exceed 3,300 meters and are even higher in Lesotho, which is 
known as the "Mountain Kingdom." 

In the west and the southwest, the Cape Ranges, the coun- 
try's only "fold mountains" — formed by the folding of the con- 
tinental crust — form an "L," where the north-south ranges 
meet several east-west ranges. The north-south Cape Ranges, 
paralleling the Atlantic coastline, include the Cedarberg 
Mountains, the Witsenberg Mountains, and the Great Winter- 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



hoek Mountains, and have peaks close to 2,000 meters high. 
The east-west ranges, paralleling the southern coastline, 
include the Swartberg Mountains and the Langeberg Moun- 
tains, with peaks exceeding 2,200 meters. 

The Cape Ranges are separated from the Highveld by a nar- 
row strip of semidesert, known as the Great Karoo (Karoo is a 
Khoisan term for "land of thirst"). Lying between 450 meters 
and 750 meters above sea level, the Great Karoo is crossed by 
several rivers that have carved canyons and valleys in their 
southward descent from the Highveld into the ocean. Another 
narrow strip of arid savanna lies south of the Great Karoo, 
between the Swartberg Mountains and the Langeberg Moun- 
tains. This high plain, known as the Little Karoo, has a more 
temperate climate and more diverse flora and fauna than the 
Great Karoo. 

The narrow coastal strip between the Great Escarpment and 
the ocean, called the Lowveld, varies in width from about sixty 
kilometers to more than 200 kilometers. Beyond the coastline, 
the continental shelf is narrow in the west but widens along the 
south coast, where exploitable deposits of oil and natural gas 
have been found. The south coast is also an important spawn- 
ing ground for many species of fish that eventually migrate to 
the Atlantic Ocean fishing zones. 

Lakes and Rivers 

Water shortages are a chronic and severe problem in much 
of South Africa. The country has no commercially navigable 
rivers and no significant natural lakes. Along the coastline are 
several large lagoons and estuarine lakes, such as Lake Saint 
Lucia in KwaZulu-Natal. The government has created several 
artificial lakes, primarily for agricultural irrigation. 

South Africa's largest river, the Orange River, rises in the 
Drakensberg Mountains and flows to the west and northwest, 
draining the highlands of Lesotho before being joined by the 
Caledon River between the Eastern Cape province and the 
Free State. The Orange River forms the border with Namibia 
before emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. 

The major tributary of the Orange River, the Vaal ("foul" — 
for its murky cast) River, rises in the Drakensbergs and flows 
westward, joining the Orange River from the north in North- 
ern Cape province. Together, the Orange and the Vaal rivers 
drain almost two-thirds of the interior plateau of South Africa. 
Other major rivers are the Breede River, the Komati River, the 



99 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Olifants River, the Tugela River, and the Umzimvubu River, 
which run fairly short distances from the interior plateau to the 
ocean, and the Limpopo and Molopo rivers along the north- 
ern border with Botswana and Zimbabwe. 

Climate and Rainfall 

Climatic conditions generally range from Mediterranean in 
the southwestern corner of the country to temperate in the 
interior plateau, and subtropical in the northeast. A small area 
in the northwest has a desert climate. Most of the country has 
warm, sunny days and cool nights. Rainfall generally occurs 
during summer (November through March), although in the 
southwest, around the Cape of Good Hope, rainfall often 
occurs in winter (June through August). Temperatures are 
influenced by variations in elevation, terrain, and ocean cur- 
rents more than latitude. 

Temperature and rainfall patterns vary in response to the 
movement of a high-pressure belt that circles the globe 
between 25° and 30° south latitude during the winter and low- 
pressure systems that occur during summer. There is very little 
difference in average temperatures from south to north, how- 
ever, in part because the inland plateau rises slightly in the 
northeast. For example, the average annual temperature in 
Cape Town is 17°C, and in Pretoria, 17.5°C, although these cit- 
ies are separated by almost ten degrees of latitude. Maximum 
temperatures often exceed 32°C in the summer, and reach 
38°C in some areas of the far north. The country's highest 
recorded temperatures, close to 48°C, have occurred in both 
the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga (formerly Eastern Trans- 
vaal) . 

Frost occurs in high altitudes during the winter months. The 
coldest temperatures have been recorded about 250 kilometers 
northeast of Cape Town, where the average annual minimum 
temperature is -6.1°C. Record snowfalls (almost fifty centime- 
ters) occurred in July 1994 in mountainous areas bordering 
Lesotho. 

Climatic conditions vary noticeably between east and west, 
largely in response to the warm Agulhas ocean current, which 
sweeps southward along the Indian Ocean coastline in the east 
for several months of the year, and the cold Benguela current, 
which sweeps northward along the Atlantic Ocean coastline in 
the west. Air temperatures in Durban, on the Indian Ocean, 
average nearly 6°C warmer than temperatures at the same lati- 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



tude on the Atlantic Ocean coast. The effects of these two cur- 
rents can be seen even at the narrow peninsula of the Cape of 
Good Hope, where water temperatures average 4°C higher on 
the east side than on the west. 

Rainfall varies considerably from west to east. In the north- 
west, annual rainfall often remains below 200 millimeters. 
Much of the eastern Highveld, in contrast, receives 500 milli- 
meters to 900 millimeters of rainfall per year; occasionally, rain- 
fall there exceeds 2,000 millimeters. A large area of the center 
of the country receives about 400 millimeters of rain, on aver- 
age, and there are wide variations closer to the coast. The 400- 
millimeter "rainfall line" has been significant because land east 
of the rainfall line is generally suitable for growing crops, and 
land west of the rainfall line, only for livestock grazing or crop 
cultivation on irrigated land (see fig. 2). 

Environmental Trends 

South Africa has a wealth of natural resources, but also some 
severe environmental problems. The mainstay of the economy, 
the mining industry, has introduced environmental concerns, 
and mineowners have taken some steps in recent years to mini- 
mize the damage from this enterprise (see Environmental Pro- 
tection and Tourism, ch. 3). Agriculture suffers from both land 
and water shortages, and commercial farming practices have 
taken a toll on the land. Energy production, too, has often con- 
tributed to environmental neglect. 

Because of the generally steep grade of the Great Escarp- 
ment as it descends from the interior to the coastal lowlands, 
many of South Africa's rivers have an unusually high rate of 
runoff and contribute to serious soil erosion. In addition, water 
consumption needs and irrigation for agriculture have 
required building numerous dams. As of the mid-1990s, the 
country has 519 dams with a total capacity of 50 billion cubic 
meters. Water management engineers estimate that the Vaal 
River, which provides most of the water for the industrial hub 
around the Witwatersrand, has reached its maximum capacity 
for water utilization. 

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the largest hydroelec- 
tric project ever undertaken in Africa, is a thirty-year joint 
endeavor between South Africa and Lesotho that is due for 
completion in the year 2020. Through a series of dams on the 
headwaters of the Orange River, it will alleviate water shortages 
in South Africa and is expected to provide enough electrical 



101 



South Africa: A Country Study 

power to enable Lesotho to become virtually self-sufficient in 

energy. 

Much of the land in South Africa has been seriously over- 
grazed and overcultivated. During the apartheid era, black 
African farmers were denied many government benefits, such 
as fertilizers, which were available to white farmers. Settlement 
patterns, too, have contributed to land degradation, particu- 
larly in overcrowded black homelands, and the inadequate and 
poorly administered homelands' budgets have allowed few 
improvements in land use. 

The environmental impacts of the mining industry have 
been devastating to some areas of the Witwatersrand, the coun- 
try's most densely populated region. Some of the gold deposits 
located here have been mined for more than a century. 
According to South African geographer Malcolm Lupton and 
South African urban planning expert Tony Wolfson, mine 
shafts — the deepest is 3,793 meters — have made hillsides and 
ridges less stable. Pumping water from subterranean aquifers 
has caused the natural water table to subside, and the resulting 
cavities within the dolomite rock formations that overlie many 
gold deposits sometimes collapse, causing sinkholes. Moreover, 
these impacts of the mining industry could worsen over time. 

Industrial wastes and pollutants are another mining-related 
environmental hazard. Solid wastes produced by the separation 
of gold from ore are placed in dumps, and liquid wastes are col- 
lected in pits, called slimes dams. Both of these contain small 
amounts of radioactive uranium. Radon gas emitted by the ura- 
nium poses a health threat when inhaled and can contribute to 
lung cancer and other ailments. Furthermore, the dust from 
mine dumps can contribute to respiratory diseases, such as sili- 
cosis. 

Acids and chemicals used to reduce the ore to gold also 
leave dangerous contaminants in the water table. Streams 
around Johannesburg townships, such as Soweto, have been 
found to contain uranium, sulfates, cyanide, and arsenic. Land 
near mining operations is sometimes rendered "sterile" or too 
contaminated for farming, and efforts to reclaim the land have 
often proved too costly for industry or government. 

Air pollution is a serious problem in some areas. Most homes 
lack electricity in the mid-1990s, and coal is used for cooking 
and heating. Air-quality tests have revealed high levels of partic- 
ulate pollution, as a result, especially during cold weather. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) reported in the early 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



1990s that air-quality measurements in Soweto and surround- 
ing townships outside Johannesburg exceeded recommended 
levels of particulate pollution for at least three months of the 
year. Other studies suggest that air pollution contributes to 
child health problems, especially respiratory ailments, in 
densely populated areas. 

Electricity for industrial and commercial use and for con- 
sumption in urban areas is often produced in coal-burning 
power stations. These electric power stations lack sulfur "scrub- 
bers," and air-quality surveys have shown that they emit as 
much as 1.2 million tons of sulfur dioxide a year. A 1991 gov- 
ernment-appointed panel of researchers reported that South 
Africa had contributed about 2 percent of the so-called green- 
house gases in the global environment. 

Many government officials in 1995 had been among the 
strongest critics of earlier governments, and a frequent topic of 
criticism was environmental neglect. Preserving the environ- 
ment, therefore, was important in the mid-1990s, but financial 
constraints were limiting the government's ability to enact or 
implement such measures. Economic development and 
improved living standards among the poor appeared likely to 
outweigh long-range environmental concerns for at least the 
remainder of the 1990s. 

Population 

Size and Growth 

The first census of the Union of South Africa was taken in 
1911, one year after its formation. Several enumerations 
occurred after that, but the black African population was not 
accurately counted in any of them. In 1950, when apartheid 
legislation officially restricted black peoples to approximately 
13 percent of the land, the government declared that a 
national census would be taken at the beginning of each 
decade. After that, Africans were gradually assigned to live in 
these homelands (see Glossary), then called Bantustans. As the 
first four homelands were granted nominal independence in 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, their residents and others 
assigned to live there were excluded from the official census of 
South Africa. 

Another problem with census measurements was that many 
black South Africans lived in informal settlements, or "squatter 
camps," close to cities where they worked or hoped to work, 



103 



South Africa: A Country Study 



and squatters were often omitted from census counts. In addi- 
tion, although all citizens were legally required to register 
births, deaths, marriages, and divorces, many people — espe- 
cially urban blacks — avoided doing so, in part because of the 
stringency and complexity of the laws governing legal resi- 
dency. 

The 1980 census count was nearly 23.8 million; another 4.6 
million were added to compensate for acknowledged under- 
counting, resulting in a nationwide population of 28.4 million. 
The figures excluded those living in the three homelands that 
were nominally independent in 1980 — an estimated 2.7 million 
in Transkei, 1 million in Bophuthatswana, and about 350,000 
in Venda. A fourth homeland, Ciskei, with a population of 
678,000, became M independent M in 1981. 

The next census, in 1991, took place amid unprecedented 
political violence. For the first time, the government used 
aerial photography and sample surveys to enumerate residents 
in eighty-eight "unrest" areas, which were otherwise inaccessi- 
ble to government officials. After being adjusted for underenu- 
meration, the 1991 census yielded a count of 30,986,920 
citizens, excluding the four "independent" homelands. Resi- 
dents of the other six non-independent ("self-governing") 
homelands — 10,746,504 people — were included in the nation- 
wide count. 

In 1992 the United States Bureau of the Census estimated 
that 48 percent of all black South Africans, and about 1 percent 
of all other racial groups, lived in the ten homelands — which 
made up only about one-seventh of the total land area of the 
country. On this basis, the bureau estimated the total popula- 
tion of South Africa at 40.6 million. 

In 1994 the South African government estimated the total 
nationwide population at 40.4 million, after all ten homelands 
had been reincorporated into South Africa (see table 2, Appen- 
dix) . In that year, the United States Bureau of the Census esti- 
mated the total population of South Africa at 43.9 million. 
Relying on the South African government's enumeration and 
legal categories, the South African Institute of Race Relations 
estimated that the population was 76.4 percent black, 12.6 per- 
cent white, 8.5 percent coloured, and 2.5 percent Asian. 

Population growth rates declined from about 2.9 percent 
per year in the early 1980s to 2.4 percent in 1995, according to 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa, a South African 
economic research and lending organization. Again, racial 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



groups varied; population growth was about 2.6 percent per 
year for blacks, 2.2 percent for coloureds, 1.9 percent for 
Asians, and 1.0 percent for whites. The government estimated 
that the population would double by the year 2025. 

Life expectancy at birth was 62. V years for males and 68.3 
years for females in 1996, placing South Africa just below the 
global median. These figures, too, varied considerably by race; 
for black males, life expectancy was about nine years less than 
for white males. About 50.5 percent of the population is female 
and 49.5 percent is male, according to the South African Cen- 
tral Statistical Service (see fig. 8). In some rural areas and the 
former homelands, labor policies that draw men into urban 
areas have resulted in strongly skewed gender ratios. For exam- 
ple, in the early 1990s, the population of QwaQwa was esti- 
mated to be 56 percent female; in KwaZulu, 54 percent female. 

In 1995 overall fertility was 4.1 births per adult female, down 
from 5.6 a decade earlier. The crude birth rate was 2V. 1 births 
per 1,000 people, according to official estimates. Twelve per- 
cent of all births in the early 1990s were to women aged nine- 
teen or younger. Infant mortality was estimated at 45.8 deaths 
within the first year, per 1,000 live births. The average annual 
death rate for the entire population was 7.6 per 1,000. Until 
1994, these statistics had been reported by racial group, and 
both birth and death rates were higher among blacks than 
among whites. 

The median age was 19.2 years in 1995, according to official 
estimates. Roughly 37 percent of all South Africans were fifteen 
years of age or younger. Nearly 13 percent were above the age 
of fifty. Racial disparities in age composition were large, how- 
ever; for example, 52 percent of blacks and only 31 percent of 
whites were under age nineteen. 

The age dependency ratio, or the ratio of the combined 
population of children and the aged (those less than fifteen 
years of age and those more than sixty-four years of age) com- 
pared to the number between age fifteen and sixty-four, was 
70.6 percent in 1995. This measurement is often used to esti- 
mate the burden of "economic dependence" on the economi- 
cally active population. Variations among provinces are great, 
in part because of the uneven job concentration across the 
country. For example, in the Northern Province, the age 
dependency ratio is more than 100; while in Gauteng, the age 
dependency ratio is less than 50.0, according to the Central Sta- 
tistical Service. 



105 



South Africa: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 




PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 



Source: Based on information from South Africa Foundation, South Africa, 1995, 
Johannesburg, 1995, 117. 

Figure 8. Population by Age and Gender, Based on 1991 Census 
Distribution 

Population density averaged 34.4 persons per square kilome- 
ter in 1995, although distribution is uneven nationwide. The 
eastern half of the country is more densely populated than the 
western half, primarily because of the aridity of much of the 
west and the concentration of minerals in the east. The most 
densely populated areas of the country until 1994 were the 
homelands — where average densities sometimes exceeded 300 
people per square kilometer — and Gauteng, which includes 
Pretoria, Johannesburg, and the mining region of Witwa- 
tersrand. More than 7 million people, nearly 17 percent of the 
population, live in Gauteng, which constitutes less than 2 per- 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



cent of the land area of South Africa (see fig. 9). The popula- 
tion of Gauteng is expected to double by the year 2010. 

Population distribution by racial group is also uneven. In 
1995 black South Africans formed a majority in all provinces 
except the Western Cape, where they made up only 20 percent 
of the population. Cities were predominantly white, and the 
townships and squatter areas that ringed the cities were over- 
whelmingly black. The racial composition of cities and of for- 
merly white neighborhoods began to change in the early 1990s 
as apartheid-related laws were rescinded or ignored, and the 
pace of change accelerated in the mid-1990s. 

The Johannesburg-based Urban Foundation and other 
researchers have estimated that the urban population was 
approximately 57 percent of the total in 1995. Rates of urban- 
ization varied widely by province. The most highly urbanized 
provinces were Gauteng (nearly 96 percent), Western Cape (86 
percent), and Northern Cape (73 percent). The population of 
Northern Province, in contrast, was only about 9 percent 
urban, according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 

Ethnic Groups and Language 

South Africans represent a rich array of ethnic backgrounds, 
but the idea of ethnicity became highly explosive during the 
apartheid era, when the government used it for political and 
racial purposes. Whites in South Africa often attributed the 
recent centuries of warfare in the region to the varied origins 
of its peoples, rather than to the increasing economic pressures 
they had faced. Government officials, accordingly, imposed 
fairly rigid ethnic or tribal categories on a fluid social reality, 
giving each black African a tribal label, or identity, within a sin- 
gle racial classification. 

Apartheid doctrines taught that each black population 
would eventually achieve maturity as a nation, just as the Afri- 
kaner people, in their own view, had done. Officials, therefore, 
sometimes referred to the largest African ethnic groups as 
nations. The government established language areas for each 
of these and, during the 1950s and 1960s, assigned them sepa- 
rate residential areas according to perceived ethnic identity 
(see fig. 10). Over the next decade, portions of these language 
areas became Bantustans, and then self-governing homelands; 
finally, in the 1970s and the 1980s, four of the homelands — 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei — were granted 
nominal "independence" (see fig. 11). Although the indepen- 



107 



South Africa: A Country Study 



LAND AREA OF PROVINCES (percent of total) 
G k-n 




Gauteng (G) 1.7 
KwaZulu-Natal (K-N) 7.5 
Mpumalanga (MP) 6.7 
Northern Province (NP) 9.6 
North-West (NW) 9.7 
Free State (FS) 10.5 
Eastern Cape (EC) 14.0 
Western Cape (WC) 10.5 
Northern Cape (NC) 29.8 



POPULATION OF PROVINCES (percent of total) 




Source: Based on information from South Africa Foundation, South Africa, 1995, 
Johannesburg, 1995, 11, 19-23. 

Figure 9. Comparison of Provinces: Area, Population, and Economic 
Output, 1994 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



dent homelands were not recognized as separate nations by 
any country other than South Africa, people assigned to live 
there were officially "noncitizens" of South Africa. 

Apartheid policies also empowered the government to 
remove black Africans from cities and to preserve the "ethnic 
character"of neighborhoods in the African townships that were 
created, legally and illegally, around the cities. Many township 
neighborhoods were given specific "tribal" designations. Town- 
ship residents generally ignored these labels, however, and 
reacted to the divisiveness of the government's racial policies 
by minimizing the importance of their ethnic heritage, or dis- 
avowing it entirely. A few South Africans embraced the notion 
that ethnicity was an outdated concept, a creation of govern- 
ments and anthropologists, invoked primarily to create divi- 
sions among people of a particular class or region. 

The word "tribe" assumed especially pejorative connotations 
during the apartheid era, in part because of the distortions that 
were introduced by applying this concept to society. Techni- 
cally, no tribes had existed in South Africa for most of the twen- 
tieth century. The term "tribe," in anthropology, is often 
defined as a group of people sharing a similar culture — i.e., 
patterns of belief and behavior — settled in a common territory, 
and tracing their ancestry to a common — perhaps mythical — 
ancestor. But none of South Africa's black peoples shared a 
common, ancestral territory; they had been uprooted and relo- 
cated by warfare, by the search for new land, or by government 
action. Few rural residents could trace their descent from an 
ancestor shared with many of their neighbors. 

Then in 1993 and 1994, as the country emerged from the 
apartheid era, many South Africans appeared to reclaim their 
ethnic heritage and to acknowledge pride in their ancestry. 
The new political leaders recognized the practical advantage of 
encouraging people to identify both with the nation and with a 
community that had a past older than the nation. So the 
interim constitution of 1993 reaffirmed the importance of eth- 
nicity by elevating nine African languages to the status of offi- 
cial languages of the nation, along with English and Afrikaans. 

Language Groups 

The most widely spoken of South Africa's eleven official lan- 
guages in the mid-1990s are Zulu (isiZulu), Xhosa (isiXhosa), 
Afrikaans, and English (for Bantu prefixes, see Glossary). The 
others — isiNdebele, sePedi (seSotho sa Leboa), seSotho, 



109 



South Africa: A Country Study 




110 



The Society and Its Environment 



seTswana, siSwati, tshiVenda (also referred to as luVenda), and 
xiTsonga — are spoken in large areas of the country (see fig. 
12). Each of the eleven includes a number of regional dialects 
and variants. 

Despite the diversity of these language groups, it is nonethe- 
less possible to begin to understand this complex society by 
viewing language groupings as essentially the same as ethnic 
groupings. This is possible because, in general, most South 
Africans consider one of the eleven official languages, or a 
closely related tongue, to be their first language; and most peo- 
ple acquire their first language as part of a kinship group or an 
ethnically conscious population. 

Nine of South Africa's official languages (all except Afri- 
kaans and English) are Bantu languages. Bantu languages are a 
large branch of the Niger-Congo language family, which is rep- 
resented throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. Bantu lan- 
guages are spoken by more than 100 million Africans in 
Central Africa, East Africa, and southern Africa. Four major 
subgroups of Bantu languages — Nguni, Sotho, Tsonga-Shan- 
gaan, and Venda — are represented in South Africa. 

The largest group of closely related languages in South 
Africa is the Nguni. Nguni peoples in the country number at 
least 18 million. About 9 million Sotho (BaSotho) and 2 mil- 
lion Tswana (BaTswana) speak seSotho or a closely related lan- 
guage, seTswana. More than 2 million Tsonga and Shangaan 
peoples speak xiTsonga and related languages; at least 600,000 
Venda (VaVerida) speak tshiVenda (luVenda). 

Each of these language groups also extends across South 
Africa's boundaries into neighboring countries. For example, 
Nguni-speaking Swazi people make up almost the entire popu- 
lation of Swaziland. At least 1.3 million seSotho speakers live in 
Lesotho, and more than 1 million people in Botswana speak 
seTswana. Roughly 4 million speakers of xiTsonga and related 
languages live in Mozambique, and tshiVenda is spoken by sev- 
eral thousand people in southern Zimbabwe. Language bound- 
aries are not rigid and fixed, however; regional dialects often 
assume characteristics of more than one language. 

Nguni 

The Nguni peoples are classified into three large subgroups, 
the Northern Nguni, the Southern Nguni, and the Ndebele. 
The Zulu and the Swazi are among the Northern Nguni. The 
Xhosa are the largest Southern Nguni society, but the neigh- 



Ill 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




Homelands 

International boundary 

Province boundary 

® National capital 

® Province capital 

• Homeland seat of 
government 

100 200 Kilo meters 
"TOO 200 Miles 



Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication 
Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1994, Pretoria, 1995, x. 

Figure 11. Former African Homelands and Provinces, until 1994 

boring Thembu and Mpondo are also well known Southern 
Nguni societies, often described as subgroups of the Xhosa. 
Each of these groups is a heterogeneous grouping of smaller 
(also heterogeneous) ethnic groups. 

Four of South Africa's official languages are Nguni lan- 
guages; isiZulu, isiXhosa, siSwati, and isiNdebele are spoken 



Bophuthatswana 

Ciskei J Lebowa 

Gazankulu I QwaQwa 

KaNgwane 



KwaNdebele 



Transkei 
Venda 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



primarily by the Zulu, the Xhosa, the Swazi, and the Ndebele 
peoples, respectively. Each of these languages has regional vari- 
ants and dialects, which are often mutually intelligible. 

Before the nineteenth century, the dominant Nguni settle- 
ment pattern was that of dispersed households, as opposed to 
villages. The typical household was centered on a patrilineage; 
it also included other relatives through a variety of kinship ties, 
and people who had attached themselves to the household — 
often as indentured laborers who were rewarded in cattle. Cat- 
tle were central to most Nguni economies, which ranged from 
almost complete dependence on herding to mixed pastoralism 
and crop cultivation, often supplemented by hunting. 

Nguni political organization generally consisted of small 
chiefdoms, sometimes only a few hundred people loyal to a 
person chosen by descent, achievement, or a combination of 
factors. Until the eighteenth century or later, historians 
believe, these chiefdoms were not united under a king or mon- 
arch. Each chiefdom typically included a group of related patri- 
lineal clans, or descent groups united by common ancestry 
only a few generations deep, and others who had chosen to 
attach themselves to a particular chief. A chief could demand 
support and tribute (taxes) from his followers, could reward 
those he favored, could form political alliances, and could 
declare war against his enemies. A chiefs followers, in turn, 
usually had the right to leave and to join another chiefdom, if 
they wished. Larger chiefdoms sometimes exercised limited 
control over smaller ones, but such hegemony generally did 
not last for more than a generation or two. 

Zulu 

An estimated 8 million South Africans consider themselves 
Zulu (amaZulu) or members of closely related ethnic groups in 
the 1990s. By the eighteenth century, Zulu society encom- 
passed a number of Nguni-speaking chiefdoms north of the 
Tugela River (see fig. 4). The Zulu homestead (imizi) consisted 
of an extended polygynous (see Glossary) family and others 
attached to the household through social obligations. This 
social unit was largely self-sufficient, with responsibilities 
divided according to gender. Men were generally responsible 
for defending the homestead, caring for cattle, manufacturing 
and maintaining weapons and farm implements, and building 
dwellings. Women had domestic responsibilities and raised 
crops, usually grains, on land near the household. 



113 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Other (xiTsonga, seSwati, 
isiNdebele, tshiVenda) 11.8% 




seSotho, sePedi 16.8% 



Source: Based on information from South Africa, Central Statistical Service, RSA 
Statistics in Brief, 1994, Pretoria, 1994, 2.9, 2.10. 

Figure 12. Percentage of Population Using Each Official Language as 
First Language, 1994 

Zulu chiefs demanded steadily increasing tribute or taxes 
from their subjects, acquired great wealth, commanded large 
armies, and, in many cases, subjugated neighboring chiefdoms. 
Military conquest allowed men to achieve status distinctions 
that had become increasingly important. In the early nine- 
teenth century, the large and powerful Mthethwa chiefdom, 
led by Dingiswayo, dominated much of the region north of the 
Tugela River (see The Rise of African States, ch. 1). Shaka, a 
Zulu warrior who had won recognition in 1810 by skillfully sub- 
duing the leader of the warring Buthelezi chiefdom, took 
advantage of Dingiswayo's military defeat by the neighboring 
Ndwandwe armies to begin building the Zulu empire in 1817. 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



As king, Shaka Zulu (r. 1817-28) defied tradition by adopt- 
ing new fighting strategies, by consolidating control over his 
military regiments, and by ruthlessly eliminating potential 
rivals for power. Shaka's warrior regiments (impis) eventually 
subjugated the powerful Ndwandwe, and decimated or drove 
from the area the armies of Shaka's rivals. Spreading warfare — 
exacerbated by pressures from Europeans — drove thousands of 
Africans north and west, and the ensuing upheaval spawned 
new conflicts throughout the region (see fig. 5). 

The Zulu empire weakened after Shaka's death in 1828 and 
fragmented, especially following military defeats at the hands 
of the Afrikaners in 1839 and the British in 1879. Zululand, the 
area north of the Tugela River, was incorporated into the Brit- 
ish colony, Natal, in 1887. The last Zulu uprising, a poll tax pro- 
test led by Chief Bambatha in 1906, was ruthlessly suppressed. 
The Zulu population remained fragmented during most of the 
twentieth century, although loyalty to the royal family contin- 
ued to be strong in some areas. Leaders of Zulu cultural orga- 
nizations and Zulu politicians were able to preserve a sense of 
ethnic identity through the symbolic recognition of Zulu his- 
tory and through local-level politics. 

Zulu men and women have made up a substantial portion of 
South Africa's urban work force throughout the twentieth cen- 
tury, especially in the gold and copper mines of the Witwa- 
tersrand. Zulu workers organized some of the first black labor 
unions in the country. For example, the Zulu Washermen's 
Guild, Amawasha, was active in Natal and the Witwatersrand 
even before the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. 
The Zululand Planters' Union organized agricultural workers 
in Natal in the early twentieth century. 

The KwaZulu homeland was carved out of several uncon- 
nected plots of land in Natal in the 1960s. In 1976 Mangosuthu 
(Gatsha) Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family, was 
named chief minister of KwaZulu, and the government 
declared KwaZulu a self-governing territory a year later. 
Buthelezi established good relations with the National Party- 
dominated government and, in the process, severed his former 
close ties to the African National Congress (ANC) . 

During the 1980s, Buthelezi refused repeated government 
offers of homeland independence; he preferred to retain the 
self-governing status that allowed the roughly 4 million resi- 
dents of KwaZulu to be citizens of South Africa. Zulu solidarity 
was enhanced by Buthelezi's intellectually powerful and domi- 



115 



South Africa: A Country Study 



nant personality and by his leadership of the Zulu cultural 
organization, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural 
Liberation Movement — usually called Inkatha), which became 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) during the 1990s. 

During the apartheid era, many people in areas officially 
designated as Zulu were descendants of nineteenth-century 
Zulu warriors or subjects of the Zulu royal family, who retained 
a strong ethnic consciousness and pride in their Zulu identity. 
Others in these areas, however, traced their descent to those 
who resisted Shaka's domination or celebrated his death at the 
hands of his own relatives in 1828. Some viewed their associa- 
tion with Zulu royalty as little more than an artificial political 
creation. A substantial minority within the diverse Zulu society 
in the 1980s and the 1990s supported the rival ANC. 

Military prowess continued to be an important value in Zulu 
culture, and this emphasis fueled some of the political violence 
of the 1990s. Zulu people generally admire those with physical 
and mental agility, and those who can speak eloquently and 
hold a crowd's attention. These attributes strengthened 
Buthelezi's support among many Zulu, but his political rhetoric 
sometimes sparked attacks on political opponents and critics, 
even within Zulu society. 

Buthelezi's nephew, Goodwill Zwelithini, is the Zulu mon- 
arch in the 1990s. Buthelezi and King Goodwill won the agree- 
ment of ANC negotiators just before the April 1994 elections 
that, with international mediation, the government would 
establish a special status for the Zulu Kingdom after the elec- 
tions. Zulu leaders understood this special status to mean some 
degree of regional autonomy within the province of KwaZulu- 
Natal. 

Buthelezi was appointed minister of home affairs in the first 
Government of National Unity in 1994. He led a walkout of 
Zulu delegates from the National Assembly in early 1995 and 
clashed repeatedly with newly elected President Nelson 
(Rolihlahla) Mandela. Buthelezi threatened to abandon the 
Government of National Unity entirely unless his Zulu constit- 
uency received greater recognition and autonomy from central 
government control. 

Swazi 

About 1.6 million Swazi people live in the region in the 
1990s — almost 900,000 in Swaziland and the remainder in 
South Africa, especially in the area of the former homeland, 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



KaNgwane. Until the late eighteenth century, Swazi society 
consisted of a group of closely related Nguni chiefdoms orga- 
nized around patrilineal descent groups. At that time, a power- 
ful chief, Ngwane I, seized control over several smaller 
neighboring chiefdoms of Nguni and Sotho peoples to 
strengthen his own army's defense against the Mthethwa forces 
led by Dingiswayo. The greatest rival of the Mthethwa, the 
Ndwandwe, later subjugated the Mthethwa and killed Ding- 
iswayo. Ngwane I, under pressure from the Ndwandwe, then 
withdrew into the mountainous territory that would later 
become Swaziland. 

Ngwane I was able to resist incorporation into the Zulu 
empire during the reign of Shaka, and the Swazi maintained 
generally peaceful relations with Shaka's successors. Some 
Swazi clans were forced to move north, however, as regional 
upheaval spread, and together with displaced Zulu clans, they 
established aristocratic dynasties over herdsmen and farmers as 
far north as areas that would later become Malawi and Zambia. 

In the twentieth century, the Swazi kingdom retained its 
autonomy, but not total independence, as the British protector- 
ate of Swaziland in 1903 and as a British High Commission ter- 
ritory in 1907. In 1968 Swaziland became an independent 
nation led by King Sobhuza II. Swaziland has pressured Preto- 
ria for the return of Swazi-occupied areas of South Africa since 
the 1960s. In 1982 Pretoria agreed, but that decision was 
reversed by the South African Supreme Court. 

KaNgwane was carved out of land adjacent to Swaziland dur- 
ing the 1960s and was declared a "self-governing" territory with 
a population of about 400,000 in 1984. KaNgwane's Chief Min- 
ister Enos Mabuza tried to build an agricultural and industrial 
economy in the small, segmented territory, and he became the 
first homeland leader to grant full trade union rights to work- 
ers in his jurisdiction. Mabuza also led the fight against the 
incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland. During the late 
1980s, he clashed with Pretoria by expressing strong support 
for the ANC, although many KaNgwane residents remained 
uninvolved in South African politics. 

Xhosa 

The Xhosa (amaXhosa) people in South Africa in the mid- 
1990s number roughly 6 million, according to official esti- 
mates, including the Pondo (Mpondo), Thembu, and several 
other small ethnic groups, which have been assimilated, to 



117 



South Africa: A Country Study 

varying degrees, into Xhosa society over several centuries. Each 
of these is also a heterogeneous grouping of smaller popula- 
tions. 

Most Xhosa people speak English, and often several other 
languages, but they also take great pride in speaking Xhosa 
(isiXhosa), an Nguni language closely related to Zulu. Unlike 
most other African languages, Xhosa has more than a dozen 
"click" sounds, probably assimilated from Khoisan speakers 
over long periods of acculturation between Xhosa and Khoisan 
peoples. 

Some ancestors of twentieth-century Xhosa arrived in the 
eastern Cape region from the north before the fifteenth cen- 
tury, and others moved into the area during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Xhosa history tells of settlement east of 
the Sundays River by the early eighteenth century. The Xhosa 
eliminated or enslaved some of the Khoisan speakers they 
encountered, but many Khoikhoi were peacefully assimilated 
into Xhosa society. Khoikhoi workers were often entrusted with 
the care of cattle for a generation or two before being accepted 
as equal members of Xhosa society. The Xhosa generally incor- 
porated newcomers who recognized the dominance of the 
Xhosa chief. In fact, until the twentieth century, the term 
Xhosa was often used to designate territorial affiliation rather 
than common descent. The resulting Xhosa society was 
extremely diverse. 

Most Xhosa lived by cattle herding, crop cultivation, and 
hunting. Homesteads were normally built near the tops of the 
numerous ridges that overlook the rivers of the area, including 
the Fish River, the Keiskama River, the Buffalo River, and the 
Kei River. Cattle, serving as symbols of wealth, as well as means 
of exchange, pack animals, and transportation, were central to 
the economy. Crops such as corn, sorghum, and tobacco 
thrived in years with adequate rainfall. Woodworking and iron- 
working were important men's occupations. 

Xhosa homesteads were organized around descent groups, 
with descent traced through male forebears. These lineages, 
and the large clans formed by groups of related lineages, pro- 
vided the center of Xhosa social organization. These descent 
groups were responsible for preserving ancestral ties and for 
perpetuating the group through sacrifices to the ancestors, 
mutual assistance among the living, and carefully arranged 
marriages with neighboring clans or lineages. Political power 
was often described as control over land and water. A powerful 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



chief may be praised in oral histories by the claim that he had 
power over the land close to a large river, and a lesser chief, by 
the claim that he had power over land near a smaller river or 
tributary. 

Xhosa oral histories tell of installing a royal lineage, proba- 
bly by the early seventeenth century. This family, the Tshawe, 
or amaTshawe (people of Tshawe), continued to dominate 
other Xhosa clans for more than a century; only the Tshawe 
could be recognized as chiefs over other Xhosa, according to 
historical accounts in The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa 
People in the Day of Their Independence, by Jeffrey B. Peires. The 
Xhosa also experienced a rapid increase in population, and 
they divided several times over six or seven generations. The 
resulting dominant chiefdoms, the Gcaleka and the Rharhabe 
(Rarabe), formed distinct sections of Xhosa society throughout 
the twentieth century. 

Xhosa people had extensive contact with Europeans by the 
early nineteenth century, and they generally welcomed Euro- 
pean missionaries and educators into their territory. A Xhosa 
grammar book — the first in a southern African language — was 
published in 1834. Their early and sustained contact with 
Christian missionaries and educators led the Xhosa to distin- 
guish between "school people," who had accepted Western 
innovation, and "red people," who were identified with the tra- 
ditional red ocher used to dye clothing and to decorate the 
body. By the twentieth century, the Xhosa school people 
formed the core of South Africa's emerging black professional 
class and included lawyers, physicians, and ministers. 

The South African government recognized the split between 
the Gcaleka Xhosa and the Ngqika (a subgroup of Rharhabe) 
Xhosa in the twentieth century by establishing two Xhosa 
homelands. Transkei, a segmented territory in eastern Cape 
Province bordering Lesotho, was designated for the Gcaleka 
Xhosa, and Ciskei — -just west of Transkei — was for the Ngqika 
Xhosa. Transkei became an independent homeland in 1976, 
and Ciskei, in 1981. 

Xhosa language speakers also include the Thembu 
(Tembu), the eastern neighbors of the Xhosa during much of 
their history. The Thembu represent a number of clans that 
managed to exert their dominance over neighboring clans. 
The Thembu had long and varied contacts with the Xhosa. 
These were often peaceful and friendly — for example, Xhosa 
history says that the Great Wife of each chief was a Thembu — 



119 



South Africa: A Country Study 

but they sometimes erupted into war. The Thembu recognize 
their own royal clan, the Hala, who led many Thembu into bat- 
tle against the Xhosa during the late eighteenth century. 

Also closely related to the Xhosa are the Pondo (Mpondo), 
the eastern neighbors of the Thembu. The Pondo royal clan, 
the Nyawuza, struggled to establish and to preserve its domi- 
nance over neighboring clans well into the nineteenth century, 
when some of the Pondo and their neighbors were displaced 
and subjugated by the Zulu. 

Another population often described as a Xhosa subgroup is 
the Mfengu, consisting of descendants of small remnants of 
clans and chiefdoms that were displaced during the early nine- 
teenth-century upheaval of the mfecane (or crushing — see Glos- 
sary). Survivors of the mfecane attached themselves to Xhosa 
society, which was relatively stable, often in Xhosa villages 
located near Christian missions. After an initial period of cli- 
entship, or social inferiority that eroded as generations passed, 
the Mfengu were generally accepted as equals in the diverse 
Xhosa population. 

Ndebele 

The term Ndebele, or amaNdebele, in the 1990s refers pri- 
marily to about 800,000 South Africans whose forebears have 
inhabited areas of the northern Transvaal (now Northern Prov- 
ince) for more than a century. The Ndebele language, isiNde- 
bele, is classified among the Nguni languages, although Sotho 
influences are strong enough in some areas that isiNdebele is 
sometimes also classified as a variant of seSotho. 

Most Ndebele trace their ancestry to the area that became 
Natal Province, later KwaZulu-Natal. Some began moving 
northward well before the early nineteenth-century mfecane, 
and many of these settled in the northern Transvaal. Others, 
subjects of the Zulu leader Mzilikazi, fled north from Natal 
after his defeat by Shaka in 1817. Ndebele peoples throughout 
the region were forced to move several times after that, so that 
by the end of the nineteenth century, the Ndebele were dis- 
persed throughout much of Natal, the Transvaal, and adjacent 
territory. 

Many Ndebele became formidable warriors, often subjugat- 
ing smaller chiefdoms and assimilating them into Ndebele soci- 
ety, and Ndebele clashed repeatedly with Voortrekker militias 
around Pretoria. The late nineteenth-century Afrikaner leader 
Paul Kruger jailed or executed many of their leaders, seized 



120 



Traditional murals decorate homesteads informer 

KwaNdebele homeland. 
Courtesy Lisowski Collection, Library of Congress 

their land, and dispersed others to work for Afrikaner farmers 
as indentured servants. Some of the land was later returned to 
a few Ndebele, often as a reward for loyalty or recognition of 
status. 

Under apartheid, many Ndebele living in the northern 
Transvaal were assigned to the predominantly seSotho-speak- 
ing homeland of Lebowa, which consisted of several segiments 
of land scattered across the northern Transvaal. Others, mostly 
southern Ndebele, who had retained more traditional ele- 
ments of their culture and language, were assigned to KwaNde- 
bele. KwaNdebele had been carved out of land that had been 
given to the son of Nyabela, a well-known Ndebele fighter in 
Kruger's time. The homeland was, therefore, prized by Nde- 
bele traditionalists, who pressed for a KwaNdebele indepen- 
dence through the 1980s. 

KwaNdebele was declared a "self-governing" territory in 
1981. Very few of its 300,000 residents could find jobs in the 
homeland, however, so most worked in the industrial region of 
Pretoria and Johannesburg. At least 500,000 Ndebele people 
lived in urban centers throughout South Africa and in home- 
lands other than KwaNdebele through the 1980s. 



121 



South Africa: A Country Study 



During the 1980s and the early 1990s, many Ndebele recog- 
nized a royal family, the Mahlangu family, and the capital of 
KwaNdebele was called KwaMahlangu. The royal family was 
divided, however, over economic issues and the question of 
"independence" for the homeland. These disputes were over- 
ridden by the dissolution of the homelands in 1994. At that 
time, in addition to the estimated 800,000 Ndebele people in 
South Africa, nearly 1.7 million Ndebele lived in Zimbabwe, 
where they constituted about one-sixth of the population and 
were known as Matabele; about 300,000 lived in Botswana. 

Sotho 

At least 7 million Sotho (also BaSotho) people who speak 
seSotho and related languages live in South Africa. Another 3 
million Sotho and closely related people live in neighboring 
countries. The diverse Sotho population includes the Northern 
Sotho (Pedi), the Southern Sotho, and the Tswana 
(BaTswana) , each of which is itself a heterogeneous grouping. 

Ancestors of today's Sotho population migrated into the 
region in the fifteenth century, according to historians, proba- 
bly from the area of the northern Transvaal. Like many neigh- 
boring Nguni peoples, the Sotho traditionally relied on a 
combination of livestock raising and crop cultivation for subsis- 
tence. Most Sotho were herders of cattle, goats, and sheep, and 
cultivators of grains and tobacco. In addition, the Sotho were 
skilled craftsmen, renowned for their metalworking, leather- 
working, and wood and ivory carving. 

Also like the Nguni, most Sotho lived in small chiefdoms, in 
which status was determined in part by relationship to the 
chief. Unlike the Nguni, Sotho homesteads were grouped 
together into villages, with economic responsibilities generally 
shared among village residents. Villages were divided into 
wards, or residential areas, often occupied by members of more 
than one patrilineal descent group. 

The village chief — a hereditary position — generally 
appointed ward leaders, whose residences were clustered 
around the chiefs residence. Sotho villages sometimes grew 
into large towns of several thousand people. Farmland was usu- 
ally outside the village, not adjacent to the homestead. This vil- 
lage organization may have enabled the Sotho villagers to 
defend themselves more effectively than they could have with 
dispersed households, and it probably facilitated control over 
ward leaders and subjects by the chief and his family. 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



Sotho villages were also organized into age-sets, or groups of 
men or women who were close in age. Each age-set had specific 
responsibilities — men organized for warfare and herding, 
depending on age-set, and women for crop cultivation and reli- 
gious responsibilities. An entire age-set generally graduated 
from one task to the next, and the village often celebrated this 
change with a series of rituals and, in some cases, an initiation 
ceremony. 

Sotho descent rules were important, even though descent 
groups did not form discrete local groups. Clans were often 
totemic, or bound to specific natural objects or animal species 
by mystical relationships, sometimes involving taboos and pro- 
hibitions. Major Sotho clans included the Lion (Taung), Fish 
(Tlhaping), Elephant (Tloung), and Crocodile (Kwean) clans. 

Both Nguni and Sotho peoples reckoned descent through 
patrilineal ties, but their marriage rules differed markedly. 
Sotho patrilineages were usually endogamous — i.e., the pre- 
ferred marriage partner would be a person related through 
patrilineal descent ties. Nguni patrilineages, in contrast, were 
exogamous — marriage within the descent group was generally 
forbidden. 

By the early twentieth century, Sotho villages were losing 
their claims to land, largely because of pressure from whites. 
Cattle raising became more difficult, and as Western economic 
pressures intensified, Sotho people living in Lesotho and in 
South Africa increasingly turned to the mines for work. By the 
early 1990s, an estimated 100,000 BaSotho worked in South 
Africa's mines, and many others were part of South Africa's 
urban work force throughout the country. 

Northern Sotho 

The heterogeneous Northern Sotho are often referred to as 
the Pedi (or BaPedi), because the Pedi make up the largest of 
their constituent groups. Their language is sePedi (also called 
seSotho sa Leboa or Northern Sotho) . This society arose in the 
northern Transvaal, according to historians, as a confederation 
of small chiefdoms some time before the seventeenth century. 
A succession of strong Pedi chiefs claimed power over smaller 
chiefdoms and were able to dominate important trade routes 
between the interior plateau and the Indian Ocean coast for 
several generations. For this reason, some historians have cred- 
ited the Pedi with the first monarchy in the region, although 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

their reign was marked by population upheaval and occasional 
military defeat. 

During the nineteenth century, Pedi armies were defeated 
by the Natal armies of Mzilikazi and were revived under the 
command of a Pedi chief, Sekwati. Afrikaner Voortrekkers in 
the Transvaal acquired some Pedi lands peacefully, but later 
clashed with them over further land claims. By the 1870s, the 
Voortrekker armies were sufficiently weakened from these 
clashes that they agreed to a confederation with the British col- 
onies of Natal and the Cape that would eventually lead to the 
South African War in 1899. 

The smaller Lobedu population makes up another subgroup 
among the Northern Sotho. The Lobedu are closely related to 
the Shona population, the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe, 
but the Lobedu are classified among the Sotho primarily 
because of linguistic similarities. The Lobedu were studied 
extensively by the early twentieth-century anthropologist J. D. 
Krige, who described the unique magical powers attributed to a 
Lobedu female authority figure, known to outsiders as the rain 
queen. 

The Northern Sotho homeland of Lebowa was declared a 
"self-governing" (not independent) territory in 1972, with a 
population of almost 2 million. Economic problems plagued 
the poverty-stricken homeland, however, and the population 
was not unified by strong ethnic solidarity. Lebowa's chief min- 
ister, Cedric Phatudi, struggled to maintain control over the 
increasingly disgruntled homeland population during the early 
1980s; his death in 1985 opened new factional splits and occa- 
sioned calls for a new homeland government. Homeland poli- 
tics were complicated by the demands of several ethnic 
minorities within Lebowa to have their land transferred to the 
jurisdiction of another homeland. At the same time, govern- 
ment efforts to consolidate homeland territory forced the 
transfer of several small tracts of land into Lebowa. 

Southern Sotho 

The Southern Sotho peoples are a diverse group that 
includes almost 2 million South Africans, many of whom live in 
the area surrounding Lesotho, and 1.6 million residents of 
Lesotho. The Southern Sotho were unified during the reign of 
King Moshoeshoe I in the 1830s. Moshoeshoe established con- 
trol over several small groups of Sotho speakers and Nguni 
speakers, who had been displaced by the mfecane. Some of 



124 




Cooking hearth between family members' huts in a Northern Sotho 

location near Pieters burg 
Courtesy R. T. K. Scully 



these communities had established ties to San peoples who 
lived just west of Moshoeshoe's territory. As a result, Southern 
Sotho speech, unlike that of Northern Sotho, incorporates a 
number of "click" sounds associated with Khoisan languages. 

Southern Sotho peoples were assigned to the tiny homeland 
of QwaQwa, which borders Lesotho, during the apartheid era. 
QwaQwa was declared "self-governing" in 1974, but Chief Min- 
ister Kenneth Mopeli rejected independence on the grounds 
that the homeland did not have a viable economy. Only about 
200,000 Sotho people lived in QwaQwa during the 1980s. 

A community of more than 300,000 people, Botshabelo, was 
incorporated into QwaQwa in 1987. Officials in the homeland 
capital, Phuthaditjhaba, and many homeland residents 
objected to the move, and the South African Supreme Court 
returned Botshabelo to the jurisdiction of the Orange Free 
State a short time later. The homeland continued to be an 
overcrowded enclave of people with an inadequate economic 
base until the homelands were dissolved in 1994. 

Tswana 

The Tswana (BaTswana), sometimes referred to as the West- 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

ern Sotho, are a heterogeneous group, including descendants 
of the once great Tlhaping and Rolong societies, as well as the 
Hurutshe, Kwena, and other small groups. Their language, 
seTswana, is closely related to seSotho, and the two are mutu- 
ally intelligible in most areas. About 4 million Tswana people 
live in southern Africa — 3 million in South Africa and 1 million 
in the nation of Botswana. In South Africa, many BaTswana live 
in the area that formed the numerous segments of the former 
homeland, Bophuthatswana, as well as neighboring areas of 
the North-West Province and the Northern Cape. Tswana peo- 
ple are also found in most urban areas throughout South 
Africa. 

By the nineteenth century, several Tswana groups were polit- 
ically independent, loosely affiliated chiefdoms that clashed 
repeatedly with Afrikaner farmers who claimed land in the 
northern Transvaal. In the late nineteenth century, Afrikaner 
and British officials seized almost all Tswana territory, dividing 
it among the Cape Colony, Afrikaner republics, and British ter- 
ritories. In 1910, when the Cape and the Transvaal were incor- 
porated into the Union of South Africa, the Tswana chiefs lost 
most of their remaining power, and the Tswana people were 
forced to pay taxes to the British Crown. They gradually turned 
to migrant labor, especially in the mines, for their livelihood. 

Tswana culture is similar to that of the related Sotho peo- 
ples, although some Tswana chiefdoms were more highly strati- 
fied than those of other Sotho or the Nguni. Tswana culture 
was distinguished for its complex legal system, involving a hier- 
archy of courts and mediators, and harsh punishments for 
those found guilty of crimes. Tswana farmers often formed 
close patron-client relationships with nearby Khoisan-speaking 
hunters and herdsmen; the Tswana generally received meat 
and animal pelts in return for cattle and, sometimes, dogs for 
herding cattle. 

Bophuthatswana was declared "independent" in 1977, 
although no country other than South Africa recognized its 
independence. The homeland consisted primarily of seven dis- 
connected enclaves near, or adjacent to, the border between 
South Africa and Botswana. Efforts to consolidate the territory 
and its population continued throughout the 1980s, as succes- 
sive small land areas outside Bophuthatswana were incorpo- 
rated into the homeland. Its population of about 1.8 million in 
the late 1980s was estimated to be 70 percent Tswana peoples; 
the remainder were other Sotho peoples, as well as Xhosa, 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



Zulu, and Shangaan. Another 1.5 million BaTswana lived else- 
where in South Africa. 

Bophuthatswana's residents were overwhelmingly poor, 
despite the area's rich mineral wealth. Wages in the homeland's 
industrial sector were lower than those in South Africa, and 
most workers traveled to jobs outside the homeland each day. 
The poverty of homeland residents was especially evident in 
comparison with the world's wealthy tourists who visited Sun 
City, a gambling resort in Bophuthatswana. 

The non-Tswana portion of the homeland population was 
denied the right to vote in local elections in 1987, and violence 
ensued. Further unrest erupted in early 1988, when members 
of the Botswana Defence Force tried to oust the unpopular 
homeland president, Lucas Mangope. Escalating violence after 
that led to the imposition of states of emergency and govern- 
ment crackdowns against ANC supporters in Bophuthatswana, 
who were often involved in anti-Mangope demonstrations. 
Mangope was ousted just before the April 1994 elections, and 
the homeland was officially dismantled after the elections. 

Tsonga and Venda 

Tsonga 

The Tsonga are a diverse population, generally including 
the Shangaan, Thonga, Tonga (unrelated to another nearby 
Tonga population to the north), and several smaller ethnic 
groups. Together they number about 1.5 million in South 
Africa in the mid-1990s, and at least 4.5 million in southern 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 

In the eighteenth century, the ancestors of the Tsonga lived 
in small, independent chiefdoms, sometimes numbering a few 
thousand people. Most Tsonga relied on fishing for subsis- 
tence, although goats, chickens, and crop cultivation were also 
important. Cattle were relatively rare in their economies, prob- 
ably because their coastal lowland habitat was tsetse-fly 
infested. The Tsonga maintained a tradition of inheritance by 
brothers, in preference to sons, which is common in many Cen- 
tral African societies but not among other South Africans. 

During the mfecane and ensuing upheaval of the nineteenth 
century, most Tsonga chiefdoms moved inland. Some success- 
fully maintained their independence from the Zulu, while oth- 
ers were conquered by Zulu warriors even after they had fled 
(see The Rise of African States, ch. 1). One Zulu military 



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South Africa: A Country Study 



leader, Soshangane, established his command over a large 
Tsonga population in the northern Transvaal in the mid-nine- 
teenth century and continued his conquests farther north. The 
descendants of some of the conquered populations are known 
as the Shangaan, or Tsonga-Shangaan. Some Tsonga-Shangaan 
trace their ancestry to the Zulu warriors who subjugated the 
armies in the region, while others claim descent from the con- 
quered chiefdoms. The Tsonga and the Zulu languages remain 
separate and are mutually unintelligible in some areas. 

The Tsonga-Shangaan homeland, Gazankulu, was carved 
out of northern Transvaal Province during the 1960s and was 
granted self-governing status in 1973. The homeland economy 
depended largely on gold and on a small manufacturing sector. 
Only an estimated 500,000 people — less than half the Tsonga- 
Shangaan population of South Africa — ever lived there, how- 
ever. Many others joined the throngs of township residents 
around urban centers, especially Johannesburg and Pretoria. 

In the 1980s, the government of Gazankulu, led by Chief 
Minister Hudson Nsanwisi, established a 68-member legislative 
assembly, made up mostly of traditional chiefs. The chiefs 
opposed homeland independence but favored a federal 
arrangement with South Africa; they also opposed sanctions 
against South Africa on the grounds that the homeland econ- 
omy would suffer. In areas of Gazankulu bordering the 
seSotho-speaking homeland of Lebowa, residents of the two 
poverty-stricken homelands clashed frequently over political 
and economic issues. These clashes were cited by South African 
officials as examples of the ethnic conflicts they claimed would 
engulf South Africa if apartheid ended. 

Venda 

The Venda (also VaVenda) population of about 600,000 peo- 
ple coalesced into an identifiable social unit in the area of the 
northern Transvaal and in Zimbabwe over several centuries. 
The Venda language, tshiVenda or luVenda, emerged as a dis- 
tinct tongue in the sixteenth century, according to scholars. In 
the twentieth century, the tshiVenda vocabulary is similar to 
seSotho, but the grammar shares similarities with Shona dia- 
lects, which are spoken in Zimbabwe. 

Venda culture is similarly eclectic; it appears to have incorpo- 
rated a variety of East African, Central African, Nguni, and 
Sotho characteristics. For example, the Venda forbid the con- 
sumption of pork, a prohibition that is common along the East 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



African coast. They practice male circumcision, which is com- 
mon among many Sotho, but not among most Nguni peoples. 

Early Venda social organization consisted of small kinship 
groups, often dispersed among several households. These were 
organized into chiefdoms, and some were ruled by chiefly 
dynasties in the eighteenth century. Smaller chiefdoms often 
served as vassal states to larger and stronger chiefdoms, but 
they were neither entirely incorporated into them nor adminis- 
tered directly by a paramount chief. Venda traditional religious 
beliefs, like other aspects of culture, appear to have combined 
elements from several neighboring religious systems and Chris- 
tianity. 

The homeland of Venda became nominally independent in 
1979 but was not recognized by any country except South 
Africa. Unlike other homelands, Venda actually drew most of 
the 700,000 people assigned to live there. Its economy 
depended on agriculture and small industry, and coal mining 
began in the late 1980s. Nearly 70 percent of the men worked 
elsewhere in South Africa, however, and at least 40 percent of 
the homeland's income was migrant labor wages. Facing eco- 
nomic collapse, Venda authorities applied for readmission into 
South Africa in 1991. Their petition was essentially overtaken 
by the political negotiations and constitutional reforms of the 
early 1990s, which led to the dissolution of the homelands in 
1994. 

Afrikaans Speakers 

Afrikaners 

Roughly 3 million people, or 7 percent of the people of 
South Africa, trace their roots to Dutch, German, Belgian, and 
French forebears (see Early European Settlement, ch. 1). Their 
language, Afrikaans, and membership in the Dutch Reformed 
Church are the most widespread common features of this pop- 
ulation. Afrikaans, a seventeenth-century African variant of 
Dutch, differs from its parent language in that it has eliminated 
grammatical gender and many inflected verbs. Afrikaans was 
recognized as a separate language in the nineteenth century, 
after a significant literature began to develop. 

Many of the Afrikaners' forebears arrived in southern Africa 
in search of independence from government oppression. They 
settled the region by fighting a series of wars, first with 
Khoikhoi and Xhosa peoples who had preceded them in the 



129 



South Africa: A Country Study 

area, and then with Zulu and British armies, who also hoped to 
defend their territorial claims. The Afrikaners' defeat in the 
South African War was a crucial turning point in their history; 
their greatly outnumbered troops suffered a military defeat, 
and more than 26,000 Afrikaners — including many women and 
children — died in British concentration camps. The two for- 
merly independent Afrikaner republics, the Orange Free State 
and the South African Republic (later the Transvaal), were 
incorporated into the Union of South Africa within the British 
empire in 1910. 

The war left much of the Afrikaners' farm land devastated, 
the result of the British "scorched earth" policy. Farmers had 
also been hard hit by cyclical occurrences of drought and 
rinderpest fever. This desperate rural poverty drove many Afri- 
kaners into urban areas for the first time, to seek jobs in the 
growing industrial sector and particularly the flourishing min- 
ing industry. But many Afrikaners lacked educational creden- 
tials and urban work experience, and they were threatened by 
competition from the large black population in the cities. Afri- 
cans had, in some cases, become accustomed to the work and 
lifestyle changes that were new to Afrikaners at the time. Afri- 
kaner mineworkers, nonetheless, demanded superior treat- 
ment over their black counterparts, and they organized to 
demand better wages and working conditions through the 
1920s. 

During the 1920s and the 1930s, Afrikaner cultural organiza- 
tions were important vehicles for reasserting Afrikaners' pride 
in their cultural identity. The most important of these was the 
Afrikaner Broederbond, also known as the Broederband 
(Brotherhood), an association of educated elites. The Broeder- 
bond helped establish numerous other Afrikaner social and 
cultural organizations, such as the Federation of Afrikaner Cul- 
tural Organisations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenig- 
inge — FAK), and a variety of Afrikaner social service 
organizations. Most of these groups represented people of dif- 
ferent classes and political persuasions, but Afrikaner leaders 
worked hard in the 1930s and the 1940s to forge a sense of 
unity and pride among them. 

By the 1940s, the National Party (NP) had gained wide- 
spread appeal among Afrikaners by emphasizing racial separa- 
tion and Afrikaner nationalism. Its narrow election victory in 
1948 brought apartheid into all areas of social and economic 
life in South Africa. The force of the government's commit- 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



ment to apartheid, and the popularity of the Dutch Reformed 
Church among Afrikaners, contributed to the impression of 
Afrikaner unity during the decades of National Party rule. But 
numerous rifts divided the community, and heated debates 
ensued. Some believed that the basic assumptions of apartheid 
were flawed; others, that it was being applied poorly. A small 
number of Afrikaners worked to end apartheid almost as soon 
as it was imposed. 

Most Afrikaners strongly supported the government's 1960s 
and 1970s campaign to stem the spread of communist influ- 
ence in southern Africa — the Total Strategy — based in part on 
their suspicion of strong centralized government and on their 
religious beliefs. But many were critical of South Africa's mili- 
tary intervention in neighboring states during the 1980s, and 
of escalating military costs in the face of the receding threat of 
what had been called the communist "Total Onslaught." By the 
late 1980s, enforcing apartheid at home was expensive; the 
unbalanced education system was in disarray and could not 
produce the skilled labor force the country needed. Most Afri- 
kaners then welcomed the government's decision to try to end 
apartheid as peacefully as possible. 

" Colour eds " 

Roughly 3.2 million South Africans of mixed-race (Khoikhoi 
and European or Asian) ancestry were known as "coloureds" in 
apartheid terminology. About 83 percent of them speak Afri- 
kaans as their first language, and most of the remainder speak 
English as their first language. Almost 85 percent of coloureds 
live in Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces, and a siz- 
able coloured community lives in KwaZulu-Natal. 

The largest subgroup within the coloured population is the 
Griqua, a largely Afrikaner-Khoikhoi population that devel- 
oped a distinct culture as early as the seventeenth century. 
Their community was centered just north of the area that later 
became the Orange Free State. Growing conflicts with Afri- 
kaner farmers and, later, diamond diggers, prompted Griqua 
leaders to seek the protection of the British, and later, to relo- 
cate portions of their community to the eastern Cape Colony 
and Natal. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century demands for 
land and the implementation of apartheid forced Griqua com- 
munities to move repeatedly, and many eventually settled north 
of Cape Town. They number at least 300,000 in the 1990s. Most 



131 



South Africa: A Country Study 

speak a variant of Afrikaans as their first language and are 
members of the Dutch Reformed Church. 

Another large subgroup, the Cape Malays, number about 
180,000, primarily in the Western Cape, in the 1990s. Most are 
descendants of Afrikaners, indigenous Khoikhoi, and slaves 
brought to South Africa from the Dutch East Indies. The Cape 
Malays have retained many cultural elements from their diverse 
origins, but they are recognized as a distinct community largely 
because most are Muslims. 

The coloured population suffered many indignities under 
apartheid, such as eviction from homes and neighborhoods 
preferred by whites. But the limited political reforms of the 
1980s gave them political rights that were denied blacks, such 
as a separate house of parliament in the tricameral legislature 
and the right to vote in national elections. Coloured politicians 
took advantage of their status to improve life for their constitu- 
ents, but at the same time, many were active in the antiapart- 
heid movement. 

In April 1994, the coloured community in the Western Cape 
gave the NP its only provincial victory in the national elections. 
Coloured voters outnumbered black voters by three-to-one, 
and white voters by two-to-one, according to local estimates. 
The population voted for the NP by a large margin, in part out 
of fear that its interests would be sidelined by a provincial gov- 
ernment dominated by the ANC, and in part because conserva- 
tive members of the coloured community had distanced 
themselves from the ANC's revolutionary rhetoric over the 
years. Another important consideration for many was their 
desire to preserve their first language, which is Afrikaans. 

English Speakers 

"Europeans " 

Although most of the English spoken in South Africa is spo- 
ken by nonwhites, the term "English speakers" is often used to 
identify non-Afrikaner whites in particular, largely because this 
group shares no other common cultural feature. Some of 
South Africa's roughly 2 million English-speaking whites trace 
their forebears to the large influx of British immigrants of the 
1820s and the 1830s. Many more Europeans arrived in the late 
nineteenth century, after the discovery of gold and diamonds. 
Almost two-thirds of English speakers trace their ancestry to 
England, Scotland, Wales, or Ireland, but a few arrived from 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Netherlands, Germany, or France and joined the English- 
speaking community in South Africa for a variety of social and 
political reasons. During the late 1930s and the 1940s, East 
Europeans arrived in substantial numbers. Unlike the Afrikan- 
ers, the English-speaking community has not worked to forge a 
common identity. During the apartheid era, non-Afrikaner 
whites held relatively little political power, but they maintained 
their superior wealth, in many cases, through their activities in 
commerce and business. 

Also among South African whites are about 49,000 Portu- 
guese immigrants, and 13,000 Greeks. South Africa's Jewish 
population of about 100,000 has been a relatively cohesive 
community, in comparison with other non-Afrikaner whites. 
Many South African Jews trace their ancestry to Eastern 
Europe or to the United Kingdom, and many others fled from 
Nazi Germany during the 1930s and the 1940s. In general, Jew- 
ish South Africans opposed apartheid, in part because of its 
emphasis on racial purity derived from National Socialist 
(Nazi) thought. Many Jews have also experienced religious dis- 
crimination in South Africa. 

Asians 

Of the roughly 1 million people of Asian descent in South 
Africa in the mid-1990s, all but about 20,000 are of Indian 
descent. Most speak English as their first language, although 
many also speak Tamil or Hindi, and some speak Afrikaans as a 
second or third language. Many South Africans of Indian 
descent trace their ancestry to indentured agricultural laborers 
brought to Natal in the nineteenth century to work on sugar 
plantations. But almost all Indians in South Africa in the 1990s 
were born there, because the South African government cur- 
tailed immigration from India in 1913. 

Asians have endured racial and ethnic pressures throughout 
the past century. In the late nineteenth century, they were pro- 
hibited from living in the Orange Free State; a few settled in 
the Pretoria-Johannesburg area, but in the 1990s almost 90 per- 
cent of the Asian population live in KwaZulu-Natal — especially 
in Durban and other large urban centers. Only about 10 per- 
cent live in rural areas. 

In the nineteenth century, Indians were divided by class, 
between those who had arrived as indentured laborers or 
slaves, and wealthier immigrants who had paid their own pas- 
sage. The latter were given citizenship rights, in most cases, and 



133 



South Africa: A Country Study 



were not bound by the labor laws applied to indentured work- 
ers. This class difference was reinforced by the origins of the 
immigrants — most of the wealthier Indian immigrants had 
arrived from northern and central India, and a substantial 
number were Muslims, while many indentured laborers were 
Hindus. 

By the 1990s, these differences were narrowing; more than 
60 percent of all Indians in South Africa are Hindus. About 20 
percent are Muslims and 8 percent, Christians, and a few are 
members of other religions. Most are merchants or business- 
men, but significant numbers are teachers or artisans. Caste 
differences based on Indian custom continue to have some 
influence over social behavior but are of decreasing impor- 
tance. 

Khoisan 

Khoisan languages, characterized by "click" sounds not 
found elsewhere in Africa, have almost disappeared from 
South Africa in the 1990s. All remaining Khoisan speakers are 
believed to be San, living in the Kalahari Desert region in the 
Northern Cape and North-West Province. The government has 
no accurate count of their numbers, although it is generally 
believed that larger numbers of San live in Botswana and 
Namibia. 

The closely related Khoikhoi, who were living in coastal 
areas of the southwest in the seventeenth century, have been 
entirely destroyed or assimilated into other cultures. No 
Khoikhoi peoples remain in South Africa in the 1990s, 
although many so-called coloureds and others can trace their 
ancestry through Khoikhoi and other lines of descent. 

The San hunters and gatherers who occupied southern 
Africa for several thousand years organized their society into 
small kinship-based villages, often including fewer than fifty 
people. The San economy developed out of the efficient use of 
the environment; their diet included a wide array of birds, ani- 
mals, plants, and, among coastal populations, fish and shellfish. 
The San espoused generally egalitarian values and recognized 
few leadership roles, except that of religious specialist, or 
diviner. The culture of the Khoikhoi was similar to that of the 
San, but the Khoikhoi acquired livestock — mainly cattle and 
sheep — probably from Bantu speakers who moved into the 
area from the north. 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



Some South Africans of mixed-race descent and Khoikhoi 
residents of Namibia have preserved Khoikhoi oral histories 
that tell of a time when their ancestors quarreled and split 
apart. Ancestors of the Namaqua (Nama) moved to the Atlan- 
tic Ocean coastline and south toward the Cape of Good Hope; 
other Khoikhoi moved toward the Kalahari and the Namib 
deserts and farther north. Seventeenth-century European 
immigrants enslaved hundreds of Khoikhoi around Cape 
Town, and many died in smallpox epidemics that swept south- 
ern Africa in 1713 and 1755. Others were absorbed into the 
dominant societies around them, both African and European, 
and into the populations of laborers who were brought from 
Malaya, China, and from other region of Africa. 

Religion 

Almost all South Africans profess some religious affiliation, 
according to the official census in 1991. Attitudes toward reli- 
gion and religious beliefs vary widely, however. The govern- 
ment has actively encouraged specific Christian beliefs during 
much of the twentieth century, but South Africa has never had 
an official state religion nor any significant government prohi- 
bition regarding religious beliefs. 

About 80 percent of all South Africans are Christians, and 
most are Protestants. More than 8 million South Africans are 
members of African Independent churches, which have at 
least 4,000 congregations. The denomination generally holds a 
combination of traditional African and Protestant beliefs. The 
other large Protestant denomination, the Dutch Reformed 
Church, has about 4 million members in several branches. 
Most are whites or people of mixed race. 

Other Protestant denominations in the mid-1990s include at 
least 1.8 million Methodists, 1.2 million Anglicans, 800,000 
Lutherans, 460,000 Presbyterians, and smaller numbers of Bap- 
tists, Congregationalists, Seventh Day Adventists, and members 
of the Assembly of God and the Apostolic Faith Mission of 
Southern Africa. More than 2.4 million South Africans are 
Roman Catholics; about 27,000 are Greek or Russian Ortho- 
dox. More than 7,000 are Mormons. Adherents of other world 
religions include at least 350,000 Hindus, perhaps 400,000 
Muslims, more than 100, 000 Jews, and smaller numbers of Bud- 
dhists, Confucians, and Baha'is. 



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South Africa: A Country Study 



Historical Background 

African Religions 

The earliest southern African religions, those of the Khoisan 
peoples, were more complex than early missionaries often 
recorded. Their beliefs and practices were substantially eroded 
by contacts with Europeans. Exceptional records of Khoisan rit- 
uals were made by a German linguist, Wilhelm Bleek, during 
the 1870s and the 1880s. Some traditional Khoisan beliefs have 
been preserved through oral histories, and some religious 
practices are still observed in remote areas of Botswana and 
Namibia. 

Many Khoisan peoples believe in a supreme being who pre- 
sides over daily life and controls elements of the environment. 
In some Khoisan belief systems, this god is worshiped through 
rituals or small sacrifices. A second, evil deity brings illness and 
misfortune to earth. This dualism between good and evil per- 
vades other areas of Khoisan thought about the nature of the 
universe. Some Khoisan belief systems maintain that a person 
should never attempt to communicate with the beneficent 
deity, for fear of provoking his evil counterpart, and some 
believe that spiritual beings simply ignore humanity most of 
the time. 

Traditional Khoisan religion also included numerous mythic 
tales of gods and ancestor-heroes, whose lives provided exam- 
ples of ways to cope with social conflicts and personal prob- 
lems. Also important was the use of dance and altered states of 
consciousness to gain knowledge for healing an individual or 
remedying a social evil. Healing dances are still among the 
most widely practiced religious rituals in South Africa, even in 
the 1990s, and are used in some African Independent churches 
to heal the sick or eradicate evil. 

For many Khoisan peoples, the sun and the moon were 
gods, or aspects of a supreme deity. The cycle of religious 
observance was, therefore, carefully adjusted according to the 
cycles of the moon. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
observers in the Cape Colony noted the importance of ritual 
dances and prayers during the full moon each month. Khoisan 
legends and myths also refer to a "trickster" god, who could 
transform himself into animal or human forms, and who could 
die and be reborn many times over. The praying mantis, a 
predatory insect with large eyes and other features characteris- 
tic of animal predators, figures in San myths and folktales in a 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



role similar to the clever fox in European folktales. Khoisan 
herdboys still use mantises to "divine" the location of lost ani- 
mals, and in Afrikaans, the mantis is referred to as "the Hotten- 
tot's god." 

Bantu-speaking peoples brought an array of new religious 
practices and beliefs when they arrived in the first millennium 
A.D. Most believed in a supreme being, or high god, who could 
bestow blessings or bring misfortune to humans. More influen- 
tial in their spiritual life, however, was a group of ancestral spir- 
its — a different pantheon of spiritual beings in each 
community. These spirits could communicate with and influ- 
ence the lives of the living, and they could sometimes be influ- 
enced by human entreaties. The male head of a homestead was 
usually the ritual leader, responsible for performing rituals, giv- 
ing thanks, seeking a blessing, or healing the sick on behalf of 
his homestead. Rites of passage, or rituals marking major life- 
cycle changes such as birth, initiation, marriage, and death, 
were also important religious observances, and rituals were 
used for rainmaking, strengthening fertility, and enhancing 
military might. 

Zulu and Xhosa religions generally sought to placate male 
ancestral spirits, often with libations of beer or offerings of 
meat, and to seek their guidance or intercession. Ancestral 
spirits were almost uniformly benevolent; evil was generally 
attributed to witches or sorcerers, who might overpower or 
bypass a spiritual protector or ancestor. Ancestral spirits occa- 
sionally caused minor illnesses, primarily as a warning against 
religious neglect or misdeeds. 

Most Bantu religious systems had no priesthood, or officially 
recognized mediator between the material and the spiritual 
worlds. Rather, they believed that political leadership was 
accompanied by religious responsibility. For example, a chief- 
dom or kingdom relied on the chief or monarch for physical 
and spiritual survival. Particular importance was attached to 
the status of the diviner, or sangoma, however; the sangoma 
underwent rigorous training to acquire the extensive knowl- 
edge and skills necessary for divination and healing. 

Bantu religions usually avoided any claim that rituals per- 
formed by human beings could influence the actions of the 
supreme deity, or high god; rituals were normally intended to 
honor or placate lesser spiritual beings, and sometimes to ask 
for their intervention. The high god was a remote, transcen- 
dent being possessing the power to create the Earth, but 



137 



South Africa: A Country Study 

beyond human comprehension or manipulation. Ancestors, in 
contrast, were once human and had kinship ties with those on 
earth, and they were sometimes amenable to human entreaties. 

Many Bantu societies have historical accounts or myths that 
explain the presence of human society on earth. In many cases, 
these myths affirm that human beings first emerged from a 
hole in the ground, that they were plucked from a field or a 
bed of reeds, or that they were fashioned from elemental sub- 
stances through the efforts of a supreme deity. Death origi- 
nated in the failure of human beings or their messengers, such 
as a chameleon who was sent to relay a divine message of 
immortality, but who delayed and was overtaken by the mes- 
sage of death. 

Such widespread myths not only provide an account of the 
origins of the human condition, but they also describe appro- 
priate behavior for coping with a complex world. For example, 
a Zulu myth tells of the creation of both black and white 
human beings, the assignment of the black people to the land 
and the white people to the sea, and the provision of spears for 
black people and guns for whites. Many of life's conflicts arise, 
it is believed, when people defy the divine plan. 

Scholars have reported that during the rapid acculturation 
of the nineteenth century in southern Africa, new myths and 
legends arose, attributing greater and greater power to tradi- 
tional gods. In this way, new events and displays of power were 
incorporated into existing belief systems. Others have sug- 
gested that the upheaval of the nineteenth century provided 
fertile ground for Christian and Muslim missionaries, whose 
teachings of a Supreme Being presiding over the entire world 
provided reassurance of a divine order in a changing environ- 
ment. In this view, the new world religions drew converts based 
on their appeal as an explanation of changing circumstances. 

The Arrival of Christianity 

Religion and politics were inextricably interwoven as soon as 
the Portuguese navigator Bartholomeu Dias (Diaz) erected a 
limestone pillar and Christian cross at the Cape of Good Hope 
in the year A.D. 1488. Religious missionaries did not arrive in 
any significant numbers for more than a century, however. In 
1652 the Dutch East India Company established a resupply sta- 
tion at the Cape, based largely on the experience of Jan van 
Riebeeck, who had survived a shipwreck off the coast of the 
Cape in 1648 and who later became the governor of the Cape 



138 



Man consulting a Shangaan herbalist, whose manipulation of cowrie 
shells, carved bones, and other ritual objects helps 
communicate her diagnosis 
Courtesy R. T. K. Scully 

Colony. Dutch Reformed Church missionaries reported in 
1658 that Khoikhoi slaves in the area attended their mission 
services (and were rewarded with a glass of brandy after the ser- 
mon). 

Religious reforms swept through the Netherlands in the 
early seventeenth century, and the Calvinist Synod ruled in 
1618 that any slave who was baptized should be freed. In the 
Cape Colony, however, farmers who depended on their slaves 
refused repeated entreaties from the church authorities in 
Europe to free these slaves. Instead, the slaveowners banned 
religious instruction for slaves, so none could be baptized. 

The London Missionary Society sent large numbers of mis- 
sionaries to the Cape Colony in 1799, and soon after that, the 
Glasgow Missionary Society and the Wesleyan Methodist Mis- 
sionary Society arrived, along with missionaries from the 
United States, France, Germany, and Scandinavia. Most mis- 
sions placed a high priority on literacy and Biblical instruction, 
but as the Industrial Revolution swept through Europe and the 
United States, the evangelical message increasingly emphasized 



139 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the spiritual benefits of productive labor. Missionaries also pro- 
moted European values and occupations as well as the posses- 
sion of material goods unrelated to spiritual salvation, such as 
European clothing, houses, and tools. 

Many Western missionaries mistakenly believed that south- 
ern Africans had no religion because of the differences in their 
faiths. Africans often denied the existence of a single, supreme 
being who could be influenced by prayer on behalf of humans. 
They appeared to confirm the missionaries' suspicions that 
they were "godless" by performing ritual oblations to lesser 
spiritual beings and ancestors. The absence of a priest or minis- 
ter, or any type of church, was interpreted as further proof of 
the lack of spiritual beliefs, even among those who had strong 
beliefs in an array of spiritual beings and forces. 

A few African leaders took advantage of the missionaries' 
presence to enhance or to reinforce their own political power. 
For example, the nineteenth-century Sotho King Moshoeshoe 
I claimed that Christian teachings only validated rules of behav- 
ior he had long advocated for his subjects. The Xhosa chief, 
Ngqika, rewarded local missionaries when their prayers 
appeared to bring much-needed rain. Sotho, Tswana, and oth- 
ers sought the protection of Christian missionaries during the 
mfecane and the related upheaval of the first part of the nine- 
teenth century. The term Mfengu was originally applied to 
these displaced people who settled around Christian mission 
stations, but over time, the Mfengu came to be recognized as a 
relatively cohesive ethnic group. 

The relationships among indigenous African leaders, mis- 
sionaries, and European settlers and officials were always com- 
plex. Missionaries whose efforts were frustrated by local chiefs 
sometimes sought government intervention to weaken the 
chiefs' power. Government officials relied in part on the influ- 
ence of missionaries in order to convince indigenous Africans 
of the validity of European customs. At times, however, mission- 
aries objected to official policies that they considered harmful 
to their followers, and they were criticized by government offi- 
cials, as a result, for interfering in official matters. 

In the 1830s and the 1840s, British officials in the eastern 
Cape Colony tried to eliminate the Xhosa practice of witch 
hunts, which were increasing in response to the turmoil in the 
region and were spreading fear through many religious com- 
munities. The British also abolished traditional economic prac- 
tices, such as the Xhosa custom of paying lobola, or bridewealth 



140 



The Society and Its Environment 



given by the family of a groom to that of his bride. But abolish- 
ing an element of traditional culture almost always resulted in 
an array of unforeseen cultural consequences, and this was 
especially true when the practices being eliminated were cen- 
tral to a group's social organization, as was the lobola. 

By 1850, the Xhosa were enraged by the British presence. A 
leading Xhosa healer and diviner, Mlangeni, organized an 
army to confront the British and promised supernatural assis- 
tance in this effort, as long as the Xhosa people sacrificed all of 
their yellow and dun-colored cattle to counteract the evil spell 
that had engulfed them. A brutal frontier war ensued, and the 
rebellion was suppressed in 1853. 

The Xhosa defeat was made even more bitter when a chiefly 
adviser, Mhlakaza, convinced many people of a prophecy 
brought by his niece, Nongqawuse, telling of an end to British 
domination and the redemption of the Xhosa if they would 
first kill all their remaining cattle and destroy their food stocks. 
In 1856 and 1857, thousands of Xhosa responded to the proph- 
ecy; more than 400,000 cattle were sacrificed. After the proph- 
ecy failed, more than 40,000 people died of starvation, and 
almost as many were forced to seek work in the colonial labor 
market. 

Religion and Apartheid 

Dutch Reformed Churches 

Christianity became a powerful influence in South Africa, 
often uniting large numbers of people in a common faith. In 
the twentieth century, however, several Christian churches 
actively promoted racial divisions through the political philoso- 
phy of apartheid. The largest of these denominations was the 
Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk — 
NGK), which came to be known as the "official religion" of the 
National Party during the apartheid era. Its four main 
branches had more than 3 million members in 1,263 congrega- 
tions in the 1990s. 

The Dutch Reformed Church arrived in South Africa in the 
seventeenth century, after Calvinist reforms in Europe had 
entrenched the idea of predestination, and the Synod of Dort 
in the Netherlands had proclaimed this church as the "commu- 
nity of the elect" in 1619. The church gained recognition as the 
state religion in 1651, and the Dutch East India Company, as an 



141 



South Africa: A Country Study 

extension of the state in southern Africa, established the first 
Dutch Reformed Church at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. 

Church members in South Africa generally resisted liberal 
trends that arose in Europe in the nineteenth century, but rifts 
occurred in the church in 1853 with the formation of the 
Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (also translated, the Dutch 
Reformed Church), and in 1859, with the formation of the 
Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika (the Reformed Church of 
South Africa). The NGK is generally referred to as the Dutch 
Reformed Church, and these two newer churches are also 
referred to as Dutch Reformed churches. 

All of the Dutch Reformed churches share similar Calvinist 
beliefs and presbyterial organization. Their doctrines assert 
that God is eternal, infinite, wise, and just, and the Creator of 
the universe. He has planned the life and the fate of each indi- 
vidual on earth; the "chosen" are saved, as long as they adhere 
to the church's teachings. The Bible — both the Old Testament 
and the New Testament — is the final authority on religious 
matters. 

The presbyterial organization of the Dutch Reformed 
churches means that the functioning of each congregation is 
governed, in part, by that community, whereas decisions con- 
cerning policy and discipline are generally handled by regional 
synods. A general synod is responsible for the denomination as 
a whole. In South Africa, a national synod and nine regional 
synods oversee the operation of the Dutch Reformed congrega- 
tions. 

As black Africans and people of mixed race converted to the 
religion, church members debated the question of racial sepa- 
ration. Pressures grew for racially separate congregations, and 
the issue was complicated by the demands of some black 
church members for their own churches and congregations. In 
1881 the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (Sending Kerk) 
established a separate coloured church. In 1910, when black 
South Africans made up about 10 percent of the community, 
the synods established the NGK in Afrika, as it became known, 
for black Africans. (An Indian Dutch Reformed Church was 
formed in 1951.) 

Racial separation was only widely accepted in the church in 
the early twentieth century, as many Afrikaners came to believe 
that their own survival as a community was threatened, and as 
the belief in racial separation was gaining acceptance among 
white South Africans in general. Social and spiritual survival 



142 



The Society and Its Environment 



became intertwined in church philosophy, influenced in part 
by the early twentieth-century persecution of the Afrikaners by 
the British (see British Imperialism and the Afrikaners, ch. 1). 
Church leaders refused to condemn Afrikaner rebellions 
against the British, and their followers gained strength by 
attributing divine origins to their struggle for survival. 

As the system of apartheid was called into question through- 
out the country in the 1970s and the 1980s, church leaders 
were, in general, more committed to apartheid than many of 
their followers, and the church became an impediment to 
political reform. A few Dutch Reformed clergy opposed apart- 
heid. The best known of these, Reverend Beyers Naude, left his 
whites-only church in the late 1970s and joined a black parish 
within the Dutch Reformed church. The efforts of other 
church leaders who worked to reduce the church's racist image 
were often constrained by the fact that parish finances were 
controlled by the church's highest authorities, who supported 
apartheid. 

Other Religious Organizations 

In the 1990s, black South Africans form a majority in all 
large Christian churches in South Africa, except the Dutch 
Reformed churches, and this was true throughout the apart- 
heid era. In these churches, many people became involved in 
efforts to reverse or to ameliorate the effects of apartheid poli- 
cies, but with varying degrees of militancy. Again, there were 
often significant differences between church leaders and their 
followers concerning race and politics. For example, senior 
officials within the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa 
opposed apartheid, but a group of Catholics formed the South 
African Catholic Defence League to condemn the church's 
political involvement and, in particular, to denounce school 
integration. 

Leaders of the Church of the Province of South Africa, the 
Anglican Church, spoke out in opposition to apartheid, but 
church members disagreed about tactics for expressing their 
views. Some white Anglicans vigorously opposed their church's 
involvement in politics, while many black Anglicans became 
leaders in the antiapartheid movement. The Methodist 
Church, which was overwhelmingly black, adopted openly anti- 
apartheid stands on many public issues, but its leaders' activism 
cost it support among those who feared public scrutiny on this 
politically sensitive issue. 



143 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Religious alliances provided a means of coordinating church 
opposition to apartheid while minimizing the public exposure 
of church leaders and parishioners. The South African Council 
of Churches (SACC) was the most active antiapartheid 
umbrella organization. The SACC not only opposed apartheid 
but also offered encouragement to those who contravened race 
laws. Under the leadership of Anglican Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu in the 1980s, the SACC also attempted to withhold coop- 
eration with the state, as much as possible, in protest against 
apartheid. SACC leaders were outspoken in their political 
views, lodging frequent complaints with government officials 
and organizing numerous peaceful protests. 

Countering the efforts of the antiapartheid community, the 
Christian League of Southern Africa rallied in support of the 
government's apartheid policies. The Christian League con- 
sisted of members of Dutch Reformed and other churches who 
believed apartheid could be justified on religious grounds. The 
group won little popular support, however, and was criticized 
both for its principles and for its tactic of bringing religious 
and political issues together in the same debate. 

Zion Christian Church 

The largest and fastest-growing of the African independent 
churches in the 1990s is the Zion Christian Church. Its mem- 
bers, estimated to number between 2 million and 6 million in 
more than 4,000 parishes, live primarily in urban townships 
and rural communities. The church is well known by the abbre- 
viation, ZCC, pronounced "zed-say-say." The ZCC was estab- 
lished in 1910 by Engenas Lekganyane, a farm worker in a 
rural area that later became Zion City, in the Northern Prov- 
ince. Lekganyane was educated by Scottish Presbyterian mis- 
sionaries, and the church reflects some elements of that 
religion. The ZCC took its name from Biblical references to the 
Mount of Zion in Jerusalem, based in part on the inspiration of 
a similar community in Zion, Illinois. 

The highlight of the ZCC religious calendar is the Easter cel- 
ebration, which has drawn more than 1 million church mem- 
bers for several days of religious services at Zion City. Zionist 
beliefs emphasize the healing power of religious faith, and for 
this reason ZCC leaders sometimes clash with the traditional 
healers, or sangomas, who are important in many belief systems. 
Despite occasional conflicts, however, the ZCC respects tradi- 
tional African religious beliefs, in general, especially those con- 



144 



Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin, May 1995 
Permission of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel; 

photographer Ronald M. Overdahl 

cerning the power of the ancestors to intercede on behalf of 
humans. 

ZCC beliefs are eclectic, but the church's practices are often 
strict. The ZCC proscribes alcoholic beverages, smoking, and 
eating pork. It condemns sexual promiscuity and violence. As a 
result, church members have become known in the business 
community for their honesty and dependability as employees. 

The growth of the independent churches was spurred by the 
antiapartheid movement. Nevertheless, because devout ZCC 
members place their spiritual agenda ahead of earthly politics, 
they generally avoided antiapartheid demonstrations and orga- 
nizations. As a result, ZCC members were often shunned, and 
some were even attacked, by antiapartheid militants. President 
Mandela is popular among ZCC members in the 1990s, how- 
ever, in part because of his political moderation and antiviolent 
rhetoric. 

Islam 

South Africa's small Muslim community of about 400,000 is 
gaining new members, especially among black South Africans, 



145 



South Africa: A Country Study 



in the 1990s. The majority of Muslims are of Indian descent, 
however, and a small minority are Pakistanis or people of 
mixed race. Most live in or near Cape Town, Durban, or Johan- 
nesburg. The Africa Muslim Party won 47,690 votes, less than 1 
percent of the total vote, in the April 1994 nationwide elec- 
tions. 

Most South African Muslims are members of the Sunni 
branch of Islam, although a small Shia sect is becoming more 
vocal in the 1990s. The Muslim Youth Movement, the Muslim 
Student Association, and several other Islamic organizations 
have small branches in South African universities. Diplomats 
and other visitors from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have 
contributed to the building of mosques and other efforts to 
promote Islam. The desire to proselytize in the region was an 
important topic of discussion at the first southern African con- 
ference on Islam, which was held in Cape Town in April 1995. 

Education 

Schools in South Africa, as elsewhere, reflect society's politi- 
cal philosophy and goals. The earliest mission schools aimed to 
inculcate literacy and new social and religious values, and 
schools for European immigrants aimed to preserve the values 
of previous generations. In the twentieth century, the educa- 
tion system assumed economic importance as it prepared 
young Africans for low-wage labor and protected the privileged 
white minority from competition. From the 1950s to the mid- 
1990s, no other social institution reflected the government's 
racial philosophy of apartheid more clearly than the education 
system. Because the schools were required both to teach and to 
practice apartheid, they were especially vulnerable to the weak- 
nesses of the system. 

Many young people during the 1980s were committed to 
destroying the school system because of its identification with 
apartheid. Student strikes, vandalism, and violence seriously 
undermined the schools' ability to function. By the early 1990s, 
shortages of teachers, classrooms, and equipment had taken a 
further toll on education. 

South Africa's industrial economy, with its strong reliance on 
capital-intensive development, provided relatively few pros- 
pects for employment for those who had only minimal educa- 
tional credentials, or none at all. Nationwide literacy was less 
than 60 percent throughout the 1980s, and an estimated 
500,000 unskilled and uneducated young people faced unem- 



146 



The Society and Its Environment 



ployment by the end of the decade, according to the respected 
Education Foundation. At the same time, job openings for 
highly skilled workers and managers far outpaced the number 
of qualified applicants. These problems were being addressed 
in the political reforms of the 1990s, but the legacies of apart- 
heid — the insufficient education of the majority of the popula- 
tion and the backlog of deficiencies in the school system — 
promised to challenge future governments for decades, or per- 
haps generations. 

Early Development 

Many African societies placed strong emphasis on traditional 
forms of education well before the arrival of Europeans. Adults 
in Khoisan- and Bantu-speaking societies, for example, had 
extensive responsibilities for transmitting cultural values and 
skills within kinship-based groups and sometimes within larger 
organizations, villages, or districts. Education involved oral his- 
tories of the group, tales of heroism and treachery, and prac- 
tice in the skills necessary for survival in a changing 
environment. 

In many Nguni-speaking chiefdoms of southern Africa, 
highly regimented age-groups of young men acquired knowl- 
edge and skills vital to their survival and prestige under the 
instruction of respected military, religious, or political leaders. 
The socialization of women, although sometimes done within 
age-groups, was more often in small groups of siblings or cous- 
ins, and it emphasized domestic and agricultural skills neces- 
sary to the survival of the family. In all of these settings, the 
transmission of religious values was a vital element of educa- 
tion. 

The socialization of African youth was sometimes inter- 
rupted by warfare or political upheaval. More serious disrup- 
tions occurred in the late nineteenth century and the 
twentieth century, when government policies drew large num- 
bers of adult men away from their homes for long periods of 
employment in mines or urban industries. Women were heads 
of households for months or years at a time. And after apart- 
heid became entrenched in the early 1950s, security forces 
sometimes removed entire villages from their land and relo- 
cated them to less desirable areas in the interest of white eco- 
nomic development. 

The earliest European schools in South Africa were estab- 
lished in the Cape Colony in the late seventeenth century by 



147 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Dutch Reformed Church elders committed to biblical instruc- 
tion, which was necessary for church confirmation (see Early 
European Settlement, ch. 1). In rural areas, itinerant teachers 
(meesters) taught basic literacy and math skills. British mission 
schools proliferated after 1799, when the first members of the 
London Missionary Society arrived in the Cape Colony. 

Language soon became a sensitive issue in education. At 
least two dozen English-language schools operated in rural 
areas of the Cape Colony by 1827, but their presence rankled 
among devout Afrikaners, who considered the English lan- 
guage and curriculum irrelevant to rural life and Afrikaner val- 
ues. Throughout the nineteenth century, Afrikaners resisted 
government policies aimed at the spread of the English lan- 
guage and British values, and many educated their children at 
home or in the churches. 

After British colonial officials began encouraging families to 
emigrate from Britain to the Cape Colony in 1820, the Colonial 
Office screened applicants for immigration for background 
qualifications. They selected educated families, for the most 
part, to establish a British presence in the Cape Colony, and 
after their arrival, these parents placed a high priority on edu- 
cation. Throughout this time, most religious schools in the 
eastern Cape accepted Xhosa children who applied for admis- 
sion, and in Natal many other Nguni-speaking groups sent 
their children to mission schools after the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury. The government also financed teacher training classes for 
Africans as part of its pacification campaign throughout the 
nineteenth century. 

By 1877 some 60 percent of school-age children in Natal 
were enrolled in school, as were 49 percent in the Cape Colony. 
In the Afrikaner republics, however, enrollments remained 
low — only 12 percent in the Orange Free State and 8 percent 
in the Transvaal — primarily the result of Afrikaner resistance to 
British education. Enrollments in these republics increased 
toward the end of the century, after the government agreed to 
the use of Afrikaans in the schools and to allow Afrikaner par- 
ents greater control over primary and secondary education. 

By the late nineteenth century, three types of schools were 
receiving government assistance — ward schools, or small rural 
schools generally employing one teacher; district schools, pro- 
viding primary-level education to several towns in an area; and 
a few secondary schools in larger cities. But during the last 
decades of that century, all four provinces virtually abolished 



148 



The Society and Its Environment 



African enrollment in government schools. African children 
attended mission schools, for the most part, and were taught by 
clergy or by lay teachers, sometimes with government assis- 
tance. 

Higher education was generally reserved for those who 
could travel to Europe, but in 1829 the government established 
the multiracial South African College, which later became the 
University of Cape Town. Religious seminaries accepted a few 
African applicants as early as 1841. In 1852 British officials in 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State acknowledged the 
right of Afrikaners to establish their own institutions of higher 
learning, and based on this understanding, Britain's incoming 
governor — Sir George Grey — allocated small sums of money to 
help fund Afrikaner institutions. The government established 
Grey College — later the University of the Orange Free State — 
in Bloemfontein in 1855 and placed it under the supervision of 
the Dutch Reformed Church. The Grey Institute was estab- 
lished in Port Elizabeth in 1856; Graaff-Reinet College was 
founded in 1860. The Christian College was founded at 
Potchefstroom in 1869 and was later incorporated into the 
University of South Africa and renamed Potchefstroom Univer- 
sity for Christian Higher Education. 

Following the British victory in the South African War, the 
new representative of the Crown, Sir Alfred Milner, brought 
thousands of teachers from Britain, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand to instill the English language and British cultural 
values, especially in the two former Afrikaner republics. To 
counter the British influence, a group of Afrikaner churches 
proposed an education program, Christian National Educa- 
tion, to serve as the core of the school curriculum. The govern- 
ment initially refused to fund schools adopting this program, 
but Jan C. Smuts, the Transvaal leader who later became prime 
minister, was strongly committed to reconciliation between 
Afrikaners and English speakers, and he favored local control 
over many aspects of education. Provincial autonomy in educa- 
tion was strengthened in the early twentieth century, and all 
four provincial governments used government funds primarily 
to educate whites. 

The National Party (NP) was able to capitalize on the fear of 
racial integration in the schools to build its support. The NP's 
narrow election victory in 1948 gave Afrikaans new standing in 
the schools, and after that, all high-school graduates were 
required to be proficient in both Afrikaans and English. The 



149 



South Africa: A Country Study 



NP government also reintroduced Christian National Educa- 
tion as the guiding philosophy of education. 

Education under Apartheid 

The Bantu Education Act 

The Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 widened the gaps 
in educational opportunities for different racial groups. Two of 
the architects of Bantu education, Dr. W.M. Eiselen and Dr. 
Hendrik F. Verwoerd, had studied in Germany and had 
adopted many elements of National Socialist (Nazi) philoso- 
phy. The concept of racial "purity," in particular, provided a 
rationalization for keeping black education inferior. Verwoerd, 
then minister of native affairs, said black Africans "should be 
educated for their opportunities in life," and that there was no 
place for them "above the level of certain forms of labour." The 
government also tightened its control over religious high 
schools by eliminating almost all financial aid, forcing many 
churches to sell their schools to the government or close them 
entirely. 

Christian National Education supported the NP program of 
apartheid by calling on educators to reinforce cultural diversity 
and to rely on "mother-tongue" instruction in the first years of 
primary school. This philosophy also espoused the idea that a 
person's social responsibilities and political opportunities are 
defined, in large part, by that person's ethnic identity. The gov- 
ernment also gave strong management control to the school 
boards, who were elected by the parents in each district. 

Official attitudes toward African education were paternalis- 
tic, based on trusteeship and segregation. Black education was 
not supposed to drain government resources away from white 
education. The number of schools for blacks increased during 
the 1960s, but their curriculum was designed to prepare chil- 
dren for menial jobs. Per-capita government spending on black 
education slipped to one-tenth of spending on whites in the 
1970s. Black schools had inferior facilities, teachers, and text- 
books. 

Soweto and Its Aftermath 

Tensions over language in education erupted into violence 
on June 16, 1976, when students took to the streets in the 
Johannesburg township of Soweto. Their action was prompted 
by the decision of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, the archi- 



150 




Children at play in schoolyard, KTC Township ( Cape Town) 



151 



South Africa: A Country Study 

tect of the Bantu education system, to enforce a regulation 
requiring that one-half of all high-school classes must be taught 
in Afrikaans. A harsh police response resulted in the deaths of 
several children, some as young as eight or nine years old. In 
the violence that followed, more than 575 people died, at least 
134 of them under the age of eighteen. 

Youthful ANC supporters abandoned school in droves; some 
vowed to "make South Africa ungovernable" to protest against 
apartheid education. Others left the country for military train- 
ing camps run by the ANC or other liberation armies, mostly in 
Angola, Tanzania, or Eastern Europe. "Liberation before edu- 
cation" became their battle cry. 

The schools suffered further damage as a result of the unrest 
of 1976. Vandals and arsonists damaged or destroyed many 
schools and school property. Students who tried to attend 
school and their teachers were sometimes attacked, and admin- 
istrators found it increasingly difficult to maintain normal 
school activities. Some teachers and administrators joined in 
the protests. 

The National Policy for General Affairs Act (No. 76) of 1984 
provided some improvements in black education but main- 
tained the overall separation called for by the Bantu education 
system. This act gave the minister of national education author- 
ity to determine general policy for syllabuses, examinations, 
and certification qualifications in all institutions of formal and 
informal education. But responsibility for implementing these 
policies was divided among numerous government depart- 
ments and offices, resulting in a bewildering array of educa- 
tional authorities: For example, the Department of Education 
and Training was responsible for black education outside the 
homelands. Each of the three houses of parliament — for 
whites, coloureds, and Indians — had an education department 
for one racial group, and each of the ten homelands had its 
own education department. In addition, several other govern- 
ment departments managed specific aspects of education. 

Education was compulsory for all racial groups, but at differ- 
ent ages, and the law was enforced differently. Whites were 
required to attend school between the ages of seven and six- 
teen. Black children were required to attend school from age 
seven until the equivalent of seventh grade or the age of six- 
teen, but this law was enforced only weakly, and not at all in 
areas where schools were unavailable. For Asians and coloured 



152 



The Society and Its Environment 



children, education was compulsory between the ages of seven 
and fifteen. 

The discrepancies in education among racial groups were 
glaring. Teacher: pupil ratios in primary schools averaged 1:18 
in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, 1:27 in coloured 
schools, and 1:39 in black schools. Moreover, whereas 96 per- 
cent of all teachers in white schools had teaching certificates, 
only 15 percent of teachers in black schools were certified. Sec- 
ondary-school pass rates for black pupils in the nationwide, 
standardized high-school graduation exams were less than one- 
half the pass rate for whites. 

As the government implemented the 1984 legislation, new 
violence flared up in response to the limited constitutional 
reforms that continued to exclude blacks (see Constitutional 
Change, ch. 4). Finally, the government began to signal its 
awareness that apartheid could not endure. By 1986 President 
P.W. Botha (1984-89) had stated that the concept of apartheid 
was "outdated," and behind-the-scenes negotiations had begun 
between government officials and imprisoned ANC leader Nel- 
son Mandela. The gap between government spending on edu- 
cation for different racial groups slowly began to narrow, and 
penalties for defying apartheid rules in education began to 
ease. 

The School System in the 1990s 

Reorganizing education was one of the most daunting tasks 
the government faced as apartheid laws were being lifted in the 
1990s. President Frederik W. (F.W.) de Klerk, in a speech to 
Parliament in January 1993, stressed the need for a nonracial 
school system, with enough flexibility to allow communities to 
preserve their religious and cultural values and their home lan- 
guage. De Klerk established the Education Co-ordination Ser- 
vice to manage education during the political transition of the 
1990s, and he charged it with eliminating the bureaucratic 
duplication that had resulted from apartheid education. 

In August 1993, de Klerk gathered together leading experts 
on education in the National Education and Training Forum 
to formulate a policy framework for restructuring education. 
Anticipating rising education costs, the government earmarked 
23.5 percent of the national budget in fiscal year (FY — see Glos- 
sary) 1993-94 for education. It established new education 
offices and gave them specific responsibilities within the reor- 
ganization plan. When the new school year began in January 



153 



South Africa: A Country Study 



1995, all government-run primary and secondary schools were 
officially integrated, and the first stage of the transformation in 
education had begun almost without violence. 

The new policies were difficult to implement, however, and 
many policy details remained to be worked out. Education was 
compulsory for all children between age seven and age sixteen, 
for example, but there had not been enough time or resources 
to provide adequate schools and teachers for the entire school- 
age population. The schools received government assistance 
for teachers' salaries only; they had to charge fees for equip- 
ment and supplies, but pupils who could not pay school fees 
could not be expelled from school. 

In 1995 South Africa had a total of 20,780 primary and sec- 
ondary schools. Of these, 20,303 belonged to the government, 
and 477 were private. In addition, 226 specialized schools were 
in operation for gifted pupils or students with special needs 
(see table 3, Appendix). More than 11 million pupils were 
enrolled, about 6.95 million in primary school and 4.12 million 
in secondary schools. The number of teachers in the regular 
primary and secondary schools was 344,083, of whom 226,900 
were black. Of the white teachers, more than 60 percent were 
Afrikaners. Men teachers were paid substantially more than 
women; women's salaries averaged 83 percent of men's salaries 
for the same job with equal qualifications. 

Higher Education 

University-level education suffered under apartheid. When 
the NP came to power in 1948, there were ten government-sub- 
sidized institutions of higher learning — four with classes taught 
in English; four with classes taught in Afrikaans; one bilingual 
correspondence university; and the South African Native Col- 
lege at Fort Hare, in which most classes were taught in English 
but other languages were permitted. The four Afrikaans uni- 
versities and one of the English-language universities (Rhodes 
University) admitted white students only. Students of all races 
attended the University of Cape Town, the University of the 
Witwatersrand, and the University of Natal, although some 
classes at these universities were segregated. 

The Extension of University Education Act (No. 45) of 1959 
prohibited established universities from accepting black stu- 
dents, except with the special permission of a cabinet minister. 
The government opened several new universities and colleges 
for black, coloured, and Indian students, and these students 



154 



The Society and Its Environment 



were allowed to attend a "white" university only if their "own" 
institutions became too overcrowded. The University of the 
North, established in 1959, for example, admitted students of 
Tsonga, Sotho, Venda, or Tswana descent only 

The 1959 law also gave the central government control over 
the South African Native College at Fort Hare (later the Uni- 
versity of Fort Hare), and the government instituted a new pol- 
icy of admitting Xhosa students only to that school. Several 
technikons (advanced-level technical schools) gave preference 
to students of one ethnic group. Overall, however, the 1959 leg- 
islation reduced opportunities for university education for 
blacks, and by 1978 only 20 percent of all university students in 
South Africa were black. During the 1980s, several university 
administrations, anticipating the dismal impact of the long- 
term racial biases in education, began admitting students from 
all racial groups. 

As of the mid-1990s South Africa has twenty-one major uni- 
versities, which are government-financed and open to students 
of all races. In addition, secondary-school graduates can attend 
one of fifteen technikons, 128 technical colleges, and seventy 
teacher-training colleges (which do not require high-school 
certificates for admission), or another in a wide array of 
teacher training institutions (see table 4, Appendix). Students 
in universities and teacher-training colleges numbered 362,000 
in 1994, and the institutions themselves had 14,460 academic 
staff members. At technical colleges and technikons, students 
numbered 191,087, and teaching staff numbered 5,532. 

Each university administration is headed by a government- 
appointed chancellor, the institution's senior authority; a vice 
chancellor; and a university council. The chancellor is often a 
civic leader or political figure whose primary function is to rep- 
resent the university to the community. The university council, 
comprising members of the university and the community, 
names the vice chancellor or rector, who controls the adminis- 
tration of the institution. The vice chancellor generally holds 
office until age sixty-five. 

The university senate manages academic and faculty affairs, 
under the vice chancellor's authority. Each university sets its 
own tuition costs and receives government funding based on 
studenf.faculty ratios and tuition receipts. The university aca- 
demic year lasts thirty-six weeks; school terms and vacation 
periods are set by the university council. The government 
establishes general degree requirements, but the individual 



155 



South Africa: A Country Study 

university's council and administration set specific require- 
ments for each campus. 

A variety of adult education opportunities are available. 
These include classes in basic literacy, in technical and voca- 
tional subjects, and in sports and leisure activities. Two univer- 
sities, those of Cape Town and Witwatersrand, offer classes for 
instructors in adult education, and Witwatersrand has a course 
leading to a diploma for adult educators. Some of these pro- 
grams are being reoriented in the 1990s to emphasize literacy 
training for the more than 8 million adults who cannot read. 

Health and Welfare 

South Africa's population in general enjoys good health, 
compared with other African countries in the 1990s. Rural 
health care compares favorably with delivery systems in Kenya 
and in Nigeria, for example. The system reflects the biases of 
apartheid, in that superior care is available to wealthy urban 
residents, most of whom were white as of 1995, and inferior ser- 
vices are available to the poor, who are black. These differences 
began to narrow in the early 1990s, as apartheid was being dis- 
mantled. Under the government's 1994 blueprint for social 
and economic development, the Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment Programme (RDP), R14 billion (for value of the rand — 
see Glossary) was set aside for improvements in health care. 

Incidence of Disease 

Tuberculosis is the most prevalent disease reported to health 
officials in the 1990s. European settlers probably introduced 
this disease into southern Africa in the seventeenth or the eigh- 
teenth century, and it was perhaps reintroduced by nineteenth- 
century gold and diamond miners from Europe or China. Min- 
ers of all races lived in unhealthy and unsanitary conditions 
during the first decades of industrial development, and these 
conditions contributed to the spread of the disease in the early 
twentieth century. From the beginning, whites who became ill 
received better treatment than others. In 1955 tuberculosis 
reached epidemic proportions among black mineworkers, 
which prompted the South African Chamber of Mines to 
improve mineworkers' dwellings and health care services. 

About 90 percent of tuberculosis cases reported after 1970 
were among blacks. The rate of infection appeared to decline 
between 1970 and 1985, and the government, citing this 



156 




Business students in a Pretoria technical college 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

decline, ended compulsory tuberculosis vaccinations in 1987. 
Although tuberculosis among blacks increased after that, 
health officials believed other causes were important. Over- 
crowding in urban housing projects increased in the late 1980s, 
and many tuberculosis patients discontinued treatment after 
only a few weeks, rather than the prescribed year. The South 
African National Tuberculosis Association reported that its 
case load increased from 88,000 cases in 1985 to more than 
124,000 in 1990 and continued to increase after that. More 
than 6,000 people died of tuberculosis and related effects each 
year in the early 1990s. More than 47,800 new cases of the dis- 
ease were reported in 1994. 

Malaria ranked second among reported diseases, again 
affecting whites less than other racial groups. This disease 
reached epidemic levels in the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth century, especially in the northern Natal and the 



157 



South Africa: A Country Study 

lowveld areas of the northern and eastern Transvaal. During 
the 1960s, there were 2.7 cases of malaria per 100,000 non- 
whites, compared with only 1.1 cases per 100,000 whites. As 
malaria increased during the 1970s and the 1980s, the gap 
between races widened and these rates rose to 40.5 cases per 
100,000 among blacks, Asians, and people of mixed race, com- 
pared with six cases per 100,000 whites in the early 1990s. In 
1994 health officials reported 4,194 cases of malaria nation- 
wide. 

Several factors probably contributed to the changing pat- 
terns in malaria incidence. The use of insecticides helped 
reduce the incidence of malaria temporarily in the 1950s. The 
1972 worldwide ban on the insecticide, DDT, though only par- 
tially observed in South Africa, was followed by a steady 
increase in the incidence of malaria. At the same time, mosqui- 
toes and other parasites became more resistant to chemicals 
and medicines. Residential patterns also changed, and several 
mosquito-infested areas of the country were permanently set- 
tled. For example, the black homelands of Venda, Gazankulu, 
and Lebowa were established in heavily malaria-infested areas 
of the northern Transvaal. 

Most other diseases decreased between 1970 and 1990. In 
keeping with world trends, smallpox was virtually eradicated in 
South Africa by the 1970s. Diphtheria declined to almost negli- 
gible levels — fewer than 0.1 cases per 100,000 people — by 1990. 
Leprosy showed similar trends, diminishing to 0.5 cases per 
100,000 in 1990. 

Typhoid continues to appear in scattered areas of the coun- 
try in the 1990s, and most typhoid cases are among blacks. In 
the early 1990s, between twenty-five and thirty-five cases of 
typhoid were reported per 100,000 blacks, per year, compared 
with fewer than eight cases per 100,000 whites, Indians, and 
coloureds. A total of 581 new cases were reported in 1994. Mea- 
sles outbreaks remained fairly steady in the early 1990s, with 
thirty to seventy new cases per 100,000 whites, coloureds, and 
Indians, and sixty to 150 cases per 100,000 blacks, each year. In 
1994 a total of 1,672 cases of measles were reported. Other 
common ailments, such as gastroenteritis, kill several hundred 
black South Africans each year, even though these diseases are 
easily treatable in South African hospitals. 

Infectious and parasitic diseases cause roughly 12 percent of 
all deaths among blacks but only 2 percent of deaths among 
whites. Health officials attribute the high incidence of infec- 



158 



The Society and Its Environment 



tious diseases in poor areas to the lack of clean water and sew- 
age disposal systems. As a result, these services are high 
priorities in the government's development plans for the late 
1990s. 

Heart disease and cancer, which are common in industrial- 
ized nations, affect whites more than other racial groups in 
South Africa. Heart disease accounts for about 38 percent of all 
deaths among whites in the 1990s, compared with only 13 per- 
cent of deaths among blacks. Cancerous tumors are responsi- 
ble for 18 percent of deaths among whites, but for only 8 
percent of deaths among blacks. 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 

Although the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases had 
declined from 1966 through the 1980s, the overall rate of infec- 
tion increased after 1990, and among these diseases, acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) raised the greatest fears. 
South Africa's first recorded death from AIDS occurred in 
1982, although the risks of AIDS were not widely publicized at 
the time. In 1985 health officials began testing blood to pre- 
vent AIDS transmission through transfusion. 

By early 1991, 613 cases of AIDS had been reported nation- 
wide, and 270 people were known to have died from the dis- 
ease. Officials at the South African Institute of Medical 
Research estimated at that time that 15,000 people were 
infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The 
World Health Organization (WHO) reported 1,123 cases of 
AIDS in South Africa in 1992. By March 1996, the number of 
reported AIDS cases had reached 10,351. 

Some health researchers estimated that between 800,000 
and 1 million South Africans were HIV-positive in the mid- 
1990s. More than 500 — perhaps as many as 700 — people were 
becoming infected each day, according to these estimates, and 
the rate of infection was likely to double every thirteen months 
in the late 1990s. These figures suggested that between 4 mil- 
lion and 8 million people would be HIV-positive by the year 
2000. Estimates of the number of likely deaths from AIDS in 
the early twenty-first century ranged as high as 1 million. 

As in most of Africa, AIDS is primarily an urban phenome- 
non in South Africa, but it has spread rapidly into rural areas 
and has affected a disproportionate number of people between 
the ages of fifteen and forty. Recognizing the potential impact 
on the country's economic output, the South African Chamber 



159 



South Africa: A Country Study 

of Mines, the nation's largest employer, began an aggressive 
campaign to educate workers and to curtail the spread of AIDS 
in the 1980s, after the chamber's health adviser warned that 
AIDS could be the country's most serious health problem by 
the late 1990s. The industry already had established treatment 
and counseling services for workers afflicted with sexually 
transmitted diseases, so it used this network to promote its cam- 
paign against AIDS. The Chamber of Mines found an inci- 
dence of only 0.05 percent of HIV infection among more than 
30,000 mine workers in a baseline study in 1986. It then initi- 
ated random blood testing on 2,000 to 3,000 workers each 
month and found that the rate of HIV infection had risen to 6 
percent by 1992. 

The government was able to build on the early efforts of the 
Chamber of Mines to help stem the spread of HIV and AIDS in 
the 1990s. Government officials, health specialists from the 
ANC, and others established the National AIDS Convention of 
South Africa to coordinate the nationwide campaign emphasiz- 
ing public education. In 1993 the National AIDS Convention, 
working with the Chamber of Mines, WHO, and other interna- 
tional experts, received financial assistance from the European 
Union (EU — see Glossary) for its efforts. In 1994 and 1995, 
however, the campaign became embroiled in funding disputes 
and was slowed by partisan political debate. 

Although health officials were concerned about the spread 
of AIDS, some were still more concerned about the incidence 
of tuberculosis in the mid-1990s. They argued that tuberculosis 
caused as many as thirty-six deaths each day, on average, com- 
pared with less than one death per day from AIDS. Moreover, 
methods for preventing the spread of tuberculosis were already 
well known and could help in the fight against AIDS. Health 
officials had reported that people infected with tuberculosis 
are more susceptible to HIV infection and more likely to 
develop AIDS symptoms in a shorter time after being infected, 
and that these AIDS sufferers are likely to die sooner than 
those free of tuberculosis. 

Health Care Services 

Until 1990 apartheid was practiced in most hospitals, to vary- 
ing degrees. Some admitted patients of one racial group only, 
and others designated operating rooms and special care facili- 
ties for patients of certain racial groups. This practice often led 
to expensive and redundant services and organizations, and, at 



160 



The Society and Its Environment 



times, unnecessary neglect. A few medical personnel, nonethe- 
less, ignored apartheid-related restrictions, especially in emer- 
gency rooms and public clinics. By the early 1990s, deliberate 
racial distinctions were beginning to disappear from hospital 
care in general. Health care services continued to reflect the 
status of the communities in which they were found, however; 
wealthier people had easier access to health care and generally 
received better care. 

South Africa's health care facilities include hospitals, day 
hospitals, community health care centers, and clinics. In 1995 
about 25,600 doctors as well as 24,500 supplementary health 
professionals, 160,000 nurses and nurses' auxiliaries, and more 
than 5,100 dentists and dental specialists were registered with 
the South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC) and 
the South African Nursing Council. In the early 1990s, only 
about 1,500 doctors, nationwide, were black. Wealthy white 
areas averaged one doctor per 1,200 people; the poorest black 
homelands, one doctor for 13,000 people. 

Seven universities have medical schools, and six provide den- 
tal training. Nurses are trained at several universities, hospitals, 
and nursing schools. More than 300 hospitals are managed 
entirely or in part by provincial governments, and 255 hospitals 
are privately operated. There are an estimated 108,000 hospital 
beds nationwide, and almost 24,800 beds in psychiatric hospi- 
tals. 

The South African Red Cross renders emergency, health, 
and community services, and operates ambulance services, 
senior citizens' homes, and air rescue services across the 
nation, but primarily in urban areas. Some areas also have 
twenty-four-hour-a-day poison control centers, child-assistance 
phone services, rape crisis centers, and suicide prevention pro- 
grams. 

One of the interim government's highest priorities in the 
mid-1990s is the prevention of childhood death and disease 
through nationwide immunization programs. The incidence of 
tetanus, measles, malaria, and other communicable diseases is 
high, especially in the former African homelands. For this rea- 
son, one of President Nelson Mandela's first actions after 
assuming office in May 1994 was to implement a program of 
free health care for children under the age of six. By early 
1996, officials estimated that at least 75 percent of all infants 
had been immunized against polio and measles. 



161 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Malnutrition and starvation also occur in a few, especially 
rural, areas. These problems are being addressed through 
other elements of the government's RDP of the 1990s (see 
Postapartheid Reconstruction, ch. 3). Minister of Health Nko- 
sazana Zuma noted in December 1994 that only 20 percent of 
South Africans have any form of health insurance. The govern- 
ment plans to institute a program of free universal primary 
health care, but health officials estimated in early 1996 that it 
might take ten years to implement the plan fully. 

Social Welfare 

Disabilities and the Aged 

Social welfare services in the 1990s include care for the dis- 
abled and the aged, alcohol and drug-rehabilitation programs, 
previous offenders' programs, and child care services. At least 
1,742 private welfare organizations and numerous government 
agencies administer these programs. 

The National Welfare Act (No. 100) of 1978 established a 
coordinating council, the South African Welfare Council, to 
help manage these diverse programs. Amendments to the act 
in 1987 signaled the government's growing awareness of the 
need to narrow differences in social welfare among racial 
groups. In the early 1990s, the government spent about Rl bil- 
lion per year on welfare programs, excluding old-age pensions. 
About one-half of that amount was spent on whites. Govern- 
ment spending under the RDP in the mid-1990s was geared 
toward improving social services for other racial groups. 

About 3.5 million South Africans are physically disabled in 
the mid-1990s. The government's approach is to encourage 
independent, although sometimes assisted, living for them. 
Assistance is sometimes available through outpatient rehabilita- 
tion centers, counseling services, workshops, and sheltered 
employment centers. Families and church groups are still 
important in assisting the handicapped, especially the mentally 
and psychologically impaired, although government-funded 
services are available for the blind and the deaf. Substance 
abuse programs, especially for alcohol abuse or marijuana 
dependence, are also available in some communities. 

The government administers about 1.8 million old-age (non- 
military) pensions in the 1990s that represent a total of about 
R4 billion. The government began narrowing the gap in pen- 
sions for different racial groups in 1992 and pledged to elimi- 



162 




Intensive-care unit at Morningside Medi Clinic, 
Bryanston (Johannesburg) 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

nate such disparities. But elderly black and other citizens 
continued to claim that they were disadvantaged because of 
their racial identity in the mid-1990s. Government welfare 
agencies also provide veterans' benefits, adoption and foster 
care services, services for alcoholics and drug addicts, and ser- 
vices for abused and neglected children. 

Refugees 

Most refugees in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s were 
from Mozambique, fleeing that country's civil war. Estimates of 
their number varied widely, in part because many other 
Mozambican migrant workers were in South Africa during that 
time. The number of refugees was particularly difficult to esti- 
mate because until 1993, South African officials sometimes 



163 



South Africa: A Country Study 

denied access to refugee camps for international observers try- 
ing to monitor the refugees' living conditions. 

In early 1994, officials estimated that perhaps 1 million 
Mozambicans were working in South Africa, legally or illegally, 
and that perhaps as many as 500,000 were refugees. Although 
only a few took advantage of a repatriation program imple- 
mented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees (UNHCR) in April 1994, in early 1995 relief workers 
estimated the number of refugees at about 200,000. This num- 
ber was reduced by half during 1995, although several thou- 
sand Mozambicans were entering South Africa each month in 
early 1995 — some for the second or third time. 

Internally displaced South Africans were believed to number 
at least 500,000 in 1995, according to the United States Com- 
mittee on Refugees (USCR). Most of these had been uprooted 
by official apartheid-related policies in the past decade, and 
perhaps 10,000 or more were displaced by political violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990s. The new government estab- 
lished a Land Claims Court and planned to adjudicate several 
thousand of such claims by the late 1990s. By mid-1996 a few 
cases had been resolved by restoring lost land, and a small 
number of displaced South Africans had received compensa- 
tion for their losses. 

Narcotics 

After South Africa's international isolation ended and bor- 
der trade increased in the early 1990s, problems associated 
with narcotics trafficking and drug use increased dramatically, 
according to the South African Police Service (SAPS). In 1994 
South African authorities confiscated more than 2.4 million 
ounces of cocaine; nearly 25,000 grams of heroin; more than 
16,000 units of LSD; 27,000 ounces of hashish, and 7 million 
kilograms of cannabis (marijuana), according to police 
records, and most of these figures were expected to increase in 
1995 and 1996. At the same time, officials at the National 
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence reported an 
increase in problems related to substance abuse and addiction, 
and police officials reported that narcotics dealers often were 
involved in other forms of crime, such as arms smuggling, bur- 
glaries, or car hijackings. 

Women in Society 

In general, all racial and ethnic groups in South Africa have 



164 



The Society and Its Environment 

long-standing beliefs concerning gender roles, and most are 
based on the premise that women are less important, or less 
deserving of power, than men. Most African traditional social 
organizations are male centered and male dominated. Even in 
the 1990s, in some rural areas of South Africa, for example, 
wives walk a few paces behind their husbands in keeping with 
traditional practices. Afrikaner religious beliefs, too, include a 
strong emphasis on the theoretically biblically based notion 
that women's contributions to society should normally be 
approved by, or be on behalf of, men. 

Twentieth-century economic and political developments 
presented South African women with both new obstacles and 
new opportunities to wield influence. For example, labor force 
requirements in cities and mining areas have often drawn men 
away from their homes for months at a time, and, as a result, 
women have borne many traditionally male responsibilities in 
the village and home. Women have had to guarantee the day- 
to-day survival of their families and to carry out financial and 
legal transactions that otherwise would have been reserved for 
men. 

Women and Apartheid 

Apartheid imposed new restrictions on African women 
beginning in the 1950s. Many lived in squalor in the former 
homelands, where malnutrition, illness, and infant mortality 
were much higher than in urban areas. Other women who fol- 
lowed their husbands into cities or mining areas lived in inade- 
quate, and often illegal, housing near industrial compounds. 
Women often left their own families to commute long distances 
to low-wage jobs in the domestic work force in white neighbor- 
hoods. Substantial numbers were temporary workers in agricul- 
ture; and a growing number of women joined the burgeoning 
industrial work force, as has been carefully researched in Iris 
Berger's Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry, 
1900-1980. 

Women became the major source of resistance to many race- 
related restrictions during the apartheid era, especially the pass 
laws, which required Africans to carry documents permitting 
them to be in white-occupied areas. The Women's Defence of 
the Constitution League, later known as the Black Sash, was 
formed in 1954, first to demonstrate against such laws and later 
to assist pass-law violators. Black Sash established pass-law 



165 



South Africa: A Country Study 

advice centers in many cities and helped reduce sentences or 
assist violators in other ways. 

The African National Congress Women's League (ANCWL), 
formed in 1943, was able to organize more than 20,000 women 
to march on government buildings in Pretoria to protest 
against the pass laws and other apartheid restrictions in 1955. 
Their protests eventually failed, however. In the early 1960s, 
pass-law restrictions were extended to women and new legisla- 
tion restricted black women without steady employment to 
stays of no more than seventy-two hours in any urban area. Also 
in 1964, many senior ANC leaders were arrested, and others 
fled from South Africa or went underground, and the ANCWL 
became almost defunct. 

Women continued to join the urban work force, and by the 
late 1980s, women made up at least 90 percent of the domestic 
work force and 36 percent of the industrial work force, accord- 
ing to labor union estimates. Women's wages were lower than 
men's even for the same job, however. In addition, positions 
normally held by women had long hours and few benefits, such 
as sick leave; women often were dismissed without advance 
notice and without any type of termination pay. 

Conservative Afrikaner women have organized in support of 
Afrikaner cultural preservation and apartheid since the 1970s. 
The Kappiekommando was established in the late 1970s to 
demand a return to traditional Afrikaner values. This organiza- 
tion was named for its distinctive Voortrekker dress, which 
caused some young Afrikaners and others to ridicule its mem- 
bers' appearance and their militancy. The Kappiekommando's 
militant opposition to political reforms eventually contributed 
to its marginalization, even among staunchly conservative Afri- 
kaners. 

The Afrikanervroue-Kenkrag (AVK), another Afrikaner 
women's organization, was formed in 1983 and worked prima- 
rily to oppose racial integration in schools and other public 
places. AVK membership grew to about 1,000 during the mid- 
1980s. The group published a monthly newsletter and cooper- 
ated with other Afrikaner organizations, but like the Kappie- 
kommando, the AVK lost support when mainstream Afrikaner 
political leaders began working toward racial inclusiveness in 
the 1990s. 

Women in the 1990s 

The ANCWL was resurrected in 1990, after the ban on the 



166 



The Society and Its Environment 



ANC was lifted, and women in more than 500 towns and cities 
organized to press for consideration of gender issues in the 
upcoming constitutional negotiations. At the insistence of its 
Women's League, the ANC accepted, in principle, the proposal 
that women should receive one-third of the political appoint- 
ments in the new government. Other symbolic gains by the 
ANCWL have included strong policy stands on women's rights 
and protection against abuse and exploitation, but translating 
these standards into enforceable laws proved to be a difficult 
task. 

Women are achieving new prominence in politics as a result 
of the sweeping political reforms of the 1990s. In 1994 women 
won election to eighty of the 400 seats in the National Assem- 
bly, the only directly elected house of parliament, and a 
woman, Frene Ginwala, was elected Speaker of the National 
Assembly. Women also were elected to almost one-third of the 
seats in the nine provincial assemblies. 

President Mandela appointed two women cabinet ministers 
in May 1994, and a woman succeeded the late minister of hous- 
ing, Joe Slovo, after his death in January 1995. Three women 
were deputy ministers in early 1995. One of these, President 
Mandela's former wife, Winnie Mandela, was appointed deputy 
minister of arts, culture, science, and technology. 

Mrs. Mandela had been a courageous fighter for the rights 
of the downtrodden for more than two decades while her hus- 
band was in prison, and she had achieved high office within 
the ANC. But her association with violent elements of the ANC 
Youth League in the late 1980s and other accusations against 
her in the 1990s led many within the ANC to shun her. She was 
also outspoken in her criticism of the government in early 1995 
for its failure to move more quickly to ease the extreme poverty 
of many citizens. Her defiance led to her removal from office 
in March of that year. 

Eliminating violence against women and improving educa- 
tional opportunities for women are almost universally sup- 
ported goals in South Africa in the mid-1990s, but these goals 
receive only rhetorical support, in many cases. More urgent pri- 
orities are to eliminate the vestiges of apartheid legislation and 
to improve economic and social conditions for the very poor, 
for children, and for other groups that were especially disad- 
vantaged in recent decades. Gender-related inequities appear 
likely to be decried, but relegated to secondary importance, 
well into the twenty-first century. 



167 



South Africa: A Country Study 

* * * 

Studies of South Africa's rich cultural heritage begin with 
ethnographic classics by Hilda Kuper on the Swazi, Max Gluck- 
man on the Zulu, Isaac Schapera on the Tswana, J. D. Krige on 
the Lobedu, John Marshall and Elizabeth Marshall Thomas on 
the San, and Monica Hunter Wilson on the Pondo. Their 
works are available in numerous monographs and collections 
of articles, especially in the International African Institute's 
Ethnographic Survey of Africa, which includes valuable field- 
work observations and initial analyses. More recent mono- 
graphs include Jeffrey B. Peires's The House ofPhalo: A History of 
the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence and Gerhard 
Mare's Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in 
South Africa on the Zulu. 

South Africa's complex society cannot be, fully understood 
by analyzing specific cultures, however. Patrick J. Furlong's 
Between Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the 
Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era describes the 
growth of authoritarian politics in South Africa. Religious 
developments are presented in David Chidester's Religions of 
South Africa. Iris Berger's Threads of Solidarity: Women in South 
African Industry, 1900-1980 describes women's role in the 
growth of the working class. Recent national developments are 
examined by Marina Ottaway in South Africa: The Struggle for a 
New Order and by a variety of authors in South Africa: The Political 
Economy of Transformation edited by Stephen John Stedman. 
The complexities of the rapid changes of the 1990s are docu- 
mented by Timothy Sisk in Democratization in South Africa. 
Numerous articles in the Journal of Southern African Studies pro- 
vide insights into political and social change under apartheid. 

Available information on population, health, and educa- 
tion — although incomplete — has been carefully compiled each 
year by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its Race 
Relations Survey. The South African government's South Africa 
Yearbook, originally published as the South Africa Official Year- 
book, and numerous reports by the Central Statistical Service 
include available data on many social issues. Urbanization and 
social change are surveyed from diverse points of view in The 
Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South 
Africa edited by David M. Smith. Environmental concerns are 
outlined in Hamish Main and Stephen Wyn Williams's Environ- 



168 



The Society and Its Environment 

ment and Housing in Third World Cities. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



169 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




outnumber people in areas of the Great Karoo. 



TRADING ON JOHANNESBURG'S financial markets reached 
a new all-time high on April 26, 1994, reflecting the buoyant 
mood of voters of all races who were about to participate in the 
country's first democratic elections. As South Africa emerged 
from the economic stagnation and international isolation of 
the apartheid era, the new government and its theme of eco- 
nomic reconstruction received international acclaim and 
encouragement. At the same time, however, it faced conflicting 
pressures to speed economic growth, to strengthen South 
Africa's standing among international investors and donors, 
and, at the same time, to improve living conditions for the 
majority of citizens. 

South Africa's economy had been shaped over several centu- 
ries by its abundant natural resources and by the attempts of 
immigrant populations to dominate and to exploit those who 
had arrived before them. For most of the twentieth century, its 
mineral wealth had surpassed that of almost any other country 
in the world, except the Soviet Union. South Africa produced 
nearly half of the world's gold and ranked among the top ten 
producers of a dozen other valuable minerals, including dia- 
monds and copper. The mining industries provided the foun- 
dation for the strongest economy on the continent, which, by 
the mid-twentieth century, included a comprehensive transpor- 
tation system, an extensive electric power grid, and a signifi- 
cant manufacturing sector. South Africa's main resource 
deficiency is oil, and as a result, many industries rely on coal 
rather than on imported fuels. 

By the mid-1980s, the economy was distorted by government 
policies designed to bolster the economic and political power 
of a small minority and to exclude many of South Africa's citi- 
zens, selected by race, from significant participation in the 
nation's wealth. Basic needs were unmet, resulting in hunger, 
malnutrition, and undereducation, especially in rural areas. 
Industrial development could not be sustained through domes- 
tic resources, and there was stagnation in some areas when for- 
eign capital was reduced in the face of strong international 
pressures for political reform. Because the mining industry 
continued to dominate the economy, wide fluctuations — espe- 
cially in the price of gold — eroded currency values and 
reduced the country's ability to import goods. At the same 



173 



South Africa: A Country Study 

time, keeping black wages low, which was crucial to profits in 
all areas of the economy, perpetuated the discrimination that 
provoked widespread protests and condemnation. 

By the early 1990s, the weaknesses in the economy were 
increasingly evident despite the country's dazzling mineral 
wealth. Some segments of the population were poorer, and liv- 
ing in more difficult circumstances, than many people in far 
less developed African countries. Moreover, a poorly educated, 
impoverished majority of the population could not provide the 
skills and the resources that the country's infrastructure and 
labor market required. The government cast off the constraints 
of apartheid (see Glossary) in the early 1990s, in part to con- 
front the serious economic problems caused by that system. 
The new government in the mid-1990s faces the enormous 
challenges of improving living standards and managing the 
country's resources profitably. 

Historical Development 

Before South Africa's vast mineral wealth was discovered in 
the late nineteenth century, there was a general belief that 
southern Africa was almost devoid of the riches that had drawn 
Europeans to the rest of the continent. South Africa had no 
known gold deposits such as those the Portuguese had sought 
in West Africa in the fifteenth century. The region did not 
attract many slave traders, in part because local populations 
were sparsely settled. Valuable crops such as palm oil, rubber, 
and cocoa, which were found elsewhere on the continent, were 
absent. Although the local economy was rich in some areas — 
based on mixed farming and herding — only ivory was traded to 
any extent. Most local products were not sought for large-scale 
consumption in Europe. 

Instead, Europeans first settled southern Africa to resupply 
their trading expeditions bound for other parts of the world 
(see Origins of Settlement, ch. 1). In 1652 the Dutch East India 
Company settled a few employees at a small fort at present-day 
Cape Town and ordered them to provide fresh food for the 
company's ships that rounded the Cape on their way to East 
Africa and Asia. This nucleus of European settlement quickly 
spread outward from the fort, first to trade with the local 
Khoikhoi hunting populations and later to seize their land for 
European farmers. Smallpox epidemics swept the area in the 
late eighteenth century, and Europeans who had come to rely 



174 



The Economy 



on Khoikhoi labor enslaved many of the survivors of the epi- 
demics. 

By the early nineteenth century, when the Cape settlement 
came under British rule, 26,000 Dutch farmers had settled the 
area from Stellenbosch to the Great Fish River (see fig. 7). In 
1820 the British government sponsored 5,000 more settlers 
who also established large cattle ranches, relying on African 
labor. But the European immigrants, like earlier arrivals in the 
area, engaged primarily in subsistence farming and produced 
little for export. 

The discovery of diamonds in 1869 and of gold in 1886 revo- 
lutionized the economy. European investment flowed in; by the 
end of the nineteenth century, it was equivalent to all Euro- 
pean investment in the rest of Africa. International banks and 
private lenders increased cash and credit available to local 
farmers, miners, and prospectors, and they, in turn, placed 
growing demands for land and labor on the local African popu- 
lations. The Europeans resorted to violence to defend their 
economic interests, sometimes clashing with those who refused 
to relinquish their freedom or their land. Eventually, as the 
best land became scarce, groups of settlers clashed with one 
another, and rival Dutch and British populations fought for 
control over the land (see Industrialization and Imperialism, 
1870-1910, ch. 1). 

South Africa was drawn into the international economy 
through its exports, primarily diamonds and gold, and through 
its own increasing demand for a variety of agricultural imports. 
The cycle of economic growth was stimulated by the continual 
expansion of the mining industry, and with newfound wealth, 
consumer demand fueled higher levels of trade. 

In the first half of the twentieth century, government eco- 
nomic policies were designed to meet local consumer demand 
and to reduce the nation's reliance on its mining sector by pro- 
viding incentives for farming and for establishing manufactur- 
ing enterprises. But the government also saw its role as helping 
to defend white farmers and businessmen from African compe- 
tition. In 1913 the Natives Land Act reserved most of the land 
for white ownership, forcing many black farmers to work as 
wage laborers on land they had previously owned. When the 
act was amended in 1936, black land ownership was restricted 
to 13 percent of the country, much of it heavily eroded. 

White farmers received other privileges, such as loans from a 
government Land Bank (created in 1912), labor law protec- 



175 



South Africa: A Country Study 

tion, and crop subsidies. Marketing boards, which were estab- 
lished to stabilize production of many crops, paid more for 
produce from white farmers than for produce from black farm- 
ers. All farm activity suffered from the cyclical droughts that 
swept the subcontinent, but white farmers received greater gov- 
ernment protection against economic losses. 

During the 1920s, to encourage the fledgling manufacturing 
industries, the government established state corporations to 
provide inexpensive electricity and steel for industrial use, and 
it imposed import tariffs to protect local manufacturers. Again 
black entrepreneurs were discouraged, and new laws limited 
the rights of black workers, creating a large pool of low-cost 
industrial labor. By the end of the 1930s, the growing number 
of state-owned enterprises dominated the manufacturing sec- 
tor, and black entrepreneurs continued to be pressured to 
remain outside the formal economy. 

Manufacturing experienced new growth during and after 
World War II. Many of the conditions necessary for economic 
expansion had been present before the war — cities were grow- 
ing, agriculture was being consolidated into large farms with 
greater emphasis on commercial production, and mine owners 
and shareholders had begun to diversify their investments into 
other sectors. As the war ended, local consumer demand rose 
to new highs, and with strong government support — and inter- 
national competitors at bay — local agriculture and manufactur- 
ing began to expand. 

The government increased its role in the economy, espe- 
cially in manufacturing, during the 1950s and the 1960s. It also 
initiated large-scale programs to promote the commercial culti- 
vation of corn and wheat. Government investments through 
the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
helped to establish local textile and pulp and paper industries, 
as well as state corporations to produce fertilizers, chemicals, 
oil, and armaments. Both manufacturing and agricultural pro- 
duction expanded rapidly, and by 1970 manufacturing output 
exceeded that of mining. 

Despite the appearance of self-sustaining economic growth 
during the postwar period, the country's economy continued 
to be susceptible to its historical limitations: recurrent drought, 
overreliance on gold exports, and the costs and consequences 
of the use of disenfranchised labor. While commercial agricul- 
ture developed into an important source of export revenue, 
production plummeted during two major droughts, from 1960 



176 



The Economy 



to 1966 and from 1981 to 1985. Gold continued to be the most 
important export and revenue earner; yet, as the price of gold 
fluctuated, especially during the 1980s, South Africa's 
exchange rate and ability to import goods suffered. 

Manufacturing, in particular, was seriously affected by down- 
swings in the price of gold, in part because it relied on 
imported machinery and capital. Some capital-intensive indus- 
tries were able to expand, but only with massive foreign loans. 
As a result, many industries were insulated from the rising 
labor militancy, especially among black workers, which sparked 
disputes and slowed productivity in the late 1980s. As black 
labor increasingly voiced its frustrations, and foreign banks cut 
short their loans because of mounting instability, even capital- 
intensive industries felt the impact of apartheid on profits. 

The economy was in recession from March 1989 through 
most of 1993, largely in response to worldwide economic con- 
ditions and the long-term effects of apartheid. It registered 
only negligible, or negative, growth in most quarters. High 
inflation had become chronic, driving up costs in all sectors. 
Living standards of the majority of black citizens either fell or 
remained dangerously low, while those of many whites also 
began to decline. Economic growth continued to depend on 
decent world prices for gold and on the availability of foreign 
loans. Even as some sectors of the economy began to recover in 
late 1993, intense violence and political uncertainty in the face 
of reform slowed overall growth through 1994. 

Postapartheid Reconstruction 

As the African National Congress (ANC) shifted away from 
its liberation agenda toward a leadership role in government in 
the early 1990s, ANC economists, together with government 
and private-sector consultants, developed a blueprint for devel- 
opment in the late 1990s. This Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment Programme (RDP) analyzed nationwide living standards 
and proposed ways to improve government services and basic 
living conditions for the poor. The RDP detailed the extreme 
poverty of at least 17 million citizens who were living below 
internationally accepted minimum standards. The report esti- 
mated that 4.3 million families were without adequate housing, 
and some 12 million people lacked access to clean drinking 
water. Most homes, and many schools and hospitals, lacked 
electricity. An estimated 4.6 million adults were illiterate. 



177 



South Africa: A Country Study 



In May 1994, the new government adopted the RDP as the 
centerpiece of its economic policy, although President Nelson 
(Rolihlahla) Mandela was quick to reassure potential investors 
and donors that his government's social programs would be 
financed largely through cuts in existing government spend- 
ing. He pledged that his government would avoid both dra- 
matic increases in taxes and large-scale deficit spending to 
implement the much-needed welfare improvements. 

The RDP envisioned sweeping government programs to 
raise living standards — to build houses and roads, to provide 
services, to upgrade education, and to create jobs to narrow 
the gap between rich and poor. By late 1994, the government 
had begun to implement its highest RDP priorities: a US$135 
million school lunch program; a US$14 million program of 
free medical care for children and pregnant women; providing 
water and electricity to rural communities; and phasing in free, 
compulsory primary education for children of all races. 

Government officials and ANC economists in the National 
Institute for Economic Policy estimated that RDP expenditures 
in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1994-95 would amount to 2.5 
billion rands (R; for value of the rand — see Glossary), or about 
7 percent of government spending. They also estimated that 
RDP expenditures would double in FY 1995-96 and would 
increase by about R2.5 billion each year after that, to R12.5 bil- 
lion — probably more than 25 percent of government spend- 
ing — in FY 1998-99. The Development Bank of Southern 
Africa estimated costs approaching US$30 billion — US$19 bil- 
lion in capital expenditures and US$11 billion in recurrent 
expenditures — by 1999. Government officials insisted that they 
would rely on increased trade and overall economic growth, as 
well as on international assistance and private-sector donations, 
for most of the additional revenue, and that reconstruction 
would be aided by a one-time, 5 percent levy on individuals and 
companies with taxable incomes of more than R50,000. They 
also predicted that the government would save money by 
increasing efficiency (in particular by eliminating the redun- 
dancy that had been necessary to provide services to separate 
racial groups under apartheid) and by reducing military 
expenditures. 

To help finance the RDP, the government also undertook 
negotiations to sell some national assets to private citizens, 
despite the ANC's earlier opposition to privatization. Senior 
government officials, including the president, accepted salary 



178 



Shopkeeper in a Lebowa township rewards his 
young assistants with oranges. 
Courtesy R. T. K. Scully 

cuts of between 10 percent and 20 percent to contribute to 
social reconstruction. President Mandela also asked for con- 
crete proposals and contributions from the business commu- 
nity — such as on-the-job training and employer subsidies of 
housing, transportation, and education — to meet the urgent 
needs defined in the RDR 

The new government launched worldwide appeals for new 
trade and investment packages for South Africa, as it tried to 
overcome more than a decade of international isolation. South 
Africa began reentering world financial markets, establishing 
new trading partners, and expanding formerly clandestine 
trade ties that had long existed with many countries. Interna- 
tional donors and investors responded cautiously at first, in 
part because of the continuing high levels of urban and town- 
ship violence. 



179 



South Africa: A Country Study 

After mid-1994 immigrants from other African countries 
arrived in large numbers — a total of perhaps a million in that 
year alone, according to some estimates — seeking jobs in posta- 
partheid South Africa. Poorer neighboring states also intensi- 
fied their requests for assistance from Pretoria, hoping South 
Africa's economic revival would increase output and trade 
throughout the region and that South Africa would become 
the region's new "engine of development." 

Structure of the Economy 

Gross Domestic Product 

Historically, mining and agriculture contributed the most to 
national output. With government assistance during and after 
World War II, manufacturing grew to become the greatest con- 
tributor to overall gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary), and overall economic growth in the 1960s rivaled that of 
Japan — averaging 5.9 percent per year in real terms (compared 
with the 4 percent annual average growth of the 1950s). Dur- 
ing the 1970s, however, growth in both manufacturing and 
agriculture stagnated, and the services sector — especially the 
insurance industry, financial facilities, and transport services — 
became the fastest-growing economic sector (see table 5, 
Appendix). 

The price of gold was allowed to float (relative to the rand) 
in the early 1970s, and by the end of the decade, high prices 
for gold and other export commodities sparked a brief eco- 
nomic recovery. Mining continued to be vital to the nation's 
economic future, because minerals, especially gold, dominated 
exports and influenced the growth of other major economic 
sectors, which relied on gold exports to bring in much-needed 
foreign exchange. Thus, even as the importance of gold in the 
GDP declined, it continued to affect the country's balance of 
payments. When gold prices (and export revenues) declined, 
local industries often were unable to obtain imports, such as 
machinery and other inputs necessary to maintain production; 
as a result, other exports also declined. 

Economic growth slowed in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, not only because of declining gold revenues, but also 
because of rising prices for oil imports and increased interna- 
tional competition in other traditional export commodities. 
The first recession of this period occurred in 1976, following 
dramatic oil price hikes. Strong export growth based on higher 



180 



The Economy 



gold prices helped the recovery from this recession, but the 
country was hit by a series of droughts in the 1980s, which seri- 
ously affected agricultural output. Further erratic changes in 
gold prices led to a series of booms and busts, reducing average 
annual GDP growth for the 1980s to only 1.5 percent. 

Negligible growth in the 1980s led to an overall decline in 
living standards, as population growth far outpaced economic 
expansion. Per capita GDP declined by more than 10 percent 
during the decade, and for the average individual, real wealth 
in 1990 was no higher than it had been in 1970. 

National economic stagnation continued in the early 1990s. 
GDP declined in 1991 and 1992, and registered only weak posi- 
tive growth in 1993, according to the government's Central Sta- 
tistical Service. Private consumption accounted for 57 percent 
of GDP in 1993, representing a minimal (0.4 percent) increase 
over 1992. Private consumption was constrained by high con- 
sumer indebtedness, however, and by concerns over violence 
and job security. 

The recovery strengthened in 1994. In that year, GDP 
amounted to R432.8 billion (US$121.9 billion) representing 
2.6 percent real growth over 1993 (see table 6, Appendix). Per 
capita GDP averaged about US$3,010, placing South Africa 
among the World Bank's (see Glossary) upper-middle-income 
developing countries. The recovery continued in 1995, and 
officials predicted GDP growth would exceed 4 percent in 1996 
(see fig. 13; fig. 14). 

National accounting procedures were adjusted in 1994 to 
incorporate the economies of the four former "independent" 
African homelands — Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and 
Venda. In addition, GDP measurements were adjusted upward 
by 5.6 percent to include a modest estimate of output in the 
informal sector, which had been omitted from national 
accounts until 1994. The informal sector constitutes a "paral- 
lel" economy, consisting primarily of unrecorded and untaxed 
wages, barter trade, and other unofficial receipts. For many 
rural families in South Africa, as in the rest of Africa, informal 
economic activity accounts for most of the household income. 

South Africa's advanced industrial sector made it the twenty- 
fifth largest economy in the world, a giant among African coun- 
tries in the 1990s. Per capita GDP, in 1994, compared with the 
rest of Africa, was topped only by the Seychelles, Reunion, and 
Gabon. With only about 7 percent of the population and 4 per- 
cent of the total land area of Africa, South Africa produced 



181 



South Africa: A Country Study 



GDP* 1995 - US$133.6 billion 



AGRICULTURE, 
OTHER FORESTRY, 




*GDP -- Gross Domestic Product (see Glossary) at current market prices. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: 
South Africa, No. 2, London, 1996, 3. 

Figure 13. Origins of Gross Domestic Product, 1995 

more than one-third of Africa's goods and services, and nearly 
40 percent of its manufacturing output. 

External Debt 

Loan capital was readily available during the 1970s, and both 
the public and the private sectors borrowed heavily, often in 
the form of trade credits. Then in the early 1980s, foreign 
investments declined relative to the value of foreign loans 
needed to finance economic growth. As a result, equity capital 
dropped as a percentage of foreign debt from 60 percent in 
1970 to less than 30 percent in 1984, while South Africa's loans 
grew from 40 percent to 70 percent of foreign debt. The gov- 
ernment encouraged this trend by stepping in whenever for- 
eign bankers hesitated to increase lending and stabilized 
indebtedness through gold swaps or by borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). As a result 
of these policies, South Africa's net indebtedness to the inter- 
national banks increased sharply, and about two-thirds of its 



182 



The Economy 



outstanding loans in 1984 had a maturity of one year or less. 
The banking sector was responsible for 44 percent of South 
Africa's foreign liabilities, and a further 16 percent had been 
incurred by the public sector. Only about 40 percent were pri- 
vate liabilities. Britain dominated foreign capital loans and 
investments, accounting for about 40 percent of foreign invest- 
ment in 1985. 

South Africa was hit with a major foreign debt crisis in 1985, 
when a group of banks, led by Chase Manhattan, withdrew sub- 
stantial credit lines. The banks refused to roll over existing 
loans and called in many of the short-term loans. As a result, 
the value of the rand dropped precipitously, and the govern- 
ment temporarily closed its financial and foreign-exchange 
markets. Unable to meet debt obligations so suddenly, the gov- 
ernment declared a standstill on repayments of approximately 
US$14 billion of South Africa's US$24 billion total external 
debt. Liabilities not included in the standstill were trade cred- 
its, loans from the IMF and central banks, and credits guaran- 
teed by Paris Club (see Glossary) member governments. 
Publicly quoted issues of South African parastatals (state corpo- 
rations) were also left out. 

During the standstill, government officials met with repre- 
sentatives of creditor banks and drew up a rescheduling plan, 
which proposed extending the 1985 debt freeze until June 
1987 and repaying 5 percent of the total outstanding by April 
1987. An initial payment of US$420 million was made in mid- 
April 1986, but additional rescheduling agreements in 1987 
and 1989 extended many of these loans. The 1989 agreement 
stipulated that the amount of debt remaining in those catego- 
ries affected by the standstill, originally amounting to US$14 
billion, would be reduced to roughly US$6 billion in four years. 

A key problem in repaying its loans was the large, but undis- 
closed, portion of South Africa's debt that was denominated in 
hard nondollar currencies, but appreciated in dollar terms as 
the dollar weakened. South Africa nonetheless repaid between 
US$1.7 billion and US$1.9 billion of debt by 1990, and some 
foreign bankers were increasingly willing to refinance matur- 
ing South African credits. For example, US$300 million of 
US$900 million bearer bonds in deutsche marks and Swiss 
francs were rolled over or replaced in 1990. 

There was almost no external borrowing by South Africa 
from 1985 to 1990, so even its slowed schedule of debt repay- 
ment made South Africa a net capital exporter during the late 



183 



South Africa: A Country Study 




.3 J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 

YEAR 

* Gross Domestic Product (see Glossary). 



Source: Based on information from Nedcor Economic Unit, South Africa's Statistical 
Profile, 1 994, Johannesburg, 1994, 3; and Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Report: South Africa, No. 1, London, 1996, 3. 

Figure 14. Economic Growth, 1985-95 

1980s. South Africa reduced its total disclosed foreign debt to 
less than US$20 billion in early 1992, down from nearly US$24 
billion in 1985, according to the South African Reserve Bank. 
Currency fluctuations brought South Africa's international 
debt back to US$25.8 billion at the end of 1993, including 
rand-denominated foreign debt, and that figure continued to 
increase in 1994. 

The government repaid about US$500 million in foreign 
debt in February 1994. At that time, South Africa was consid- 
ered an under-borrower by conventional financial criteria, with 
a foreign debt/ export ratio of about 60 percent and a foreign 
debt/GDP ratio of 15.1 percent, according to South African 
Reserve Bank figures. Overall, South Africa posted a net capital 
inflow of more than R8 billion in the second half of 1994. For- 
eign borrowing increased in 1995, when gross foreign debt 
rose to nearly 22 percent of GDR 



184 



The Economy 



Inflation 

Historically, South Africa's inflation rate was tied closely to 
that of its major trading partners. In the 1960s, annual infla- 
tion averaged about 3 percent. In line with world trends, it rose 
above 10 percent in 1974 and fluctuated between 11 and 14 
percent through the early 1980s. During the late 1980s, how- 
ever, South Africa's inflation rates did not decline along with 
those of its Western trading partners. Inflation reached a high 
of 18.6 percent in 1986, forcing a depreciation of the rand, and 
it continued in double-digit amounts after that. The erratic 
price of oil — a crucial import bought on the black market 
because of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) sanctions — provided a consistent inflationary pres- 
sure. 

Inflation continued to erode economic strength in the early 
1990s, but declined to 9.1 percent in 1994. Inflation increased 
in early 1995 under pressure from new social spending, but 
declined to 8.7 percent by the end of the year. The lower rate 
of inflation resulted in part from a decline in food prices, the 
relative stability of the rand, and the lowering of import tariffs. 
Inflationary pressures persisted in the increase in credit pur- 
chases and strong labor demands. 

Economic Distortions and Apartheid 

National accounts in 1994 showed a sharp break with the 
past, as economic and legal data were reorganized to include 
citizens of all races and all jurisdictions, including former 
homelands. The interim constitution implemented in 1994 
ended the use of racial categories to determine social and eco- 
nomic opportunity, but the economic system of the mid-1990s 
nonetheless continued to reflect some of the economic pat- 
terns that had developed during more than forty years of apart- 
heid. 

Creating the homelands and resettling people in them had 
drastically changed the country's population distribution and 
regional economic patterns in the 1970s and 1980s. Account- 
ing for these anomalies caused confusion and obfuscation in 
economic data and analyses. Many homeland residents were 
barely able to support themselves, owing in part to the home- 
lands' arid land, inferior roads and transportation, and over- 
crowding; some were therefore forced to travel great distances 
to work in "white" South Africa. Many of these workers were 



185 



South Africa: A Country Study 

excluded from national accounts because they were not legal 
residents of South Africa. 

It became increasingly clear in the 1980s that apartheid 
could not be implemented as decreed by law, and eventually 
many official and unofficial policies allowed some flexibility in 
its application. In 1986 the government called for "orderly 
urbanization," under which a limited numbers of blacks could 
live in officially "white" urban areas, as long as housing was 
available. Few black workers could afford to take advantage of 
this policy, however, and demographic trends did not change 
noticeably. 

By the late 1980s, black poverty was so serious that the gov- 
ernment began to take steps to alleviate some of the most dire 
impacts of apartheid. Government statistics then indicated that 
more than 16 million people were living below internationally 
determined minimum-subsistence levels. Using nutritional 
standards as an alternative measure, an estimated 2.3 million 
people were at severe risk from hunger and malnutrition. In 
1988 the minister of national health and population develop- 
ment characterized the crisis as "worse than the Great Depres- 
sion," and in response, the government initiated food 
programs and other social welfare initiatives (see Health and 
Welfare, ch. 2). 

Role of the Government 

South African economists in the 1980s described the 
national economy as a free-enterprise system in which the mar- 
ket, not the government, set most wages and prices. The reality 
was that the government played a major role in almost every 
facet of the economy, including production, consumption, and 
regulation. In fact, Soviet economists in the late 1980s noted 
that the state-owned portion of South Africa's industrial sector 
was greater than that in any country outside the communist 
bloc. The South African government owned and managed 
almost 40 percent of all wealth-producing assets, including iron 
and steel works, weapons manufacturing facilities, and energy- 
producing resources. Government-owned corporations and 
parastatals were also vital to the services sector. Marketing 
boards and tariff regulations intervened to influence consumer 
prices. Finally, a wide variety of laws governed economic activi- 
ties at all levels based on race. 

The government's main concern since the discovery of gold 
in 1886 had been balancing the growth of the mining industry 



186 



The Economy 



against the need to diversify, in order to create sustained devel- 
opment and self-sufficiency. Successive governments had tried 
to encourage and to support local industries that could reduce 
imports, provide jobs, and create a multiplier effect by encour- 
aging further industrial growth. Paul Kruger, who had led the 
Transvaal in the late nineteenth century, had granted monop- 
oly concessions to industrialists; the 1920s governments of Jan 
C. Smuts and J.B.M. Hertzog had initiated state corporations, 
and the post-1948 National Party government had tried indus- 
trial decentralization (see Industrialization and Imperialism, 
1870-1910; Segregation, 1910-48; and Apartheid, 1948-76, ch. 
1). 

Even after decades of policy shifts designed to spur develop- 
ment and diversification, however, South Africa's export econ- 
omy in the 1980s still relied primarily on the gold-mining 
industry, and the government still protected import-substitu- 
tion industries in order to keep them in operation. Further- 
more, agriculture continued to be an uneven producer and 
therefore received substantial subsidies and other forms of gov- 
ernment assistance. In the late 1980s, the government pre- 
sented a blueprint for economic policy consistent with this 
history of economic struggle. Its central economic strategy 
advocated a shift toward strongly market-oriented policies, but 
left room for government intervention in response to social 
and political demands. The strategy increased the emphasis on 
local industrialization in order to cut imports and to create 
jobs. The only component of the central economic strategy 
that was really new was the effort to strengthen export indus- 
tries, especially to increase value added through local process- 
ing of raw materials for export. 

In 1994 the new Government of National Unity continued 
the economic policies of its predecessors, emphasizing a mar- 
ket orientation overall, but allowing government intervention 
when necessary, and maintaining import-substitution indus- 
tries while trying to spur industrial development toward 
exports. International markets increasingly opened to South 
Africa, and trade flourished, especially with the new industrial 
giants of Asia. Senior government officials tried to downplay 
the ANC's longstanding commitment to nationalization of key 
industries in order to gain much-needed foreign investment. It 
was nonetheless clear that the debate over privatization would 
continue at least through the rest of the decade. 



187 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Legal Restrictions 

Two legislative pillars of apartheid — the Natives Land Act 
(No. 27) of 1913 (and its amendment in 1936) and the Group 
Areas Act (No. 41) of 1950 — limited African economic and 
business activities in both rural and urban areas (see The Legis- 
lative Implementation of Apartheid, ch. 1). These acts were 
repealed in 1991, but few blacks could yet afford to move into 
formerly white areas without financial assistance. Numerous 
other laws and regulations had restricted black economic activ- 
ities and employment, especially the Mines and Works Act (No. 
12) of 1911, the Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15) of 
1911, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and its amend- 
ments in 1937 and 1956, the Mines and Works Amendment Act 
of 1926, the Factories, Machinery, and Building Works Act (No. 
22) of 1941, and the Bantu Labour Act (No. 67) of 1964. Public 
services and education opportunities were limited by the Bantu 
Education Act (No. 47) of 1953, the Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act (No. 49) of 1953, and the National Policy for 
General Affairs Act (No. 76) of 1984. 

In contrast to the government's control over domestic eco- 
nomic activity of South Africans, few legal restrictions were 
imposed on the economic activities of foreign nationals in 
South Africa, aside from stringent exchange controls on the 
repatriation of capital funds. Foreigners were welcome, even 
encouraged, to establish businesses in South Africa, and they 
could qualify for numerous government concessions and subsi- 
dies. During most of the apartheid era, those who wished to sell 
their South African assets, however, could do so only in finan- 
cial rands (a currency control device), rather than the more 
commonly used commercial rands (see Currency, this ch.). 

Financial rands could be sold only to a foreign buyer for cap- 
ital investment inside the country, and the financial rand 
traded at a discount (15 percent in late 1994) compared with 
the commercial rand. Exchange restrictions did not apply to 
current earnings, however, and investors could transfer those 
funds, subject to taxation. In March 1995, as the financial rand 
strengthened, and under strong pressure from the business 
community, the government abolished the financial rand. 

The new government in 1994 began to implement legisla- 
tion intended to compensate some of the roughly 3.5 million 
black citizens who had been dispossessed of their land under 
apartheid. The Restitution of Land Act (No. 22) of 1994 pro- 
vided for the creation of a Land Claims Court and a Commis- 



188 



The Economy 



sion on Restitution of Land Rights to arbitrate demands for 
restitution. Petitioners under the law were given three years to 
lodge their claims. White landowners who feared the loss of 
their land lobbied hard through the South African Agricultural 
Union, which represented 60,000 white farmers, and suc- 
ceeded in weakening provisions in the new law that would have 
given land rights to many sharecroppers and labor tenants. 
The white landowners also won the right to appeal land-claim 
decisions and to receive legal aid services under the new legis- 
lation. By mid-1996, only a small number of land claims had 
been adjudicated. 

Parastatals 

The government's strong role in shaping the economy was 
especially evident in the large number of parastatals, or state 
corporations, that it established beginning in the 1920s. Its pri- 
mary goal was to strengthen import-substitution industries, 
which had started to grow during World War I, by providing 
infrastructure improvements and basic materials. Among the 
first such enterprises were the Electricity Supply Commission 
(Eskom) and the South African Iron and Steel Corporation 
(Iscor), both founded in the 1920s, and the Industrial Develop- 
ment Corporation (IDC), established in 1940 to support other 
new industries. The IDC helped to establish many other state 
corporations, including the Phosphate Development Corpora- 
tion (Foskor); the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corpora- 
tion (SASOL); and the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation 
(Soekor). In addition, many state corporations also founded 
subsidiary companies in partnership with private firms, and 
many held controlling shares of stock in private firms. 

Private individuals were allowed to purchase shares in many 
state-owned corporations. The government generally 
appointed a majority of corporate directors, but senior man- 
agement made most personnel decisions independent of gov- 
ernment control. The government's primary avenue of control 
over state corporations was by granting or withholding loans of 
state money. The electricity parastatal, Eskom, was always 
allowed to raise money publicly, but most other state corpora- 
tions relied on government funds for capital financing. 

The anticipated private-sector participation in these para- 
statals did not materialize, however. Investors showed little 
interest in purchasing parastatals' stock. Iscor suffered the 
embarrassment of an almost total public refusal of its stocks 



189 



South Africa: A Country Study 

when they were offered for sale in 1929. In fact, most state cor- 
poration ventures were viewed as unprofitable and were 
funded by the government because of a lack of private interest. 
In 1979, however, after oil sales from Iran had been cut off, the 
synthetic fuel corporation, SASOL, offered shares to the pub- 
lic; investors eagerly bought all that were available and fully 
supported two more such issues. 

In February 1988, President P. W. Botha announced plans to 
privatize several state-controlled industries, including Eskom, 
Foskor, and Iscor, as well as state-operated transport, postal, 
and telecommunications services. The reasons given for the 
privatization effort were that it would reduce public criticism of 
the government role in these enterprises and that these para- 
statals themselves were no longer profitable for the govern- 
ment. State corporations had been the major recipients of 
large foreign loans that were called in and cut off in 1985, leav- 
ing them with serious capital shortages. Sale of the corpora- 
tions' assets could both ease the debt burden and provide the 
government with new revenue for much-needed social pro- 
grams for the poor. 

Iscor was the first major parastatal to be sold, in November 
1989. Its sale raised R3 billion for the treasury. The govern- 
ment then scaled down its plans, and in the early 1990s the 
future of privatization was unclear. Officials estimated that the 
roughly R250 billion needed to finance the purchase of the 
largest state corporations probably could not be found inside 
the country. The argument for privatization was also weakened 
by the worsening investment climate as political negotiations 
stalled and violence increased. Government opponents, espe- 
cially the ANC, vigorously opposed privatization — viewing it as 
a ploy to maintain white control in preparation for majority 
rule. 

In 1995 the Government of National Unity began to develop 
its own privatization program. Late that year, Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki announced that the government would seek 
equity partners in Telkom and in South African Airways and 
that it would sell several smaller parastatals outright. The 
announcement provoked strong protests from labor unions 
over the threat of job losses and over labor's exclusion from the 
policy decision-making process. 

Budgets 

The government enjoyed surplus budgets in most years dur- 



190 



The Economy 



ing the 1970s and the early 1980s, until chronic high inflation 
and gold price fluctuations combined to diminish the business 
tax base in the mid-1980s. The severe decline in real gold 
prices reduced tax revenues to less than 2 percent of total reve- 
nues in FY 1990-91, compared with 25 percent of total reve- 
nues in the boom year a decade earlier (see table 7, 
Appendix). 

The personal tax base had always been relatively narrow 
because of the limited income of the large black population 
(about 76 percent of the total population) and the relative 
affluence of most whites (about 13 percent of the population). 
Searching for additional revenue during the late 1980s, the 
government tried to avoid higher taxes on businesses and 
instead relied on deficit financing. For example, in FY 1987-88, 
the deficit was 5.8 percent of GDP as part of a deliberate fiscal 
stimulation of the economy. This pattern of spending contin- 
ued, and the budget deficit rose to 9 percent of GDP in 1993. 

The erratic price of gold during the 1980s led to other bud- 
get problems, fueling the cycle of reduced industrial revenue, 
currency devaluation, and high inflation. The government 
attempted to encourage business development through lenient 
tax policies, but average incomes continued to be low so this 
strategy failed to bring in the needed government revenues. 
The government tried to increase its revenues by "widening the 
net" of goods and services taxed in 1991, when it introduced a 
10 percent value-added tax (VAT) to replace the former 13 per- 
cent general sales tax. Then, in an effort to encourage capital 
spending, businesses were exempted from paying the VAT on 
capital inputs. And to encourage investment, other forms of 
tax, such as corporate taxes, taxes on gold mines and gold com- 
panies, and import surcharges on capital goods, were reduced. 
By 1995 the VAT had been increased to 14 percent. 

The FY 1994-95 budget projected revenues of R105.8 billion 
and expenditures of R135.1 billion, leaving a deficit of R29.3 
billion, or about 6.2 percent of projected GDP (see table 8, 
Appendix). To raise revenues, the government planned to sell 
domestic stocks, increase foreign borrowing, and increase 
excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco products — expected to 
bring in an estimated R525 million. The government also lev- 
ied a one-time, 5 percent "transition levy" on individuals and 
businesses with taxable incomes of more than R50,000, expect- 
ing to enhance its revenues by about R2.25 billion through this 
measure. 



191 



South Africa: A Country Study 

In March 1995, the ANC-led government's budget for FY 
1995-96 estimated total revenues at roughly R123 billion and 
expenditures at R153.3 billion, with a budget deficit of R29.7 
billion and a gross borrowing requirement (including interest 
on previous debt) of R38 billion. Government revenues were to 
be enhanced by higher taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline 
(and a higher, 43 percent maximum rate on individual 
incomes). The budget was well received overall, and the Johan- 
nesburg Stock Exchange generally held steady after it was pre- 
sented. 

The proposed government budget for FY 1996-97 projected 
revenues of roughly R145 billion and expenditures of R174 bil- 
lion, with a projected deficit equivalent to 5.1 percent of GDR 
Principal projected new revenues included taxes on monthly 
retirement income, while revenues from import tariffs would 
be reduced or eliminated. Proposed budget allocations 
included roughly R7.5 billion for salary increases and pay 
adjustments for government workers, intended to reduce the 
inequities of the apartheid era. The budget also envisioned 
expenditures of roughly R5.5 billion for education, RIO. 2 bil- 
lion for military spending, and R9.8 billion for the police. 

Foreign Trade and Investment 

South Africa's foreign trade and investment were affected by 
sanctions and boycotts, especially during the 1980s and early 
1990s. These measures included a voluntary arms embargo 
instituted by the United Nations (UN) in 1963, which was 
declared mandatory in 1977; the 1978 prohibition of loans 
from the United States Export-Import Bank; an oil embargo 
first instituted by OPEC in 1973 and strengthened in a similar 
move by Iran in 1979; a 1983 prohibition on IMF loans; a 1985 
cutoff of most foreign loans by private banks; the United States 
1986 Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, which limited trade 
and discouraged United States investors; and the 1986 Euro- 
pean Economic Community (EEC) ban on trade and invest- 
ment. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also 
discouraged trade with South Africa, although observers esti- 
mated that Africa's officially unreported trade with South 
Africa exceeded RIO billion per year in the late 1980s. 

The most effective sanctions measure was the withdrawal of 
short-term credits in 1985 by a group of international banks. 
Immediate loan repayments took a heavy toll on the economy 
(see External Debt, this ch.). More than 350 foreign corpora- 



192 



Durban, historic port and multicultural city 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

tions, at least 200 of which were United States owned, sold off 
their South African investments. In 1991 both the EEC and the 
United States lifted many official sanctions in view of measures 
taken by Pretoria to begin dismantling apartheid. Foreign 
investors were slow to return to South Africa, however; most 
banking institutions considered the country too unstable, and 
foreign corporations faced high labor costs and unrest if they 
tried to operate there. 

In 1994 and 1995, many of the United States companies that 
had sold off shares or operations in South Africa in the past 
decade returned to do business there. By early 1996, at least 
225 United States companies employed more than 45,000 
South African workers. 

Foreign Trade 

Throughout the twentieth century, South Africa's economy 



193 



South Africa: A Country Study 

has depended heavily on foreign trade — a trend that contin- 
ued even under pressure from international sanctions and 
recession. Gold dominated its exports to the point that the gov- 
ernment occasionally intervened to promote nongold exports. 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the price of gold directly 
affected the value of the rand and, therefore, the prices at 
which exports were sold overseas. As the gold price fluctuated, 
the exchange rate of the rand rose and fell, and export reve- 
nues responded accordingly. Under these uncertain condi- 
tions, few manufacturers were willing to risk large investments 
to increase their export capacity. 

One of the 1970s programs that promoted nongold mineral 
exports was the development of new harbor facilities, railway 
lines, and mines, which helped to increase revenues from the 
export of metal ores at the impressive rate of nearly 18 percent 
per year, on average, during the 1980s. Also during the 1980s, 
the Board of Trade and Industry implemented structural 
adjustment programs for various industries and a General 
Export Incentive Scheme, which reduced import tariffs on raw 
materials to be used to manufacture goods for export, in pro- 
portion to their value and local content. One effect of these 
programs was to reduce the importance of gold in South Afri- 
can exports from 56 percent of revenues in 1980 to 36 percent 
in 1992, according to government statistics. Gold exports 
increased slightly in 1993 and 1994, as a fraction of export reve- 
nues, but remained below 40 percent of the total. 

The government also took direct action to limit imports, in 
part to protect local industries. The government has the power 
to do so through tariffs, surcharges, and import licenses. 
Import tariffs provided some protection against dumping by 
foreign manufacturers. Import surcharges helped reduce 
import demand and raise government revenues. In August 
1988, the surcharge on some items was raised as high as 60 per- 
cent in a bid to hold down imports, but in May 1989 the sur- 
charge on capital goods was eased from 20 percent to 15 
percent, and most import tariffs were being phased out in the 
1990s. 

Government pressures in the 1970s and the 1980s succeeded 
in reducing South Africa's import levels but did not succeed in 
changing the pattern of imports. By 1987, when total imports 
were down about 30 percent from their peak 1974 volume, 
industrial inputs continued to dominate imports. Machinery 
was the most important among these, followed by vehicles and 



194 



The Economy 



transportation equipment, a variety of chemicals, and oil. After 
the OPEC boycott of 1973 and Iran's cutoff of oil to South 
Africa in 1979, however, official figures on oil trade were not 
available. Observers estimated that 1987 oil import costs 
reached US$1.75 billion. 

The pattern of trade dominated by gold exports and indus- 
trial imports continued in the early 1990s (see table 9; table 10, 
Appendix). The government continued to promote exports 
and to limit imports in an effort to create the trade surplus 
(and foreign exchange reserve surplus) necessary for debt 
repayment. In 1993 exports were valued- at roughly R79.5 bil- 
lion (almost 35 percent of GDP) according to official estimates, 
and imports were valued at approximately R59 billion. In 1994 
exports were valued at an estimated R89.1 billion, and imports, 
at R75.9 billion. In early 1995, imports began to outstrip 
exports, and South Africa's trade surplus declined at an uneven 
pace for the rest of the year. South African Reserve Bank esti- 
mates in early 1996 placed the value of exports in the previous 
year at R81 billion in merchandise and R20.2 billion in gold. 
Merchandise imports were about R98.5 billion, leading officials 
to predict that the trade balance could lapse into deficit. In 
early 1996, however, exporters took advantage of the sharp 
depreciation of the rand, and the trade surplus rose sharply. In 
dollar values, however, the trade balance remained almost flat 
as the benefits of the lower rand were offset by lower commod- 
ity prices 

Foreign trade delegations began arriving in South Africa as 
international sanctions were being lifted in the early 1990s. 
Among its most dramatic turnabouts, South Africa sent a dele- 
gation to Moscow in mid-1991 to discuss strengthening trade 
ties, and for the first time, South African companies partici- 
pated in a trade fair there. 

South Africa's main trading partners in the mid-1990s are 
West European countries, the United States, and Japan. Mem- 
bers of the European Union (EU — see Glossary) receive 
roughly 40 percent of South African exports and provide one- 
third of South Africa's imports. In 1994 Switzerland, an impor- 
tant destination of South African diamonds, purchased the 
largest share of South African exports. Other markets for 
South African goods are the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Japan, and Germany, in that order. Leading sources of 
South African imports are Germany, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy. 



195 



South Africa: A Country Study 



The EU accorded South Africa duty-free entry on most of its 
industrial exports in early 1995, and the two were negotiating 
terms for the purchase of South Africa's agricultural products. 
In 1996 the EU granted South Africa a qualified membership 
in the Lome Convention, to take effect in 1997. The Lome 
Convention gives African, Pacific, and Caribbean countries 
preferential access to European markets. 

South Africa's trade with the United States increased rapidly 
after 1994. In 1995 South Africa imported roughly US$2.75 bil- 
lion worth of United States exports, mostly manufactured 
goods. This represented more than half of all United States 
exports to Africa. South Africa exported roughly US$2.21 bil- 
lion worth of metals, alloys, and precious stones to the United 
States in that year, representing the only significant source of 
African products other than petroleum. 

South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa, the natural mar- 
ket for its manufactured goods and agricultural products, was 
carried on both openly and clandestinely until the early 1990s, 
because of the OAU's long-standing trade ban. As commercial 
ties expanded in the 1990s, African countries purchased about 
10 percent of South Africa's exports; Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
Mozambique were the largest African markets. Only Zimbabwe 
supplied significant exports (primarily tobacco) to South 
Africa. 

Official South African trade statistics include all members of 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SACU arose out 
of a customs agreement between South Africa and the territo- 
ries that became Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, dating 
back even before the Union of South Africa was formed in 
1910. SACU was formally established when the agreement was 
renegotiated in 1969, and Namibia joined the customs union 
when it became independent in 1990. Goods move freely 
among SACU member states, which share a common account- 
ing procedure and impose a common tariff structure. Each 
country contributes to a shared fund and receives a fixed por- 
tion of revenues based on its approximate share of production 
and consumption. In the mid-1990s, South Africa was consider- 
ing either dismantling SACU or restructuring its participation 
in the alliance. 

Investment 

During the 1960s, foreign investment in mining and manu- 
facturing grew steadily, reaching over 60 percent of total for- 



196 



The Economy 



eign investment by 1970. After that, foreign investment in 
South Africa stagnated and in some cases declined, increasing 
the government's reliance on loans rather than on equity capi- 
tal to finance development. In 1984 loans constituted over 70 
percent of South Africa's foreign liabilities, as compared with 
only 27 percent from direct investments. As a result, when most 
loans were cut off in 1985, available investment capital 
dropped sharply, and the economy suffered. In 1989 a substan- 
tial proportion of gross investment — R39 billion out of R49 bil- 
lion — represented depreciation. 

Although international opposition to South Africa eased in 
the early 1990s and bans on investment were lifted, investment 
as registered on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) con- 
tinued to decline and South African share prices on the JSE 
and on the London Stock Exchange were low. Industrial shares 
fared better than other sectors, but even the industrial index 
showed only sluggish growth through 1991. The overall JSE 
index improved slightly in 1992, and this trend continued after 
that. In 1993 the index rose by nearly 50 percent, although the 
volume of trade continued to be low by international stan- 
dards. By late 1995, foreign purchases on the JSE had risen to 
more than R4.5 billion. 

Foreign purchases were primarily in portfolio investment 
rather than direct investment through the mid-1990s. Most for- 
eign direct investment was in the form of joint ventures or buy- 
ing into existing enterprises. There was very little foreign direct 
investment in new enterprises, a trend that hit hardest in the 
struggling black business sector in South Africa. United States 
direct investment in South Africa rose during this time, from 
about US$871 million in 1992 to more than US$1.34 billion in 
1995. 

South Africans invested heavily in other African countries, 
even during the years of declining investments in South Africa. 
Tourist facilities were a favorite target for South African invest- 
ments during the sanctions era. South Africans invested in 
tourist parks in Madagascar, for example, and in hotel develop- 
ment in the Comoro Islands and in Mozambique in the early 
1990s. South African tourists, banned from many other tourist 
locales at the time, then shared in the benefits of these devel- 
opments. 

Balance of Payments 

Before the debt crisis of 1985, South Africa's current-account 



197 



South Africa: A Country Study 

position traditionally mirrored its business cycle, showing alter- 
nate surpluses and deficits. Whenever the economy grew faster 
than about 3 percent a year, local demand for imports 
increased, and when the economy slowed, imports decreased. 
In times of growth, when current-account deficits became too 
large, the government implemented restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies in order to slow demand. After the 1985 debt cri- 
sis, however, South Africa had no choice but to run continuous 
current-account surpluses to meet repayment commitments. 
By the early 1990s, South Africa had become a capital-export- 
ing nation because creditors wanted repayment on loans, and 
almost no new capital inflows other than replacement or roll- 
over trade credits were available. 

South Africa's current-account surplus, which had averaged 
about 3 percent of GDP in the late 1980s, increased sharply to 
exceed R6 billion in 1991, before declining slightly in 1993, 
according to the Central Statistical Service. In 1994 and 1995, 
import growth forced the current account into a deficit for the 
first time in more than a decade and officials estimated that the 
current-account deficit could reach RIO billion by 1997. 

South Africa's gold and foreign currency reserves were hit 
hard by the need to repay the nation's loans in 1985 and 1986. 
At that time, gold holdings were sufficient to cover only about 
ten weeks of imports, and by the end of 1988 the reserve posi- 
tion had deteriorated to little more than six weeks of import 
cover. Although the capital account started to improve in 1990, 
and total gold and other foreign reserves rose to US$2.39 bil- 
lion, this amount was still equivalent to the cost of only about 
six weeks of imports of goods and services. Net foreign cur- 
rency reserves were still very low in the mid-1990s, at about 
R15.7 billion (about two months of import cover) in late 1995, 
and RIO billion (only about one month's import cover) in mid- 
1996. 

Employment and Labor 
Labor Force 

Agricultural employment in the formal economy declined 
beginning in the 1970s, reflecting the trends toward mechani- 
zation in agriculture and increasing urbanization. During that 
time, the government also changed its definition of agricul- 
tural employment to exclude many farmers who owned small 
plots of land and produced primarily for subsistence or for 



198 



The Economy 



local markets. Impressive growth in the services sector — includ- 
ing trade, finance, insurance, restaurants, hotels, and other 
business and social services — accounted for most of the jobs 
created during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The services sec- 
tor also included the country's large domestic work force, esti- 
mated at more than 800,000 in the early 1990s. 

The distribution of labor continued to change in the 1990s, 
in response to global and regional market factors and political 
change in South Africa. For example, despite the importance 
of mining revenues throughout the twentieth century, the min- 
ing industry employed a dwindling share of the work force — 
only about 7 percent in 1995, down from nearly 10 percent a 
decade earlier. More than 200,000 mineworkers had been laid 
off between 1987 and 1993, according to the industrial 
umbrella organization, the South African Chamber of Mines 
(see table 11, Appendix). 

In 1994 and 1995, officials revised employment statistics to 
incorporate into national accounts employment in the former 
black homelands — which were home to almost one-half of the 
black South African population. With these revisions, the gov- 
ernment estimated the national work force in mid-1995 at 14.3 
million people. Unemployment statistics also were being 
revised to incorporate workers outside the formal economy. In 
1995 the government estimated unemployment at 32.6 per- 
cent. Unofficial estimates ranged to 40 percent or higher, and 
officials acknowledged that the rate was as high as 47 percent 
in some rural areas. 

Labor and Politics 

Even before apartheid restrictions were imposed during the 
1950s, government policies, rather than market principles, 
determined many aspects of labor-management relations. 
From the 1950s until the early 1990s, black workers suffered 
systematic discrimination. Apartheid legislation authorized the 
"reservation" of many skilled jobs and managerial positions for 
whites; qualified blacks were legally excluded from most senior- 
level jobs, but black education standards were so inferior to 
those for whites that few blacks were qualified for well-paid 
jobs. Even in equivalent job categories, blacks received lower 
wages than whites. Although white workers were divided in 
their racial attitudes throughout the apartheid era, they often 
opposed benefits for black workers that could threaten their 
own economic standing. 



199 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Throughout South Africa's industrial history, workers of all 
races organized to demand better wages and working condi- 
tions, but through the early 1980s, almost all union leaders 
were white. This was true in part because some employers 
refused to negotiate with black representatives and because of 
legal restrictions on black labor organizations. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924, which governed many aspects of 
labor relations, redefined the term, employee, to exclude most 
blacks; the definition was amended by the Native Labour (Set- 
tlement of Disputes) Act (No. 48) of 1953 to exclude all blacks, 
thereby depriving them of any labor law protection. 

A century of South African industrial development had 
relied on an abundance of low-wage labor in order to ensure 
profits. But as the economic and social problems associated 
with implementing apartheid emerged, and as new technolo- 
gies were developed during the 1960s and the 1970s, many 
industries chose to increase their capital stock — investing in 
sophisticated machinery and employing a few skilled techni- 
cians — rather than adopt labor-intensive methods that would 
require training and managing a large work force. This trend 
toward capital-intensive operations probably resulted in lower 
labor costs and increased productivity. At the same time, it con- 
tributed to the country's soaring unemployment and spreading 
poverty, which fueled resentment and raised the costs to the 
government of preserving apartheid. 

Increasing poverty among blacks, along with entrenched 
workplace discrimination and the marginalization of blacks 
from national politics, caused black workers' organizations to 
become increasingly politicized in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
They provided a legal arena in which political grievances could 
be aired. By the early 1970s, there were twenty-four African 
workers' organizations with a combined membership of nearly 
60,000. Their increasing militance and a series of strikes that 
began in Durban in 1973 finally persuaded the government to 
begin reassessing its restrictions on black labor. 

The government-appointed Commission of Inquiry into 
Labour Legislation (Wiehahn Commission) recommended the 
legal recognition of these fledgling unions, in part to exercise 
stronger control over black workers. As a result, Parliament 
enacted the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979, 
recognizing black unions and extending labor law protection 
to them for the first time. 



200 




Adult labor often includes child- 
care responsibilities: street 
vendor's child plays beneath 
urban kiosk. 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 



A weaver's child accompanies 
her to work. 
Courtesy Sheila Ross 



Under this legislation, many black workers had the legal 
right to bargain collectively with their employers in the 1980s, 
and, when legally required mediation procedures failed, they 
had the right to strike. They exercised these rights aggressively, 
using both legal and illegal labor actions to press their work- 
place demands and to protest against apartheid. Black union 
membership of about 500,000 in 1980 grew to more than 2.5 
million in 1990. By the early 1990s, almost 70 percent of all 
union members in South Africa were black, and more than 
one-third of all employees in mining, industry, and commerce 
were union members. 

The largest organizing effort among black workers resulted 
in the establishment of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) in 1985. An umbrella organization of more 
than a dozen unions, COSATU had a total of 1.3 million mem- 



201 



South Africa: A Country Study 

bers by 1990. COSATU affiliated with the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party 
(SACP), both of which were banned. In addition to winning 
major financial concessions for its members, COSATU became 
the effective mobilizing arm of the ANC and the SACP. 
COSATU's two largest labor rivals were the National Council of 
Trade Unions (Nactu), a blacks-only confederation that 
rejected multiracial membership, and the United Workers' 
Union of South Africa (UWUSA), which was affiliated with the 
Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). 

Union militancy contributed to labor successes. Real wages 
for black manufacturing workers rose an average of 29 percent 
between 1985 and 1990. Overall wage increases, outside agri- 
culture, rose by 11 percent during 1985 alone, and this annual 
rate of increase accelerated to 17 percent in 1990. 

By the early 1990s, however, both labor and government 
leaders were alarmed over the violence that had erupted dur- 
ing some labor actions. Violence had been part of labor's his- 
tory of confrontation; some employers used force to suppress 
labor militancy, and strikers often used violence against non- 
striking workers. But the scale of labor violence increased 
sharply, and the often-repressive police response also contrib- 
uted to the destruction. In one of South Africa's most violent 
strikes — at a gold mine near Welkom, in the Orange Free 
State — more than eighty miners died in clashes between strik- 
ers and nonstrikers in 1991. Like many other violent strikes, 
this clash initially concerned economic issues, but it escalated 
because of political, ethnic, and racial grievances. 

In the early 1990s, COSATU's largest and most militant 
unions were the National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa (NUMSA) and the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM), each with more than 300,000 members. NUMSA's 
actions cost automobile manufacturers and related industries 
more workdays than any other union in 1993 and 1994. 
NUMSA threatened even more costly labor actions in the 
future if auto workers' wage increases did not accelerate. 

Three other large unions led the labor movement in the 
number of strikes called during the early 1990s. These were the 
National Education, Health, and Allied Workers' Union; the 
Transport and General Workers' Union; and the Food and 
Allied Workers' Union. Even workers in small companies were 
becoming more militant; during the early 1990s, more than 40 
percent of all strikes involved 200 or fewer employees. 



202 



The Economy 



In 1994, with 194 legally recognized labor unions in the 
country, the government extended labor law protection to 
domestic workers for the first time. Initially, this meant recog- 
nizing their 70,000-member domestic workers' organization as 
a union and granting its members rights such as sick leave and 
on-the-job lunch breaks for the first time. Several COSATU- 
affiliated unions launched membership drives among domestic 
workers in 1995 and 1996, and they promised to work for the 
introduction of a legal minimum wage and access to literacy 
classes and other forms of vocational training for the large 
domestic work force. 

Business and labor leaders agreed that confrontations with 
labor contributed to rising business costs during the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. The number of workdays lost to work stop- 
pages rose from 175,000 in 1980 to 5.8 million in 1987. Lost 
workdays per year declined in the late 1980s, but labor actions 
still extracted high costs from business by slowing operations, 
by intimidating investors, and by destroying property. Among 
the most costly actions were those by transport workers, whose 
services were vital to all sectors of the economy. South Africa's 
ability to compete globally was also affected by labor militancy, 
in part because, officials estimated, a worker's cost to employ- 
ers in 1994 — including wages and benefits — averaged US$5 an 
hour in South Africa, or double the average labor costs in 
Mexico or Brazil and more than five times the average labor 
cost in China. 

Education and Employment 

The Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 helped pave the 
way for labor strife in the 1980s and the 1990s by institutionaliz- 
ing a plan to restrict black workers to low-paid jobs through 
deliberately inferior education (see Education, ch. 2). During 
the 1960s and 1970s, per capita spending on white pupils was 
about ten times greater than educational spending on black 
pupils. By the early 1990s, the gap had been reduced by half, 
but in general, standards for teacher qualifications and facili- 
ties in black schools continued to be inferior to those in white 
schools. 

The economic costs of implementing and enforcing apart- 
heid sky-rocketed in the 1980s. Black poverty deprived South 
African businesses and manufacturers of a sizable domestic 
market. Even more ominous for the future, it became clear 
that South Africa lacked the necessary skilled personnel to 



203 



South Africa: A Country Study 

maintain growth in its manufacturing enterprises, and millions 
of South African workers were unqualified for anything but the 
lowest-paid jobs. 

South Africa's Education Foundation, a respected private 
research organization, estimated in 1991 that unemployment 
among unskilled and uneducated workers would increase dur- 
ing the 1990s, and that at least 500,000 skilled jobs and mana- 
gerial positions were likely to remain unfilled, unless foreign 
workers were hired to fill them. The government's National 
Manpower Commission confirmed these bleak estimates in 
1992, adding to the political pressure to end apartheid, espe- 
cially in education. 

The interlinked challenges of economic recovery and educa- 
tional reorganization presented the new government with an 
intractable dilemma in 1994. Educational reform would 
require significant increased spending in an expanding econ- 
omy, but, at the same time, economic growth would require a 
more highly skilled work force and educational reforms. The 
government approach to these challenges was deliberate and 
careful, and attempted with foreign donor assistance to con- 
vince those who were uneducated and unemployed that some 
of the benefits of ending apartheid would be seen during their 
lifetime. Officials sought international assistance in providing 
on-the-job training for workers in many industries and in 
speeding the pace of reforms, but by late 1995, only a few new 
programs were being implemented. 

Women constituted only about 36 percent of the labor force 
in the formal economy in the mid-1990s, according to official 
estimates. Women of all races generally held lower-paid jobs 
than men, and they were paid less in comparable jobs. During 
the apartheid era, white women most often worked in service 
industries and clerical positions; a few white women held 
supervisory jobs or government offices. Black women domi- 
nated the large domestic work force; some worked in clerical 
positions or in temporary jobs, often in agriculture. Women 
managed most agricultural production in the former home- 
lands and rural areas where men frequently left home to work 
in cities or in the mines. 

Foreign workers have been an important segment of the 
industrial work force. In 1994 the government estimated that 
between 1 million and 1.2 million workers from Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland were legally 
employed in South Africa — most on temporary contracts in the 



204 



The Economy 



mines or urban industries. In addition, as many as 2 million 
foreign workers were believed to be self-employed or working 
illegally in South Africa in 1995, according to minister of home 
affairs Gatsha Buthelezi. Foreign workers were sometimes sub- 
ject to immediate layoffs or discriminatory treatment at the 
hands of management or fellow employees, and in 1996, they 
faced the threat of new restrictions on their being hired. 

Extractive Industries 

South Africa's modern history has often been dated from 
the first commercial mining of diamonds and gold in the 1870s 
and the 1880s, when the region became a magnet for Euro- 
pean investment. Mining in the region predated European 
arrivals by several centuries, however, as the new government 
recalled in its minerals policy statements in 1994 and 1995. 
Iron mining and smelting sites in the northeast were used as 
much as 1,700 years ago; copper was mined south of the Lim- 
popo River more than 1,000 years ago; and historians describe 
early mining activities in the Witwatersrand (literally, "Ridge of 
White Waters" in Afrikaans, commonly shortened to Rand) 
area, which attracted miners from elsewhere in Africa as early 
as the thirteenth century. 

Soon after the European rush for gold and diamonds in the 
late nineteenth century, mining operations expanded to 
include more than two dozen other minerals. By the mid-twen- 
tieth century, South Africa was the world's largest producer or 
second largest producer of gold, diamonds, platinum, chro- 
mium, manganese, and vanadium; and it ranked high among 
producers of coal, iron ore, uranium, copper, silver, fluorspar, 
asbestos, and limestone (see table 12, Appendix). 

Clusters of minerals occur in five major mineral com- 
plexes — the Bushveld, Transvaal, Witwatersrand, Northern 
Cape, and Western Cape complexes (see fig. 15). Whereas 
most mines were originally funded and managed from Euro- 
pean centers, by the 1970s most were managed by South 
Africa's large diversified corporations, which controlled assets 
around the world. 

Despite its importance in export revenues, the mining indus- 
try contributes only about 9.6 percent of GDP in the mid- 
1990s, down from an average of nearly 15 percent during the 
1980s. The mining sector had been gradually surpassed by 
manufacturing and financial services both in terms of national 
output and labor force participation. The mines still account 



205 



South Africa: A Country Study 




206 



The Economy 



for a greater share of export revenues than any other single 
economic activity in the 1990s. 

The mineowners' association, the South African Chamber of 
Mines, was formed in 1889 to represent the industry in deal- 
ings with the government. In the 1990s, the Chamber of Mines 
includes six major mining finance houses, with thirty-six gold 
mines, twenty-two coal mines, and sixteen diamond, platinum, 
antimony, asbestos, manganese, lead, and copper mines. 
Together they account for 85 percent of South Africa's mineral 
output. The Chamber of Mines negotiates labor concerns on 
behalf of mineowners, administers training programs for mine- 
workers, trains mineworkers in rescue and safety procedures, 
oversees pension and benefit funds, coordinates research pro- 
grams, and refines and processes some minerals before sale. 

Gold 

Gold, first mined by Europeans in 1886 near Johannesburg, 
soon became the most important sector in the mining industry. 
South Africa has almost one-half of the world's known gold 
reserves, located primarily in the Rand in what was once a pre- 
historic lake. Gold is also mined in the Free State. Industry ana- 
lysts estimated in the early 1990s that South Africa had 
produced more than 43,000 tons of gold in the past century, 
and that at least that amount remained in reserves. 

Gold occurs in seams embedded in rock strata, sometimes 
more than a mile below the surface. Deep shafts must be sunk, 
large amounts of rock must be blasted and brought to the sur- 
face, and the rock must be crushed and chemically separated 
from the gold. Some gold mines then pump processed mine 
tailings underground to serve as backfill. Mining and process- 
ing are costly, especially in deposits where the gold seam is 
extremely thin compared with the surrounding rock. For 
example, in the early 1990s industry analysts estimated that 
only 5.6 grams of gold were extracted from each ton of ore 
excavated. Nevertheless, the industry has consistently earned 
high profits and has accounted for one-third to one-half of the 
world's gold production in the 1980s and 1990s. The country's 
fifty-seven operating gold mines produce between 600 and 620 
tons of gold per year, representing almost 30 percent of the 
world production. Gold production in 1994 and 1995 fell 
below 600 tons for the first time since the 1960s. 

Gold mining companies traditionally kept expenses to a 
minimum by paying low wages. Gold mines became known for 



207 



South Africa: A Country Study 

their often exploitative labor policies, including the use of 
migrant workers on limited contracts, strict worker control in 
company compounds, and difficult working conditions. Labor 
costs were especially important in determining profits, because 
the price of gold was set at US$35 per ounce through the 
1960s. After the price of gold was allowed to float in 1968, it 
gradually rose in response to market demand, and companies 
could afford to produce less and still earn even greater profits. 
They then began to expand operations into so-called low- 
grade-ore mines. The volume of South African gold produc- 
tion fell, and gold prices skyrocketed to an all-time high of 
US$613 per ounce in 1980. 

During the 1980s, the dollar price of gold fluctuated widely, 
but because of devaluations of the rand, the rand price of gold 
generally advanced. When gold prices fell in 1989, the industry 
found that many of the low-grade-ore mines were no longer 
profitable. As the average value of the rand increased against 
the dollar, overall industry profits declined, and nearly half of 
the gold mines in operation were running at a loss. At least 
40,000 gold mine workers were laid off in 1990, according to 
government estimates, and layoffs continued through 1993. 

During 1994 all major gold mining houses except Johannes- 
burg Consolidated Investments (JCI) were reporting lower 
profits as output fell in response to labor unrest and other fac- 
tors. Randgold closed its Durban gold mine in mid-1994, owing 
primarily to poor grades of available ore, and other mines were 
threatening to close within the next few years unless profits 
improved. 

In 1994 JCI began to "unbundle" its corporate structure by 
dividing into three separate companies. Anglo American, JO's 
largest shareholder (with 48 percent), retained its platinum 
and some diamond interests in one company, Anglo American 
Platinum. JCI's gold mining and other industrial interests were 
separated into two companies, JCI Limited and Johnnies Indus- 
trial Corporation. Shares for these companies are being 
offered to the public, primarily as a vehicle for black invest- 
ment and broadening participation in this sector of the econ- 
omy. 

Diamonds and Platinum 

South Africa's diamond mining industry dates back to 1867, 
when diamonds were discovered near Kimberley, now in the 
Northern Cape. The Kimberley diamond fields, and later dis- 



208 



The Economy 



coveries in Gauteng, the Free State, and along the Atlantic 
coast, emerged as major sources of gem-quality diamonds, 
securing South Africa's position as the world's leading pro- 
ducer in the mid-twentieth century. (Rough diamonds were 
produced in larger quantities in Australia, Zaire, Botswana, and 
Russia.) Through 1991 most of South Africa's diamonds were 
mined at only five locations, but a sixth mine, Venetia — in the 
Northern Cape — opened in 1992 and was expected to become 
a major diamond producer later in the decade. 

The De Beers Consolidated Mines Company controlled most 
diamond mining in South Africa and influenced international 
trade through a diamond-producers' alliance, or cartel — the 
Central Selling Organisation. The cartel enabled diamond pro- 
ducers to control the number of gems put on the market and 
thereby to maintain high prices for gem-quality diamonds. The 
cartel was able to react to marketing efforts outside its control 
by temporarily flooding the market, and thereby driving down 
the price paid for an outsider's product. 

Diamond prices fluctuated in the early 1980s, but the indus- 
try continued to expand even in the face of international reces- 
sion and the discovery of the diamond-like cubic zirconia. 
Dollar prices for diamonds improved in 1985 but dropped 
again in 1987, requiring De Beers to support the market by 
withholding diamonds from dealers. Thus, annual production 
of more than 10 million carats in 1985 and in 1986 dropped to 
9.1 million in the late 1980s. Gem and industrial diamond out- 
put in 1994 was 10.8 million carats, or roughly 11 percent of 
world production. 

In 1990 the Soviet Union signed and openly acknowledged a 
contract to sell its diamonds (estimated at a value of about R13 
billion over a five-year period) exclusively through De Beers. 
The action marked the first time in nearly thirty years that the 
Soviet Union had openly associated itself in commodity deal- 
ings with South Africa. Later that year, De Beers announced a 
loan of R2.63 million to the Soviet Union, against the security 
of an equivalent amount in diamonds. 

Platinum group metals (platinum, palladium, ruthenium, 
rhodium, iridium, and osmium), which occur together in ore 
seams and are mined in one operation, were discovered in 
South Africa in 1924. Most of the estimated 59,000 tons of 
reserves are in the Bushveld complex of minerals; some con- 
centrations are also found in the Transvaal and the Witwa- 
tersrand complexes. Platinum is used in automobile catalytic 



209 



South Africa: A Country Study 

converters to reduce fuel emissions, as a catalyst in industrial 
processes, and in making jewelry. 

South Africa is the world's leading producer of platinum. Its 
output of about ninety tons in 1993 accounted for almost 49 
percent of world production. South Africa's platinum mines 
have profited, in particular, from the sale of rhodium, which 
sold for almost US$6,000 an ounce in the early 1990s, but 
world market prices fell after that. 

Ferrous and Nonferrous Metals 

South Africa has the world's largest known deposits of chro- 
mium, manganese, and vanadium, as well as significant depos- 
its of iron ore, antimony, copper, nickel, lead, titanium, 
fluorspar, zinc, and zirconium. Most of these metals are 
exported unprocessed, with the exception of iron ore, which is 
also used in the local steel industry. 

South Africa's chromium deposits contain about 72 percent 
of the world's reserves, most of it in the Bushveld complex of 
minerals. In 1993 its mines produced 2.8 million tons of chro- 
mium, or about 32 percent of world output — down from 4 mil- 
lion tons in 1989; production recovered, to roughly 3.6 million 
tons in 1994. Used primarily to produce stainless steel, chro- 
mium was one of South Africa's export successes in the 1980s; 
prices reached US$0. 70 per pound but dropped sharply when 
producers tried to undercut each other in 1990. The govern- 
ment used various incentives, including export subsidies and 
power rebates to those who produced alloys for export, to 
encourage production. About one-third of chromium pro- 
duced in 1993 was exported, much of it to the United States 
and Japan. 

South Africa contains the largest known deposits of manga- 
nese ore in the world. Its reserves of at least 12.5 billion tons, 
mostly in the Northern Cape mineral complex, constitute 75 
percent of the world total. Manganese is essential in the manu- 
facture of iron and steel, and more than 90 percent of South 
Africa's manganese is used for this purpose. During the late 
1980s, production fluctuated slightly, but it remained between 
3 and 4 million tons per year, while prices generally rose, nearly 
doubling in 1989. By the end of 1991, however, South African 
producers were forced to reduce prices in response to a weak 
international market. In 1994 more than 2.8 million tons of 
manganese ore were produced, roughly 17 percent of world 
output. 



210 



The Economy 



South Africa produced between 25,000 tons and 30,000 tons 
of vanadium a year in the early 1990s, almost 45 percent of the 
world's supply. Its estimated 5.4 million tons constitute one- 
third of world reserves. The world's largest producer is a South 
African firm, Highveld Steel and Vanadium. The year 1989 set 
a record in terms of both production and exports for South 
Africa, but when world steel production declined, demand for 
vanadium dropped and prices plummeted, forcing one vana- 
dium producer in South Africa to close down. Prices again 
surged in early 1995, and Highveld Steel and Vanadium 
expected earnings to more than double in 1995, compared 
with 1994. Vanadium is used in manufacturing steel, to provide 
tensile and torsional strength and resistance to abrasion. 

South Africa is the largest producer of iron ore on the conti- 
nent, with reserves estimated at more than 9.4 billion tons. 
Iron is mined in the Northern Cape, the Bushveld, and the 
Transvaal complexes, and in KwaZulu-Natal. More than 29.3 
million tons of iron ore, roughly 3 percent of world output, 
were produced in 1993. Almost half of that amount was used in 
the steel industry. A record 19.6 million tons were exported in 
1994, much of it to Japan. 

Although small by world standards, South Africa's steel man- 
ufacturing industry is the largest on the continent (see Heavy 
Industry, this ch.). Steel production increased dramatically in 
the 1970s following the development of port facilities at 
Saldanha Bay and the associated rail line connecting it to the 
high-grade Sishen ore deposits in the Northern Cape. Projec- 
tions for the use of steel in local construction were increasing 
as the government began to implement its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme in 1994. Government plans to imple- 
ment stricter automobile emission standards promised another 
boost to the steel manufacturers, who produce stainless steel 
for use in catalytic converters. 

South Africa has only about 2 percent of the world's known 
copper reserves, with the largest deposits in the Transvaal com- 
plex in the northeast. Copper is also mined in the Northern 
Cape and the Western Cape. Mining costs are high, because of 
the high concentration of other minerals in copper ore. At the 
country's largest copper mine, at Phalaborwa, production 
decreased in early 1993, in part because of flooding that 
brought work in the mine to a standstill. Later that year, the 
mine owners received government permission to institute a 
seven-day workweek, and the mine increased its work force to 



211 



South Africa: A Country Study 



extend operations. Nationwide copper production, nonethe- 
less, fell from more than 176,000 tons in 1992 to about 165,000 
tons in 1994, and copper exports decreased steadily, to roughly 
82,000 tons in 1994. 

Energy Minerals and Petroleum 

Fortunately for South Africa, it is well endowed with coal and 
uranium for energy production, because the country appar- 
ently has no significant petroleum reserves and was officially 
cut off from oil imports from 1979 to 1993. Oil accounted for 
about 20 percent of primary energy until the early 1970s, and 
the government had stockpiled an estimated 18 million tons of 
imported oil by 1979. Although unreported oil shipments con- 
tinued during the sanctions era, many industries switched to 
the use of coal to power generators. 

Imported crude oil is processed at four refineries — two in 
Durban, one near Cape Town, and one in Sasolburg, southwest 
of Johannesburg — with a combined distillation capacity of 
about 401,000 barrels per day, or 21.5 million tons per year. In 
1994 the government invited international investment in oil 
and gas exploration for the first time since the 1960s. Minister 
of Mines and Energy Roelof "Pik" Botha announced the plan, 
saying that the government needed domestic energy sources 
for reconstruction and development. The state-owned South- 
ern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor) also needed the 
investment capital to develop nine recently discovered small 
oilfields off the western Cape coast, and several other small 
wells near Mossel Bay. 

South Africa's coal reserves, most located in the Witwa- 
tersrand and in northern KwaZulu-Natal, were estimated to be 
between 60 billion and 100 billion tons, enough to maintain 
ear ly-1 990s levels of domestic use and exports through much of 
the twenty-first century, according to industry analysts. The 
coal occurs in seams, often less than one hundred meters 
below the surface, and hence it is relatively easy and inexpen- 
sive to mine. Most coal used locally is burned in generators at 
electricity plants; it is also used for coking in the steel industry. 

During the 1980s, Eskom, the government's electric power 
utility, was the coal industry's major customer. Eskom pur- 
chased about two-thirds of coal output, which fluctuated 
between 159 million and 176 million tons from 1984 to 1989. 
In the early 1990s, the coal industry produced more than 180 
million tons of coal each year, of which at least 47 million tons 



212 



SASOL II oil-from-coal facility south of Johannesburg 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

were exported. The industry employed more than 76,000 peo- 
ple. Eskom helped to finance coal mining operations and guar- 
anteed coal prices to ensure the mining companies' return on 
investment. 

International sanctions in the 1980s affected the coal indus- 
try in two ways. United States and European importers reduced 
their demand for South African coal exports, and South Afri- 
can homes and industries increased their use of coal in place of 
oil and other imported fuels. But in 1991 and 1992, as most 
sanctions were being lifted, the South African coal industry 
found itself facing stiff competition from emerging low-cost 
producers, such as Indonesia, Colombia, and Venezuela. 

South Africa is ranked fifth in world uranium reserves in the 
1990s with recoverable reserves estimated at nearly 180,000 
tons. Uranium is produced as a by-product of gold in some 
mines of the Witwatersrand, and as a by-product of copper in 



213 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the Phalaborwa mines of the far northeast of the country. 
Since 1968 all uranium produced in South Africa has been pro- 
cessed and marketed by the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of 
South Africa, a private company owned by the gold mines that 
produce uranium. Output declined in the late 1980s, as operat- 
ing costs increased and uranium prices hit a thirteen-year low. 
Uranium output averaged nearly 2,000 tons a year in the early 
1990s. Exports of uranium declined from roughly 1.3 percent 
of total export revenues in the 1980s to roughly 0.2 percent in 
the early 1990s. 

South Africa produced substantial, but undisclosed, 
amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in its nuclear 
weapons program, until that program was dismantled in the 
early 1990s. In 1994 the government, although a signatory to 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) , maintained stock- 
piles of HEU to produce industrial and medical isotopes, or to 
downgrade for use in power reactors. 

The government has sponsored extensive research and 
development in the production of synthetic fuels, and South 
Africa became a pioneer in extracting oil and gas from coal in 
the 1960s and the 1970s. The South African Coal, Oil, and Gas 
Corporation (SASOL) established three facilities between 1950 
and 1982 and is considering building a fourth plant in the late 
1990s. After 1979, when SASOL shares were offered to the pub- 
lic, most of the corporation was run as a private company, with 
government assistance in constructing new facilities. Officials 
did not release production figures to the public, but the 
SASOL plants were believed to be supplying about 40 percent 
of South Africa's liquid fuel needs in the early 1990s. The cor- 
poration received tariff protection when the price of oil 
dropped below US$23 per barrel and paid into a fuel equaliza- 
tion fund when prices exceeded US$28. 70 per barrel. In addi- 
tion to liquid fuels, the company produces chemicals, 
fertilizers, and explosives. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 

South Africa has a broad and well-developed agricultural sec- 
tor and is a net food exporter in most years. Agricultural pro- 
duction, reflecting the sector's increased mechanization and 
commercialization, increased throughout the twentieth cen- 
tury. As mining and manufacturing industries expanded at a 
faster rate, however, agriculture's share of GDP declined from 
about 20 percent in the 1930s to about 12 percent in the 1960s 



214 



The Economy 



and to less than 7 percent in the 1990s. The impressive range 
of crops — including almost every kind of food crop, as well as 
fibers, medicinal herbs, and components of cosmetic fra- 
grances — reflects the country's diverse terrain, climate, and 
ecology. The agriculture sector provides for most domestic 
needs, and South Africa exports corn (maize), wool, sugar, pea- 
nuts (groundnuts), tobacco, and other farm products (see 
table 13, Appendix). 

About 15 million hectares, or 12 percent of the land area, is 
under cultivation, and about 10 percent of this is under inten- 
sive irrigation. Agricultural production has suffered from cycli- 
cal droughts since the seventeenth century, and probably even 
earlier. Generally, the best rainfall is in the Western Cape and 
along the coast of KwaZulu-Natal. The rest of the country is rel- 
atively dry, and much of the arid Northern Cape is suitable 
only for grazing sheep (see fig. 16). 

Under apartheid-era legislation until 1994, white farmers, 
who owned only 2 percent of the farms, controlled more than 
80 percent of the arable land. White-owned farms averaged 
1,300 hectares in size, whereas black farms averaged 5.2 hec- 
tares. Because nearly 80 percent of the population was 
restricted to less than 20 percent of the land, most black farm- 
land was severely overused, leading to soil erosion and low pro- 
ductivity. As a result, many black farm families were supported 
by at least one person engaged in nonagricultural employ- 
ment. The need for agrarian reform — broadening land owner- 
ship and increasing overall productivity — was one of the most 
serious issues facing the government in the mid-1990s as the 
inequities of apartheid were being reduced. 

The government regulated both the production and the 
marketing phases of commercial agriculture through the early 
1990s. Government-appointed marketing boards purchased 
important consumer crops — such as milk, corn, and most cere- 
als — at fixed prices and sometimes subsidized consumer prices 
as well. Crops destined for further commercial processing — 
such as tobacco, wool, oilseeds, and dried fruit for export — also 
had to be sold through a marketing board, although producers 
generally received market value for these crops after the board 
sold the pooled national output. The only crops freely traded 
were fruits and vegetables sold at local markets. The govern- 
ment began to reduce the role of the marketing boards in the 
mid-1990s, and officials hoped to eliminate them entirely by 
the end of the decade. 



215 



South Africa: A Country Study 




Figure 16. Major Agricultural Activity, 1996 



Agriculture suffered serious effects from the chronic high 
inflation and debt that eroded other sectors of the economy in 
the early 1990s. Input costs (fertilizers, machinery, etc.) rose by 
10 to 20 percent in some years; farm debt had reached R17 bil- 
lion in 1992, more than four times the amount owed in 1980. 
Farmers also had witnessed deterioration in the terms of trade 
in farm products; for example, the amount of corn that had to 
be sold to buy a farm tractor increased from about 191 tons in 
1984 to 347 tons in 1990. Moreover, South Africa faced 
reduced harvests as a result of severe drought in the early 
1990s, forcing the government to spend vital foreign exchange 
on food imports. 



216 



The Economy 



Crops 

Cereals and grains are South Africa's most important crops, 
occupying more than 60 percent of hectarage under cultiva- 
tion in the 1990s. Corn, the country's most important crop, is a 
dietary staple, a source of livestock feed, and an export crop. 
Government programs, including generous loans and exten- 
sion services, have been crucial to the country's self-sufficiency 
in this enterprise. Corn is grown commercially on large farms, 
and on more than 12,000 small farms, primarily in North-West, 
Mpumalanga (formerly, Eastern Transvaal), Free State (for- 
merly, the Orange Free State), and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. 
Corn production generates at least 150,000 jobs in years with 
good rainfall and uses almost one-half of the inputs of the mod- 
ern agricultural sector. 

Corn production exceeds 10 million tons in good years; 
owing to regional drought in the early 1990s, however, produc- 
tion fell to just over 3 million tons in 1992, and roughly 5 mil- 
lion tons of corn were imported, at a cost of at least US$700 
million. Both domestic and imported corn was shipped to 
neighboring countries to help ease the regional impacts of the 
drought. The drought eased in 1993, and officials estimated 
the 1994 harvest at approximately 12 million tons. Below-aver- 
age rainfall in late 1994 again threatened to reduce corn out- 
put in 1995, and officials expected to import some 600,000 
tons of corn in that year. Plentiful rain in late 1995 provided for 
a bumper crop in 1996. 

Wheat production, which is concentrated in large, highly 
mechanized farms, also increased after World War II. Wheat 
cultivation spread from the western Cape where rainfall is fairly 
reliable, to the Orange Free State and the eastern Transvaal, 
primarily in response to rising consumer demand. But wheat 
harvest volumes vary widely; for example, roughly 2.1 million 
tons were produced in 1991 and only 1.3 million tons in 1992. 
Production in the early 1990s failed to meet local demand for 
about 2.2 million tons per year. Wheat imports in 1992, for 
example, cost more than US$5 million. 

Other small grains are grown in localized areas of South 
Africa. For example, sorghum — which is native to southern 
Africa — is grown in parts of the Free State, as well as in the 
North-West and the Northern provinces, with yields often 
exceeding 200,000 tons. Sorghum has been used since prehis- 
toric times for food and brewing purposes. Barley is also grown, 



217 



South Africa: A Country Study 

primarily in the Western Cape. Nearly 300,000 tons of barley 
were produced in 1995. 

South Africa produces peanuts, sunflower seeds, beans, and 
soybeans. Annual production of these crops varies significantly 
from year to year, although South Africa is usually able to meet 
domestic vegetable-oil needs and generate some exports. Plen- 
tiful rains in late 1995 meant increased harvests of these crops 
in 1996, compared to 1994 and 1995. 

Fruits, including grapes for wine, earn as much as 40 percent 
of agricultural export earnings in some years. (Fresh fruit finds 
a good market in Europe because it matures during the north- 
ern hemisphere's winter.) Deciduous fruits, including apples, 
pears, and peaches, are grown primarily in areas of the Western 
Cape and the Eastern Cape, where cold winters and dry sum- 
mers provide ideal conditions for these crops. Almost 1 million 
tons of deciduous fruits were sold fresh locally or were 
exported each year in the early 1990s. 

Pineapples are grown, primarily in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. Tropical fruits — especially bananas, avocados, 
and mangoes — are also grown, especially in the northeast and 
some coastal areas. More than half of citrus production is 
exported in most years. South Africa exported 40 million car- 
tons of citrus fruit in 1994, earning roughly R1.34 billion, 
according to industry sources. 

More than 1.5 million tons of grapes are used domestically 
in South Africa's renowned wine industry, which dates back to 
the seventeenth-century vineyards introduced by French 
Huguenot immigrants. More than 100,000 hectares of land are 
planted in vineyards, centered primarily in the Western Cape. 
Smaller vineyards are also found in the Northern Cape, Free 
State, and Northern Province. One of the noticeable signs of 
the end of international sanctions against South Africa was a 
dramatic increase in worldwide demand for South African 
wines in 1994 and 1995. 

Sugarcane is also an important export crop, and South 
Africa is the world's tenth largest sugar producer. Sugarcane 
was first cultivated in mid-nineteenth-century Natal. Produc- 
tion is still centered there, but sugar is also grown in Mpuma- 
langa, where irrigation is used when rainfall is inadequate. 
Land under sugar cultivation has steadily increased, and the 
industry estimated that it produced more than 16 million tons 
of sugarcane in 1994. 



218 



The Economy 



Livestock 

From the earliest times, livestock raising has been the back- 
bone of South African agriculture. The large sheep herds of 
the Khoikhoi peoples on the Cape peninsula were admired 
and later appropriated by European settlers in the seventeenth 
century. The early Xhosa and Zulu societies were well known 
for the value they placed on cattle even before Europeans 
began cattle farming in the region in the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth centuries. The Europeans brought new breeds of 
sheep and cattle to southern Africa, and from these various 
stocks emerged a thriving commercial livestock sector. Cattle, 
estimated at more than 8 million head, are found in areas 
throughout the country; sheep (nearly 26 million) graze pri- 
marily in pastures stretching across the Northern Cape, East- 
ern Cape, western Free State, and Mpumalanga. 

The livestock sector produces an estimated 900,000 tons of 
red meat each year. For example, the industry reported that 
nearly 2 million head of cattle were slaughtered in 1994. Poul- 
try and pig farms are also found across the country, although 
most large commercial farms are near metropolitan areas. The 
industry estimates that farmers own roughly 1.2 million pigs. 
The poultry industry, with at least 11 million chickens, report- 
edly produced more than 500,000 tons of meat in 1994. In 
addition, a small but growing ostrich-raising industry produces 
plumes, skins, and meat. 

Wool is an important agricultural export. South Africa 
became the world's fourth-largest exporter of wool by the late 
1940s, and is consistently among the world's top ten wool pro- 
ducers, with an output of about 100,000 tons in most years. 
Approximately 60 percent of South African sheep are Merino, 
which produce high yields of fine wool. The newer, locally 
developed Afrino breed is a wool-mutton breed adapted to arid 
conditions. Most wool is exported, but the domestic wool-pro- 
cessing industry includes wool washing, combing, spinning, 
and weaving. 

Dairy farming is found throughout the country, especially in 
the eastern half, and is sufficient to meet domestic needs, bar- 
ring periods of extreme drought. The predominant dairy 
breeds are Holstein, Friesian, and Jersey cows. The milk price 
was deregulated in 1983, resulting in lower prices, but industry 
regulations continued to enforce strict health precautions. In a 
system dating to 1930, all wholesale milk buyers pay a compul- 
sory levy to the National Milk Board. This money is pooled in a 



219 



South Africa: A Country Study 

stabilization fund and used to subsidize dairies manufacturing 
butter, skim milk powder, and cheese when a surplus exists. 
Fresh-milk dairies objected in the early 1990s, however, and sev- 
eral of them were involved in litigation to have the levy lifted. 

Forestry 

South Africa's forests cover only about 1 percent of the coun- 
try's total land area. The country never was heavily forested, 
and by the early twentieth century, humans had destroyed 
much of its natural wood resources. After World War I, the gov- 
ernment began to establish forest plantations to grow trees for 
commercial use. Located primarily in the northeast and in 
KwaZulu-Natal, most timber plantations produce pine and 
eucalyptus trees. Although most wood is used for fuel, indus- 
trial uses include construction and mine props, paper prod- 
ucts, and a variety of agricultural applications. 

The country's pulp and paper industries expanded opera- 
tions for export during the 1980s. About half of all commercial 
South African sawlogs came from state-owned plantations for 
use in the pulp and paper industries and in the mines. The two 
major paper manufacturers, Mondi (owned by Anglo Ameri- 
can) and Sappi (owned by Gencor), spent approximately R3 
billion to expand their operations during the 1980s, and in 
1991 Sappi expanded even further by purchasing five specialty 
paper mills in Britain. Sappi was then ranked as the eleventh 
largest company in South Africa. 

South Africa's forests produce more than 14.5 million cubic 
meters of unseasoned timber annually. Several hundred thou- 
sand people are employed on timber farms and in more than 
240 wood-processing factories. Although South Africa could 
supply most of its own needs for wood and wood products, the 
timber industry faced problems on the export market in the 
early 1990s. The industry had relied on exports of pulp and 
paper, but falling world prices threatened profitability. In the 
mid-1990s, the government's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme calls for more than 1 million housing starts during 
the decade, and the timber industry is promoting the use of 
timber-frame houses to increase its domestic market share 
under this program. 

Fishing 

South Africa has a large commercial fishing industry. More 
than 4,500 commercial fishing vessels licensed by the Depart- 



220 



Tea plantation workers near Tzaneen, Northern Province 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

ment of Environment Affairs work its nearly 3,000-kilometer 
coastline from Mozambique to Namibia. The industry employs 
more than 22,000 people. The principal species of shoal fish 
caught by coastal trawlers are anchovy, pilchard, and herring. 
Deep-sea trawlers bring in hake, barracuda, mackerel, 
monkfish, sole, and squid. The most important species caught 
by handline are tuna, cod, barracuda, silverfish, salmon, and 
yellowtail. Cape rock lobsters are harvested along the west 
coast, and several hundred other species, along the east and 
the south coastline. The total catch in the early 1990s was 
between 500,000 and 700,000 tons each year. 

South Africa exports about 80 percent of its fish in most 
years. Much of the rest is consumed domestically or processed 
into fish meal and fish oil. The industry hit a peak in the 1960s, 
with a catch of more than 1 million tons in 1968, but declined 
after that, in part because local waters had been overfished and 



221 



South Africa: A Country Study 

marine resources were severely depleted. Recorded fish har- 
vests also declined in the early 1990s after South Africa relin- 
quished control over its former fishing territory off the coast of 
Namibia. 

The government enforces strict conservation measures, 
including fishing quotas and closed seasons, to prevent over- 
fishing and to protect the fishing industry. Since 1977 it has 
enforced an exclusive South African fisheries zone of 200 nau- 
tical miles. In 1983 the government reduced foreign fishing 
quotas, and in the early 1990s it began scaling down the rights 
of five foreign countries still fishing in South African waters — 
Japan, Israel, Spain, Portugal, and the Republic of China (Tai- 
wan). 

Much of the fishing near large ports, such as Cape Town, 
Durban, Mossel Bay, and Port Elizabeth, is controlled by Port- 
net, the national port authority, in the mid-1990s. The provin- 
cial governments supervise some harbor facilities and provide 
marine conservation inspectors at official fishing harbors, 
including Saldanha Bay, Hout Bay, and at least ten others. 

Manufacturing 

Although agriculture and, later, mining historically have 
dominated South Africa's economy, manufacturing became the 
most productive sector in the early twentieth century. Until 
then, manufacturing industries — wine making, tanning, and 
tallow production — were entirely derived from agriculture and 
were intended primarily for the domestic market. Then as the 
mining sector expanded, new industries arose to meet growing 
urban demands for processed foods, clothing, and footwear. 
Until the 1920s, the country still depended heavily on imports, 
ranging from mining equipment to textiles and clothing. The 
government encouraged local manufacturing through the 
establishment of state corporations to produce electricity (in 
1922) and steel (in 1928) for manufacturers' use and through 
tariffs designed to protect local industry. 

From 1936 to 1946, manufacturing output grew by 6 percent 
per year, and growth jumped even more dramatically after 
1948, when the government tightened its control over imports. 
Annual manufacturing output increased an average of 13.3 
percent in the early 1950s. Since then, most growth in manu- 
facturing has been in heavy industry, led by the local iron and 
steel industry, but by the early 1990s, the manufacturing sector 
as a whole was relatively diverse (see table 14, Appendix). 



222 



The Economy 



As manufacturing activity expanded, the sector became 
increasingly capital intensive despite the availability of a large 
labor pool in South Africa. The government encouraged capi- 
talization through tax incentives and led such investment 
through the state corporations. During the 1970s, manufactur- 
ing enterprises steadily increased their fixed-capital stock, lead- 
ing to surplus capacity by the mid-1980s. In particular, massive 
extensions at the government's power utility, Eskom, as well as 
the establishment of SASOL synthetic fuel plants and the Koe- 
berg nuclear power station, represented significant capital 
intensification but only a minimum labor requirement. Fur- 
thermore, most private manufacturers moved toward machin- 
ery and technology to cut labor costs, both to keep up with 
foreign producers and to avoid confronting an increasingly 
militant, organized labor force. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s 
the government recognized that much of the responsibility for 
creating jobs for new entrants to the labor market would neces- 
sarily rest on the manufacturing industries, and for this reason, 
government programs in the 1990s were beginning to encour- 
age more labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises. 

Because of the general economic downturn of the 1980s, 
chronic high inflation, and the debt crisis — which hit capital- 
intensive manufacturing especially hard — manufacturing out- 
put slumped during the decade from an overall annual 
increase of 3 percent in 1981 to a decline of 2.5 percent in 
1991. The biggest decreases were in textiles, footwear, indus- 
trial chemicals, and nonferrous base-metal industries. The 
poor performance in these industries reflected a weakness in 
local demand and the drawing down of inventories because of 
higher interest rates. Furthermore, average labor productivity 
in nonagricultural sectors was only about 2 percent higher in 
1990 than in 1980, despite a major increase in capital per 
worker during the decade. Manufacturing sales increased after 
1990, largely the result of improved business and investor con- 
fidence, increased domestic and export sales, and a decline in 
stocks of finished goods. In the early 1990s, manufacturing 
contributed more than 22 percent of total economic output. 

Manufacturing industries are heavily concentrated in urban 
areas — especially in the industrial region around Johannes- 
burg, which accounted for more than 50 percent of industrial 
output in the early and mid-1990s. Other major industrial cen- 
ters are Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban. 
Smaller, but nonetheless important, industrial concentrations 



223 



South Africa: A Country Study 

are at Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Queenstown, and Mossel Bay. 
Government incentives for manufacturers to move to rural 
areas and the black homelands during the 1980s were generally 
unsuccessful, in part because of logistical and transportation 
difficulties. The government then tried regional development 
projects, intended to bring manufacturing jobs to undeveloped 
areas by providing performance-based incentives and improv- 
ing infrastructure, although these projects were difficult and 
costly to initiate. 

Manufacturing industries registered sharp increases in 
capacity utilization in 1994 and 1995, exceeding 90 percent of 
capacity in the coal and nonferrous metal industries, as well as 
in furniture and footwear manufacturing. Investors judged 
South Africa's manufacturing competitiveness in the interna- 
tional arena to be fairly weak, however, largely because of the 
outdated facilities and physical plant in many industries. 

Electric Power 

The country's first electric power plants were developed to 
support the turn-of-the-century mining industry. Most mines 
used on-site electrical generators until 1909, when the Victoria 
Falls Power Company was established. In 1923 the electricity 
parastatal, Eskom, began providing electricity for the country's 
railroads and nonmining industries. Eskom bought out the Vic- 
toria Falls Power Company in 1948 and has been the country's 
major power producer since then. Eskom's sales increased 
faster than GDP growth after World War II, and the utility 
expanded steadily. From 1950 to 1982, sales grew at an average 
rate of 8 percent per year. 

Despite Eskom's strong sales record, officials became 
increasingly concerned over the government's capital invest- 
ments in Eskom's expansion efforts, which were estimated at 
R27 billion between 1983 and 1987. Eskom was one of the 
enterprises hit hardest by the cutoff in foreign loans in 1985. 
After that, it scaled down plans for further expansion. Eskom 
supplied more than 97 percent of the electricity used nation- 
wide in the early 1990s, but a few mines and industries had 
power generators of their own. Only about 40 percent of the 
population had electricity in their homes, but the new govern- 
ment in 1994 placed a high priority on supplying power to 
rural areas. 

Eskom derives nearly 90 percent of its power from coal-fired 
electric power stations, 8 percent from nuclear power plants, 



224 



The Economy 



and the remainder from hydroelectric plants. Some energy 
analysts predict that the country's coal reserves (estimated to 
be between 60 billion and 100 billion tons) will begin to run 
out by the middle of the twenty-first century. Eskom officials 
estimate that the last coal-fired station will be commissioned 
before the year 2045. With about 14 percent of the world's ura- 
nium reserves in South Africa, Eskom then plans to switch to 
the use of nuclear power to produce electricity. 

The Koeberg nuclear power station, commissioned in 1976 
but subsequently damaged through sabotage, began opera- 
tions using uranium as an energy source in 1984. In the mid- 
1990s, it is the only nuclear power plant in operation, but sites 
have been selected for at least two additional plants to be built 
early in the twenty-first century. 

South Africa imported electricity from the Cahora Bassa 
hydroelectric facility in Mozambique during the early 1980s, 
but that source was cut off in 1983 as a result of sabotage by 
Mozambican rebels. South Africa, Mozambique, and Portugal 
agreed on reconstruction plans, begun in 1995, that were 
expected to reestablish power to South Africa by 1997. 

Heavy Industry 

Iron and steel production dominates South Africa's heavy 
industry, providing material for manufacturing structural 
goods, transport equipment, and machinery, and for the engi- 
neering industry. Large-scale production of iron and steel was 
begun in 1934 by the state-owned South African Iron and Steel 
Corporation (Iscor). Iscor began selling shares to the public in 
1989. It operate plants at Pretoria, Vanderbijlpark (Gauteng), 
and Newcastle (KwaZulu-Natal) and owns numerous coal, iron 
ore, and other mines throughout the country. Most major com- 
panies in this sector, including Union Steel (Usco), African 
Metals (Amcor), and Vanderbijl Engineering (Vecor), were 
established with help from Iscor or are operated as subsidiaries 
of Iscor. Highveld Steel and Vanadium is owned by the Anglo 
American Corporation. 

South Africa produced about 9 million tons of steel, on aver- 
age, each year in the early 1990s, only about 1 percent of world 
production. This output was more than enough to meet 
domestic demand and to provide some steel for export. The 
industry plans to increase production in the late 1990s to meet 
domestic construction needs and to increase steel exports. 



225 



South Africa: A Country Study 

The first vehicle assembly plant was established by Ford in 
Port Elizabeth, and in 1960 the government began to promote 
the increased use of local parts in vehicle assembly. Phase One 
through Phase Five of the local-content encouragement pro- 
gram were based on the weight rather than the value of local 
components and tended to make South African vehicles rela- 
tively heavy and expensive. In 1989 the government introduced 
Phase Six, which shifted the determination of content to value 
rather than weight. The result was a reduction in the cost of 
vehicles as manufacturers turned to low-cost imported parts in 
order to increase the percentage of value represented by local 
products. The lowered cost of assembly was evidenced in June 
1991 when the South African Motor Corporation (Samcor) 
announced that it had started exporting locally assembled Maz- 
das to Britain. 

Vehicles are manufactured primarily in the industrial area 
around Johannesburg, in Mpumalanga, and in the Eastern and 
Western Cape provinces, using parts manufactured locally at 
more than 150 plants and some imported parts. In 1994 South 
African automakers assembled more than 225,000 passenger 
cars and more than 97,000 commercial vehicles, employing 
more than 91,000 workers. At that time, almost 6 million vehi- 
cles, including more than 3.5 million passenger cars, were 
licensed to operate in South Africa. 

South Africa also has a significant heavy-engineering indus- 
try that meets many of the country's industrial and construc- 
tion requirements. Many of the firms connected to Iscor 
produce structural steel, for use in construction, as well as 
machinery and mining equipment. Most advanced machinery, 
such as Eskom's generators or SASOL's plant, was still being 
imported in the 1990s. Nevertheless, when the production of 
all categories of heavy industry is combined — including steel 
and metal products, machinery, and vehicles — this subsector 
accounts for about one-fourth of manufacturing output by 
value. 

Chemicals Industry 

South Africa has a well-developed chemicals industry that 
dates back to the use of explosives in the late nineteenth-cen- 
tury mining industry. Miners imported dynamite from France 
and Germany until 1896, when the De Beers company suc- 
ceeded in establishing a dynamite factory at Modderfontein in 
partnership with a British chemical manufacturer. In addition 



226 



Robots on Nissan assembly line, 
Rosslyn (Pretoria) 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 



to explosives, the African Explosives and Chemical Industries 
(AECI) plant produced a wide variety of industrial chemicals 
including insecticides, paints, varnishes, nitrogen compounds, 
sulfuric acid, and cyanide. 

The government controls a significant segment of the chem- 
ical industry. Its largest investment is the SASOL operation, in 
which synthetic oil and gas are extracted from coal through a 
gasification process that also produces ammonia, pitch, alco- 
hol, and paraffin. The government established the Phosphate 
Development Corporation (Foskor) in 1950 to produce phos- 
phate concentrates for use in chemical fertilizers, and Foskor 
also produces zirconium and copper. Government involvement 
in the industry increased in 1967, when the IDC created a hold- 
ing company to merge several small chemical companies in an 
effort to achieve greater economies of scale. 

Many other chemicals are produced in South Africa, includ- 
ing plastics, resins, dyes, solvents, acids, alkalis, hydrogen per- 
oxide, iodine, nitrates, and chemical materials for atomic 
reactors. Pharmaceutical products are also produced, primarily 
by subsidiaries of large international firms. 

Consumer Goods 

The single most productive subsector in manufacturing is 



227 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the food-processing industry, which produces canned fruits 
and vegetables, dried fruit, dairy products, baked goods, sugar, 
and meat and fish products. Dairy products and baked goods 
are sold exclusively on the local market, but dried fruit, canned 
foods, sugar, meat, and fish products are exported. In the early 
1990s, South Africa produced about 400,000 tons of canned 
fruits and vegetables each year. 

Clothing manufacturing and textile weaving are important 
consumer industries. The clothing industry predated local tex- 
tile manufacturing; even at the end of the nineteenth century, 
clothing manufacturers relied on imported textiles to produce 
a variety of apparel. By the 1990s, the clothing industry not 
only met the country's needs but also exported its goods, aided 
in part by the government's elimination of import duties on 
cloth. It maintained a 30 to 35 percent import duty on most 
apparel through the early 1990s. Then, because clothing man- 
ufacturers increasingly relied on imported cloth, the domestic 
textile industry suffered from the increased competition, and 
as all import tariffs were being lifted in 1995 and 1996, both 
clothing and textile manufacturers were laying off workers. 

The bread industry was subsidized by the government for 
decades in order to avoid high prices for basic foodstuffs; the 
government eliminated the bread subsidy in 1991 in an effort 
to encourage competition. A few large institutions then domi- 
nated the bread industry; six of them, representing about 85 
percent of the local market, reached a marketing agreement, 
allocating sales by producer quotas and by regional distributor. 
The government in the mid-1990s decided to allow the compa- 
nies to continue market-sharing but was debating whether to 
discourage such agreements in the future. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

South Africa has a well-developed transportation system, the 
product of more than a century of government investment. 
The Ministry of Transport, formerly part of the Ministry of 
Transport, Posts, and Telecommunications, handles national 
transportation policy. The South African Railways and Har- 
bours Administration, established in 1910, managed the opera- 
tions of most of the nation's transportation network; in 1985 it 
became the South African Transport Services (SATS). In 1990 
SATS reorganized as the public commercial company, Trans- 
net. 



228 



The Economy 



Transnet has six business divisions — Spoornet to operate the 
railroads; Portnet to manage the country's extensive port sys- 
tem; Autonet, a comprehensive road transport service; South 
African Airways (SAA); Petronet to manage petroleum pipe- 
lines; and a parcel delivery service, known as "PX." With assets 
of nearly R35 billion, Transnet is one of the country's largest 
business enterprises, employing roughly 120,000 people in 
1995. The government is the sole shareholder in Transnet but 
is considering the privatization of some sectors of transporta- 
tion management by the end of the decade. 

Railroads 

When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, rail- 
road authorities had to unify and to coordinate the operations 
of the four separate provincial railroad systems. Rail transport 
was already a critical element in economic development 
because it linked mining, agricultural, and urban areas and 
moved unprocessed raw materials (primarily minerals) to the 
coast for transport between South African ports and for export. 
The major axis of railroad transportation at the beginning of 
the twentieth century — linking Cape Town, Durban, and 
present-day Maputo in Mozambique, and running inland to 
the mining centers of Kimberley and Johannesburg — still 
forms the major axis of railroad transportation almost a cen- 
tury later (see fig. 17). 

The national rail authority, Spoornet, manages a network of 
21,303 kilometers of 1.067-meter, narrow-gauge (regional stan- 
dard) rail lines throughout the country. An additional 314 kilo- 
meters of track are .610-meter gauge. In addition to hauling 
freight (roughly 164 million tons in 1993-94), intercity passen- 
ger trains carry more than 600 million passengers per year. 

Rail transportation relied on steam power or steam-gener- 
ated electricity as a result of the country's easy access to coal 
and its lack of petroleum resources. Some of the rail lines were 
electrified as early as 1926. In the 1970s, the railroads began 
phasing out the use of steam locomotives in favor of electricity 
in order to increase the carrying capacity and the speed of 
trains, especially those used to haul heavy mineral ores and 
coal for export. By the early 1990s, more than half of the rail 
network was electrified, and most rail traffic — both passenger 
and freight — was carried by electric locomotives. 

Suburban commuter trains are important to many industrial 
and urban workers who live in the formerly segregated town- 



229 



South Africa: A Country Study 




Figure 17. Transportation: Major Railroads and Ports, 1996 

ships or rural areas, but the commuter lines are the least cost- 
effective rail service. The South African Rail Commuter Corpo- 
ration (SARCC), relying on government subsidies of more than 
R600 million a year, manages these trains. Many trains are in 
poor condition, in part the result of the serious urban violence 
of the early 1990s, which often centered on the commuter rail 
lines as symbols of apartheid. The SARCC began refurbishing 
and modernizing rail coaches in 1994, at a cost of some 
US$180,000 per vehicle. Several private railroads also operate 
suburban commuter train service in several large cities. 

Fast freight trains operate on eighteen routes nationwide, 
sometimes approaching speeds of 120 kilometers per hour, 
although the more common speed of rail travel is about sixty 
kilometers per hour. Railroad officials claimed a world record 
in 1989 when a 71,600-ton train ran at speeds of up to eighty 



230 



The Economy 



kilometers per hour on the 861-kilometer Sishen-Saldanha ore 
line. Spoornet implemented a computerized operating infor- 
mation system in the early 1990s to manage high levels of rail 
traffic. In 1994 this system reported on more than 3,000 trains 
daily, often involving as many as 5,500 locomotives and 100,000 
rail cars. 

South Africa's luxury line, the Blue Train, travels the 1,600- 
kilometer route between Pretoria and Cape Town and is an 
important tourist attraction. Other well-known trains are the 
Trans-Oranj, which runs 2,088 kilometers between Durban and 
Cape Town; the Trans-Natal, which runs 721 kilometers 
between Johannesburg and Durban; the Diamond Express, 
which runs 563 kilometers between Pretoria and Kimberley; 
and the Limpopo, which runs 1,376 kilometers between Johan- 
nesburg and Harare, Zimbabwe. The Blue Train and the Trans- 
Karoo (between Johannesburg and Cape Town) have facilities 
for carrying passenger cars. 

South Africa's railroads are also vital to the economies of sev- 
eral neighboring countries, especially landlocked Lesotho and 
Botswana, and Mozambique, where existing railroads have 
been sabotaged and destroyed through warfare. In 1990 the 
general managers from eight national railroads (South Africa, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimba- 
bwe, and Zaire) formed a joint operations working group to 
integrate rail service in the region. In 1994 they began to coor- 
dinate timetables for scheduled freight service in order to 
speed transit of export commodities and perishables between 
countries. They also streamlined customs inspections and 
allowed trains to leave border stations with only partial loads of 
freight. As a result, during 1995, freight carried from Johannes- 
burg to southern Zaire sometimes arrived in seven days, down 
from as much as forty days for the same journey in the past. 

Ports and Shipping 

South Africa has no commercially navigable rivers, but 
ocean shipping has long been a feature of its transportation 
network, capitalizing on the country's two-ocean frontage. The 
earliest nineteenth-century shipping firms began as coastal car- 
riers for local commerce, traveling between southern African 
ports. After World War II, private investors initiated an interna- 
tional shipping service, and in 1946 the state corporation, 
South African Marine Corporation (Safmarine), assumed con- 
trol over the private company. Safmarine operates container 



231 



South Africa: A Country Study 

ships, general cargo vessels, and bulk carriers for mineral 
exports, and, since the 1980s, has offered expanded service to 
Europe, North America, South America, and Asia (South 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). In 1992 it purchased the new- 
est of its five container ships, Oranje, from Croatia at a cost of 
R100 million. 

South Africa has six major commercial ports: Durban, Rich- 
ards Bay, Cape Town, Saldanha Bay, Port Elizabeth, and East 
London. Portnet manages their facilities, including cargo- 
handling equipment, wharves, and container terminals, and 
provides services such as tugs, berthing, and cargo handling. 
Portnet also sets the standards for such services offered by pri- 
vate businesses. (In addition, Portnet manages forty-six light- 
houses — eighteen operated by keepers and twenty-eight that 
are automatic.) Relying on containerization and automation to 
speed up service, Portnet handled more than 127 million tons 
of cargo on more than 12,900 seagoing vessels in 1994. 

Each major port has traditionally played an important, spe- 
cialized role in South Africa's export sector. For example, Dur- 
ban handles general cargo, especially cereal exports; Cape 
Town specializes in exports of deciduous fruit, wine, and vege- 
tables; and Saldanha Bay was built specifically to export min- 
eral ores from the Northern Cape. 

Durban's port encompasses 893 hectares of bay area. The 
port entrance channel is 12.7 meters deep at low tide. Durban 
has five deep-sea and two coastal container berths, and pro- 
vides 15,195 meters of quayage for commercial ships. Durban 
also has repair facilities, including a floating dry dock. 
Through the 1980s, Durban was South Africa's busiest general 
cargo port, handling as much as 25 percent of the country's 
imports and exports in some years, but it was being surpassed 
by Richards Bay in the 1990s. 

Richards Bay, a deep-water port 193 kilometers northeast of 
Durban, was commissioned in 1976 primarily to export coal 
from the eastern Transvaal, but by the early 1990s it was hand- 
ling almost one-half of all cargo passing through South African 
ports. Port facilities can accommodate bulk carriers of up to 
250,000 tons, with five berths for general and bulk cargo, and a 
coal berth. 

Cape Town has one of the largest dry docks in the southern 
hemisphere, including five berths for container vessels and 
general cargo carriers, a pier for coastal traffic, and extensive 



232 



The Economy 



ship repair facilities. The port at Cape Town has a water area of 
112.7 hectares. 

Port Elizabeth's enclosed water area of about 115 hectares 
has more than 3,400 meters of quayage for commercial ship- 
ping and a container terminal that has two berths. Vessels with 
a draught of up to twelve meters can use the harbor, and off- 
shore anchorage is available for vessels of any draught. Facili- 
ties at Port Elizabeth include a mechanical ore-handling plant, 
which can process up to 1,500 tons per hour, and a precooling 
storage area with a capacity of 7,500 cubic meters. 

Saldanha Bay, 110 kilometers northwest of Cape Town, is the 
largest port on the west coast of Africa and one of the best nat- 
ural ports in the world. The facilities at Saldanha Bay provide 
anchorage in the lee of a breakwater where the minimum 
water depth is 14.6 meters. With a port area of about 5,000 hec- 
tares, Saldanha Bay is larger than the combined areas of the 
ports of Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London. 
The ore-loading jetty can handle carriers of 350,000 tons. 

South Africa's only river port, East London, is situated at the 
estuary of the Buffalo River in Eastern Cape province. 
Although East London is the smallest of the six major ports, it 
has a 75,000-ton capacity grain elevator — the largest in South 
Africa. East London handles agricultural exports and is the 
main outlet for copper exports from other African countries, 
such as Zambia and Zaire. 

Two other coastal cities — Simonstown, south of Cape Town, 
and Mossel Bay, between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth — have 
substantial port facilities. Mossel Bay is a commercial fishing 
harbor between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and Simon- 
stown is a naval base and training center (see Navy, ch. 5) . 

Road System and Transport 

South Africa has an extensive national, provincial, and 
municipal road system covering the entire country (see fig. 
18). As of 1996, the national routes include nearly 2,500 kilo- 
meters of limited-access freeways and 3,600 kilometers of high- 
ways with unlimited access. Roughly 60,000 kilometers of all- 
weather, paved roads and more than 100,000 kilometers of 
unpaved roads are maintained by the national and provincial 
governments. 

More than 6 million vehicles are in operation nationwide, 
including about 3.5 million passenger vehicles, in 1996. Buses 
and private van services are also used by many workers who 



233 



South Africa: A Country Study 

commute from townships and rural areas to urban workplaces. 
Several private bus companies run commuter lines, and munic- 
ipal bus services operate within several cities. 

South Africa has one of the highest road fatality rates in the 
world — more than 10,000 people, almost one-half of them 
pedestrians and bicyclists, were killed in more than 400,000 
road accidents in 1992. The number of deaths was reduced 
slightly, to about 9,400, in 1993. The government has taken 
numerous measures to reduce accidents — for example, by 
implementing seat-belt laws and lowering speed limits. Never- 
theless, in the mid-1990s, the government estimates that barely 
half of all automobile passengers wear seat belts, and traffic 
accidents continue to take a heavy toll. 

Civil Aviation 

The Chief Directorate of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Trans- 
port, is responsible for providing air traffic services at about 
twenty airports throughout the country and for issuing licenses 
to airline pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. This director- 
ate also certifies the airworthiness of all registered craft, and 
approves maintenance schedules and flight manuals. In early 
1996, more than 6,100 registered civil aviation aircraft operate 
in South Africa. 

The Chief Directorate of Civil Aviation operates nine major 
airports. They are located at Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Dur- 
ban, East London, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, 
George, and Upington. In the mid-1990s, the government 
changed the names of these and several other large airports 
from the Afrikaner heroes they had commemorated in the 
past, to the cities in which they are located. The airports at 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban are international air- 
ports and receive direct overseas flights. In addition, at least 
300 landing strips throughout the country are used by private 
and commercial pilots. 

South African Airways (SAA), the country's only national air 
carrier until the early 1990s, was established in 1934 by the 
South African Railways and Harbours Administration. After 
1990 SAA was operated by the public company, Transnet. SAA 
has provided international service between Johannesburg and 
London since 1945 and has used jet passenger aircraft since 
1953. In the mid-1990s, SAA operates a fleet of forty-eight air- 
craft, primarily Boeing 747s, Boeing 737s, and Airbus 300s, pro- 



234 



The Economy 



viding air service among all major cities in South Africa, with at 
least 687 domestic flights a week. 

SAA was denied landing rights in most European and Afri- 
can countries and the United States in the 1980s and the early 
1990s. A few African and Middle Eastern countries, such as 
Sudan, Congo, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Morocco, also denied 
SAA overflight rights, forcing SAA pilots to fly longer routes to 
avoid prohibited air space. The airline nonetheless continued 
to operate flights to several European and African capitals 
throughout the sanctions era; then, as sanctions eased in the 
early 1990s, SAA reestablished and expanded its international 
flight routes to the rest of Africa, the United States, Europe, 
South America, the Middle East, and Asia. 

After the government began deregulating airlines in 1990 — 
legalizing competition with SAA on domestic and international 
routes — several new private airlines were established in South 
Africa, and the number of foreign air carriers flying to South 
Africa increased to more than fifty. Transnet assumed control 
of at least one former homeland airline and established Alli- 
ance Airlines as a joint venture between SAA and the national 
carriers of Tanzania and Uganda. In addition, at least fifteen 
independent feeder airlines operate more than 200 routes link- 
ing smaller towns to cities served by international air carriers. 

Pipelines 

Although South Africa has no significant petroleum 
reserves, it uses a nationwide network of pipelines to transport 
imported crude oil to refineries and to transport other petro- 
leum products to industrial areas. At least 931 kilometers of 
crude-oil pipelines, 322 kilometers of natural gas pipelines, 
and 1,748 kilometers of pipelines for other petroleum products 
make up this network in the mid-1990s. 

Telecommunications and Postal Service 

Until 1990 the Department of Posts and Telecommunica- 
tions regulated all nationwide communications networks. In 
1991, in anticipation of possible privatization, the government 
formed two state-owned companies, the telecommunications 
corporation, Telkom, and the South African Post Office to 
deliver the mail. Telkom is the largest telecommunications sys- 
tem in Africa. It earned at least US$2.3 billion in 1993, provid- 
ing telegraph, telex, telephone, radio, television, and data and 
facsimile transmissions. Telkom also holds a majority stake in 



235 



South Africa: A Country Study 




Mkntic 
Ocean 



Cape Town 
CAPE Of GOOD HOPE 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Indian Ocean 



International boundary 
National capital 
• Populated place 
■ National freeway 

Major highway 

4" Airport 

100 200 Kilometers 



Figure 18. Transportation: Major Highways and Airports, 1996 

one of the nation's two cellular phone networks that began 
operation in 1995. 

The telephone system, which links all major cities and many 
small towns, encompasses roughly 5 million telephones in the 
mid-1990s, roughly 9.7 per 100 inhabitants. They are con- 
nected through more than 1,200 automatic exchanges. The 
telephone system includes a network of coaxial and fiber optic 
cable and radio-relay, three ground stations that communicate 
with satellites over the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean, 
and an undersea coaxial cable between South Africa and the 
Canary Islands that joins other cables linking Europe and 
South America. 

Telephone service became a symbol of the racial disparities 
under apartheid, especially during the 1980s, when per capita 
access to telephone service in black communities was less than 



236 



The Economy 



one-tenth that in white areas. For this reason, early-1990s plans 
for a cellular telephone network in rural and township areas 
assumed symbolic as well as economic importance as a means 
of black empowerment. In 1994 and 1995, this system 
extended telephone service into many rural areas for the first 
time and was assisting local entrepreneurs for whom communi- 
cation had often been a major obstacle. Industry officials pre- 
dicted that by the late 1990s, the cellular phone industry would 
create at least 4,500 jobs directly, and would contribute to the 
creation of perhaps 40,000 or more jobs in related industries. 

The government began allowing the private sector to pro- 
vide data transmission services in 1994. The plan was to allow 
companies to use Telkom facilities to provide customers with 
value-added services, such as the electronic transfer of funds 
and messages, management of corporate data networks, and 
the remote processing of corporate information. Telkom 
retained control over the independent telecommunications 
services, to continue the company's statutory monopoly overall 
and to regulate competition in the field. Private companies are 
able to lease facilities, such as data lines, from Telkom and 
charge customers only for value added to these services. 

The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) had a 
near-monopoly in television service in most of South Africa 
until the independent television company, M-Net, inaugurated 
service in January 1991. In 1993 the government placed SABC 
broadcasts under the supervision of the Independent Broad- 
casting Authority, as a step toward greater media independence 
from political control. Television service, which had been initi- 
ated in 1976, consisted of four channels broadcasting in 
English, Afrikaans, and five African languages. One of the 
English-Afrikaans stations was a subscription service, similar to 
cable television, owned by a syndicate of newspaper publishers. 
Until 1994 residents of some of the former black homelands, 
and those near the border with Swaziland, had received sepa- 
rate broadcasts from those areas. After that, television service 
in the former homelands was incorporated into the nationwide 
system. A reorganization of SABC was implemented in the mid- 
1990s to allow greater diversity in its broadcasts. 

The SABC operates 300 frequency modulation (FM) and 
fourteen amplitude modulation (AM) radio stations. Programs 
were primarily in English and Afrikaans through the early 
1990s, but several low-power FM stations broadcast in at least a 
dozen African languages, and the use of African languages was 



237 



South Africa: A Country Study 

increasing. One short-wave external service, Radio RSA, broad- 
casts worldwide. 

The South African Post Office provides postal and money- 
transfer services, as well as postal savings accounts. Its 1,580 
post offices and other facilities handled more than 7 million 
items each workday in 1994, delivering mail to some 5 million 
addresses. In its first year in power (1994-95), the new Govern- 
ment of National Unity opened at least seventy new post offices 
and upgraded many others in previously ill-served areas. It also 
installed an estimated 700,000 new mail boxes at private 
addresses and in post-office box locations. Postal savings 
accounts are available to individuals with as little as R10 to 
deposit; interest payments in 1995 were reportedly as high as 5 
percent on savings deposits and 1 1 percent on savings certifi- 
cates. South Africa was readmitted to the Universal Postal 
Union in 1994, enabling it to participate in international tech- 
nical assistance programs and accounting facilities within the 
union. 

Environmental Protection and Tourism 

Environmental Protection 

South Africa has signed at least twenty-four major interna- 
tional agreements concerning environmental preservation, 
including the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the 
1987 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, or 
Montreal Protocol. During the 1980s, the government 
enforced environmental legislation only weakly, however, and 
the Environment Conservation Act (No. 73) of 1989 further 
weakened existing practices. Based on this legislation, the gov- 
ernment's Council on the Environment proposed a new 
approach, called Integrated Environmental Management, 
aimed at accommodating development concerns. As in other 
countries, many business and community leaders place infra- 
structure development far ahead of environmental issues, and 
many voters place a higher priority on alleviating poverty than 
preserving the environment. 

The 1989 legislation and subsequent amendments set out 
the official objectives in environmental conservation — to pre- 
serve species and ecosystems, to maintain ecological processes, 
and to protect against land degradation and environmental 
deterioration resulting from human activities. The government 



238 



The Economy 



requires environmental impact assessments for major develop- 
ment and construction projects, and it imposes fines on indus- 
trial polluters. Demographic researchers concluded in 1993, 
however, that the implications of rapid population growth are 
potentially devastating to the environmentalists' concerns — 
they estimate that the population is likely to double by the year 
2025, and one-half of the population may then be living in 
"grinding poverty." As a result of these pronouncements, land 
preservation and population control became interlinked social 
causes in the 1990s. 

Environmentalists argue that the country's advanced soil 
erosion and land degradation threaten future generations and 
will be worsened by overpopulation and overcultivation. Little 
more than one-tenth of the total land area is fit for cultivation; 
as much as 500 million tons of topsoil are lost each year 
through erosion caused by wind and water, and the problem is 
worsened by deforestation through uncontrolled tree harvest- 
ing. Environmentalists also note that industrial pollutants and 
raw sewage are allowed to seep into streams and lakes, and 
even into wells used for drinking water in some communities. 

As the April 1994 elections approached, environmental 
activists persuaded ANC leaders to include a chapter on the 
environment in the Reconstruction and Development Pro- 
gramme (RDP), the blueprint for development in the 1990s. 
The ANC also commissioned an environmental study by the 
Canadian International Development Research Centre, and 
the new government gave strong lip service to environmental 
priorities when it assumed office in 1994. 

Later that year, however, as some officials tried to maintain 
the priority on long-term environmental concerns, they faced 
strong opposition within the new, financially strapped govern- 
ment and from the business community. The government's 
Department of Environmental Affairs (formerly Department of 
Environment Affairs and Tourism) is in charge of coordinating 
environmental policy, but critics have argued that it is not pur- 
suing this task very aggressively and that nongovernmental 
organizations lack the financial and political support to effect 
significant change. 

South Africa has sought an exception to the 1973 CITES 
convention, which governs global trade in animals threatened 
with extinction. The convention aims to protect the dwindling 
African elephant population; it first banned trade in ivory 
products among signatory states and was amended in 1989 to 



239 



South Africa: A Country Study 

outlaw commercial trade in all elephant parts. South Africa's 
request was based on local game officials' reports that ele- 
phants were not threatened with extinction in South Africa, 
and that animals being culled offered lucrative trade in hides 
and meat. By 1995 this petition, unlike earlier petitions from 
Pretoria, was being given serious consideration among CITES 
signatories, partly in recognition of the new government's post- 
apartheid needs. 

Tourism 

In the mid-1990s, control of the tourism industry was trans- 
ferred from the Department of Environmental Affairs to the 
Department of Industry and Trade, partly to give a higher pri- 
ority to tourist-industry development concerns. Through the 
new Department of Industry, Trade, and Tourism, the govern- 
ment operates National Tourist Bureaus throughout the coun- 
try as well as the South African Tourism Board (Satour). 
Satour, established in 1983 to promote tourism from abroad, 
has been recognized internationally for its high-quality ser- 
vices. 

Among South Africa's many tourist attractions are sixteen 
national parks and numerous provincial and local game parks, 
nature reserves, and wilderness areas. The National Parks 
Board employs more than 4,000 South Africans. Kruger 
National Park in Mpumalanga and Northern provinces is one 
of the most popular with visitors and is home to more than 140 
species of mammals and 450 species of birds. The rare moun- 
tain zebra, which is unique to South Africa, is protected in the 
Mountain Zebra National Park in the Eastern Cape. The 
Augrabies Falls National Park, site of the fifty-six-meter- high 
Augrabies Falls on the Orange River near Upington, preserves 
plants and animals that have adapted to semi-desert condi- 
tions. The Kalahari Gemsbok National Park, in the Northern 
Cape bordering Namibia and Botswana, is known for its free- 
roaming gemsbok and springbok. In addition to game parks, 
nature reserves, and big-game hunting between May and July, 
the wine region of the Western Cape is a consistent tourist 
attraction. 

South African tourism figures have risen since the late 1980s 
and exceeded 3.8 million in 1994 (see table 15, Appendix). 
More than half of the tourists in South Africa are from other 
African countries; most of the remainder are from the United 
Kingdom or Germany. South Africa is a member of the World 



240 



The Economy 



Tourism Organization and a participant in the Africa Travel 
Association, which promotes tourist attractions in Africa to the 
North American travel industry. 

Banking and Currency 
Banking 

The heart of the banking system is the South African 
Reserve Bank, which is the primary monetary authority and 
custodian of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
The Reserve Bank is managed by a board of fourteen directors, 
seven representing major commercial and financial institu- 
tions, industry, and agriculture, and seven appointed by the 
government. Of the latter, one serves as governor, and three 
serve as deputy governors of the Reserve Bank. 

The Reserve Bank's primary functions are to protect the 
value of the rand and to control inflation. The Reserve Bank 
regulates the money supply by influencing its cost — i.e., inter- 
est charged on loans to other institutions. It is technically inde- 
pendent of government control, but in practice it works closely 
with the Treasury and helps to formulate and to implement 
macroeconomic policy. The Reserve Bank issues banknotes 
and is responsible for the sale and purchase of foreign 
exchange for the government, as well as for the administration 
of the treasury-bill tender system. Its major customers are gov- 
ernment agencies, private banks, and discount houses, 
although it also performs clearinghouse functions for private 
banks and assists banks that experience liquidity problems. 
Finally, the Reserve Bank is the authorized buyer of gold bul- 
lion, thereby acting as agent for the gold-mining industry in 
effecting sales on their behalf in the private market. 

The Reserve Bank uses monetary policy to control inflation, 
primarily by adjusting the liquid-asset requirements of private 
banking institutions and by restricting bank credit in order to 
control consumer demand. Until 1975 the bank enforced fixed 
interest rates on long-term government securities, but thereaf- 
ter it allowed transactions at market-related prices. Direct con- 
trol over deposit interest rates quoted by banking institutions 
was abolished in 1980; nevertheless, the Reserve Bank still exer- 
cises considerable indirect control through its own bank rate. 

The private banking sector was controlled by commercial 
banks until the 1950s when banking services began to diversify. 
Until then, commercial banks had avoided services such as per- 



241 



South Africa: A Country Study 

sonal loans, property leasing, and credit-card facilities. New 
institutions — including discount houses, merchant banks, and 
general banks — emerged to meet this demand, and in reaction 
to these changes in the banking sector, commercial banks 
increasingly entered into medium-term credit arrangements 
with commerce and industry and acquired interests in hire- 
purchase firms and leasing activities. In addition, they 
expanded their operations into insurance and even invested in 
manufacturing and commercial enterprises. 

During the late 1980s, the "big five" commercial banks — 
First National Bank (formerly Barclays), Standard Bank of 
South Africa, Nedbank, Volkskas, and Trust Bank — were 
increasingly challenged by building societies, which had listed 
holding companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) and had set up commercial and/or general banking 
arms. The Deposit Taking Institutions Act of 1991 formalized 
the overlapping of functions between the banks and the build- 
ing societies that had existed for more than a decade. The act 
brought South Africa into line with internationally recognized 
standards for capital requirements. 

In February 1991, four of the country's leading financial 
institutions — Allied Bank, United Bank, Volkskas, and Sage 
Banks — merged to create the largest banking group in the 
country, the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA), with 
assets of R56 billion. ABSA, which merged with a fifth bank in 
1992, is jointly controlled by the Rembrandt tobacco group 
and the South African National Life Assurance Company (San- 
lam) , the country's second-largest insurance group. The bank- 
ing industry is undergoing further reorganization in the mid- 
1990s, in part to establish banking services in poor communi- 
ties that were neglected under apartheid. 

Currency 

Until the late 1960s, South Africa had a fixed exchange rate 
for its currency; thereafter, the rand was pegged to major for- 
eign currencies. In 1979 the government switched to a system 
that formally expressed parity against the dollar. The value of 
the rand followed changes in the balance of payments and 
moved roughly with sterling and other weaker currencies until 
1985. The foreign-debt crisis of that year caused the rand to 
depreciate at an unprecedented rate, and it fell to an all-time 
low of less than US$0.40. The rand recovered somewhat in 
1987, reaching US$0.43, but it declined steadily, with minor 



242 




The South African Reserve Bank (Pretoria) regulates 
money supply and monetary policy. 
Embassy of South Africa, Washington 



243 



South Africa: A Country Study 

adjustments, after that, dipping to about US$0.26 in late 1995. 
Between February 1 and May 1, 1996, the rand lost roughly 16 
percent of its value, falling from R3.7 to R4.33 = US$1, or a 
value of about US$0.23. 

A parallel currency, the financial rand, was used exclusively 
for the movement of nonresident capital during the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. Financial rands developed out of currency- 
exchange controls instituted in the early 1960s, known as the 
"blocked rand." The financial rand was available only to for- 
eigners for investment in South Africa and was created by the 
sale of nonresidents' assets in the country. This two-tiered cur- 
rency system insulated the country's foreign reserves from 
politically motivated capital flight, because all divestment by 
nonresidents was automatically met by new investment, and the 
price of the financial rand varied independently of the com- 
mercial rand. Financial rands invariably stood at a discount to 
commercial rands, but the size of the discount depended on 
South Africa's relative attraction as an investment destination. 
The discount stood at almost 40 percent during most of 1992, 
for example, but declined to about 20 percent in late 1993. 

Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals, under pressure from the 
banking and business communities, said that the government 
would phase out the financial rand in 1994 or 1995, assuming 
that South Africa's foreign currency reserves reached at least 
R20 billion and that the discount between the financial and the 
commercial rands narrowed to about 10 percent. Foreign cur- 
rency reserves were precariously low in early 1994 but, in a dra- 
matic reversal of the capital outflow of 1993, increased steadily 
throughout 1994 and early 1995. In March 1995, with foreign 
reserves of only about R12 billion, the government abolished 
the financial rand. The newly unified currency traded well on 
international currency markets, marking a vote of confidence 
in South Africa's business potential. 

Growth Trends and Potential 

One sign of hope for South Africa's economic future in the 
mid-1990s is the black business sector, which struggled to sur- 
vive during the 1980s but began to thrive in the postapartheid 
era. In 1994 the first major black-owned investment company 
to be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, New Africa 
Investment, Ltd., had 8,500 black shareholders. It holds a con- 
trolling stake in a major newspaper, a large life insurance com- 
pany, and a cellular telephone company. These and other 



244 



The Economy 



black-owned businesses plan to target rural communities and 
the poor for a substantial portion of their expansion. But they, 
like other enterprises in South Africa, must depend on a grow- 
ing economy to finance new investment. 

South Africa's businesses have been disappointed in the rela- 
tively slow increase in foreign investment since 1994, but they 
still hope that outside assistance will help ease the political and 
the economic transition of the 1990s. South Africa joined the 
African Development Bank (ADB) in 1995, in part because 
ADB membership offered the possibility of at least US$200 mil- 
lion in development aid by 1997, and because South African 
companies could bid for contracts on ADB-sponsored projects 
in other African countries. The value of these projects was esti- 
mated at US$3.5 billion in 1995. 

South Africa's economic growth has always depended on 
increasing gold profits and foreign investments. In the mid- 
1990s, these continued to be important to the country's future, 
and both were directly linked to the ongoing dismantling of 
apartheid and political reconstruction. Yet profits were certain 
to drop if the government agreed to raise wages for industrial 
workers, as most labor leaders insisted. National earnings also 
would be reduced if the mining companies were to cut back on 
production. Thus, there were strong economic incentives for 
the government both to limit wages and to avoid serious out- 
breaks of labor unrest in order to attract much-needed foreign 
investment. But rising tensions in late 1994 and 1995 signaled 
the difficulty it faced in balancing these two goals. Neither 
manufacturing, which depended on foreign capital, nor agri- 
culture, which produced erratically as a result of weather con- 
ditions, could provide sufficient independent growth to break 
this cycle. Furthermore, both of these sectors had long 
depended on low wage scales for labor and would experience 
the same difficulties as the mining sector in the 1990s. 

In the long term, it appears doubtful that South Africa's 
economy can continue the same spectacular growth it experi- 
enced earlier in the twentieth century. But under a stable mul- 
tiracial government, South Africa can gain access to many new 
export markets for manufactured goods throughout Africa and 
elsewhere, and, with labor's cooperation and barring serious 
unrest, it can attract the investments necessary to service those 
markets. The country is nonetheless likely to remain depen- 
dent on foreign capital and to suffer from erratic agricultural 
production into the twenty-first century. 



245 



South Africa: A Country Study 



* * * 

There is a wealth of information available on South Africa's 
economy and its historical development. The South African 
government itself publishes the most useful information, and 
citations for numerous reports and other publications may be 
found in the annual South Africa Yearbook, formerly published as 
the South Africa Official Yearbook. Source Material on the South Afri- 
can Economy: 1860-1970 by D. Hobart Houghton and Jenifer 
Dagut is a definitive guide to primary and secondary sources 
for the historical period. 

Secondary sources on historical economic development are 
divided both on ideological grounds and by topic. The follow- 
ing are some of the best known: Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall 
of the South African Peasantry; D. Hobart Houghton, The South 
African Economy; Frederick A. Johnstone, Class, Race, and Gold: A 
Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa; 
Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, eds., Economy and Society in 
Pre-Industrial South Africa; Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, 
eds., Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa; and Shula 
Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds., The Politics of Race, Class, and 
Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa. 

Initial analyses of economic change in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s are found in Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins's 
State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Excellent sources 
of current information are the South African Reserve Bank 
Quarterly Bulletin; Financial Mail; Financial Times; Africa Economic 
Digest; Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial, and Technical 
Series; and the various publications of the Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit, in particular the quarterly Country Report South 
Africa and the annual Country Profile: South Africa. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



246 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Steam engine wends its way past fields and homestead in hilly KwaZulu-Natal. 



SOUTH AFRICA IN 1994 underwent the most radical and far- 
reaching political and constitutional transformation since the 
racially divisive South Africa Act provided the legal basis for the 
Union of South Africa in 1910. The latest sweeping transforma- 
tion officially began with the April 26—29, 1994, national and 
provincial elections, and with the triumph of the previously 
banned African National Congress (ANC). 

The country's main political antagonists, the ANC and the 
former ruling National Party (NP), had agreed in November 
1993 on the composition of a multiparty Transitional Executive 
Council (TEC) to govern jointly until elections were held. They 
also agreed that, after the elections, a transitional Government 
of National Unity would be in power and that a transitional 
bicameral parliament would form a constitutional assembly to 
draft a final constitution. In addition, they agreed on an 
interim constitution that would guide the transition between 
the April 1994 elections and the adoption of the final constitu- 
tion. 

Domestic, regional, and international developments over 
the past decade had served to alter radically both Afrikaner 
(see Glossary) and black politics from the politics of repression 
and armed resistance to the politics of negotiation and partici- 
pation. Since 1960 the banned ANC, ANC-allied South African 
Communist Party (SACP), and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 
had waged an armed struggle from their bases in neighboring 
countries. The armed struggle intensified during the 1980s 
and expanded into a "people's war" involving mass demonstra- 
tions against the apartheid (see Glossary) state. International 
pressure in the form of economic and political sanctions, 
including diplomatic pressure by the United States, helped 
force the Afrikaner establishment — faced with a threat to its 
own economic well-being — to embark on a process that would 
ultimately result in sharing power, authority, and resources with 
the disenfranchised black majority. 

A multiparty conference, the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (Codesa), met to formulate a new constitution on 
December 20, 1991, and, after talks foundered in 1992, 
resumed in March 1993 to plan the political transition. In April 
1994, the nation's first nonracial provincial legislatures and the 
transitional National Assembly were democratically elected by 



249 



South Africa: A Country Study 

universal suffrage. The 1994 elections were the culmination of 
a spectacular series of bilateral talks in which NP and ANC 
leaders agreed on a set of compromises concerning the interim 
period while formulating preliminary constitutional guidelines 
for a multiracial and majoritarian democratic society, based on 
the principle of "one person-one vote." Finally, the political 
conflict between the ANC and several recalcitrant parties that 
had boycotted the negotiations process — including the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP, known as Inkatha), which demanded 
greater regional autonomy for its Zulu constituency, and the 
Freedom Front, a group committed to Afrikaner self-determi- 
nation — was resolved only days before the April 1994 elections. 

In the early 1990s, the right-wing Afrikaner parties, includ- 
ing neo-Nazi elements, had provided the main resistance to the 
transition to multiracial democracy. Their resistance took the 
form of legal political parties, extra-legal movements, and para- 
military organizations. Most of these groups were fragmented, 
particularly over ideology, and demoralized by their realization 
that accommodationist currents were running against them. 
Some of them splintered as they were being pushed to the mar- 
gin of events by the pragmatism of President Frederik W. 
(F.W.) de Klerk. 

Establishing a national consensus over the new nonracial, 
democratic political system was, therefore, the main task of the 
leaders of the NP and the ANC. Only a consensus could over- 
come the pressures of extremists on both sides, whose violence 
and racial antagonisms had been fueled by the authoritarian- 
ism, coercion, and distortions implicit in the apartheid system. 
The task facing the moderate leaders was complicated by the 
sharp increase in violent criminal activity throughout the coun- 
try, as law and order broke down in many regions, even areas in 
which crime rates had been low in the past. Although officials 
estimated that at least 80 percent of all murders committed in 
the early 1990s were not politically motivated, political violence 
by extremist groups continuously threatened to undermine the 
country's fragile political stability as the elections approached. 

The revolutionary changes sweeping South Africa in 1993 
and 1994 were remarkable. It was almost unprecedented for a 
ruling group in a society that it so completely dominated, 
although it constituted an ethnic minority, to hand over power 
in a peaceful manner to the country's longstanding oppressed 
and banned opposition. South Africa's ruling party leaders did 



250 



Nelson Mandela addresses opening session of the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (Codesa), December 1991. 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

so with the realization that the once-banned organizations rep- 
resented the political will of the majority of citizens. 

Many political leaders helped to shape the new political sys- 
tem. The two most instrumental in bridging the gap between 
the two sides were State President F.W. de Klerk, leader of the 
NP, which had ruled the country without effective electoral 
challenge since 1948, and Nelson (Rolihlahla) Mandela, presi- 
dent of the ANC, the foremost political leader among the black 
majority. A third player, Chief Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, 
leader of the Zulu-based IFP, also gave expression to black aspi- 
rations, particularly in the IFP stronghold of Natal Province's 
KwaZulu homeland (see Glossary). Other important players 
included supporters of the new regime, such as leaders of the 
coloured (mixed race — see Glossary) and the Indian commu- 
nities, the largely English-speaking liberal white parties, and 
newly emerging leaders in the black homelands. In contrast 
were the virulent opponents of the postapartheid system, such 
as the Afrikaner extremists, who had split from the NP into sev- 
eral groups seeking to brake the slide toward political and 
social transformation in order to preserve a state based on the 
principles of apartheid. 



251 



South Africa: A Country Study 

As the country prepared to embark on full-scale democracy 
in the early 1990s, new challenges confronted the ANC. First, 
as a newly legalized party, the ANC had to demonstrate that it 
was no longer merely an extraparliamentary liberation move- 
ment, but a serious contender for the task of governing the 
country. It also had to balance the need to provide expression 
to a younger generation of black South Africans who had been 
radicalized by years of boycotts, jailings, suppression, and eth- 
nic violence, against the need to attract new supporters not 
only from its black constituency, but from the white, the 
coloured, and the Indian communities as well. 

Mandela, in order to succeed in the new political arena, had 
to gain the support of the more conservative, yet antiapartheid, 
ethnic leaders in the countryside and in the black homelands, 
while retaining the support of younger leaders and activists and 
while mobilizing the violence-prone majority in the townships. 
He also had to distance the party from the political and eco- 
nomic program of its longstanding ally, the SACP, even though 
a number of SACP leaders remained on the ANC's executive 
and working committees. To present a cohesive front, the ANC 
also had to join forces in one form or another with Inkatha 
Chief Buthelezi, although the tensions between the two black 
movements often erupted into violence over political turf, par- 
ticularly in Natal and KwaZulu. Finally, the ANC had to fill the 
vacuum left by the loss of political and military support of pre- 
vious state sponsors such as the former Soviet Union, which no 
longer provided material support to Third World liberation 
movements. 

Similarly, NP leader de Klerk had to retain the party's tradi- 
tional bases of support among Afrikaners while working to gain 
or to retain the support of coloured, Indian, and liberal white 
votes. Finally, de Klerk had to reach out to previously hostile 
black communities, a move that would invariably provoke white 
right-wing extremists, who had resorted to violence in the past 
and who were threatening antigovernment insurgency. 

System of Government 

The new political system was established by the interim con- 
stitution voted into law in late 1993 and officially implemented 
on April 27, 1994. The interim constitution provides for a Gov- 
ernment of National Unity and for a five-year transition, during 
which the final constitution would be drafted by the Constitu- 
tional Assembly, consisting of the combined Senate and 



252 



Government and Politics 



National Assembly. To understand fully the revolutionary 
nature of the new government and the direction that the polit- 
ical transition is likely to take in the long term, it is necessary to 
examine the evolution of the political system that was based on 
the principles and practices of apartheid. 

Historical Background 

The Union of South Africa became a self-governing domin- 
ion within the British Commonwealth on May 31, 1910, when 
four British dependencies were merged under the South Africa 
Act passed by the British Parliament in 1909. Unification was 
interpreted differently by British and by Afrikaner leaders, 
however. To the British, uniting the four dependencies was 
central to their imperialist philosophy of consolidating the 
empire; to many Afrikaners, unity represented a step toward 
weakening British imperial influence. Ironically, however, this 
act failed to unite South Africa in a real sense because by 
excluding the black majority from political participation, it 
fueled the discontent and the conflict that characterized the 
country's politics throughout the twentieth century. 

The South Africa Act served as the Union of South Africa's 
constitution until 1961. Although the country was formally 
ruled by a governor general representing the Crown, its gov- 
ernment was granted almost total independence in internal 
affairs. Britain's 1931 Statute of Westminster removed many 
constitutional limitations on all British dominions, and South 
Africa's corresponding legislation, the Status of Union Act of 
1934, declared that no act of the British parliament could apply 
to South Africa unless accepted by the Union parliament. 

South Africa officially became the Republic of South Africa 
on May 31, 1961, following a national referendum among the 
country's white voters on October 5, 1960. The constitution of 
1961 was based largely on the South Africa Act, but it severed 
ties with the British Commonwealth of Nations, replacing the 
words "king," "queen," and "crown" with "state." The state pres- 
ident replaced the British monarch and governor general. 

The 1961 constitution provided for a president, a prime 
minister, and an executive council (cabinet) with offices at Pre- 
toria (where most of the administrative bureaucracy was 
located). A bicameral legislature was situated at Cape Town. 
The independent judiciary was headquartered at Bloemfon- 
tein. 



253 



South Africa: A Country Study 

The 1961 constitution maintained white political domina- 
tion through an electoral system that denied blacks, coloureds, 
and Asians the right to vote for national office holders. 
Coloureds and Asians, but not blacks, won limited participa- 
tion in ethnic affairs through, respectively, a Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council established in 1964 and a South Afri- 
can Indian Council established in 1968. Since 1951 the Bantu 
Authorities Act had restricted black political participation to 
homelands (also referred to as Bantustans) set aside for Afri- 
cans. During the 1970s and the 1980s, four of the ten home- 
lands were declared "independent" black states, while the 
remaining six were known as "self-governing" territories. 

Following intense debate and a series of legislative revisions 
in the early 1980s, the new Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act (No. 110) of 1983 went into effect on Septem- 
ber 22, 1984. It outlined a government led by a president, who 
served as head of state and chief executive, and a parliamen- 
tary system with increased coloured and Indian representation. 
The new, tricameral Parliament encompassed a (white) House 
of Assembly, a (coloured) House of Representatives, and an 
(Indian) House of Delegates. The president was selected by an 
eighty-eight-member electoral college consisting of fifty whites, 
twenty-five coloureds, and thirteen Indians, chosen by a major- 
ity vote in their respective houses of parliament. The president 
served for the duration of the parliament that selected him, 
normally a five-year term. The president could dissolve the par- 
liament, or could extend it by up to six months beyond its five- 
year term. 

The president shared executive authority with a cabinet, 
which he appointed from the tricameral parliament, and with a 
Ministers Council chosen by him from the majority in each 
house of parliament. In addition, the president relied on a 
sixty-member President's Council for advice on urgent matters 
and for resolution of differences among houses of parliament. 
The President's Council comprised twenty members from the 
House of Assembly, ten from the House of Representatives, five 
from the House of Delegates, fifteen nominated by the presi- 
dent, and ten nominated by opposition party leaders. The NP 
dominated the President's Council throughout the ten-year 
duration of the 1983 constitution. 

The three-chambered parliament was based on a fundamen- 
tal premise of the 1983 constitution, the distinction between a 
racial community's "own" affairs (encompassing education, 



254 



Government and Politics 



health, housing, social welfare, local government, and some 
aspects of agriculture), and "general" affairs (encompassing 
defense, finance, foreign policy, justice, law and order, trans- 
port, commerce and industry, manpower, internal affairs, and 
overall agricultural policy) . Thus, legislation "affecting the 
interests" of one community was deliberated upon by the 
appropriate house, but legislation on "general affairs" of 
importance to all races was handled by all three houses of par- 
liament. Disagreements among houses of parliament on spe- 
cific legislation could be resolved by the President's Council, 
giving the NP-dominated House of Assembly substantial weight 
in determining the outcome of all legislative debates. The pres- 
ident signed all legislation, and he also exercised administra- 
tive responsibility for black affairs. 

The country was divided into four provinces — Cape of Good 
Hope Province (later, the Cape Province), Natal Province, the 
Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. The president appointed 
a provincial administrator for each province. Until the mid- 
1980s, the provincial administrator acted in consultation with a 
provincial council, which was elected by whites only. In July 
1987, the provincial councils were replaced by eight multiracial 
regional services councils (RSCs) — four in the Transvaal, three 
in the Cape Province, and one in the Orange Free State. The 
RSCs were empowered to administer government regulations 
and to coordinate the provision of services to local communi- 
ties. 

Constitutional Change 

The constitutional reforms of the early 1980s led to four 
phases of political change that, ultimately, irrevocably trans- 
formed the South African political system. First, the 1983 con- 
stitution's new political representation for coloureds and 
Indians made the glaring lack of participation by the country's 
black majority even more obvious. Even early discussions of the 
new constitution triggered widespread violent protests by anti- 
apartheid activists. The escalating violence prompted the gov- 
ernment to impose a series of states of emergency and forced 
both the government and many citizens to realize that promis- 
ing future political reform regarding black political participa- 
tion would no longer suffice; sweeping political reforms would 
be necessary, and the need for such reforms was becoming 
increasingly urgent. 



255 



South Africa: A Country Study 

The second phase of change was a series of secret meetings 
between NP officials and imprisoned ANC leaders. These 
began in July 1984, after Minister of Justice Hendrik "Kobie" 
Coetsee (representing President P.W. Botha) paid several 
unpublicized visits to ANC leader Nelson Mandela, who was 
then serving the twenty-first year of a life prison sentence. The 
government formalized these visits in May 1988 by establishing 
a committee to handle government contacts with Mandela and 
with other imprisoned or exiled ANC leaders. On July 5, 1989, 
in response to Mandela's request for high-level discussions of a 
possible negotiated settlement to the ANC's armed struggle, 
Botha and Mandela held their first face-to-face talks. 

Botha resigned from office, owing to ill health, in August 
1989, and in December, Mandela suggested a "road map" for 
future negotiations to the new president, F.W. de Klerk. Man- 
dela's proposal outlined a power-sharing plan for the NP and 
its political rivals and embraced the spirit of compromise that 
would be needed to weather the political turbulence that lay 
ahead. 

These talks led to the third, and most transforming, phase in 
recent politics, beginning with de Klerk's historic speech of 
February 2, 1990, in which he legalized more than thirty anti- 
apartheid organizations; ordered the release of eight long-term 
political prisoners, including Mandela and ANC deputy presi- 
dent Walter Sisulu; removed many emergency regulations con- 
cerning the media and political detainees; and announced his 
intention to negotiate a new democratic constitution with his 
political opponents. In October of that year, the parliament 
took a symbolic step toward reform by repealing the Separate 
Amenities Act, an important legislative pillar of apartheid. 

The fourth phase in the political transformation occurred as 
the NP government and the ANC leadership began to recog- 
nize their mutual dependence and the need for cooperation 
and compromise in embarking on constitutional negotiations. 
In this phase, their previously adversarial relationship was 
transformed through their discussions and their agreement on 
three accords — the Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990), the 
Pretoria Minute (August 1990), and the D.F. Malan Accord 
(February 1991). In these accords, ANC leaders pledged to sus- 
pend the armed struggle, the government agreed to release all 
political prisoners, and both sides agreed to pursue political 
reform through negotiation. On September 14, 1991, repre- 
sentatives of twenty-seven political parties, interest groups, and 



256 



Government and Politics 



the national and homeland governments signed the National 
Peace Accord, agreeing to form a multiracial council, later 
called the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), to serve as 
temporary executive authority until democratic elections could 
be held. 

Nearly three months after the signing of the historic peace 
accord, preliminary negotiations to agree on procedural rules 
began at the World Trade Center outside Johannesburg, as the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). In Sep- 
tember 1992, Mandela and de Klerk reached a Record of 
Understanding, formally committing both sides to accept a 
democratically elected, five-year interim Government of 
National Unity led by a political coalition. They also agreed 
that the center of government would remain in Pretoria and 
that the new state president would be chosen from the party 
winning the largest plurality of votes in nationwide nonracial 
elections. Any party that won at least 5 percent of the seats in 
parliament would be entitled to a place in the cabinet. The 
transitional, bicameral parliament was to be charged with draft- 
ing and adopting a new constitution. The ANC accepted the 
idea of sharing power with the NP during the transition. 
Assuming the ANC would win the elections, it would, as the 
majority party, exercise its prerogative on most matters, and the 
NP would serve as a junior partner in running the country. 

These agreements on the transitional government repre- 
sented important compromises by both the government and 
the ANC, and they helped to set new precedents for future 
negotiations. The NP won agreement on its refusal to give the 
new state president broad and extensive powers during the 
transition period. (Under the previous system, the president 
could override the views of minority parties.) At the same time, 
de Klerk compromised on his demand for a permanent con- 
sensus-style arrangement to be enshrined in any new constitu- 
tion by agreeing to a five-year transitional government. The 
arrangement satisfied the NP demand for legally binding 
checks and balances to protect the country's white minority. 
The ANC, for its part, compromised on its earlier insistence on 
full and immediate majority rule, by agreeing to participate in 
a powersharing arrangement for at least five years. At the same 
time, many ANC leaders hoped that their party, as the domi- 
nant party in the transitional government, would win a suffi- 
ciently large majority to enable it to enact most of its policies, 
even without the consent of other parties. 



257 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Supporters on both sides viewed the Government of 
National Unity as the country's best hope for achieving long- 
term political and economic stability, for attracting much- 
needed foreign investment, and for limiting violence by both 
white and black extremists. One of the main criticisms of the 
proposed coalition government was that with the two major 
political rivals entering into a governing alliance, their small- 
party opponents would have little political maneuverability and 
would be forced into extraparliamentary protest. 

By early 1994, a number of problems remained unresolved. 
The most crucial was the need to establish a broad consensus 
among the political parties over the basic principles to be 
embodied in a new constitution. The negotiators had yet to 
reach agreement on the powers and the functions of the three 
commissions responsible for overseeing the transition — the 
TEC, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and the 
Independent Media Commission that would be charged with 
ensuring media fairness. Other problems concerned the opera- 
tions of the interim government — such as joint ANC-NP con- 
trol over the country's security forces and the integration of the 
ANC's and PAC's paramilitary wings into the new national 
army. 

The ANC and Inkatha still had to resolve their civil war in 
Natal and KwaZulu, where more than 10,000 people had been 
killed in a decade of ethnic and political violence. The large 
Zulu population (of about 8 million) was split between sup- 
porters of the ANC and Inkatha, and Inkatha itself was split 
between the conflicting interests of IFP leader Buthelezi and 
the traditional Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini. 

The Interim Constitution 

The interim constitution — The Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200) — was ratified on December 
22, 1993, and implemented on April 27, 1994. It provides a 
framework for governing for five years, while a new constitu- 
tion, to be implemented by 1999, was drafted by the Constitu- 
tional Assembly. The final constitution had to comply with the 
principles embodied in the interim constitution, including a 
commitment to a multiparty democracy based on universal 
adult franchise, individual rights without discrimination, and 
separation of the powers of government. 

The interim constitution consists of a preamble, fifteen 
chapters containing 251 sections, and seven attachments. It 



258 



Government and Politics 



contains a chapter on fundamental rights, and it requires a 
constitutional court to invalidate any new law or government 
action that might unreasonably restrict these basic human free- 
doms. The guaranteed freedoms include the right to life and 
human dignity, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, 
the right of free association, language and cultural rights, and 
other internationally accepted human rights. Key provisions 
are proportional party representation in the legislature with 
representatives to be selected from lists of party delegates; a 
bicameral parliament comprising a 400-seat National Assembly 
and a Senate consisting of ten members chosen by each of the 
nine provinces; and a Constitutional Assembly made up of both 
houses of parliament. The interim constitution requires that 
the draft of the final constitution be prepared within two years 
and that the draft be approved by two-thirds of the legislators 
and by the Constitutional Court. 

The interim constitution also defines the government's 
authority; reaffirms its sovereignty, the supremacy of the consti- 
tution, and existing national symbols; and defines the national 
executive (a president, at least two deputy presidents, and the 
cabinet), the judicial system (the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court, and lower-level courts), the Office of the Pub- 
lic Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission 
on Gender Equality, the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights, and the Public Service Commission. Further provisions 
relate to the police and security establishment; the continua- 
tion or repeal of existing laws and international agreements; 
and arrangements for legislative, executive, public service, 
legal, financial, and other administrative bodies. Schedules 
attached to the interim constitution describe the nation's nine 
new provinces, including areas still under contention; the elec- 
toral system; oaths and affirmations of office; the procedure for 
electing the president; and the authority of provincial legisla- 
tures. 

Executive and Legislative Authority 

The President 

Under the interim constitution, executive authority is vested 
in the president, deputy presidents, and a cabinet chosen by 
the president in consultation with party leaders (see fig. 19). 
The executive offices are based in the administrative capital, 
Pretoria. The directly elected National Assembly elects the 



259 



South Africa: A Country Study 



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260 



Government and Politics 



president from among its members and can remove the presi- 
dent from office by a vote of no-confidence or by impeach- 
ment. The president's primary responsibilities are to uphold, 
to defend, and to respect the constitution; to appoint cabinet 
members; to convene cabinet meetings; to refer bills back to 
the legislators or forward them to the Constitutional Court 
when constitutionality is in question; to summon the National 
Assembly for urgent matters; to appoint commissions of 
inquiry; to appoint ambassadors; and to accredit foreign diplo- 
mats. 

According to the interim constitution, any party winning 
more than 20 percent of the popular vote is entitled to name a 
deputy president. If only one party or no party wins that per- 
centage of votes, each of the two parties with the largest num- 
bers of votes selects a deputy president. The deputy presidents' 
primary responsibilities are to assist the president in the duties 
of the executive and to succeed the president in the event of 
absence, incapacitation, or vacancy in that office. In 1994 the 
NP named outgoing president F. W. de Klerk and the ANC 
named Thabo Mbeki to serve as deputy presidents. 

The Cabinet 

The cabinet shares executive authority with the president 
and his deputies, and its members are appointed by the presi- 
dent in consultation with party leaders. Under the interim con- 
stitution, cabinet appointments reflect the relative strength of 
political parties; each party winning more than 5 percent of the 
popular vote is entitled to a proportional number of cabinet 
portfolios. In May 1994, the ANC was allocated seventeen cabi- 
net portfolios, and a minister without portfolio was from the 
ANC. The NP was allocated six cabinet portfolios, and the IFP, 
three. After NP Minister of Finance Derek Keys resigned in July 
1994, that post was designated "nonpartisan," and a new portfo- 
lio, General Services, was allocated to the NP in December 
1994. 

The president, in consultation with national party leaders, 
appoints a minister and deputy minister to manage each cabi- 
net portfolio. In most ministries, a department staffed by gov- 
ernment employees assists the ministry in the implementation 
of national policy. For example, the Department of Education, 
within the Ministry of Education, assists in implementing 
national educational policy. Each department is headed by a 



261 



South Africa: A Country Study 

director general, who is generally a career government 
employee. 

The cabinet customarily travels between the administrative 
capital, Pretoria, and the legislative capital, Cape Town, while 
the parliament is in session. The transitional cabinet's first ses- 
sion on May 23, 1994, took place in Cape Town. The president 
is required to consult with the cabinet and to gain the approval 
of two-thirds of the cabinet on issues of fundamental impor- 
tance, but most cabinet decisions are reached by consensus. 

The diversity represented in the new cabinet in 1994 was a 
major departure from earlier administrations (see table 16, 
Appendix). The ANC held key portfolios, such as foreign 
affairs, defense, safety and security, justice, and land affairs, 
and had strong deputy ministers in finance, home affairs, pro- 
vincial affairs, and agriculture. The ANC appointees included 
older contemporaries of President Mandela, middle-aged 
former exiles, and younger antiapartheid activists of the 1980s. 
There were three women in the senior executive ranks — two 
women cabinet ministers and one woman deputy minister. 

Other sharp breaks with the past were the reorganization 
and the renaming of several ministries. For example, in 1994 
the Ministry of Law and Order became the Ministry of Safety 
and Security, and the Ministry of Information was subsumed 
under the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and Broad- 
casting. In addition, the apartheid-based distinction between a 
racial community's "own" affairs and "general" affairs was abol- 
ished. 

One of the new government's most controversial cabinet 
appointments was the minister of foreign affairs, Alfred Nzo, a 
veteran of the antiapartheid struggle who had little foreign 
affairs background. Nzo's deputy, Aziz Pahad, had been consid- 
ered effective in managing the ANC foreign affairs department 
during the preelection period, and new Deputy President 
Mbeki planned to maintain close oversight of the foreign 
affairs portfolio. Another controversial ANC appointment was 
that of Winnie Mandela, President Mandela's estranged wife, as 
deputy minister of arts, culture, science, and technology. In 
March 1995, the president removed Mrs. Mandela from her 
post as deputy minister, citing insubordination as the cause for 
her dismissal. (After a legal challenge of his action, Mrs. Man- 
dela resigned from the post.) 

Cabinet ministers from the NP included some of the previ- 
ous government's most experienced members. Important port- 



262 



Government and Politics 



folios were assigned to Keys, who retained the finance portfolio 
until his resignation, and to constitutional negotiators Roelf 
Meyer (Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Devel- 
opment) and Dawie de Villiers (Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism). Veteran minister Roelof "Pik" Botha was 
appointed Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs. 

To appease and to accommodate Mandela's rival, the IFP 
leader, Zulu Chief Buthelezi, he was appointed minister of 
home affairs. His duties include managing elections and inter- 
nal issues, several of which affect his IFP stronghold in Kwa- 
Zulu-Natal. Buthelezi also shares responsibility for resolving 
the country's growing problem of illegal immigration from 
neighboring states. 

Parliament 

Under the interim constitution of 1993, legislative authority 
is vested in a bicameral parliament consisting of the National 
Assembly (lower house) and the Senate (upper house), based 
in the country's legislative capital, Cape Town. Members of the 
National Assembly are chosen by proportional representation: 
constitutionally, 200 of the 400 assembly delegates are chosen 
from party lists of national candidates, and 200 are chosen 
from lists of candidates representing specific provinces. The 
200 selected from provincial party lists are allocated in the fol- 
lowing proportions: Eastern Cape 28, Free State 14, Gauteng 
44, KwaZulu-Natal 42, Mpumalanga 11, Northern Cape 4, 
Northern Province 25, North-West Province 12, and Western 
Cape 20. 

In 1994 individual delegates could choose to run as national 
or provincial party delegates. Provincial party leaders submit- 
ted lists of delegates after elections or party caucuses in each 
province. A candidate nominated on a provincial list had to be 
a resident of that province, although exceptions were made for 
parties that listed only one nonresident candidate, or for cases 
in which fewer than 10 percent of the party's nominees lived 
outside the province. The assembly delegates elected a speaker 
and deputy speaker to preside over their deliberations. The 
speaker and the deputy speaker retained their parliamentary 
seats but could not vote, except in the case of a tie. 

The Senate consists of ten members from each of the nine 
provinces, selected by the provincial legislature on the basis of 
proportional representation, to reflect party strength in each 
province. The president and the two deputy presidents preside 



263 



South Africa: A Country Study 



over the Senate and are also members of the Senate. Although 
not granted a deliberative vote, they can vote in case of a tie. 

The bicameral parliament is empowered not only to pass 
laws, but, in its additional role as the Constitutional Assembly, 
to draft and to adopt the final constitution, which had to be 
completed in 1996. Although intended to serve as the interim 
legislature for five years, parliament may be dissolved at any 
time by presidential decree, followed by new parliamentary 
elections. 

The interim constitution requires ordinary bills introduced 
in either house of parliament to be voted on by both houses. If 
one house passes a bill and the other rejects it, the bill is 
referred to a joint committee from both houses. Both houses 
approve bills affecting the powers and the boundaries of prov- 
inces; the appropriate provincial legislature also must approve 
any bill affecting the powers and the boundaries of that prov- 
ince. Both houses deal with bills appropriating revenue or 
imposing taxes, and in case of a conflict between houses on any 
bill, the decision of the National Assembly prevails. 

In accordance with the interim constitution, parliament gen- 
erally convenes from January to June each year in Cape Town, 
although a briefer session may be called later in the year if 
needed. All members of the government plus many of the 
departmental secretaries and heads of other executive agencies 
reside in Cape Town when parliament is in session. 

Reflecting the far-reaching changes in the new political sys- 
tem, the new parliament in 1994, unlike its predecessor, 
adopted an informal dress code — many new members dis- 
pensed with the conventional Western suit and instead wore 
kaftans or safari suits. For the first time as well, some speeches 
in parliament were delivered in African languages, with a bevy 
of translators assembled to render them in English or Afri- 
kaans. 

Volkstaat Council 

In November 1994, the Volkstaat Council Act (No. 30) of 
1994 established a Volkstaat Council within the legislative 
branch of the government to investigate the possibility of estab- 
lishing an Afrikaner state within South Africa. The twenty 
members of the council were elected by a joint session of the 
National Assembly and the Senate. The functions of the coun- 
cil are to gather information concerning possible powers, 
boundaries, and structures of such a state; to study the feasibil- 



264 



Government and Politics 



ity of these; and to submit recommendations to the joint 
National Assembly and Senate. The Volkstaat Council began 
deliberations in early 1995. Its formal proposals had not been 
presented as of mid-1996. 

Provincial and Local Government 

Until 1994 South Africa was divided administratively into 
four provinces, the Cape Province, Natal Province, the Trans- 
vaal, and the Orange Free State; six "self-governing" home- 
lands, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, 
and QwaQwa; and four "independent" homelands or "sover- 
eign independent states," Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, 
and Ciskei (see fig. 11). The government estimated in the early 
1990s that 44 percent of the country's total population resided 
in the ten homelands, which formed less than 14 percent of 
the total land area. A 1992 study by the Urban Foundation, a 
South African research organization, concluded that this high 
population density — several hundred persons per square kilo- 
meter in some areas — greatly exacerbated socioeconomic and 
political problems in the homelands. 

To resolve these problems, government and ANC negotia- 
tors redrew the country's internal boundaries, dissolving the 
homeland boundaries and forming nine new provinces (see 
fig. 1). The demarcation process began in May 1993, when the 
Multiparty Negotiating Council appointed a 150-member Com- 
mission on the Demarcation of States/Provinces/Regions, with 
instructions to hold a public hearing and to submit recommen- 
dations to the council. After receiving 304 written reports and 
hearing eighty oral witnesses, the commission recommended 
the formation of nine provinces, with a few disputed borders to 
be reconsidered at a later date. These recommendations were 
incorporated into the interim constitution, and the homelands 
were officially dissolved on April 27, 1994. 

The interim constitution assigns authority in each of the 
nine provinces to a provincial executive, or premier, and a leg- 
islative assembly. The premier, elected by the legislators, selects 
a council, or cabinet, based on proportional representation of 
political parties (see table 17, Appendix). Provincial legisla- 
tures have between thirty and 100 members, although within 
those limits, the size of the legislature is proportional to the 
number of votes cast in the province — i.e., the total is divided 
by 50,000, and that number is added to the base of thirty dele- 
gates (see table 18, Appendix). Thus, at both the provincial 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

and the national levels, voters select a political party they wish 
to have represent them rather than a specific individual to 
serve as legislator. The legislators are chosen on the basis of 
proportional representation from lists of party representatives. 

The capitals of the new provinces are Cape Town (Western 
Cape), Kimberley (Northern Cape), Bisho (Eastern Cape), 
Bloemfontein (Free State), Nelspruit (Mpumalanga), Pieters- 
burg (Northern Province), Johannesburg (Gauteng), and 
Mmabatho (North- West Province). The capital of KwaZulu- 
Natal was not yet decided, between Ulundi and Pietermar- 
itzburg, as of 1996. 

As the 1994 elections approached, the government 
amended the interim constitution to strengthen the power of 
the provincial governments, largely in an attempt to appease 
Zulu and Afrikaner separatists. These new measures uphold 
the general principle of "self-determination," to the extent that 
people of a common culture are allowed to establish a "territo- 
rial homeland" where their language and traditions can be 
maintained. They also stipulate that the resulting homeland 
must have broad popular support within its boundaries and its 
policies may not be racially or ethnically discriminatory. The 
amendments also assign to the provincial authorities the power 
to levy taxes and to formulate a provincial constitution, as long 
as they do not violate constitutional provisions concerning fun- 
damental rights. Furthermore, to satisfy Zulu aspirations, the 
negotiators adopted the name KwaZulu-Natal for the former 
Natal Province and agreed to allow the Zulu king to retain his 
honorary crown and to continue to receive his salary from the 
central government. 

Although the new provincial administrations assumed power 
immediately after the April 1994 elections, many of them were 
unable to deliver government services to their constituents in 
the months following the elections. Provincial authority had 
not yet been fully defined, and many provincial and local-level 
offices and procedures continued to be under the control of 
apartheid-era civil servants. Throughout 1995, several provin- 
cial administrators demanded more autonomy and more finan- 
cial support from the central government, and this issue 
delayed agreement on a draft of the final constitution in 1996. 

One of the last steps in the creation of the new political sys- 
tem was the establishment of new local government institutions 
below the provincial level. The government planned for elec- 
tions in 1995 to replace the existing all-white city councils with 



266 



Town meeting at chiefs kraal in Makushane location, Northern Province 

Courtesy R. T. K Scully 

nonracial, democratically chosen municipal governments and 
to establish multiracial local councils in rural districts. The 
Local Government Transition Act (No. 209) of 1993 required 
40 percent of local government members to be elected by a sys- 
tem of proportional representation using a party list system, 
and 60 percent to represent individual localities. The interim 
constitution specified that the existing local governments in 
1994 would continue in place until the new elections were 
held. 

On November 1, 1995, local government elections were held 
in all areas of the country except KwaZulu-Natal and some 
parts of the Western Cape. The elections put in place munici- 
pal and rural councils, replacing the bureaucratic infrastruc- 
ture that had existed since the apartheid era. The elections 
were successfully held in 686 constituencies, although only 
about 52 percent of the registered electorate turned out to 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

vote. The ANC won seats on all 686 councils, and it won a 
majority of the seats on 387 councils. The NP won a majority of 
seats on forty-five councils. The Freedom Front won control 
over one local council. Independent or nonpartisan candidates 
won a majority of seats on at least forty-two councils. A few elec- 
tions were finally decided in byelections held in early 1996. In 
KwaZulu-Natal and areas of the Western Cape, the local gov- 
ernment elections were postponed until mid-1996. 

Drafting a Final Constitution 

On May 8, 1996, the Constitutional Assembly completed two 
years of work on a draft of a final constitution, intended to 
replace the interim constitution of 1993 by the year 1999. The 
draft embodied many of the provisions contained in the 
interim constitution, but some of the differences between 
them were controversial. In the final constitution, the Govern- 
ment of National Unity is replaced by a majoritarian govern- 
ment — an arrangement referred to by its critics as "winner- 
take-all" in national elections. Instead of requiring political par- 
ties to share executive power, the final constitution would 
enable the majority party to appoint cabinet members and 
other officials without necessarily consulting the minority par- 
ties that would be represented in the National Assembly. 

The draft final constitution in 1996 also proposes changes in 
the country's legislative structure. The National Assembly 
would continue to be the country's only directly elected house 
of parliament, but the Senate would be replaced by a National 
Council of Provinces. Like its predecessor, the new council 
would consist of legislators chosen to represent each of the 
country's nine provinces. The new council would include some 
temporary delegates from each province, however, so some leg- 
islators would rotate between the National Council of Prov- 
inces and the provincial legislatures from which they were 
chosen. 

Negotiators in the early 1990s had agreed that the 1996 draft 
constitution would be submitted to the Constitutional Court to 
ensure that it conformed to agreed-upon constitutional princi- 
ples, such as the commitment to a multiparty democracy, based 
on universal franchise without discrimination. In May 1996, 
however, the Constitutional Court did not immediately 
approve the draft as received; instead, it referred the document 
back to the Constitutional Assembly for revision and clarifica- 
tion of specific provisions. Chief among its concerns were the 



268 



Government and Politics 



need to clarify references to the powers that would devolve to 
the provincial legislatures and the rights of organized labor 
and management in an industrial dispute. The Constitutional 
Assembly was revising the draft constitution as of mid-1996. 

Even before it was approved or implemented, the draft con- 
stitution had an immediate impact on the structure of govern- 
ment in 1996. Just one day after the draft had been completed 
by the Constitutional Assembly the National Party declared its 
intention to resign from the Government of National Unity, 
effective June 30, 1996. In the weeks leading up to the NP's for- 
mal departure from the executive branch, NP leaders repeat- 
edly tried to assure voters that the party would play a 
constructive role in politics as a loyal critic of the ANC-led gov- 
ernment. President Mandela, too, accepted the NP departure 
as a sign of a "maturing democracy." NP legislators continued 
to serve in the National Assembly and in the Senate. 

The Legal System 

South Africa's legal system, like the rest of the political sys- 
tem, was radically transformed as the apartheid-based constitu- 
tional system was restructured during the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, many laws unrelated to apartheid continued to 
be rooted in the old legal system. Thus, the justice system after 
1994 reflected elements of both the apartheid-era system and 
nondiscriminatory reforms. 

The Apartheid- Era Legal System 

The principles embodied in the legal system were adapted 
from Roman-Dutch law with an admixture of English law intro- 
duced after 1806. The influence of English law is most pro- 
nounced in criminal legal procedures, in constitutional or 
statutory law, and in corporate and mercantile law. Roman- 
Dutch law predominates in private law — for example, the law 
of persons, of property, of succession, and the law of sale and 
lease. Despite the influence of these universally accepted laws, 
however, a prominent feature of the former legal system was 
the pervasive role of discriminatory apartheid-based laws, regu- 
lations, and codes (see The Legislative Implementation of 
Apartheid, ch. 1), and the extensive judicial apparatus 
required to enforce them. 

Judicial authority is vested in the state, and the minister of 
justice is responsible for administering the justice system. The 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

president appoints the attorneys general, who order public 
prosecutions on behalf of the state, and whose authority in the 
lower courts is delegated to public prosecutors. Similarly, the 
president also appoints judges from among members of the 
bar. Until the 1990s, all judges were white. The legal profession 
is divided broadly, as in Britain, into advocates (barristers) and 
attorneys (solicitors); only the former can plead a case in a 
higher court. 

The judicial system is headed by the Supreme Court, the 
decisions and interpretations of which are considered an 
important source of the law. The Supreme Court comprises an 
Appellate Division and six provincial divisions. Each provincial 
division encompasses a judge president, three local divisions 
presided over by judges, and magisterial divisions presided over 
by magistrates. Separate traditional courts administer African 
traditional law and custom; they are presided over by tradi- 
tional leaders, often chiefs or respected elders. 

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the highest 
court in the country and is seated in Bloemfontein, the coun- 
try's judicial capital. The Appellate Division is composed of the 
chief justice and the judges of appeal, whose number varies, as 
determined by the president. Supreme Court members can be 
removed only on grounds of misbehavior or incapacity. The 
Appellate Division's decisions are binding on all lower courts, 
as are the decisions — within their areas of jurisdiction — of the 
provincial and the local divisions. Lower courts, which are pre- 
sided over by civil service magistrates, have limited jurisdiction 
in civil and criminal cases. In 1995, there were 309 district mag- 
istrates' offices, presided over by 1,014 magistrates, 1,196 prose- 
cutors, and 3,717 officers. 

The Legal Aid Society, an independent statutory body, pro- 
vides advice and assistance to indigent persons. Other pro- 
grams offer aid or rehabilitation to prisoners. Until the mid- 
1990s, a few private voluntary organizations, such as Black 
Sash, offered legal assistance to people who faced legal prob- 
lems arising out of the pass laws or other apartheid-era legisla- 
tion. 

The New Legal System 

The postapartheid legal system introduced by the interim 
constitution of 1993 embodies the supreme law of the land and 
is binding on all judicial organs of the state. It establishes an 
independent judiciary, including a Constitutional Court with 



270 



Supreme Court in Bloemfontein 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 



the power to review and to abolish legislation inconsistent with 
the constitution. It includes provisions not found in apartheid- 
era laws, such as a prohibition on all forms of discrimination 
and an emphasis on individual rights. These rights include 
"equality before the law and equal protection of the law"; free- 
dom of expression, assembly, demonstration, petition, and 
association; the right to "choose a place of residence anywhere 
in the national territory"; the right not to be deprived of citi- 
zenship without justification; full political rights; full access to 
the courts; and fair and lawful administrative justice mecha- 
nisms, including rights concerning detention, arrest, and accu- 
sation. Other provisions provide for specific rights in areas 
such as economic activity, labor relations, property, environ- 
ment, children, language and culture, education, and condi- 
tions under which a state of emergency can be declared. 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

In 1994 the government established the new Constitutional 
Court, a Human Rights Commission, and a Judicial Services 
Commission that forwarded to the president its ten nominees 
to the Constitutional Court. Legislation in 1994 also set forth 
operating procedures for these bodies and established the 
Office of the Public Protector (public defender). 

The new legal system also deals with the consequences of 
apartheid-related abuses and crimes, although it aims primarily 
to promote a spirit of national reconciliation and a new "cul- 
ture of human rights," rather than to resolve long-standing 
grievances. In June 1994, the government announced that a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission would investigate accu- 
sations of human rights abuses and political crimes by both 
supporters and opponents of apartheid, and that it would con- 
sider related issues such as amnesty and reparation to survivors 
and their dependents. The government established guidelines 
for the commission's operations in 1994 and 1995, and the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission began hearing testi- 
mony by both victims and perpetrators of apartheid-era vio- 
lence in early 1996 (see Human Rights and National 
Reconciliation, ch. 5). 

Political Participation 

The abolition of apartheid radically transformed political 
participation in South Africa in the 1990s. This change, in 
turn, had a major impact on the nature of the country's elec- 
toral system, political parties, and political elites. 

The 1 994 Elections 

Until the nonracial elections in April 1994, the laws of apart- 
heid governed elections. An elections administrator, or chief 
electoral officer, prepared a list based on the population regis- 
try of people who were qualified to register as voters. They had 
to be more than eighteen years of age and, under the 1983 con- 
stitution, to belong to one of the constituencies of the three 
racially based houses of parliament — white, coloured, and 
Indian (see Limited Reforms, ch. 1). In the 1989 parliamentary 
election, for example, only 2,176,481 votes were cast, out of 
3,170,667 registered voters and a total population of almost 28 
million. 

In the April 1994 national and provincial elections, nineteen 
political parties, representing the country's diverse constituen- 



272 



Voters in Cape Town (above) and Durban (below) 
in historic elections of April 1994 
Courtesy James B, Parks 



273 



South Africa: A Country Study 

ties, participated in the electoral process. Each voter received 
two ballots and cast two votes (enabling each voter to choose 
different parties at the national and the provincial levels). Vot- 
ers selected a political party, not an individual candidate, to 
represent them in the National Assembly and in the provincial 
legislature. Each party had prepared ranked lists of delegates 
for the national and the provincial legislatures. Political parties 
gained seats in each body proportionally, according to the 
number of votes each party received, and party delegates 
became legislators based on their ranking on the appropriate 
list. 

The number of eligible voters in 1994 was estimated at 21.7 
million — about 16 million of whom had never voted before. In 
a radical departure from previous electoral practice, no formal 
voter register was prepared; instead, voters were asked to 
present identity books as proof of citizenship, and even this 
requirement was enforced with flexibility. Officials had deter- 
mined before the elections that about 2.5 million people — 
mostly blacks — lacked identity books, and most of these were 
given temporary identity papers. For most residents of the 
homelands, valid travel documents were accepted as legal iden- 
tification. 

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) created a 
state electoral fund with an estimated 22 million rands (for 
value of the rand — see Glossary) to finance the April 1994 elec- 
tions. Half of that amount was distributed among participating 
political parties before the election, and the balance afterward. 
The first payment was made in late March 1994 to nine parties 
that had submitted documentation of popular support. 

During the campaign, political parties were hampered by 
several factors. One of the major challenges was the need to 
educate the electorate, particularly those who had never voted 
before, in basic elements of democracy and electoral proce- 
dures. For example, there was a great deal of skepticism about 
democratic practices — such as the secret ballot — particularly in 
rural areas where literacy rates are low, and where traditional 
leaders and white employers had often manipulated political 
participation in the past. In addition, the political violence 
leading up to the elections threatened to keep many potential 
first-time voters away from the polls. ANC voters felt especially 
vulnerable in KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, and Giskei, where the 
apartheid-era homeland leaders and security forces had 
harassed and intimidated ANC supporters. Similarly, in ANC- 



274 



Government and Politics 



controlled areas, some of that party's activists intimidated IFP, 
NP, and even liberal Democratic Party (DP) organizers and dis- 
rupted their campaign rallies, despite ANC leaders' pleas for 
tolerance. Finally, the election posed a logistical nightmare for 
the IEC, which had to accommodate the IFP's last-minute deci- 
sion to participate in the elections and add the party's name to 
the ballots. The IEC helped monitor the more-than-9,000 poll- 
ing stations and was responsible for verifying the vote count 
before it was announced. 

The IEC reported that it had counted 19,726,579 ballots and 
rejected 193,081 as invalid. The voting was declared generally 
free and fair. Observer missions from the United Nations 
(UN), British Commonwealth, European Union (EU — see 
Glossary), and Organization of African Unity (OAU) issued 
this statement: "South Africans' confidence in the secrecy of 
the ballot was manifest and they were able to participate freely 
in the elections. The outcome of the elections reflects the will 
of the people of South Africa." 

Seven political parties won seats in the National Assembly, 
the ANC, 252 seats (representing 62.6 percent of the popular 
vote); the NP, 82 seats (20.4 percent); the IFP, 43 seats (10.5 
percent); the Freedom Front (FF), 9 seats (2.2 percent); the 
DP, 7 seats (1.7 percent); the PAC, 5 seats (1.2 percent); and 
the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), 2 seats (0.5 
percent). Twelve other parties received too few votes to be rep- 
resented in the National Assembly. Each of the seven major 
parties also won representation in at least one of the nine pro- 
vincial legislatures. The ANC won a majority in seven provincial 
legislatures. The NP won a majority in the Western Cape; and 
the IFP did so in KwaZulu-Natal (see table 18, Appendix). 

Political Parties 

South Africa's political party system underwent radical trans- 
formation in the early 1990s when previously illegal parties 
were unbanned and participated in the April 1994 elections. In 
what international observers called a "developing multiparty 
system," parties were challenged to become all-inclusive and 
not to limit their appeal to their traditional constituent groups. 
They also had to reorient themselves to participate in the 
bicameral multiracial legislature rather than the previous tri- 
cameral apartheid-based parliament. The most successful of 
the parties in the April 1994 elections (and the South African 



275 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Communist Party) are described below, in order of decreasing 
parliamentary strength. 

African National Congress 

The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 
as the South African Native National Congress, under the lead- 
ership of Dr. Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, a Durban attorney. It was 
renamed the African National Congress in 1923. Although the 
ANC cooperated to some degree with the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA — later, in 1953, the South African Commu- 
nist Party, or SACP) in the early 1920s, cooperation ceased in 
1927 when some traditional African leaders opposed white-led 
communist involvement in the black nationalist movement. In 
the 1930s, the ANC's influence declined, primarily because it 
was unsuccessful in representing black grievances and was 
weakened by factionalism and leadership disarray. The ANC's 
revival in the 1940s was largely the result of a dynamic group of 
young leaders — including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, 
Oliver Tambo, and Anton Lembede — who were influenced by 
a pan-African version of black nationalism. In 1943 they estab- 
lished the ANC Youth League to mobilize mass protest against 
racial discrimination. Following the rise to power of the NP in 
1948 and its implementation of strict apartheid laws, the ANC, 
with many of the Youth League founders then in leadership 
positions, responded by launching a series of countrywide defi- 
ance campaigns. This activism invigorated the ANC and 
resulted in the movement's growth from 7,000 to some 100,000 
dues-paying members in 1952. 

In the mid-1950s, the ANC formed the Congress Alliance 
with other antiapartheid organizations to oppose the white 
state. On June 26, 1955, alliance members adopted the Free- 
dom Charter, which advocated the creation of a nonsocialist 
multiracial society, but the debate over the charter widened an 
ideological rift in the ANC between Charterists and Africanists, 
concerning the question of multiracialism. A few activists 
opposed the ANC's inclusive policies and established the Pan- 
Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959 to press for black political 
control. 

The government declared the ANC an illegal organization 
on April 8, 1960, as part of a government crackdown and state 
of emergency following violent antiapartheid incidents at 
Sharpeville and Langa. The ANC went underground, many of 
its cadres left South Africa for exile in neighboring states, and 



276 



Government and Politics 



its leaders adopted armed struggle as a means of achieving 
their goals. In 1961 ANC and SACP leaders created a joint mili- 
tary wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation," also 
known as Umkhonto, MK). The principle of armed struggle 
through guerrilla warfare to overthrow the South African 
regime superseded the goal of gaining political rights for all cit- 
izens. ANC sabotage and attacks between 1960 and 1962 led to 
the arrest of many party leaders. At the 1963 trial that became 
renowned as "the Rivonia trial," Mandela, Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, 
and others were convicted of treason and were sentenced to 
life terms in prison. Most ANC leaders fled the country, estab- 
lished ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, and continued 
their struggle against the Pretoria regime. 

Over the years, the ANC built up a strong support network 
in many Western and Eastern-bloc states, in cooperation with 
overseas antiapartheid groups. Although certain Western 
states, particularly Scandinavian countries, provided financial 
support, the ANC's logistical support, including the supply of 
weapons, came from the Soviet Union and the German Demo- 
cratic Republic (East Germany). The ANC also attained 
observer status at the UN and during the 1980s broadened its 
diplomatic ties with Western states. 

The ANC's leadership structure consists of the president, 
deputy president, secretary general, deputy secretary general, 
and treasurer general. A ninety-member National Executive 
Committee (NEC) consults with senior officers and influences 
decisions on important issues. A twenty-six-member National 
Working Committee (NWC), chosen from the NEC, oversees 
day-to-day decision making and administration and manages 
the party's functional departments. The seven appointed mem- 
bers of the President's Committee serve as presidential advisers 
and assistants. 

The ANC's annual national conference brings together 
more than 1,300 representatives, whose functions are to elect 
the NEC and to nominate delegates to the party's National 
Assembly, which meets every five years. At a working level, the 
party has nine national departments — Information and 
Research, Manpower and Development, Foreign Affairs, Youth, 
Political Education, Information and Publicity, Finance, Reli- 
gious Affairs, and Women — as well as branches in each of the 
provinces. 

In the early 1990s, the ANC took a number of steps to 
broaden its political base. It reactivated the ANC Youth League 



277 



South Africa: A Country Study 



in order to bridge the generational gap between its older lead- 
ers and young members. In addition, propelled by the many 
politically active women in the organization, the ANC reacti- 
vated its Women's League in order to promote women's rights 
nationwide. The ANC Youth League and the ANC Women's 
League work in cooperation with the corresponding depart- 
ments within the ANC. 

Although the ANC primarily represents the interests of the 
majority black population, its membership is open to whites, 
coloureds, and Asians, as well. It had appealed to all races to 
join in 1969, and a substantial number of white liberals did join 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. In April 1991, five white mem- 
bers of parliament representing the Democratic Party left that 
party to join the ANC, giving the ANC official parliamentary 
representation for the first time in the all-white House of 
Assembly. 

Until the ANC and the NP-led government entered into 
negotiations over the country's political future in 1991, the 
ANC's ideological platform for opposing apartheid ranged 
from Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi's strategy of passive resis- 
tance (in the early 1900s), to pan-Africanism (in the 1940s), to 
the Freedom Charter in 1955. In 1969 the ANC adopted an 
official policy advocating armed struggle to gain political con- 
trol of the state, and in 1988 it promulgated the Constitutional 
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, derived from the 
Freedom Charter of the 1950s. These guidelines called for a 
nonracial democratic state based on universal franchise. In 
August 1989, the ANC adopted the Harare Declaration, advo- 
cating multiparty negotiations to arrive at a new form of gov- 
ernment, giving strong emphasis to the concept of individual 
rights. 

The ANC's major political partner throughout most of the 
apartheid era was the SACP. SACP leaders helped the ANC to 
secure the support of communist and socialist governments 
during its period of exile, played important roles in ANC policy 
formulation, and helped to consolidate support for the ANC in 
the labor movement. The SACP at times played a moderating 
role in the ANC, too; for example, in early 1993 SACP chair Joe 
Slovo drafted the ANC's proposals, couched in a "sunset 
clause," to compromise and to share power with the NP. Slovo's 
position was that compromise was necessary because the party 
was "not dealing with a defeated enemy," but with the NP as a 
minority party. 



278 



Government and Politics 



Although the ANC became the country's dominant political 
party in 1994, it still faced a number of long-term problems. 
The issue of political succession had yet to be resolved. Presi- 
dent Mandela and other senior party leaders were members of 
the older generation, whose active leadership years were draw- 
ing to a close. Mandela had pledged he would not seek reelec- 
tion in 1999. His most likely successors — Thabo Mbeki, the 
former ANC secretary for international affairs, and Cyril Rama- 
phosa, ANC secretary general since 1991 — had not demon- 
strated the decades of practiced leadership of their seniors. 

As the dominant party in the national unity government, the 
ANC had to balance the need to co-manage (along with the 
NP) the country's finances to facilitate economic growth 
against its long-standing affiliation with the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), the labor confederation 
known for vigorously defending workers' interests against those 
of the previous government. The ANC also had to overcome its 
image as a violator of human rights after its leaders acknowl- 
edged there had been instances of torture, execution, and 
abuse of dissidents in its exile camps and in some black town- 
ships during the antiapartheid struggle. In 1993 the party apol- 
ogized for past abuses, but it refused to punish its human rights 
violators or to pay compensation to the victims or their fami- 
lies. 

In 1994 the ANC proposed a number of controversial cabi- 
net appointments, adding to the difficulties inherent in trans- 
forming itself from a former liberation movement into a broad- 
based political party. A notable case was that of Winnie Man- 
dela, who had earlier been regarded as South Africa's "first lady 
of liberation." She had staged a political comeback after being 
stripped of her official posts in the ANC and after being 
shunned by many black leaders because of her 1991 conviction 
for her part in a kidnapping that had resulted in a death. Her 
five-year jail sentence was set aside for a fine, but she was subse- 
quently removed from the ANC's NEC and as head of its Wel- 
fare Department. 

Mrs. Mandela went on to organize an independent power 
base in the restive and impoverished squatter camps, where she 
was respected for her activism on behalf of the poor. In some 
communities, Mrs. Mandela was able to capitalize on the wide- 
spread distrust of government that extended even to black 
leaders like Nelson Mandela. During the preelection negotia- 
tions, she had criticized power-sharing proposals as a deal 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

between "the elite of the oppressed and the oppressors" and 
had charged ANC leaders with "the distortion of a noble goal 
in favor of a short-cut route to parliament by a handful of indi- 
viduals." But while she chided ANC leaders for their new-found 
"embourgeoisement," Mrs. Mandela continued to live in rela- 
tive luxury in the Johannesburg township of Soweto. Even after 
she fell out of favor with the government led by her husband in 
1994, she remained popular, especially among the poor and 
unemployed. Her defiance of the government led to her 
removal from office in March 1995. 

South African Communist Party 

In 1994 the South African Communist Party (SACP) was not 
an independent political entity, but a strong faction within the 
ANC, where its members held important leadership positions. 
Former party leaders, Joe Slovo and Chris Hani, for example, 
had both served as chief of staff of the ANC's military wing and 
on its most important committees. The SACP won strong rep- 
resentation in the National Assembly in 1994, not by participat- 
ing openly in the April 1994 elections, but by having SACP 
members well represented among delegates from the ANC. 

The SACP was originally founded as the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) in July 1921 in Cape Town. The CPSA was 
formed out of the merger of several leftist organizations, 
including the International Socialist League (ISL), the Social 
Democratic Federation, the Durban Marxist Club, the Cape 
Communist Party, and the Jewish Socialist Society. The CPSA 
affiliated with the Communist International (Comintern), 
headquartered in Moscow, which provided it with political 
direction, although some party factions opposed Moscow's 
intervention in South African affairs. 

Although whites dominated the party in the 1920s, some 
CPSA leaders attempted to strengthen its reputation as an 
indigenous communist organization by increasing its African 
membership and orientation. David Ivon Jones and Sidney Per- 
cival Bunting, formerly of the ISL, translated the concept of 
social revolution into a struggle for a "black republic" and a 
"democratic native republic, with equal rights for all races." 
The major stumbling block they encountered was the belief, 
inherent in Marxist dogma, that all workers fundamentally 
share the same interests. In South Africa, white workers gener- 
ally felt they had little in common with their black counterparts 



280 



Government and Politics 



and feared that any improvements for black workers would 
reduce their own status and income. 

Despite efforts at Africanization, the CPSA failed to establish 
strong ties with black political organizations, many of which 
were dominated by traditional tribal leaders. In 1928, for exam- 
ple, the ANC denounced the "fraternization" between the ANC 
and the CPSA. ANC President James T. Gumede was removed 
from office in 1930, after trying to educate ANC members 
about Marxism. Even as the CPSA gradually succeeded in 
recruiting more black members, its leadership continued to be 
white. For this reason, two ANC Youth League leaders in the 
1940s — Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu — opposed any alli- 
ance between the ANC and the CPSA at that time. 

CPSA members were divided over the increasing Comintern 
intervention in local affairs. Moscow urged the CPSA and all 
communist parties to continue to be small, revolutionary elite 
organizations, and to rid the party of alleged "rightist" ele- 
ments. In 1931 a new Stalinist faction, led by Douglas Wolton, 
Molly Wolton, and Lazar Bach, assumed leadership roles in the 
CPSA and proceeded to purge the party of many white leaders. 
In the internal upheaval that followed, the party lost black sup- 
port, too, and weakened its ties to labor. As its leadership ranks 
were "Stalinized" and leading party activists fled the country, 
CPSA membership dropped from an estimated 1,750 members 
in 1928 to about 150 in 1933. Racial divisions continued to 
exist between the predominantly white leadership and the 
largely black membership ranks. 

At the outset of World War II, the CPSA opposed efforts to 
counter the Nazi threat, primarily because of the 1939 Nazi- 
Soviet Nonaggression Pact, which led to Soviet neutrality. Party 
members campaigned against military recruitment of blacks 
(and Indians) in South Africa, arguing that the "natives" 
should not be sacrificed to perpetuate their own exploitation. 
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the CPSA 
echoed Moscow's shift to support the anti-Nazi campaign, and 
the South African government responded by releasing some 
CPSA activists from detention and permitting political activities 
in support of the war effort. 

By the mid-1940s, CPSA membership was increasing, and the 
party had gained influence after a few CPSA members (all 
white) won political office. After the 1948 NP election victory, 
however, the government quickly restricted black political 
activity and in 1950 banned the CPSA. The party went under- 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

ground temporarily but also strengthened its ties to local 
nationalist organizations, such as the ANC. During the years it 
was banned, while the ANC continued to operate legally, the 
CPSA viewed the ANC as the primary expression of black aspi- 
rations for a multiracial socialist state under eventual commu- 
nist leadership. The Comintern's Sixth Congress declared that 
"the CPSA could now play an active role in the ANC." The party 
re-emerged in 1953 under the leadership of Joe Slovo and his 
wife, Ruth First, and changed its name to the SACP. 

The SACP and the ANC in the 1950s held similar views 
about policy and tactics as embodied in the ANC's Freedom 
Charter; in addition, they both advocated the use of guerrilla 
warfare against the apartheid regime in order to bring about 
the dual-phase revolution of political liberation followed by 
economic transformation. Party members reportedly per- 
suaded the ANC to abandon African nationalism in favor of 
nonracialism, however, although the SACP, unlike the ANC, 
viewed the primary objective of the revolution as the creation 
of a socialist state. After many leaders of both organizations 
were arrested in 1963, both the SACP and the ANC shifted 
their political and military bases of operations to neighboring 
African states. 

The close ties between the SACP and the ANC, particularly 
the predominance of SACP members in the ANC, have always 
been controversial, and in 1959 prompted a split by black 
nationalists from the ANC to form the militant Africanist, anti- 
communist PAC. The SACP-ANC relationship evolved into a 
symbiosis, derived in part from their dual memberships and 
overlapping leadership ranks. Throughout the 1980s, for 
example, the SACP was well represented on the ANC's NEC 
and in other key ANC positions, and in ANC-affiliated labor 
organizations, such as COSATU. 

When the SACP was unbanned in February 1990, its 
strength was difficult to estimate because many party members 
had been underground for years. In July 1990, a party spokes- 
man publicized the names of twenty-two SACP members who 
were prominent in national politics but said that the names of 
others would remain secret. In 1991 SACP leaders estimated 
that the party had 10,000 dues-paying members, but refused to 
publish the party's membership rolls. 

SACP chairman Joe Slovo was the most prominent party 
member in government in 1994. Slovo was a trained lawyer and 
advocate, a member of the Johannesburg Bar, and one of the 



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Government and Politics 



original members of MK, the ANC military wing. He served on 
the ANC's revolutionary council from 1969 until it was dis- 
banded in 1983, became the first white member of the ANC's 
NEC in 1985, and served as MK chief of staff until April 1987. 
He was appointed SACP general secretary in 1986, following 
the death of Moses Madhiba, and continued in that post until 
1991, when he became party chairman. Slovo was appointed 
minister of housing in the Government of National Unity in 
May 1994 and served in that post until his death in January 
1995. 

Slovo had been a hard-line communist, a Stalinist, when he 
joined the party in the 1940s, but along with others in the 
SACP had followed Moscow's 1980s reforms. By 1987 Slovo and 
his associates espoused the creation of a multiparty state with a 
mixed economy, and sought to broaden the party's member- 
ship base. This liberal philosophy might have explained the 
SACP's large representation among ANC leaders in the 1990s. 
The collapse of the Soviet system in the late 1980s had weak- 
ened the SACP's outside support and appeared to have weak- 
ened the appeal of the socialist ideals the party espoused for 
South Africa. Party activists believed, nonetheless, that the 
remaining economic disparities among racial groups provided 
fertile ground for SACP recruitment in the 1990s. 

SACP leaders, considerably weakened by the murder of 
Chris Hani in 1993, debated the possibility that the party no 
longer represented a political asset to the ANC, as they pre- 
pared for the April 1994 elections. They realized that the SACP 
could do little to help the ANC broaden its popular support 
beyond its liberation allies, and public opinion polls gave the 
SACP, alone, strong support among only about 5 percent of 
voters. By including a large number of SACP members among 
the electoral delegates representing the ANC in the April 1994 
elections, however, the SACP was able to gain significantly 
more representation in the national and provincial legislatures 
and more key posts in the government than it would have, had 
it run independently. 

National Party 

In the early 1990s, the National Party (NP), led by President 
de Klerk, led the white community in radically transforming 
the apartheid system and ushering in nonracial democracy. 
This process also served to transform the NP into a modern 
democratic party, while at the same time depriving it of the 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

uninterrupted political dominance it had enjoyed for some 
forty-five years. 

The present-day NP emerged out of Afrikaner organizations 
of the early 1900s. Founded by General J.B.M. Hertzog in Janu- 
ary 1914 as an expression of Afrikaner ideology and ethnic 
nationalism, the NP sought to strengthen racial separation and 
to oppose British rule in South Africa. The NP, in alliance with 
the Labour Party — a white organization led by Colonel F.H.P. 
Creswell — defeated General Jan C. Smuts's ruling South Afri- 
can Party (SAP) in parliamentary elections in 1924. In 1933 the 
NP formed an alliance with the SAP, and the alliance was for- 
malized in 1934 as the United South Africa National Party, or 
the United Party (UP). The merger prompted staunch segrega- 
tionists from Cape Town to establish the Purified National 
Party under the leadership of Daniel F. (D.F.) Malan, to coun- 
teract the UP's relatively moderate positions on race. The UP 
ruled until it was unexpectedly defeated by Malan's party (then 
known as the Reunited National Party, owing to a reconcilia- 
tion with a conservative faction of the UP) in parliamentary 
elections in May 1948. After the 1948 elections, the victorious 
alliance — again under the banner of the NP — ruled without 
interruption until April 1994. 

The NP's dominance over political and security organiza- 
tions gave it a vast patronage pool for its mostly Afrikaner con- 
stituency. Numerous cultural, social, economic, and religious 
organizations also furthered Afrikaner interests, including the 
Afrikaner Broederbond (later Broederbond, or Brotherhood), 
Nasionale Pers (National Press), South African National Life 
Assurance Company (Sanlam), the Voortrekkers (a scouting 
organization), the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisa- 
tions (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge — FAK), 
Helpmekaar (an Afrikaner social service organization, roughly 
translated "mutual aid"), and Volkskas (People's Bank). 

Although the party did not publish membership figures, 
much was known about its organization — a federal structure 
divided into four provincial parties, linked through a Federal 
Council. At the lowest level were the party's local branches, 
consisting of 500 or fewer members. Local branches in rural 
areas reported to a District Council, which comprised a leader, 
a deputy leader, a secretary, and elected representatives from 
each local branch in the district. In addition, local branches 
elected Constituency Divisional Councils. Above each divi- 
sional council were a Head Council, a Provincial Congress that 



284 



Government and Politics 



met annually, and a provincial leader. At the apex of the NP 
was the thirty-seven-member Federal Council that met at least 
once a year. The national leader of the NP, who until 1994 was 
also the state president, was elected by the party's parliamen- 
tary delegates in caucus. 

Under P.W. Botha's leadership in the 1980s, the NP began to 
change directions, first to reform, and then to dismantle, apart- 
heid. Although these reform initiatives led to a number of 
splits within the NP, the reformist wing (referred to in party 
parlance as verligte, or "enlightened") was sufficiently strong, its 
parliamentary delegation sufficiently disciplined, and its 
national leadership sufficiently cohesive to enable the party to 
remain in power as its members vigorously debated the ques- 
tion of reform. The NP quickly recovered after its conservative 
faction, led by Transvaal NP leader Andries Treurnicht, aban- 
doned the party in February 1982 in protest against the pro- 
posed "power-sharing" constitution that established the 
tricameral parliament. Treurnicht launched the Conservative 
Party (CP), which gained immediate parliamentary representa- 
tion through the conversion of seventeen NP members of par- 
liament. The NP nonetheless retained its majority in the next 
elections in 1987. 

The most dramatic changes in the NP began in 1989, when 
President Botha relinquished his party leadership following a 
stroke and was replaced by then Minister of Education FW. de 
Klerk. De Klerk committed himself to establishing a new post- 
apartheid South Africa, over the objections of Botha, who had 
retained his position as president. The NP's Federal Council in 
June 1989 went on to pass a five-year plan to reform apartheid. 
As de Klerk and Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha pre- 
pared to discuss their planned political reforms with Zambian 
president Kenneth Kaunda later that year, President Botha 
objected to the pace of the proposed reforms, and he opposed 
any plan to hold discussions with Kaunda. In August 1989, his 
intransigence finally prompted the cabinet to ask him to 
resign. He did so in a televised broadcast, and de Klerk suc- 
ceeded him as president. In national elections in September 
1989, the NP under de Klerk's leadership remained in power 
both in the national House of Assembly and in the provincial 
legislatures, and de Klerk was confirmed as president for 
another five-year term. 

The NP then spearheaded the reform process that paved the 
way for the postapartheid political system (see Constitutional 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

Change, this ch.). The NP also sought to project a new party 
image. In 1990 it launched a nationwide recruitment drive for 
new members of all races, appointed a new management coun- 
cil and new regional secretaries to oversee its reforms, and 
established new training programs for party leaders, to empha- 
size racial tolerance. These changes broadened the party's par- 
liamentary support. In May 1991, five MPs deserted the Labour 
Party, which since 1965 had represented the interests of the 
coloured community, to join the NP delegation. Their view that 
the new NP best represented the interests of their community 
was rejected by most of the Labour Party, but the NP continued 
to seek the support of the roughly 1.6 million voters in the 
coloured community. 

As the April 1994 elections approached, the party tried new 
approaches to win support among the country's black majority. 
One of its campaign tactics was to emphasize its active role in 
dismantling apartheid and to portray itself as the liberator of 
the country's black population. The NP also portrayed the 
ANC as intolerant of political dissent. 

The NP failed to gain many black votes in the April 1994 
elections but nonetheless won the second-largest vote — 20.4 
percent of the total, gaining eighty-two seats in the National 
Assembly. The NP won a majority in the Western Cape, gar- 
nered the second-largest vote in seven provinces, and ranked 
third in KwaZulu-Natal. Despite its second-place performance 
in the elections, the NP — by virtue of its long-term political 
dominance — still exerts strong influence in the state bureau- 
cracy and the country's security forces. 

Inkatha Freedom Party 

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP, also Inkatha) is a Zulu- 
based political party, based in its ethnic stronghold, KwaZulu- 
Natal. It is the ANC's main rival in the black community. 
Between 1970 and 1990, Inkatha portrayed itself as a moderate 
and democratic organization, contrasting its views with extrem- 
ist positions within the ANC. But in the early 1990s, the IFP 
became increasingly intransigent in its efforts to preserve its 
traditional power base in KwaZulu, while the rest of the coun- 
try was moving closer to nonracial democracy under the now 
moderate NP and ANC leadership. 

Inkatha was originally established in 1922 as a cultural move- 
ment to promote the Zulu heritage. It was rejuvenated in 1928 
by the Zulu king, Solomon ka Dinuzulu, as Inkatha ya kwa Zulu 



286 



Government and Politics 



(Organization of the Zulu). During this phase, controversy 
arose over the party's activities. For example, critics claimed 
that funds collected from Natal's impoverished black popula- 
tion were misused to pay for King Solomon's lavish life-style. 
Others suggested that the organization's 1928 constitution, 
written by a white lawyer from Durban at the urging of white 
businessmen in Natal, was intended to ensure that the party 
would express the interests of the traditional tribal elites, the 
conservative black petite bourgeoisie, and a few white power 
brokers. After a period of relative inactivity, and following an 
unsuccessful attempt to revive it in 1959, Inkatha ya kwa Zulu 
was reestablished as a political organization in March 1975 by 
KwaZulu's chief minister, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi. 
Buthelezi renamed the organization Inkatha Yenkululeko 
Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement). In August 
1990, following the unbanning of antiapartheid organizations, 
Inkatha proclaimed itself a political party, the IFP, with mem- 
bership open to all races. 

From its primarily Zulu political base, Inkatha has played an 
important role in national politics. In 1977 it was the largest 
legal black movement in the country, having an estimated 
120,000 members; by the late 1980s, its leaders estimated their 
membership at 1.5 million (considered highly inflated by the 
inclusion of the party's 600,000-member Youth Brigade and 
500,000-member Women's Brigade). It has never managed to 
recruit many members outside the Zulu community, however. 

The IFP in the 1990s is a tightly knit and authoritarian orga- 
nization, dominated by Buthelezi. Its political structure consists 
of local branches organized into regions and provinces. The 
IFP's four provincial councils are led by the IFP National Coun- 
cil. Provincial delegates elect representatives to the annual gen- 
eral conference, where delegates to the National Council are 
elected each year. The IFP's power base is rooted in three 
sources — the former KwaZulu homeland bureaucracy, which 
the party controlled by virtue of its dominance over the local 
legislature and provincial government; the Zulu traditional 
leaders — i.e., chiefs and headmen; and the Zulu population, 
including the inhabitants of large squatter settlements near sev- 
eral cities, especially Johannesburg and Durban. 

Although Inkatha and the ANC had close ties in the early 
1970s, their relationship deteriorated after that. Inkatha 
became especially threatened by ANC organizing efforts 
among educated and urban Zulus. The ANC criticized 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

Buthelezi for becoming the leader of the KwaZulu homeland, 
and thereby accepting the government's demographic manipu- 
lation for apartheid purposes. The ANC pressed for a more 
militant antiapartheid campaign and waged a propaganda war 
against Buthelezi, demonizing him as a "stooge" of apartheid. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, this rivalry degenerated into 
violent conflict, spilling over into townships and rural areas, 
and claiming the lives of thousands of black South Africans. 

Some Western observers and South African political leaders 
hoped that the IFP, rooted in Zulu tradition and Western in its 
outlook in support of a federalist democracy and free enter- 
prise, would attract moderate South African blacks to its ranks. 
That prospect dimmed in the climate of escalating violence 
leading up to the 1994 elections. Buthelezi protested against 
his being sidelined by what he considered "ANC-NP collusion" 
in the negotiating process, and in early 1994 he announced 
that the IFP would boycott the country's first free elections. 

The IFP ultimately participated in the elections, after the 
ANC and the NP agreed to consider international mediation 
on the issue of provincial autonomy and agreed to reinforce 
the status of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini and the Zulu home- 
land. The party's late entry cost it popular support at the polls, 
however. The IFP managed to win barely one-half of the vote in 
Natal and only 10.5 percent of the nationwide vote, with most 
of its support in KwaZulu and the area around Johannesburg. 

The IFP's commitment to Zulu autonomy remained strong 
after the elections. In May 1994, at a caucus of the KwaZulu leg- 
islative assembly, Inkatha formed a new society called Iso 
Lesizwe, or Eye of the Nation, with Chief Buthelezi as its presi- 
dent. The new organization dedicated itself to pursuing Zulu 
autonomy "within the parameters of democratic and pluralistic 
forms of government and along with all the other peoples liv- 
ing in the ancestral territory of the Zulu nation." Debate over 
this issue intensified in 1995 and 1996. 

Freedom Front 

The Freedom Front (FF) is a right-wing Afrikaner political 
party established in March 1994, following a split among 
extremist organizations, to ensure a proapartheid presence in 
the April elections. It is a successor to the Afrikaner Volksfront 
(AVF), which was founded by General Constand Viljoen, who 
had also served as chief of the South African Defence Force 
(SADF) until November 1985. Viljoen emerged from retire- 



288 



Government and Politics 



ment in 1991 to lead a group of right-wing former generals in 
forming an alliance of Afrikaner parties. As the AVF, the alli- 
ance included the White Protection Movement (Blanke Bevry- 
dingsbeweging — BBB) , the Boerestaat Party (Boer State Party, 
the military wing of which was known as the the Boer Resis- 
tance Movement, or the Boere Weerstandsbeweging — BWB), 
the Conservative Party of South Africa (CP), the Reconstituted 
National Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party — HNP), the Oran- 
jewerkers (Orange Workers), and the Republic Unity Move- 
ment. The AVF's objective was to unify the extreme right and to 
advocate the formation of a volkstaat, an autonomous Afrikaner 
nation-state, in a postapartheid South Africa. However, even 
some AVF leaders were troubled by the violent racism and 
political extremism of some members of the front. Their 
refusal to participate in the nation's first nonracial elections 
weakened the movement, and in March 1994 General Viljoen 
and his allies broke away to form the FF. 

Much of the support for the FF comes from farmers' organi- 
zations in the former Transvaal and the Free State. Among the 
FF's leaders are several former Conservative Party members of 
parliament, former high-ranking military officers, and a 
former chairman of the Broederbond. 

In the 1994 elections, the FF received only 2.2 percent of the 
vote, gaining nine National Assembly seats. The party per- 
formed best in Gauteng, where some 40 percent of its votes 
were cast. Its participation in the elections helped to legitimize 
the electoral process and thus to neutralize the violent threat 
that the extremist right-wing extraparliamentary forces could 
have posed to the new political system. In doing so, it bolstered 
the standing of Viljoen and others who sought to preserve Afri- 
kaner cultural autonomy through nonviolent means. 

Other Political Parties 

The Democratic Party (DP) was established in April 1989 as 
a liberal, centrist party. It was formed as an amalgamation of 
four liberal political groupings, the most important of which 
was the recently disbanded Progressive Federal Party (PFP), led 
by Zach de Beer. The coalition also included the Independent 
Party (IP), led by Dennis Worrall; the National Democratic 
Movement (NDM), led by Wynand Malan; and a group of 
reform-minded Afrikaners dubbed the "fourth force." The DP 
then became the primary left-of-center parliamentary opposi- 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

tion to the NP. It won 20 percent of white support in the 1989 
general election, giving it thirty-three parliamentary seats. 

The DP advocated the abolition of apartheid and the cre- 
ation of a nonracial social democratic state through the protec- 
tion of human rights, a government based on proportional 
party representation and universal suffrage, an independent 
judiciary, collective bargaining in industrial relations, and eco- 
nomic growth through individual entrepreneurs hip. Ironically, 
the NP adopted some of the DP's notions about reforming the 
apartheid state in 1989 and 1990, thus depriving the DP of 
some of its political base. A few DP leaders advocated an alli- 
ance with the ANC; others favored joining the NP; and the 
embattled center — led by the party's leader de Beer — sought to 
develop a distinctive, liberal, centrist image that would serve to 
mediate between the ANC and the NP. At the same time, the 
DP sought, without much success, to expand its support among 
all racial groups. 

In preparation for the April 1994 elections, the DP's eco- 
nomic program gave top priority to creating jobs in a "free mar- 
ket economy with a social conscience," while rejecting the 
"nationalization of privately owned businesses and the expro- 
priation of property for political purposes." The DP also 
opposed "economic populism," socialism, and the "politiciza- 
tion of education, housing, and social services." Its political 
program criticized the interim constitution for failing to elimi- 
nate laws that allowed detention without trial, and for failing to 
ensure the political independence of the media. The DP also 
opposed the antidefection clauses in the interim constitution, 
which made it difficult for members of parliament to break 
ranks and vote against the dictates of their party leaders. The 
DP called, instead, for a constitution based on individual 
rights, property rights, press freedom, women's rights, propor- 
tional representation within constituencies, federalism, devolu- 
tion of federal powers to the provinces, and the direct election 
of senators by the provincial electorates. 

In the 1994 elections, the DP's performance was considered 
disastrous, as it won only 1.7 percent of the vote and gained 
only seven seats in the National Assembly. The voting results 
revealed that it had failed to broaden its urban, middle-class, 
and English-speaking white base. It had won only about 3 per- 
cent of the coloured vote in the Western Cape, a comparable 
percentage of the Indian vote in KwaZulu-Natal, and no signifi- 
cant black support. 



290 



Government and Politics 



The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was established in April 
1959 by ANC dissidents who opposed that group's multiracial 
orientation and advocated black liberation within an exclu- 
sively black nationalist context. The party was founded in the 
black townships of Orlando and Soweto, outside Johannes- 
burg, where it has received most of its support. The govern- 
ment declared the PAC an "unlawful" organization in 1960, 
because it advocated violent rebellion against the government. 
Like the ANC, the PAC was recognized by the United Nations 
(UN) and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as an 
official South African liberation movement. It was unbanned 
on February 2, 1990. 

As advocates of the black liberation struggle, the PAC's 
founders criticized the ANC for diluting black nationalism by 
accepting white members (and Asians and coloureds). The 
PAC also opposed the ANC's alliance with the SACP because 
most PAC leaders rejected Marxist economic dogma (although 
the PAC had advocated some Maoist tenets in the late 1960s). 
Instead, the PAC advocated an indigenous form of African 
"communalism." It rejected the ANC's Freedom Charter 
because the charter sought to guarantee minority rights in a 
future postapartheid state, and issued instead the Azanian 
Manifesto in 1959. The manifesto promoted armed struggle by 
black South Africans as the only means of seizing power, over- 
throwing capitalism, and restoring their birthright of African 
landownership. Finally, unlike the ANC, which engaged in 
extensive political organizing through formal party structures, 
the PAC believed in the inevitability of national liberation 
through the spontaneous revolt of the masses. 

From 1960 to 1990, the PAC's activities ranged from mass 
action campaigns, such as a campaign in 1960 to overcome 
what it termed "black psychological subservience to whites," to 
protests against the hated pass laws that required black South 
Africans to carry identity documents. One such demonstration 
in March 1960 led to at least sixty-seven deaths at police hands 
and more than 11,000 arrests in subsequent disturbances. The 
PAC's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army 
(APLA) — then known by the name "Poqo" (loosely translated 
"blacks only") — also engaged in an underground armed strug- 
gle against white-dominated political and cultural institutions 
(see Consolidating Apartheid in the 1960s, ch. 1). 

After the PAC was banned in 1960, the organization went 
underground, with headquarters located in Maseru, Lesotho. 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

It was led by an executive committee, the members of which 
had either evaded arrest or been released from prison. The 
PAC's senior leaders included its charismatic founder, Robert 
Sobukwe; acting president Potlako Leballo, who resigned 
under pressure in 1979; Vusumazi Make, who succeeded Leb- 
allo; John Pokela, who became leader in 1981; Johnson 
Mlambo, who succeeded Pokela as chairman in 1985; and Clar- 
ence Makwetu, who became president in 1990. 

Following the PAC's unbanning in 1990, it reorganized as a 
legal political party, although its military wing continued to 
operate underground until 1994. Its internal organization con- 
sisted of a thirty-five-member National Executive Committee 
led by President Makwetu, first deputy president Johnson 
Mlambo, second deputy president Dikgang Moseneki, and gen- 
eral secretary Benny Alexander. 

The PAC has eight working committees and a five-member 
National Coordinating Committee. Its members are organized 
into 105 local branches nationwide. Affiliated organizations 
include the Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu), a youth 
wing; the All African Student Committee (Aasac) ; the National 
Council of Trade Unions (Nactu); the African Organisation for 
Women (AOW); the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM); 
the Sobukwe Forum, a London-based faction; and the Pan-Afri- 
canist Students' Organisation (PASO), which has branches at 
several South African universities. 

Although the PAC played little role in the multiparty negoti- 
ations during 1993 and early 1994, it formally suspended its 
armed struggle in early 1994 and agreed to participate in the 
April elections. It gained only 1.2 percent of the national vote, 
receiving five seats in the National Assembly, and it won one 
seat in each of three provincial legislatures — in Gauteng (then 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging — PWV) , KwaZulu-Natal, 
and the Eastern Cape. 

Several other political parties participated in the 1994 elec- 
tions, although, with the exception of the African Christian 
Democratic Party (which gained two seats in the National 
Assembly and seats in three of the nine provincial legislatures), 
none received more than 1 percent of the vote. These parties 
included the Sports Organisation for Collective Contributions 
and Equal Rights (SOCCER), the Keep It Straight and Simple 
Party (KISS), the Women's Rights Peace Party (WRPP), the 
Worker's List Party (WLP), the Ximoko Progressive Party 
(XPP), the Africa Muslim Party (AMP), the African Democratic 



292 



Government and Politics 



Movement (ADM), the African Moderates Congress Party 
(AMCP), the Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA), the 
Federal Party (FP), the Luso-South Africa Party (LUSAP), and 
the Minority Front (MF). 

Interest Groups 

Interest groups have played a significant role in South Afri- 
can politics, although until apartheid was abolished the pri- 
mary criterion for interest articulation was race, more often 
than economic issues. Interest groups work to achieve the goals 
of a particular ethnic community (Afrikaner, Xhosa, Zulu), 
racial group (white, black, coloured, or Indian) , or other cate- 
gory of persons sharing a common goal. Leonard Thompson 
and Andrew Prior, in their book South African Politics, describe 
apartheid-era attempts by groups such as the Afrikaner Broed- 
erbond to win political influence in the parliament and the 
executive branch in order to maintain the status quo, while 
others, such as trade unions, sought to change labor relations 
and economic policy. Still other interest groups, such as the 
South African Media Council, had specific goals, in this case 
the establishment of a free and independent press. Finally, sev- 
eral organizations that were effectively banned from the politi- 
cal arena, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), continued to function as 
political interest groups during the apartheid era. 

Within this system, the Afrikaner interest groups were the 
most influential, as they constituted an element in the coun- 
try's ruling elite. After apartheid was abolished, however, inter- 
est-group politics began to change. Many organizations 
abandoned their ethnically based, secretive, extraparliamen- 
tary, or underground characteristics to meet the challenges of 
the new nonracial, open, and democratic political order. 

Afrikaner Broederbond 

The Afrikaner Broederbond (later Broederbond, or Broth- 
erhood) was the most important apartheid-era interest group 
in South Africa. Functioning for almost sixty years as an elite, 
exclusively Afrikaner, secret society, the Broederbond gradually 
shifted its perspective on the future and supported the political 
reform process beginning in the early 1980s. 

Founded in 1918, the Broederbond became a secret organi- 
zation in 1921 and dedicated itself to advancing Afrikaner 
political, cultural, and economic interests. Membership was 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

restricted to white Afrikaner males who passed a rigorous selec- 
tion process. One of the group's primary goals was to place 
Afrikaner nationalists in key political positions and to establish 
other organizations to further Afrikaner interests. With mem- 
bers of the Broederbond in key leadership positions, the NP 
government often promoted the interests of the group. 

The Broederbond's organizational structure and political 
strategy were first publicly disclosed in the late 1970s by Hennie 
Serfontein, an Afrikaner journalist who devoted much of his 
career to investigating the organization. According to internal 
Broederbond documents, in 1993 the society reportedly had 
20,074 members — one of the highest figures in its history — 
organized into twelve regions and 1,392 branches, or cells. 
Branches varied in size from five to twenty members, and cen- 
tral committees in towns and cities coordinated branch activi- 
ties. Branch cells selected representatives to regional councils, 
the next higher level of organization. Top policy-making 
authority was vested in the National Congress (Bondsraad), 
which met every two years and elected the organization's senior 
executive authorities, the Broederbond chairman and the 
Executive Council. The Executive Council served for two years; 
in 1993 it had eighteen members. 

The Broederbond played an important role in transforming 
apartheid. Major governmental policy shifts in areas such as 
education and sports were first tested in Broederbond discus- 
sions before being aired in parliamentary debate. Then in 
November 1993, in preparation for the postapartheid political 
system, the Broederbond adopted a new constitution that radi- 
cally transformed the previously clandestine organization. The 
Broederbond changed its name to the Afrikanerbond, 
removed its cloak of secrecy, and abolished its Afrikaner male 
exclusivity by permitting women and all racial groups to join. 
Some membership restrictions remained — new entrants had to 
speak Afrikaans, had to subscribe to the organization's constitu- 
tion, and had to be approved by the other members. These 
restrictions helped to ensure the continued importance of Afri- 
kaner interests and identity. 

United Democratic Front 

The United Democratic Front (UDF) was an extraparlia- 
mentary organization established in 1983, primarily in opposi- 
tion to the government's constitutional proposals of that year. 
It served as an umbrella organization of antiapartheid groups. 



294 



Government and Politics 



Membership was open to any organization that endorsed the 
principles of the ANG's Freedom Charter. Affiliates of the UDF 
included the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), the South African National Student Congress 
(Sansco), the National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS), and the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS). 

Following clashes with the government, the UDF was effec- 
tively banned — i.e., its political activities were proscribed — 
under the terms of the emergency regulations of February 24, 
1988, and many of its affiliates were reorganized under the 
guise of a new political coalition. The UDF disbanded on 
August 20, 1991, declaring that its major objectives had been 
fulfilled. 

Mass Democratic Movement 

The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was the name of 
an informal coalition of antiapartheid groups during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. As a formal organization, the MDM was estab- 
lished as an antiapartheid successor to the UDF after the 1988 
emergency restrictions effectively banned the UDF and several 
other opposition groups. Even after 1988, the MDM was a tem- 
porary loose coalition of antiapartheid activists with no perma- 
nent constitution, no official membership rolls, no national or 
regional governing body, and no officeholders. Like the UDF, 
the MDM drew much of its support from the black community; 
a condition for affiliation with the MDM was adherence to the 
provisions of the ANC's Freedom Charter. 

The MDM gained prominence in 1989, when it organized a 
campaign of civil disobedience in anticipation of national elec- 
tions scheduled to take place in September of that year. Defy- 
ing the state-of-emergency regulations in effect at the time, 
several hundred black protesters entered "whites-only" hospi- 
tals and beaches. During that month, people of all races 
marched peacefully in several cities to protest against police 
brutality and repressive legislation. When the UDF was 
unbanned in February 1990, most MDM leaders and many 
members rejoined their former organizations. 

Trade Unions 

Labor activism dates back to the 1840s, when the first unions 
were formed. Most major industrial unions were organized 
after World War I either to support or to oppose racial privi- 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

leges claimed by whites. Black and communist organizations 
formed antiapartheid unions to abolish racist policies in the 
workplace; most proapartheid unions were formed by govern- 
ment forces to support discriminatory labor practices. During 
the apartheid era, membership in most trade unions was based 
on race, and until 1979, the government did not recognize 
black unions or grant them labor law protection. In 1977, for 
example, out of 172 registered trade unions that were eligible 
to bargain collectively, eighty-three were white, forty-eight were 
coloured, and forty-one were open to whites, coloureds, and 
Asians. Among the proapartheid and all-white unions were the 
White Workers' Protection Association (Blankewerkersbesker- 
mingsbond), the Mineworkers 1 Union, and larger coordinating 
bodies such as the South African Confederation of Labour. 

The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), 
formed in the early 1950s, became the leader of the antiapart- 
heid struggle in the labor movement. The government often 
arrested and harassed its leaders for political agitation. During 
the 1970s, however, the government recognized the need to 
exert greater control over labor activities and to improve gov- 
ernment-union relations. In 1977 it established the Commis- 
sion of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, headed by Professor 
Nicolas Wiehahn. The Wiehahn Commission recommended 
the legalization of black unions, in part to bring labor militants 
under government control. The government recognized black 
unions in 1979 and granted them limited collective bargaining 
rights. In the same year, the government established a National 
Manpower Commission, with representatives from labor, busi- 
ness, and government, to advise policy makers on labor issues. 

During the 1980s, business owners and management organi- 
zations, such as the Afrikaner Trade Institute (Afrikaanse Han- 
delsinstituut — AHI), which had represented Afrikaner 
commercial interests since the 1940s, were forced to negotiate 
with black labor leaders for the first time. To adapt to the new 
labor environment, they established the South African Employ- 
ers' Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA) to 
represent the owners in lobbying and collective bargaining ses- 
sions. 

Black union membership soared during the 1980s. New 
labor confederations included the nonracial COSATU, which 
was affiliated with the ANC and the SACP; the PAC-affiliated 
National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu); and the IFP-affili- 
ated United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). By 



296 



Government and Politics 



1990 COSATU, the largest of these, had more than thirty 
union affiliates with more than 1 million members. 

Efforts to begin dismantling apartheid during the early 
1990s meant that union leaders were pressed to represent 
workers' interests more vigorously in the changing economic 
environment. Although the largest unions had been strong 
ANC supporters in the past — and were vital to ANC efforts to 
mobilize popular demonstrations against apartheid — they 
began to clash with ANC party officials and with government 
leaders in 1994 and 1995. Some union members feared that 
workers' interests would be overlooked in the effort to imple- 
ment economic development plans in the postapartheid era. 

Political Elites 

Although change was evident at all levels of society as South 
Africa began to dismantle apartheid during the 1990s, particu- 
larly dramatic changes were occurring in the country's political 
and social leadership. Not only were new leaders emerging on 
the national level, but shifts were also occurring within political 
organizations, as new political expectations and aspirations 
arose and as new demands were placed on political leaders at 
all levels. 

Since 1948 the country's governing class, the political elite, 
had been dominated by Afrikaners. Afrikaners held most high 
positions in government, including the legislature, the judi- 
ciary, the cabinet, and the senior ranks of the military and 
security services. Afrikaners also came to dominate the larger 
community of leaders, the power elite, by assuming important 
roles in the civil service bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent in 
business, the universities, and the media. Afrikaner dominance 
was reinforced by the rules of apartheid, in large part because 
the government's security and intelligence services helped to 
enforce the rules of apartheid through other institutions. 

In general, during the apartheid era, English-speaking 
whites were less important in the political and power elites. 
They played only secondary roles in most areas of government. 
English speakers were, nevertheless, prominent in commerce 
and industry, where the Afrikaners' success had lagged behind 
their political achievements, as is explained by Thompson and 
Prior. By the 1980s, English-speaking whites also held impor- 
tant positions in universities and the media, and in a few areas 
of government. 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

In the early 1990s, these political and power elites were 
evolving, as is demonstrated in the authoritative survey of 
elites, Who's Who in South African Politics, by the South African 
writer Shelagh Gastrow. Gastrow divided South Africa's domi- 
nant political leaders into four major categories: political lead- 
ers within the Afrikaner community, most associated with the 
NP; an older generation of black opposition leaders, most 
within the ANC; a younger generation of leaders emerging 
from the Black Consciousness Movement; and a new group of 
labor leaders who had risen to prominence as the trade union 
movement strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s. A fifth 
category might be added — according to South African political 
scientist Roger Southall, who reviewed Gastrow's book — the 
small number of white political leaders who attempted to 
reshape white politics along nonracial, democratic lines. 

A subsequent revised edition of Gastrow's book identified 
118 individuals — 110 men and only eight women — as constitut- 
ing South Africa's evolving political elite in 1992. Among the 
obvious changes occurring at that time was the emergence of 
formerly imprisoned, exiled, or banned opposition leaders, 
who had been released from prison or had been legally recog- 
nized since early 1990. They could then be legally quoted in 
the country's media, and their ideas were being widely dissemi- 
nated. In addition, new challengers arose to replace formerly 
entrenched leaders, especially conservative blacks, coloureds, 
and Indians who had gained office through various forms of 
state patronage in the black homelands or in other institutions 
of government. 

Changes were also occurring within the senior ranks of the 
organizations from which the country's new leaders had 
emerged. As the ANC, for example, was forced to cooperate 
with former opponents, especially the NP, in pursuing national 
goals, new alliances and friendships were formed, shaped in 
part by a pragmatic appraisal of the political realities of the 
time. In addition, former opposition groups — especially the 
ANC — began to revise their rhetoric from that of guerrilla 
opponents of government, or "states in exile," to adapt to their 
new positions of responsibility. The ANC's best educated, 
skilled technocrats, capable of managing governmental and 
other bureaucracies, were gaining particular prominence. 

At the same time, a greater distance was developing between 
these educated elites and the less educated rank-and-file within 
their own organizations. In particular, there was a growing dis- 



298 



Apartheid-era civil servant leaving b cation in Lebowa 

Courtesy R. T. K Scully 



tance between the ANC and its radical youth wing in late 1994 
and 1995. There was also a growing distance between the ANC 
leadership and their former ally, the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). Ties between these two organizations had not 
only been close in the past; their membership and leadership 
rolls had overlapped. 

In some cases, the new elites appeared to have more in com- 
mon with members of rival political organizations than with 
their organization's own members. Several new government 
leaders, for example, were drawn from traditional African 
elites — royal families, chiefs, and influential clans. President 
Mandela, while a university-trained lawyer, is also a descendant 
of a leading family among the Thembu (Tembu), a Xhosa sub- 
group. Like Mandela, the prominent Zulu leader and minister 
of home affairs, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, is university- 
educated and the product of aristocratic origins. Buthelezi, a 



299 



South Africa: A Country Study 



member of the Zulu royal family, is also a chief within the 
Buthelezi sub-group (also, "tribe") of the Zulu. 

Other members of South Africa's new government also rep- 
resent ethnic elites. For example, the minister of public enter- 
prises in 1995, Stella Sigcau, is the daughter of a well-known 
Pondo paramount chief, Botha Sigcau. Stella Sigcau also had 
served as chief minister in the Transkei government during the 
early 1980s. 

Many former ANC officials who were in government office 
in the mid-1990s had worked to overcome factional differences 
based on ethnicity during the apartheid era. Although the 
ANC is often stereotyped as "Xhosa-dominated," and a number 
of its officers are Xhosa, several ethnic groups have been repre- 
sented in the ANC's senior ranks. Thomas Nkobi, treasurer 
general from 1973 through the early 1990s, represents a sub- 
group within the Zimbabwe-based Shona people. Former Sec- 
retary General Cyril Ramaphosa and National Working 
Committee member Sydney Mufamadi are Venda (VaVenda — 
see Ethnic Groups and Language, ch. 2). Ramaphosa's former 
deputy, Jacob Zuma, is one of several Zulu leaders who rose to 
prominence within the ANC. The ANC's former security and 
intelligence specialist, Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and former MK 
leader Joe Modise are Sotho (BaSotho). Several popular 
regional leaders are Tswana (BaTswana). In general, these 
leaders have rejected arguments that favored the use of ethnic- 
ity to define political factions. 

Age differences appeared more divisive than ethnicity within 
the ANC during the early and the mid-1990s. There were 
heated debates over questions of political succession, as the 
ANC's aging leaders — many over the age of seventy — faced 
challenges from the generations below them. Nelson Mandela 
was seventy-five years old when he was elected president in 
1994, and several other ANC leaders were more than seventy 
years of age. Their most likely successors — especially Mbeki, 
Ramaphosa, Zuma, and the ANC's former director of intelli- 
gence, "Mac" Maharaj — were roughly two decades younger. 
Some of the ANC's younger militants threatened revolt against 
senior party figures in the early months of the new govern- 
ment, as their demands for jobs, homes, and improved living 
standards continued to be unmet. Criticism of the "older gen- 
eration" was fueled in late 1994 and early 1995, when the presi- 
dent's former wife, Winnie Mandela, clashed with the 



300 



Government and Politics 



government and was ousted as a deputy minister, as she cham- 
pioned the grievances of the ANC's militant youth. 

As the apartheid system was being dismantled, some mem- 
bers of the Afrikaner elite in government, the civil service, and 
the security services reacted with impressive flexibility. By 
adapting quickly to the new environment, many of them not 
only retained their valued positions in the bureaucracy but 
also won new respect from former adversaries. As the ANC 
assumed responsibility for the security establishment, the 
police, and the intelligence services, ANC leaders were often 
able to work. closely and cooperatively with Afrikaners who had 
once been so effective in excluding blacks from the political 
process. 

The shift in power and influence among the country's politi- 
cal elites had begun well before the April 1994 elections. An 
important arena in which this power shift occurred was that of 
the political negotiations concerning the interim constitution 
of 1993. During those negotiations, as difficult and unpromis- 
ing as they sometimes appeared, then-governing whites began, 
some for the first time, to view their black counterparts as legit- 
imate partners in the decision-making process. At the same 
time, many black leaders adjusted smoothly to the new climate 
of political tolerance. 

Communications Media 

South Africa's communications media were radically trans- 
formed by the political reforms sweeping the country in the 
1990s. The most fundamental changes were the gradual easing 
of government censorship and its abolition in the interim con- 
stitution. In spite of frequent government censorship under 
apartheid, however, South Africans had received news reports 
through numerous publications and broadcasts. 

Under apartheid, a vast array of legislation and regulations 
had imposed limits on the media. The South African Press 
Council, for example, had the power to fine newspaper editors 
for defying emergency regulations, which often barred cover- 
age of political events. Under emergency regulations in the 
1980s, journalists were forbidden to report on banned organi- 
zations and people; the media were prohibited from reporting 
events relating to "state security," such as protests and demon- 
strations. The public then had to rely on the government's 
Bureau of Information for official reports of political events. 
And for violating emergency regulations, some journalists were 



301 



South Africa: A Country Study 

detained — even without being charged — and newspapers were 
temporarily suspended. Some editors and reporters were pros- 
ecuted, and foreign journalists were expelled or refused entry 
visas. Similarly, the Publications Control Board, under the Pub- 
lications Act (No. 42) of 1974, censored certain books and 
movies, especially those dealing with race relations. 

In the early 1990s as part of the government's pledge to 
reform apartheid, many of the emergency regulations relating 
to the media were removed. Thus, the Protection of Informa- 
tion Act of 1982, which imposed penalties on publications that 
violated national security, was repealed in February 1990 and 
less stringent guidelines for protecting sensitive information 
were established. Thereafter, the press, including numerous 
mainstream and alternative publications, was generally inde- 
pendent, criticizing both the government in power and the var- 
ious opposition parties involved in the political transformation. 

Radio and Television 

South Africa has an estimated 12.1 million radio receivers 
and more than 3.5 million television sets in the mid-1990s. 
Radio and television broadcasting (with the exception of M- 
Net, a privately owned, subscriber-based cable television ser- 
vice) is controlled by the South African Broadcasting Corpora- 
tion (SABC), a statutory body that obtains its revenue from 
licenses and advertising. It operates twenty-two domestic radio 
broadcasting services in eleven languages through SABC- 
Radio, one external radio broadcasting service in seven lan- 
guages through Channel Africa Radio, and two television chan- 
nels that broadcast in seven languages through SABC- 
Television. Although M-Net was the only privately owned televi- 
sion network (with more than 880,000 subscribers), there were 
at least six privately owned commercial radio stations by 1996. 

The most fundamental change in the role of the media in 
the mid-1990s took place in the SABC, which had been con- 
trolled by NP-led governments and had generally expressed 
government views. In April 1993, a new twenty-five-member 
SABC board began to prepare the SABC for the postapartheid 
era as an independent, autonomous, and impartial broadcast- 
ing authority. President de Klerk relinquished the right to 
appoint its board members, and the members of the board 
were selected publicly for the first time, after an independent 
judicial panel had screened the nominees to ensure political 
neutrality. Ironically, however, as a reflection of the new bal- 



302 




Union Buildings house government offices and 
National Archives (Pretoria). 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

ance of forces in the country, an estimated nineteen of the 
twenty-five new board members were ANC members or were 
generally believed to be ANC supporters, and new complaints 
of political bias in the media began to emerge. 

Another major change in the broadcasting system was the 
establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority in 
January 1994, as authorized by the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority Act (No. 153) of 1993. The authority consists of a 
seven-member panel, appointed by the minister of home 
affairs after a period of public discussion and nominations. 
The authority in 1994 required all broadcasters to reapply for 
operating licenses. It issued temporary licenses to most, and it 
obtained court orders to close down a few broadcast stations 
that had not applied for licenses. Permanent licenses were 



303 



South Africa: A Country Study 



issued in 1995, after five months of public hearings and debate 
over the rules of broadcasting in South Africa. 

Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals 

More than 5,000 newspapers, magazines, and journals were 
registered with the South African Department of Home Affairs 
by January 1994; sixty-six new ones registered in that year, and 
registration was no longer required after 1994. As in other 
nations, newspaper and magazine publishers are organized 
into corporate groupings. Major corporations include the 
Argus Printing and Publishing Company, Perskor, and Times 
Media. Newspapers are printed in English, Afrikaans, and sev- 
eral African languages. The country's two national newspapers, 
which are printed on Sundays, are the Sunday Times and Rap- 
port Both are printed in several cities, simultaneously. The Sun- 
day Times had a circulation of about 524,164 in 1995, and 
Rapport, about 396,974. Other major newspapers (and 1995 cir- 
culation figures) are City Press (262,203), The Sowetan 
(204,219), and The Star (199,753) (see table 19, Appendix). 

South Africa has more than 300 consumer magazines and 
500 trade, technical, and professional publications. Huisgenoot, 
a weekly Afrikaans publication, sold more than 520,000 issues 
in 1995, while You, its English counterpart, sold nearly 300,000 
issues. The leading business and political magazine is the 
weekly Financial Mail, with approximately 32,000 subscribers. 

The South African Press Association (SAPA) is the country's 
national news agency. It is a forty-member nonprofit coopera- 
tive, engaged in foreign and domestic news-gathering and dis- 
tribution. Foreign news agencies operating in South Africa 
include Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Reuters, and 
United Press International. 

Foreign Relations 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for South Afri- 
can foreign policy decisions. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts 
liaison with foreign governments and international organiza- 
tions on all matters affecting official relations. These relations 
are conducted through foreign government officials, through 
diplomats accredited to South Africa, and through South 
Africa's accredited embassies, consulates, and other missions 
abroad. Until the early 1990s, the DFA and the diplomatic 



304 



Government and Politics 



corps competed against numerous counterestablishment "dip- 
lomatic services" run by antiapartheid organizations in exile, 
especially the ANC. The aim of these parallel communication 
channels was to isolate the South African government within 
the international community as a means of pressuring Pretoria 
to abolish apartheid. 

After the abolition of apartheid and the inauguration of the 
democratically elected Government of National Unity, South 
Africa's foreign relations were dramatically transformed. The 
country's diplomatic isolation ended, and existing relations 
with other countries and with international organizations 
improved. South Africa reestablished diplomatic and trade 
relations with many countries, particularly in Africa, and estab- 
lished new relations with some former sanctions "hardliners," 
such as India, Pakistan, Bahrain, Malaysia, Jordan, Libya, and 
Cuba. Several regional and international organizations invited 
South Africa to join, or to reactivate its membership, including 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Southern Afri- 
can Development Community (SADC), and the United 
Nations (UN). In addition, South Africa participated in inter- 
national and bilateral sport, academic, and scientific activities, 
often for the first time in decades. Relations with the countries 
of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Central 
Europe improved. South Africa had full diplomatic ties with 
thirty-nine countries in 1990; that number increased to sixty- 
nine in 1993, and to at least 147 in 1995. 

After the April 1994 elections, President Mandela appointed 
two ANC members, Alfred Nzo and Aziz Pahad, as minister and 
deputy minister of foreign affairs. He refused to make immedi- 
ate sweeping changes in the diplomatic corps. The pillars of 
South Africa's future foreign policy had been enunciated by 
Mandela in late 1993, in an article published in Foreign Affairs. 
These principles are the promotion of human rights and 
democracy; respect for justice and international law in inter- 
state relations; the achievement of peace through "internation- 
ally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective 
arms-control regimes"; incorporation of African concerns and 
interests into foreign policy choices; and economic develop- 
ment based on "cooperation in an interdependent world." In 
southern Africa, Mandela denounced South Africa's earlier 
economic domination of the region and its deliberate destabili- 
zation of neighboring states. Instead, Mandela called for "coop- 
eration in regional construction, infrastructure and resource 



305 



South Africa: A Country Study 

development projects ... in virtually every sector and area." 
Finally, Mandela advocated the full reintegration of South 
Africa into global trade networks. 

These foreign policy principles were being implemented 
even before Mandela's inauguration. For example, in early 
1994 de Klerk and Mandela, along with the presidents of 
Botswana and Zimbabwe, helped mediate an end to a military 
revolt in neighboring Lesotho. In mid-1994, South Africa pro- 
vided its first assistance to a UN peacekeeping operation when 
it supplied hospital equipment for Rwanda. Also in 1994, Presi- 
dent Mandela agreed to help resolve the intractable civil war in 
Angola, although he cautioned against unrealistically high 
expectations in this and other deep-rooted political and ethnic 
conflicts. 

Relations with African States 

Official delegations from almost every other African state vis- 
ited Pretoria in 1992 or 1993 to discuss ways to strengthen bilat- 
eral ties. South Africa's estimated 100 assistance projects in 
twenty-two African countries in 1991 more than doubled by 
1994 and provided technical aid and training in agriculture, 
wildlife conservation, education, and health care. The effects 
of the ear ly-1 990s drought in southern Africa would have been 
even more devastating to the region's agriculture and wildlife if 
South Africa had not provided transportation and food assis- 
tance to its neighbors. 

The change in South Africa's regional standing was dramati- 
cally marked by its admission to the Southern African Develop- 
ment Community (SADC) in August 1994. The twelve-member 
organization (also including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanza- 
nia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) aims to promote regional cooper- 
ation in economic development and security affairs. The SADC 
annual meeting of heads of state and government was held in 
Johannesburg on August 28, 1995. The assembled leaders 
agreed to create a regional common market with the elimina- 
tion of all internal trade barriers by the year 2000. They also 
signed an agreement to share water resources among SADC 
member nations. 

Almost all African countries had depended on South African 
trade even during the sanctions era, despite their strong rhe- 
torical condemnation of the apartheid regime. In 1991 South 
Africa's trade with the rest of the continent was at least US$3.5 



306 



Government and Politics 



billion, and this figure increased steadily as apartheid was 
being dismantled. 

For the five landlocked countries of southern Africa 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Malawi), South 
Africa's well-developed system of roads, railroads, and port 
facilities provides a vital trade link. The Southern African Cus- 
toms Union (SACU), headquartered in South Africa, provides 
a common customs area, including Botswana, Lesotho, Swazi- 
land, and Namibia (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3). 

Botswana 

Relations with Botswana were normalized in the early 1990s, 
after a period of strained ties in the 1980s. The most conten- 
tious issue between the two countries had been Botswana's will- 
ingness to provide safe haven for the ANC military wing, MK, 
and, to a lesser extent, for other opposition groups such as the 
Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA — the exter- 
nal wing of the Black Consciousness Movement). Although 
Botswana officially prohibited ANC use of its territory as a base 
for attacks against South Africa, the ANC violated this policy 
during the 1980s, provoking several small-scale raids by the 
South African Defence Forces (SADF) against ANC bases in 
Botswana. At the same time, although Botswana joined in the 
international condemnation of apartheid, its geographic and 
economic vulnerability deterred it from imposing economic 
sanctions against South Africa, with whom it maintained exten- 
sive but unpublicized trade relations. 

Relations improved in the early 1990s, as apartheid was grad- 
ually dismantled. ANC camps in Botswana were closed in 1991 
and 1992, as several hundred political exiles returned to South 
Africa under a program administered by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 

Lesotho 

Until the 1960s, several South African governments pressed 
for the incorporation of Lesotho, then a British protectorate, 
into the Union of South Africa. As a landlocked country com- 
pletely surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho depended heavily 
on South Africa for its economic well-being. After Lesotho 
became independent in October 1966, South Africa played a 
major role in the country's internal affairs — for example, by 
supporting the new government led by Chief Leabua Jonathan. 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

Tensions between the two countries rose in the 1970s 
because of Lesotho's criticism of South Africa at the UN and at 
the OAU, its support for the ANC, its provision of safe haven to 
antiapartheid fighters such as MK, and its close ties to a num- 
ber of socialist countries. Relations became severely strained in 
April 1983, when the Jonathan government announced that 
Lesotho was at war with South Africa, and again in 1984, when 
Lesotho refused to sign a nonaggression pact with South 
Africa. In response, South Africa impounded shipments of 
arms to Lesotho, threatened economic sanctions, and sus- 
pended talks concerning the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(a thirty-year cooperative engineering venture that would sup- 
ply water to South Africa and provide electric power and finan- 
cial compensation to Lesotho). Tensions eased in 1984, as 
some ANC forces withdrew from Lesotho, but in 1985 new ten- 
sions prompted Pretoria to step up security measures along the 
border between the two countrries. 

In early 1986, South Africa backed a military coup in 
Maseru, bringing into power a government more sympathetic 
to Pretoria's security interests. Lesotho expelled several ANC 
members and technicians from the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), whom Pretoria considered a 
menace, and relations between the two nations improved. 
Work on the Highlands Water Project resumed, and in 1987 
they established a joint trade mission. Relations continued to 
improve after that, and the countries established full diplo- 
matic ties in May 1992. Pretoria recognized the outcome of 
Lesotho's March 1993 elections, the first in twenty-two years. 

In January 1994, Lesotho's democratically elected civilian 
government sought South African assistance in quelling an 
army mutiny over pay and conditions of service in the Lesotho 
Defence Forces. Pretoria refused to intervene directly, but 
threatened to seal off Lesotho's borders, which would have 
blocked vital commercial transportation to and from Maseru. 
De Klerk and Mandela, together with the presidents of Zimba- 
bwe and Botswana, urged both sides to negotiate an end to the 
crisis, a move that represented the likely pattern of postapart- 
heid diplomacy in southern Africa. 

Swaziland 

South Africa's relations with the Kingdom of Swaziland, one 
of Africa's smallest nations — which South Africa surrounds on 
the north, west, and south — were shaped by the kingdom's 



308 



Government and Politics 



complete dependence on its powerful neighbor for its eco- 
nomic and political well-being. During the 1970s and early 
1980s, although Swaziland claimed to be neutral in the East- 
West conflict, it was actually pro-Western and maintained 
strong relations with South Africa, including clandestine coop- 
eration in economic and security matters. South Africa 
invested heavily in Swaziland's economy, and Swaziland joined 
the Pretoria-dominated SACU. During the 1980s, some South 
African businesses also used Swazi territory as a transshipment 
point in order to circumvent international sanctions on South 
Africa. Relying on a secret security agreement with South 
Africa in 1982, Swazi officials harassed ANC representatives in 
the capital, Mbabane, and eventually expelled them from Swa- 
ziland. South African security forces, operating undercover, 
also carried out operations against the ANC on Swazi territory. 
Throughout this time, part of the Swazi royal family quietly 
sought the reintegration of Swazi-occupied territory in South 
Africa into their kingdom. 

In June 1993, South Africa and Swaziland signed a judicial 
agreement providing for South African judges, magistrates, 
and prosecutors to serve in Swaziland's courts. South Africa 
also agreed to provide training for Swazi court personnel. In 
August 1995, the two countries signed an agreement to cooper- 
ate in anti-crime and anti-smuggling efforts along their com- 
mon border. 

Zimbabwe 

Bilateral relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
improved substantially as apartheid legally ended. In Decem- 
ber 1993, the foreign ministers of both countries met for the 
first time to discuss ways to improve bilateral ties. Tensions 
between the two countries had been high since 1965, when 
South Africa demonstrated tacit support for the unilateral dec- 
laration of independence (UDI) by white-dominated Rhodesia 
(Southern Rhodesia), a former British colony. South Africa 
also had assisted the new regime led by Prime Minister Ian 
Smith for almost fourteen years, until it was brought down by a 
combination of guerrilla war and international pressure. 

After Rhodesia's independence as Zimbabwe, the govern- 
ment in Harare supported mandatory sanctions against South 
Africa and provided political, diplomatic, and military support 
to the ANC in its armed struggle. Zimbabwe also provided mili- 
tary assistance, including troops, for Maputo's struggle against 



309 



South Africa: A Country Study 

South African-supported insurgents in the Mozambican 
National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana — 
MNR or RENAMO). SADF troops retaliated against Harare, 
with two raids on alleged ANC bases in the capital in 1986 and 
1987, and bomb explosions in Harare in October 1987 and in 
Bulawayo in January 1988. 

Relations between the two countries began to stabilize in 
1990, after Mandela was released from prison and South Africa 
moved toward constitutional reform. Even before international 
sanctions against South Africa were lifted, a number of unpub- 
licized ministerial contacts took place to discuss matters of 
trade and transport. President de Klerk and Zimbabwean Presi- 
dent Robert Mugabe met publicly for the first time on January 
27, 1994, when de Klerk, Mandela, Mugabe, and Botswana's 
President Quett Masire joined together in urging a peaceful 
resolution to a military mutiny in Lesotho. 

President Mandela visited Harare in early 1995. The two 
countries debated trade issues throughout the year, primarily 
centered around efforts to dismantle apartheid-era tariffs. In 
November 1995, a ceremony attended by presidents Mandela 
and Mugabe marked the opening of a new bridge linking the 
two countries, across the Limpopo River. 

Namibia 

South Africa's relations with Namibia (formerly South-West 
Africa) were normalized following the 1988 agreement that 
paved the way for the solution to the interlinked conflicts in 
Namibia and Angola. Prior to this agreement, Namibia had 
been under South Africa's control since 1919, when Pretoria 
received the League of Nations mandate over the territory 
then known as South-West Africa. In 1946 the UN refused 
South Africa's request to annex the territory. In 1964 South 
Africa introduced apartheid in South-West Africa (Pretoria had 
granted Europeans living there limited self-governing privi- 
leges since 1925). 

The United Nations General Assembly in 1966 voted to 
revoke South Africa's mandate and to place the territory under 
direct UN administration. South Africa refused to recognize 
this UN resolution until 1985, when President Botha ceded 
administrative control to the territory's interim government. 
South Africa allowed a UN peacekeeping force and an adminis- 
trator to implement United Nations Security Council Resolu- 
tion 435 (1978), establishing the United Nations Transitional 



310 



Government and Politics 



Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Finally, on December 
22, 1988, South Africa signed an agreement linking its with- 
drawal from the disputed territory to an end to Soviet and 
Cuban involvement in the long civil war in neighboring 
Angola. Namibia's new government, led by the South-West 
Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), was elected in a land- 
slide victory in November 1989. 

After Namibia's independence in March 1990, South Africa 
and Namibia established diplomatic ties, but relations between 
the two countries were uneasy, in part because many of 
Namibia's senior government officials had been leaders in the 
guerrilla war to oust South Africa from their country. Namibia 
nonetheless joined the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) and continued to be almost totally dependent on 
South Africa in trade and investment. In 1992, for example, 90 
percent of Namibia's imports came from South Africa, and 
South Africa purchased 30 percent of Namibia's exports. Rela- 
tions improved as apartheid was dismantled. 

The two countries established a Joint Administrative Author- 
ity to manage the port facilities at Walvis Bay, Namibia's only 
deep-water port, which had remained under South African 
control after Namibian independence. Under pressure from 
the ANC, South Africa then agreed to transfer control over the 
port enclave to Windhoek before the 1994 elections. Namibia 
finally assumed control over Walvis Bay on March 1, 1994. 

The prospects for multiracial democracy in South Africa 
prompted Namibia to sign a series of bilateral agreements with 
Pretoria in anticipation of the close ties they hoped to maintain 
through the rest of the 1990s. One of these, signed in 1992, 
pledged cooperation in supplying water to arid regions of both 
countries along their common border. In December 1994, 
President Mandela announced his government's decision to 
write off Namibia's debt, an estimated US$190 million owed to 
South Africa. He also transferred most South African state 
property in Namibia to Namibian government ownership. 

Mozambique 

After Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1975, 
relations between South Africa and Mozambique were shaped 
by the rise to power of the revolutionary Front for the Libera- 
tion of Mozambique (Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique — 
FRELIMO) government, and in particular, by FRELIMO's com- 
mitment to support regional liberation movements. South 



311 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Africa provided covert military assistance to the anti-FRELIMO 
insurgency, RENAMO. In an attempt to curtail South Africa's 
intervention, Maputo entered into negotiations with Pretoria 
in late 1983, resulting in a non-aggression pact, the Nkomati 
Accord, in 1984. This accord committed both countries to end 
their assistance to each other's opposition movements, and to 
establish a joint security commission to monitor implementa- 
tion of the pact. South Africa continued to assist RENAMO, 
however, and relations between the two countries worsened. 

After unsubstantiated allegations of South African involve- 
ment in the death (in a plane crash) of Mozambican president 
Samora Machel in October 1986, demonstrators attacked the 
South African trade mission in Maputo. Pretoria threatened to 
retaliate by banning Mozambican migrant laborers from South 
Africa's mines, but this plan was not implemented. Even after 
South African security forces raided ANC bases around Maputo 
in 1987, presidents Botha and Joaquim Chissano met to try to 
revive the Nkomati Accord. They agreed to establish a joint 
commission on cooperation and development, whereby South 
Africa would protect Mozambique's Cahora Bassa power lines, 
which had been targets of RENAMO sabotage, and would assist 
in improving Maputo's harbor as well as road and rail links with 
South Africa. 

Relations continued to improve in 1989 following a South 
African initiative to help resolve Mozambique's civil war. 
Although both Chissano and RENAMO leader Afonso 
Dhlakama rejected Pretoria's proposal of United States media- 
tion in Mozambique, Pretoria nonetheless played an important 
role in persuading the two men to pursue a negotiated peace. 
South African president de Klerk, Zimbabwe's president 
Mugabe, and other regional leaders urged Mozambique's war- 
ring parties to sign a peace agreement and, after they did so in 
October 1992, to prepare for democratic elections. In Decem- 
ber 1992, the UN began deploying 7,500 troops for the UN 
Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and the date for 
Mozambique's first multiparty elections was finally set for Octo- 
ber 1994. 

In 1993 South Africa and Mozambique agreed to formalize 
their trade missions in each other's capitals and to upgrade dip- 
lomatic ties. Late that year, the two countries agreed to cooper- 
ate in repatriating more than 350,000 Mozambicans who had 
sought refuge in South Africa — some of the more than 800,000 
Mozambican refugees scattered throughout the region. The 



312 



Government and Politics 



UNHCR reported that refugees continued returning to 
Mozambique throughout 1994 as the elections approached. 

After South Africa's April 1994 elections, Deputy President 
Mbeki opened communication channels with RENAMO lead- 
ers, including Dhlakama, in an effort to help preserve the frag- 
ile peace in Mozambique. President Mandela made his first 
official state visit to the country on July 20, 1994, and he 
emphasized the challenges both countries faced in strengthen- 
ing democratic institutions. The two governments signed 
agreements establishing a joint cooperation commission to 
pursue shared development goals in agriculture, security, trans- 
portation, and medicine. 

In 1996 the two countries began to implement a South Afri- 
can proposal for a small group of South African farmers to set- 
tle and farm land in Mozambique. The proposal had 
originated in the desire of a few Afrikaner farmers to leave 
South Africa, and both governments viewed it as a possible 
means of improving the agricultural infrastructure in Mozam- 
bique and of providing jobs for farm laborers there. For Preto- 
ria, the proposal held some promise of reducing the influx of 
farm workers into South Africa. 

Zambia 

South African-Zambian relations until 1990 were shaped by 
Zambia's support for antiapartheid movements inside South 
Africa, by its agreement to allow anti-South African SWAPO 
guerrillas to operate from Zambia's territory, and by its anti- 
RENAMO assistance to government forces in Mozambique. As 
one of the leaders of the frontline states against South Africa, 
Zambia provided safe haven for the ANC, which had its head- 
quarters in Lusaka, prompting military reprisals by South 
Africa in the late 1980s. Relations between the two countries 
improved as apartheid was being dismantled in the early 1990s, 
leading to several visits by the two countries' leaders. Then- 
president Kaunda visited South Africa for the first time in Feb- 
ruary 1992, and the two countries established diplomatic ties 
and began to normalize trade relations later that year. (Zambia 
was already South Africa's second largest African trading part- 
ner.) President de Klerk visited Lusaka in mid-1993, the first 
visit by a South African head of state. In 1994 South Africa con- 
tinued to be the most important source of Zambian imports — 
mostly machinery and manufactured goods — and the two 



313 



South Africa: A Country Study 

countries were exploring new avenues for trade during the rest 
of the 1990s. 

Angola 

South Africa has long-standing geographic, commercial, and 
political ties with Angola, which became independent from 
Portugal in November 1975. Until the early 1990s, relations 
between the two countries were strained, however, owing pri- 
marily to South Africa's extensive military support for the 
insurgent movement in Angola. The National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Inde- 
pendencia Total de Angola — UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, 
had waged a sixteen-year war against the Marxist-led govern- 
ment in Luanda. Pretoria became Savimbi's patron principally 
because it feared the threat of Soviet and Cuban expansionism, 
but by the late 1980s, a new geostrategic environment was 
emerging in the region. The Cold War ended, accompanied by 
the collapse of Angola's superpower patron, the former Soviet 
Union; Cuban forces withdrew from Angola as part of the 1988 
Angola-Namibia Accord, and the Angolan civil war ended ten- 
tatively, with a peace agreement in May 1991. 

Angola's first democratic elections in September 1992 failed, 
after Savimbi refused to accept his electoral defeat and the war 
resumed. Pretoria then supported a negotiated outcome to the 
festering civil war, although a few South Africans (said to be 
operating outside Pretoria's control) continued their support 
to Savimbi. 

Relations between South Africa and Angola deteriorated 
after Pretoria withdrew its diplomatic representation from 
Luanda in late 1992. Early in 1993, however, both governments 
again began working to normalize diplomatic ties, and Pretoria 
promised to crack down on private channels of assistance from 
South Africa to Savimbi. Although de Klerk announced that 
South Africa would grant recognition only after a fully repre- 
sentative government had been installed in Luanda, Pretoria 
reopened its offices in Luanda and upgraded diplomatic ties in 
mid-1993. The two countries established full diplomatic rela- 
tions on May 27, 1994, and Luanda appointed an ambassador 
to South Africa later that year. 

In June 1994, President Mandela agreed to requests by UN 
Special Envoy to Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, to attend talks 
with Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Savimbi 
in an effort to end the fighting in Angola. Pretoria initially pro- 



314 



Government and Politics 



vided the venue for talks between dos Santos and President 
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, as dos Santos sought an end to 
Zairian assistance to UNITA. Finally, in November 1994, Man- 
dela witnessed an agreement between dos Santos and Savimbi 
to end the fighting in Angola and to begin rebuilding the 
country, and the slow process of disarming rebel fighters began 
in 1995. 

Kenya 

South Africa had long maintained relatively cordial relations 
with Kenya, one of Africa's leading pro-Western governments, 
although until 1990 these ties were mostly unpublicized and 
centered around trade. The nature of their relations changed 
in November 1990 when South Africa's minister of foreign 
affairs, Pik Botha, visited Kenya in the first publicized ministe- 
rial-level contact between the two countries since 1960. Rela- 
tions were further consolidated when President de Klerk visited 
Kenya in June 1991, and Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi vis- 
ited Cape Town in June 1992 — the first visit to South Africa by 
an African head of state. 

In addition to strong trade ties in the mid-1990s, South 
Africa and Kenya share the desire to promote cooperation 
among countries of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). In March 
1995, delegations from both countries, along with representa- 
tives of Australia, India, Oman, and Singapore, met in Mauri- 
tius to discuss ways to strengthen trade, investment, and 
economic cooperation among IOR member states. 

Nigeria 

Nigeria maintained a hostile attitude toward South Africa for 
more than thirty years until the early 1990s. Then the new 
political environment led to President de Klerk's visit to Nige- 
ria in April 1992 to discuss bilateral issues, primarily trade. 
South Africa and Nigeria established diplomatic relations in 
mid-1994. 

President Mandela was among the small number of world 
leaders who in late 1995 appealed to Nigeria's military head of 
state, General Sani Abacha, to spare the lives of the writer and 
environmental activist Ken Sarowiwa and eight others con- 
victed of inciting violence that resulted in several deaths in 
Nigeria. After Sarowiwa and the others were executed on 
November 10, 1995, Mandela called for international sanctions 
against the Abacha government. South African officials later 



315 



South Africa: A Country Study 

dropped this demand, deferring to the OAU, which was reluc- 
tant to impose sanctions against a member state. 

Relations with Non-African States 

Relations with non-African states focused mainly on the 
United States, Britain, and Western Europe through the 1980s. 
Commercial ties, often clandestine and subject to sanctions 
restrictions, were vital to the survival of many South African 
industries. As sanctions were lifted, commercial and diplomatic 
ties were immediately strengthened with the West, and at the 
same time, new alliances were being formed in the 1990s, espe- 
cially in Asia and the Middle East. 

United States 

Although the United States joined the international commu- 
nity in 1986 in imposing economic sanctions against South 
Africa, earlier United States interests had been driven largely 
by the aim of reducing Soviet influence in southern Africa. 
United States officials had viewed South Africa as an important 
Western geostrategic bulwark in an unstable region. All United 
States administrations during the 1970s and the 1980s con- 
demned apartheid, but they were generally opposed to broad 
economic sanctions, often arguing that the most severe impacts 
of such sanctions would be felt by the same segment of the pop- 
ulation that was most disadvantaged by apartheid. The Carter 
administration (1977-81), however, adopted a tougher line 
toward Pretoria, viewing African nationalism as a driving force 
in the region that was compatible with United States interests. 

The United States had imposed an arms embargo on Preto- 
ria in 1964 and had joined the international consensus in refus- 
ing to recognize the "independence" of four of South Africa's 
black homelands between 1976 and 1984. The 1983 Gramm 
Amendment opposed the extension of International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary) credits to "any country practicing 
apartheid." The 1985 Export Administration Amendment Act 
barred United States exports to South Africa's military and 
police, except for humanitarian supplies and medical equip- 
ment. 

The United States maintained formal diplomatic relations 
with Pretoria throughout the apartheid era. The United States 
was still South Africa's second largest trading partner, with 
exports and imports valued at more than US$1.6 billion per 
year, during most of the sanctions years. 



316 



President Frederik W de Klerk and President George Bush in 

Washington, September 1990 
Courtesy The White House 

United States administrations tried to influence South Afri- 
can governments by working with them discreetly in a strategy 
called "constructive engagement" during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Guided primarily by Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Chester Crocker, the United States emphasized 
its common strategic interests with South Africa and insisted on 
unilateral rather than multilateral negotiations over South 
Africa's future (i.e., negotiations between the government and 
its opposition, as opposed to negotiations participated in by 
outside interests). One of the arguments against sweeping 
sanctions at the time was that United States officials hoped to 
maintain the small degree of influence they may have had in 
pressing for political reforms. 

The United States also sought to bring about regional 
change through peaceful and democratic means and vigor- 



317 



South Africa: A Country Study 

ously supported the negotiations for Namibian independence 
from South Africa. This policy approach ultimately paved the 
way for the 1988 agreement that linked the withdrawal of 
South African troops from Namibia with the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola, in a process that culminated in 
Namibia's first democratic elections in 1989 and independence 
in March 1990. 

With the passage of the United States Comprehensive Anti- 
apartheid Act (CAAA) over a presidential veto in 1986, the 
United States Congress established an elaborate sanctions 
structure prohibiting future investments, bank loans, and some 
forms of trade with South Africa. More than 200 of the 280 
United States companies in South Africa sold all, or part of, 
their operations there, and many of those remaining adhered 
to business principles intended to ameliorate the effects of 
apartheid. The CAAA called on the United States president to 
report to Congress each year on the state of apartheid in South 
Africa, in order to assess the need for further legislation. In 
1987 the Intelligence Authorization Act prohibited intelli- 
gence sharing between the two countries. By 1990, twenty- 
seven state governments, ninety cities, and twenty-four counties 
had also imposed sanctions against South Africa or divestment 
measures on their own citizens' South African holdings. 

In July 1991, United States President George Bush declared 
South Africa's progress toward democracy "irreversible," and 
the United States began to lift sanctions imposed under the 
1986 CAAA. Most IMF and military-related bans remained in 
force until after the 1994 elections. A few city and county-level 
restrictions on dealings with South Africa remained on the 
books even after 1994. 

In early 1994, Washington contributed US$10 million to 
assist the electoral process in South Africa, including election 
observers and technical assistance to parties participating in 
the elections. After the elections, the administration of Presi- 
dent William J. Clinton announced a US$600 million, three- 
year aid, trade, and investment package for South Africa. The 
United States also promised to support the participation of 
international lending institutions, such as the IMF, in recon- 
structing the South African economy. 

Minor strains emerged in South Africa's relations with the 
United States after the elections, however. President Mandela 
was critical of the United States on several fronts, including the 
level of economic assistance offered to help recover from apart- 



318 



President Nelson Mandela and 
President William J. Clinton in 
Washington, October 1994 
Courtesy The White House 



heid. Another source of tension arose out of a 1991 indictment 
by a United States court against South Africa's state-owned 
Armscor (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) . The case 
concerned apparent violations of United States arms export 
controls during the 1980s. South African officials in 1994 
requested that the indictment be dropped, noting that the tar- 
get of sanctions — the apartheid regime — had been removed 
from power. United States officials refused to intervene in the 
judicial process, however, and the case was finally settled with- 
out public clamor in 1996. 

Washington placed South Africa on a "trade watch" list in 
1996, referring to apparent trademark violations that were 
being adjudicated in South African courts. These and other rel- 
atively minor disagreements might have been resolved fairly 
amicably, had they not taken place against the backdrop of 
anti-American rhetoric by South African officials on several 
occasions. For example, in his determination to maintain his 
government's sovereignty and freedom from outside interfer- 
ence, President Mandela repeatedly emphasized his loyalty and 
gratitude to countries that had staunchly opposed apartheid 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Among these countries were 
Cuba, Libya, and Iran, which the United States considered 
international outcasts or state sponsors of terrorism. 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

Pretoria has championed the cause of ending the thirty-year- 
old trade embargo against Cuba, in defiance of the United 
States, and South Africa hosted a conference to promote Afri- 
can-Cuban solidarity in October 1995. Pretoria also forged sev- 
eral new cooperation agreements with Iran in 1995 and 1996, 
and increased its oil purchases from Iran, over United States 
objections. President Mandela proclaimed South Africa's soli- 
darity with Libya and welcomed that country's leader on a visit 
to South Africa in late 1995. 

Despite these strains, South Africa and the United States are 
pursuing closer ties in many areas. More than 500 United 
States companies have more than US$5 billion in direct invest- 
ments in South Africa in the mid-1990s, and trade between the 
two countries is increasing steadily In March 1995, Washington 
and Pretoria established a United States-South Africa Bina- 
tional Commission to improve communication and coopera- 
tion. (The United States has similar commissions with Egypt, 
Russia, and Mexico.) The commission is co-chaired by United 
States vice president Albert Gore and South African deputy 
president Thabo Mbeki. It has six committees to investigate 
avenues for cooperation in agriculture, business, environment 
and water resources, human resources and education, science 
and technology, and sustainable energy resources. 

European Union 

The twelve-member European Union (EU) was South 
Africa's leading trading partner in the early 1990s, purchasing 
almost 40 percent of its exports in most years. European 
(including British) direct investment in South Africa had 
reached US$17 billion, or 52 percent of all foreign investment 
in South Africa, by 1992. By the mid-1990s, the EU could prom- 
ise South Africa one of the world's largest markets for South 
African exports. The EU also proposed a variety of loans and 
grants on preferential terms for South Africa in the 1990s, as 
well as a US$122 million aid program for priority needs such as 
education, health, job creation, and human rights. 

South Africa's closest European ties have been with Britain, 
particularly with its Conservative Party-led governments. More 
than 800,000 white South Africans retained the right to live in 
Britain, although official ties weakened after South Africa left 
the British Commonwealth in 1961 (see Apartheid, 1948-76, 
ch. 1). Britain supported the 1977 Commonwealth decision to 
discourage sporting links with South Africa to register interna- 



320 



Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and Vice President Albert Gore 

in Washington, March 1995 
Courtesy The White House 

tional disapproval of apartheid, but Britain's refusal to impose 
broader sanctions came under attack at subsequent Common- 
wealth heads of government meetings, especially in 1985, 1987, 
and 1989. In September 1994, British Prime Minister John 
Major, on a visit to Pretoria, promised a new investment protec- 
tion treaty that would further strengthen commercial ties. 

France played little role in South Africa before the 1990s. 
Trade between the two countries was increasing during the 
decade, however. South Africa imports roughly US$1 billion in 
French products a year, and at least 125 French companies 
operate in South Africa. French president Francois Mitterrand 
paid his first visit to South Africa on July 5, 1994, when the two 
nations signed an agreement aimed at strengthening commer- 
cial ties through long-term loans, subsidies, and technical assis- 
tance programs. Sectoral goals for these programs include 



321 



South Africa: A Country Study 

strengthening cooperation between the private and public sec- 
tors, urban and rural development, financial reconstruction, 
and environmental protection. 

Russian Federation 

Pretoria severed diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 
1956, largely because of Moscow's support for the SACP. In 
1964 the Soviet Union began to deliver arms to ANC military 
training camps in Tanzania, and this support continued 
through the early 1980s. Then in 1986, Soviet president 
Mikhail Gorbachev denounced the idea of a revolutionary 
takeover in South Africa and advocated a negotiated settlement 
between Pretoria and its opponents. Officials from the two 
countries then sought improved commercial and diplomatic 
relations. 

In July 1990, the South African mining conglomerate, De 
Beers Consolidated Mines, advanced a US$l-billion loan to the 
Soviet Union as part of an agreement for that company to serve 
as the exclusive exporter of Soviet rough diamonds. In August 
of that year, South Africa's minister of trade and industry, Kent 
Durr, visited Moscow to discuss possible South African assis- 
tance in the cleanup of the former Soviet nuclear site at Cher- 
nobyl. In early 1991, the two countries agreed to open interest 
sections in the Austrian embassies in each other's capitals, and 
Pretoria appointed its first trade representative to Russia a year 
later. Diplomatic ties were established in February 1992, and 
the first ambassador to South Africa of the new Russian Federa- 
tion arrived in Pretoria in December 1992. At the time, the two 
countries hoped to develop trade ties, especially in military 
hardware, although they were competitors in some areas of 
international arms trade. 

Iran 

In early 1994, after a fifteen-year break, the Iranian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs began preparing to reestablish formal ties by 
ending the oil embargo against South Africa. Iran had been 
South Africa's primary oil supplier until the fall of the shah in 
1979, when open economic and political ties were suspended. 
Limited economic relations continued between the two coun- 
tries, although at a discreet level. For example, the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) continued to maintain its 17.5 
percent share in the Sasolburg refinery of the National Petro- 
leum Refiners of South Africa, even after other ties between 



322 



Government and Politics 



the two countries were suspended. In 1995 and 1996, South 
Africa pressed for closer ties to Iran, both to acquire oil 
imports on favorable terms and to demonstrate Pretoria's will- 
ingness and ability to defy United States pressures to shun Iran. 

Israel 

One of the most hidden but critical of South Africa's strate- 
gic relationships during the apartheid era was that with Israel, 
including both the Labor and the Likud governments. Israel 
officially opposed the apartheid system, but it also opposed 
broad international sanctions against Pretoria. For strategic 
reasons, much of the debate in Israeli government circles 
stressed coordinating ties to Pretoria within the framework of 
the tripartite relationship amongjerusalem, the United States 
(Israel's primary benefactor), and South Africa. Israel was also 
opposed to international embargoes in general, largely as a 
consequence of its own vulnerability to UN and other interna- 
tional sanctions. 

South Africa and Israel had collaborated on military train- 
ing, weapons development, and weapons production for years 
before broad sanctions were imposed in the late 1980s. Military 
cooperation continued despite the arms embargo and other 
trade restrictions imposed by the United States and much of 
Western Europe. Israel and several other countries discreetly 
traded with, and purchased enriched uranium from, South 
Africa throughout the 1980s. Romania's former president Nico- 
lae Ceausescu, for example, used Israel as the "middleman" for 
exports to South Africa. In a few cases, joint ventures between 
Israel and South Africa helped to reduce the impact of sanc- 
tions on South African businesses. 

The Israeli interest in South Africa sprang in part from the 
presence in South Africa of about 110,000 Jews, including at 
least 15,000 Israeli citizens. Israeli leaders sometimes justified 
trade with South Africa as support for the South African Jewish 
community, and South Africa provided a market for some of 
Israel's military exports. Israel's arms trade with South Africa 
was estimated at between US$400 million and US$800 million 
annually (see Arms Trade and the Defense Industry, ch. 5) . In 
1986 Israel also imported approximately US$181 million in 
goods, mainly coal, from South Africa, and exported to South 
Africa nonmilitary products worth about US$58.8 million. 

In 1987 Israel took steps to reduce its military ties to South 
Africa to bring its policies in line with those of the United 



323 



South Africa: A Country Study 

States and Western Europe. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Shimon Peres announced the Israeli plan to ban new military 
sales contracts with South Africa, to reduce cultural and tour- 
ism ties, to appoint a committee to study sanctions proposals, 
and to condemn apartheid — which Peres characterized as "a 
policy totally rejected by all human beings." Israel also estab- 
lished educational programs in Israel for black South Africans. 
Nevertheless, through the early 1990s, several secret treaties 
remained in force, continuing the military relationship 
between the two countries and their joint research in missile 
development and nuclear technology. 

Relations with Other Countries 

In the early 1990s, South Africa began establishing or rees- 
tablishing ties with many other countries. Algeria, Bulgaria, 
Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and Tunisia announced the end 
of trade sanctions against South Africa in 1991 and 1992, pav- 
ing the way for full diplomatic relations. Representatives of 169 
countries attended President Mandela's inauguration in May 
1994; by 1995 South Africa had ties to at least 147 countries. 

Among the many countries that were eager for closer ties to 
South Africa in the mid-1990s were the Republic of China 
(ROC) on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
South Africa and the ROC had maintained ties during the 
apartheid era, partly because both were virtual outcasts from 
the international community. The PRC had been strongly criti- 
cal of apartheid but had been cool toward the ANC (generally 
supporting the PAC). In the 1990s, President Mandela 
expressed South Africa's desire to maintain longstanding ties to 
the ROC and to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. In 
response to PRC objections to proposals of dual recognition, 
Mandela suggested that the question of sovereignty should be 
decided between Taipei and Beijing, rather than being left to 
other countries to choose between them. 

With one of the strongest economies in the world, the ROC 
has been an important source of investment, trade, and tour- 
ism for South Africa. Taiwanese investments in South Africa, 
for example, exceeded R1.4 billion in 1994, according to South 
African reports, and the ROC was then one of South Africa's six 
largest trading partners. In addition, Taipei made significant 
contributions to South Africa's Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment Programme and to other areas of development. 



324 



Government and Politics 



The PRC — with lower levels of investment, trade, and devel- 
opment assistance to South Africa — nonetheless represents a 
population of more than 1.2 billion people in the 1990s. In 
addition, Beijing holds a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council and is recognized by most other 
countries as the legitimate representative of the Chinese peo- 
ple. With the expected transfer of control over Hong Kong to 
Beijing in 1997, some South African officials argued forcefully 
for strengthening ties between South Africa and the PRC, even 
at the expense of ties to the ROC. Opponents argued, in 
response, that Taiwan's record of commitment to South Africa 
and Beijing's record of disregard for international norms con- 
cerning human rights favored recognition of the ROC over the 
PRC, at least in the mid-1990s. 

International Organizations 

The year 1994 marked a watershed in South Africa's interna- 
tional relations, as it was welcomed into regional and interna- 
tional organizations, such as the UN, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), the Nonaligned Movement, and many 
others. The UN already had played an important role in South 
Africa's transition to democracy beginning in August 1992, 
when United Nations Security Council Resolution 772 autho- 
rized the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa 
(UNOMSA) to help quell political violence. UNOMSA 
deployed thirty members in November of that year, and 
increased the number to 1,800 to oversee the April 1994 elec- 
tions. 

On May 25, 1994, the United Nations Security Council lifted 
the last of its punitive measures, the arms embargo of Novem- 
ber 1977, known as Security Council Resolution 418 (strength- 
ened in December 1984 as Security Council Resolution 558). 
Pretoria then refused to pay roughly US$100 million in dues 
and annual payments for the years its UN participation had 
been suspended. In 1995 the UN waived most of this amount, 
stating the Pretoria was not obliged to make back-payments on 
behalf of the apartheid regime. 

President Mandela addressed the OAU summit in Tunis in 
June 1994, when South Africa assumed its seat in that organiza- 
tion for the first time. He emphasized his support for other 
African leaders and South Africa's solidarity with African inter- 
ests. Also in June 1994, South Africa rejoined the British Com- 
monwealth of Nations, which included fifty-one former British 



325 



South Africa: A Country Study 

colonies. This action followed a thirty-three-year absence that 
had begun when South Africa declared itself a republic in 
1961. 

South Africa became the eleventh member of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) on August 29, 1994, 
when Deputy President Thabo Mbeki attended a SADC meet- 
ing at the organization's headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. 
SADC's predecessor, the Southern African Development Coor- 
dination Conference (SADCC), had been established in 1979 
to attempt to reduce regional economic dependence on South 
Africa. In 1992 SADCC's ten member states agreed to reorga- 
nize as SADC in order to strengthen regional ties and to work 
toward the formation of a regional common market. 

On September 21, 1994, South Africa became the twenty- 
fourth member of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation 
Zone and attended that organization's meeting in Brasilia. 
South Africa also signed a declaration affirming the South 
Atlantic as a nuclear-weapons-free zone as well as agreements 
on trade and environmental protection in the region. 

South African leaders in early 1996 were working to capital- 
ize on the universal goodwill that had greeted their country's 
establishment of multiracial democracy in 1994 and its emer- 
gence from international pariah status. It was evident, at the 
same time, that some of the ANC's former staunch defenders 
in Africa were expecting concessions and assistance from the 
new government in Pretoria, in recognition of the decades of 
support South Africa's new leaders had received during their 
struggle to end apartheid. 

* * * 

Many excellent books, monographs, and articles are avail- 
able concerning the South African political system. Valuable 
works include those of Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in 
Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990; 
Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional 
Engineering in a Divided Society; Allister Sparks, The Mind of South 
Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid; Marina Ottaway, 
South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order, Kenneth W. Grundy, 
South Africa: Domestic Crisis and Global Challenge; Stephen John 
Stedman, ed. South Africa: The Political Economy of Transforma- 
tion; John D. Brewer, Restructuring South Africa; John Kane-Ber- 



326 



Government and Politics 



man, Political Violence in South Africa; and Timothy D. Sisk, 
Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. 

Informative biographies of political leaders include two 
works by President Mandela: The Struggle is My Life, and Long 
Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela; Willem de 
Klerk's biography of his brother, F.W. de Klerk; Gerhard Mare 
and Georgina Hamilton's An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's 
Inkatha and South Africa; and David Ottaway's Chained Together: 
Mandela, de Klerk, and the Struggle to Remake South Africa. Analysis 
of political organizations is found in works by Edward Roux, 
Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for 
Freedom in South Africa; Baruch Hirson, Yours for the Union: Class 
and Community Struggles in South Africa, 1930-1947; Anthony 
Marx, Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960- 
1990; Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr., eds., Mandela, 
Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle Against 
Apartheid, 1948-1990; Patrick J. Furlong, Between Crown and 
Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner National- 
ist Movement in the Fascist Era; and Vernon February, The Afrikan- 
ers of South Africa. 

Outstanding analyses of the country's foreign relations 
include those of Pauline H. Baker, The United States and South 
Africa: The Reagan Years; Stephen Chan, Exporting Apartheid: For- 
eign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-1988; George W. Shepherd, 
Jr., ed., Effective Sanctions on South Africa: The Cutting Edge of Eco- 
nomic Intervention; Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, eds., 
Towards a Post-Apartheid Future: Political and Economic Relations in 
Southern Africa; and Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern 
Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



327 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Cape Point, outcroppings and coves typical of the southern coastline 



SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ORIENTATION, 
policies, and institutions were changing rapidly in the 1990s. 
South Africa had settled its protracted conflict with Angola and 
had negotiated independence for Namibia (formerly South- 
West Africa) after waging a twenty-two-year war to retain con- 
trol over that country. South Africa signed nonaggression pacts 
with neighboring states and began working toward peaceful 
and constructive regional ties, while its first democratic consti- 
tution was being negotiated and implemented at home. 
Domestic security concerns shifted from the uncompromising 
suppression of dissent and the denial of political rights for a 
majority of citizens, first, to accommodation and negotiation 
with former adversaries, and, finally, in 1994 to a multiracial 
Government of National Unity. 

South Africa had been the dominant military and economic 
power on the subcontinent for more than a century. Its mili- 
tary forces were not only capable of prevailing in any conceiv- 
able conventional conflict but also the only regional force 
capable of sustained military operations and of projecting 
national power beyond international borders. South Africa's 
real vulnerability until the 1990s was internal. Its governing 
philosophy and domination by a racial minority could not with- 
stand the internal dissent generated during more than forty 
years of apartheid (see Glossary). 

By the late 1980s, it was evident to many political leaders and 
others in South Africa that their impressive security establish- 
ment was functioning primarily to defend a failing system of 
apartheid against enemies within South Africa and elsewhere. 
Whites, with their monopoly over the national electoral pro- 
cess, were becoming increasingly polarized over tactics for deal- 
ing with the growing threat of antiapartheid dissidents. This 
polarization became evident in September 1989, when the 
largely Afrikaner (see Glossary) National Party (NP) suffered 
its worst electoral setback since it came to power in 1948. In the 
1989 elections, the NP retained its majority in the all-white 
chamber of Parliament but lost ground to both the right-wing 
Conservative Party (CP) and the liberal Democratic Party 
(DP). 

Whites who favored a stronger defense of apartheid became 
even more anxious about their own future after President Fred- 



331 



South Africa: A Country Study 

erik W. (F.W.) de Klerk's historic February 2, 1990, speech 
announcing the legalization of black opposition groups and 
the release of political prisoners including African National 
Congress (ANC) leader Nelson (Rolihlahla) Mandela, and call- 
ing for multiracial constitutional negotiations. To those who 
supported political reform, the speech heralded new hope for 
domestic peace and improved relations with neighboring 
states, but, at the same time, it signaled the intensification of 
power struggles and an increase in violence in South Africa. 

These unprecedented conditions emerged just as South 
Africa's external security environment became more benign. 
President de Klerk began to reduce the size and the power of 
the military in relation to other branches of government; con- 
currently, military commanders and their former adversaries, 
black liberation fighters, began to plan for the amalgamation 
of their organizations into a unified military. As the political 
negotiations over a new constitution proceeded haltingly dur- 
ing the early 1990s, a surprising degree of consensus emerged 
among senior military officers on all sides of the political 
debate. Even before the elections in April 1994, national and 
homeland military officers and former commanders of anti- 
apartheid fighters began the military reorganization that they 
hoped would ensure the country's future peace. 

Historical Background 

Precolonial Warfare 

Bantu-speaking populations began moving into southern 
Africa from the center of the continent around A.D. 500 (see 
Southern African Societies to ca. 1600, ch. 1). In the process, 
they encountered the generally peaceful San and Khoikhoi 
populations who had preceded them in southern Africa by at 
least several centuries. Warfare and the desire for better land 
had been among the causes for the gradual southern migra- 
tion, and some of these early chiefdoms routinely seized cattle 
from their neighbors. But warfare was not central to their cul- 
ture or traditions. Most of southern Africa was sparsely settled, 
so fights over land were relatively rare. Ambitious men sought 
to control people, more than land. For example, during the 
seventeenth-century expansion of the Nguni-speaking Xhosa 
chiefdoms along the southern African coast, many Khoikhoi 
were peacefully incorporated into Xhosa society, and at least 
one Khoikhoi elder became a Xhosa chief. 



332 



National Security 



The cultural emphasis on the value of cattle, which was 
strong among Nguni-speaking societies, prompted increasingly 
frequent cattle raids by the seventeenth and eighteenth centu- 
ries. In dry areas, such as the southern fringe of the Kalahari 
Desert, and in dry years, sporadic battles over land and water 
occurred. These clashes were generally limited in scope and 
were conducted under strict rules of engagement. Weapons 
were often spears (about two meters long) thrown at a dis- 
tance, or knobkerries (wooden clubs) used in close combat. 
Bystanders sometimes cheered on the participants, and a battle 
often ended when one side admitted defeat but was not annihi- 
lated. 

During the eighteenth century, Nguni-speaking Zulu war- 
riors earned a reputation as the most fearsome fighters in the 
region. They sometimes defied tradition and fought in close 
combat with broken spears, or assegais; in this way, they 
inflicted unusually large numbers of casualties. The Zulu men's 
age-groups, close-knit fraternities organized primarily for social 
and religious purposes, provided armies when called on by 
their chiefs. By the late eighteenth century, these groups 
increasingly served as trained armed regiments to conduct 
raids and to fend off challenges from neighboring groups. 

Under the leadership of Shaka Zulu (r. 1817-28), Zulu 
armies redefined military tradition, using new strategies, tac- 
tics, and formations. As Shaka's warriors became more skilled 
and ruthless, they overran their weaker neighbors and drew 
conquered clans into a confederacy under the Zulu monarchy. 
In the upheaval that followed, known as the mfecane (or crush- 
ing — see Glossary), thousands of Africans moved north and 
west, out of the expanding boundaries of the Zulu kingdom 
that was located in the area that would later become KwaZulu 
(see fig. 5). 

Throughout the nineteenth century, European population 
growth and thirst for land added to the regional upheaval, in 
part because European immigrants sometimes forced African 
populations off land they had only recently settled and because 
Europeans sometimes used their superior weapons to annihi- 
late or to subjugate indigenous populations. By the late nine- 
teenth century, Zulu expansion had been halted. British forces 
eliminated the few remaining African leaders who defied them 
and finally subdued the Zulu army just before the outbreak of 
the most devastating in a series of Anglo-Boer (see Glossary) 
wars, the South African War of 1899-1902 (see Industrializa- 



333 



South Africa: A Country Study 

tion and Imperialism, 1870-1910, ch. 1). Military traditions 
and values continued to be central to the Zulu culture through- 
out the twentieth century and were reflected in Zulu political 

rhetoric of the 1990s. 

Early Development of the South African Military 

Ground Forces 

The South African military evolved within the tradition of 
frontier warfare fought by popular militias and small com- 
mando forces, reinforced by the Afrikaners' historical distrust 
of large standing armies. Twentieth-century military develop- 
ments were punctuated by mass mobilization for war and major 
crises. After the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, 
General Jan C. Smuts, the union's first minister of defense, 
placed a high priority on creating a unified military out of the 
separate armies of the union's four provinces. The Defence Act 
(No. 13) of 1912 established a Union Defence Force (UDF) 
that included a Permanent Force — or standing army — of 
career soldiers, an active Citizen Force of temporary conscripts 
and volunteers, and a Cadet organization. The 1912 law also 
obligated all white males between seventeen and sixty years of 
age to serve in the military, but the law was not strictly enforced 
as long as there were enough volunteers to fill the military 
ranks. In 1913 and 1914, the new 23,400-member Citizen Force 
was called on to suppress several industrial strikes on the Wit- 
watersrand (literally, "Ridge of White Waters" in Afrikaans, 
commonly shortened to Rand — see Glossary) . 

In September 1914, the union's troops supported Britain's 
declaration of war against Germany, despite strong objections 
from Afrikaner nationalists still resentful of Britain's treatment 
of them during the South African War. More than 146,000 
whites, 83,000 Africans, and 2,500 people of mixed race 
("coloureds") and Asians volunteered or were conscripted for 
service in World War I. At Britain's request, UDF forces com- 
manded by General Louis Botha invaded the neighboring Ger- 
man colony of South-West Africa by land and sea, forcing 
German troops stationed there to surrender in July 1915. In 
1920 South Africa received the League of Nations mandate to 
govern the former German colony and to prepare it for inde- 
pendence within a few years. 

In East Africa, more than 20,000 South African troops 
fought under General Smuts's command when he directed the 



334 



National Security 



British campaign against the Germans in 1915. South Africans 
also saw action with the Cape Corps in Palestine and with the 
First Brigade in Europe. By the end of World War I, 12,452 
South Africans had died — more than 4,600 in the European 
theater alone. 

Wartime casualties and postwar demobilization weakened 
the UDF. New legislation in 1922 reestablished conscription for 
white males over the age of twenty-one, for four years of mili- 
tary training and service. UDF troops assumed internal security 
tasks in South Africa and quelled numerous revolts against for- 
eign domination in South-West Africa. South Africans suffered 
high casualties, especially in 1922, when an independent group 
of Khoikhoi — known as the Bondelswart-Herero for the black 
bands they wore into battle — led one of numerous revolts; in 
1925, when a mixed-race population — the Basters — demanded 
cultural autonomy and political independence; and in 1932, 
when the Ovambo (Vambo) population along the border with 
Angola demanded an end to South African domination. 

The UDF increased its active-duty forces to 56,000 by the late 
1930s, and 100,000 men belonged to the National Riflemen's 
Reserve, which provided weapons training and practice. South 
Africa again joined the allies against Germany in World War II, 
despite growing protests by Afrikaners who objected to any alli- 
ance with Britain. South Africa, nonetheless, raised three divi- 
sions — 334,000 volunteers, including some 211,000 whites, 
77,000 blacks, and 46,000 coloureds and Asians. Nearly 9,000 
South Africans were killed in action in campaigns in Ethiopia, 
North Africa, Italy, and Madagascar during World War II. 

Wartime expansion was again followed by rapid demobiliza- 
tion after World War II. By then, a century of Anglo-Boer 
clashes followed by decades of growing British influence in 
South Africa had fueled Afrikaner resentment. Resurgent Afri- 
kaner nationalism was an important factor in the growth of the 
NP as the 1948 elections approached. The system of apartheid 
was intended both to bolster Afrikaner pride and to compen- 
sate the Afrikaners for the suffering they had endured. 

After the narrow election victory by the NP in 1948, the gov- 
ernment began the steady Afrikanerization of the military; it 
expanded military service obligations and enforced conscrip- 
tion laws more strictly. Most UDF conscripts underwent three 
months of Citizen Force training in their first year of service, 
and an additional three weeks of training each year for four 
years after that. The Defence Act (No. 44) of 1957 renamed the 



335 



South Africa: A Country Study 

UDF the South African Defence Force (SADF) and established 
within it some quick-reaction units, or Commandos, to respond 
to localized threats. The SADF, numbering about 20,000 in 
1958, would grow to almost 80,000 in the next two decades. 

The 1960s ushered in a new era in military history. South 
Africa's growing international isolation and the intensified 
black resistance to apartheid prompted the government to 
increase military service obligations repeatedly and to extend 
periods of active duty. The Defence Act (No. 12) of 1961 autho- 
rized the minister of defense to deploy Citizen Force troops 
and Commandos for riot control, often to quell antiapartheid 
demonstrations. The Defence Act (No. 85) of 1967 also 
expanded military obligations, requiring white male citizens to 
perform national service, including an initial period of train- 
ing, a period of active duty, and several years in reserve status, 
subject to immediate call-up. 

As the military expanded during the 1970s, the SADF staff 
was organized into six divisions — to manage finance, intelli- 
gence, logistics, operations, personnel, and planning; and the 
South African Medical Service (SAMS) was made co-equal with 
the South African Army, the South African Navy, and the South 
African Air Force. Also during the 1970s, the SADF began 
accepting nonwhites and women into the military as career sol- 
diers, not only as temporary volunteers or reservists, but it did 
not assign women to combat roles. By the end of the 1970s, the 
army had become the principal defender of the apartheid 
regime against the rising tide of African nationalism in South 
Africa and the region. 

During the 1980s, the legal requirements for national ser- 
vice were to register for service at age sixteen and to report for 
duty when called up, which occurred at some time after a 
man's eighteenth birthday. National service obligations could 
be fulfilled by volunteering for active-duty military service for 
two years and by serving in the reserves, generally for ten or 
twelve years. Reservists generally underwent fifty days per year 
of active duty or training, after their initial period of service. 
The requirements for national service changed several times 
during the 1980s and the early 1990s in response to national 
security needs, and they were suspended in 1993. 

Air and Naval Forces 

The origin of the South African Air Force (SAAF) dates to 
the Defence Act (No. 13) of 1912, which established the South 



336 



Army troops on parade 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 



African Aviation Corps (SAAC) as part of the army's Citizen 
Force. The SAAC's first aircraft were deployed against German 
forces in South-West Africa in January 1915. Before that, a few 
SAAC pilots had volunteered for service in Britain, where they 
joined the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). South African pilots in 
the RFC saw action over France in late 1914 and in East Africa 
in 1915. By the end of World War I, nearly 3,000 South African 
pilots had served in RFC squadrons. 

The SAAF became a separate branch of the armed services 
in 1920 and was soon put to the test in suppressing one of a 
series of miners' strikes in the Rand, near Johannesburg, as well 
as rebellions in South-West Africa. World War II saw the SAAF 
grow from a small force of ten officers, thirty-five officer cadets, 
1,600 men of other ranks, and 100 aircraft in 1939 to a force of 
31,204 servicemen, including nearly 1,000 pilots and at least 
1,700 aircraft, in 1941. By 1945, the SAAF had more than 
45,000 personnel in thirty-five operational squadrons. More 
than 10,000 women served in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force 
during the war. 

The air force established a Joint Air Training Scheme (JATS) 
in 1940. The JATS brought British and other Allied air and 
ground crews to South Africa for training and achieved impres- 
sive training records. By 1945 thirty-eight JATS training pro- 



337 



South Africa: A Country Study 

grams had turned out more than 33,300 air crew and 7,800 
pilots, including 12,200 SAAF personnel. 

In addition to protecting Allied shipping along South 
Africa's coastlines, SAAF combat and support units served in 
West Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Madagascar, the Middle 
East, Italy, the Balkans, and elsewhere in the European and the 
Mediterranean theaters. In North Africa alone, the SAAF's 
eleven squadrons flew nearly 34,000 missions and destroyed 
342 enemy aircraft between April 1941 and May 1943. The 
SAAF's 17,000-man contingent in the Italian campaign played 
the dominant role in Allied air operations there. In all of 
World War II, the SAAF flew more than 82,000 missions and 
lost at least 2,227 SAAF members. 

The SAAF's contributions to Western causes also included 
missions during the Berlin airlift of the late 1940s; SAAF crews 
flew 1,240 missions carrying 4,133 tons of supplies to West Ber- 
lin in 1948 and 1949. During the Korean War (1950-53), the 
SAAF's Second Squadron (the Flying Cheetahs) flew more 
than 12,000 missions, establishing a strong record of success. 
During that time, the SAAF reportedly lost only thirty-four 
pilots and seventy-eight aircraft. 

By the end of the 1950s, South Africa faced increasing inter- 
national isolation and the eruptions of internal and regional 
conflicts, which it confronted largely without the assistance of 
allies. SAAF pilots acquired the ability to fly at least twenty-six 
types of aircraft on a wide range of missions. In the escalating 
conflict in South-West Africa, the SAAF carried out long-range 
casualty evacuations, visual and photo reconnaissance missions, 
close air support, and air strikes, most often flying helicopters 
or light attack aircraft. The SAAF also developed both impres- 
sive early-warning equipment and maneuvering tactics to out- 
smart superior technology. SAAF mechanics were skilled 
repairmen; some aging SAAF aircraft were used through the 
1980s and were not retired until the Namibian (South-West 
African) conflict wound down at the end of the decade. 

The South African Navy (SAN) traces its origins back more 
than a century to the UDF's seagoing vessels, and to a naval vol- 
unteer unit formed in Durban in 1885. The British Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve established a division in South Africa in 
1912. The navy's modern antecedent was the Seaward Defence 
Force (SDF), established in 1940 with fifteen small ships and 
several shore bases. The SDF soon grew into a force of several 
escort groups and minesweeping flotillas, some of which served 



338 



- ..... - . ; >; . 



French-manufactured Puma helicopter used by South African Air Force 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

in the Mediterranean in World War II. Many SDF personnel 
saw active service in British Royal Navy vessels. 

The SDF was renamed the South African Naval Force in 
1947 and the South African Navy in 1951. Its main assignments 
were to guard naval installations and harbors at Richards Bay, 
Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. The 
navy's small, elite Marine Corps branch had major responsibili- 
ties in this area until it was disbanded in 1957. The Marine 
Corps was reestablished in 1979, with a force of about 900 
marines, who trained at several installations in western Cape 
Province. 

Naval acquisitions were seriously impaired by international 
embargoes of the late 1970s and 1980s. Navy personnel were 
reduced from almost 9,000 to half that number by 1990, and 
the navy bore the brunt of the military retrenchment, or down- 
sizing, of the early 1990s. The SAN closed some facilities at 
Richards Bay, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, and 
reduced armaments depots and stores at its base at Simons- 
town, south of Cape Town. 

Rise of the Security Establishment 

Senior government officials became convinced in the 1970s 
that their country faced a serious threat of insurgency orches- 



339 



South Africa: A Country Study 

trated by communist world powers and carried out by their sur- 
rogates in southern Africa. To emphasize the comprehensive 
nature of this threat, they referred to it as a "Total Onslaught," 
and to counter it, they developed a "Total Strategy," which 
called for mobilizing military, political, educational, economic, 
and psychological resources. The SADF emerged as the key 
participant in the Total Strategy, as the centerpiece of an elabo- 
rate national security apparatus encompassing the defense 
establishment, the paramilitary South African Police (SAP), 
numerous intelligence agencies, defense-oriented parastatal 
and private organizations, and — by the late 1970s — a growing 
number of government agencies with security concerns. The 
SADF's expanded role increased its influence in policy decision 
making and in resource allocation. By the end of the 1970s, the 
military was at the center of the country's domestic and foreign 
policy, implementing its Total Strategy to outmaneuver exter- 
nal and internal enemies of the state. 

National Security Management System 

Security concerns were foremost in the policies of P. W. 
Botha, who became prime minister in 1978, following twelve 
years as minister of defense. Botha and the new minister of 
defense, General Magnus Malan, overhauled, consolidated, 
and streamlined much of the government, subordinating its 
other functions to their security concerns. To manage this cum- 
bersome bureaucratic arrangement, Botha, Malan, and a few 
key advisers created the National Security Management System 
(NSMS) and consolidated the preeminence of the Directorate 
of Military Intelligence within the government's information- 
gathering community. 

The NSMS subsumed and co-opted existing structures, both 
public and private, in a comprehensive security apparatus. 
Some critics of government viewed the NSMS as a shadow or 
parallel government, or even a covert infrastructure for de 
facto military rule. Its mission was based upon a classical coun- 
terinsurgency strategy — to identify and to neutralize antigov- 
ernment activists and to strengthen public support ("Winning 
the hearts and minds" — WHAM) for security-related activities. 

At the apex of the NSMS was the State Security Council 
(SSC). The SSC had been established in 1972 as one of twenty 
cabinet committees with advisory responsibilities to the execu- 
tive branch of government. In 1979 it became the most impor- 
tant and most powerful of the four remaining cabinet 



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committees. Botha chaired the enlarged SSC, which also 
included the minister of defense, the minister of foreign 
affairs, the minister of justice, and the minister of law and 
order; the chief of the SADF; the chiefs of the military and the 
intelligence services; the commissioner of police; the chief of 
the security police; and other senior government officials by 
invitation. 

The SSC functioned as a national command center, evaluat- 
ing current intelligence, formulating policy, and directing a 
nationwide organizational network dedicated to implementing 
the Total Strategy. The scope of its responsibilities, size, organi- 
zational complexity, and budget far exceeded that of any other 
cabinet committee, past or present. The SSC was supported by 
a Work Committee and by the State Security Secretariat staff. 
The Work Committee met weekly to review and to coordinate 
the activities of more than a dozen interdepartmental commit- 
tees and to refine issues to be put before the entire council. 
The secretariat staff of about ninety consisted primarily of mili- 
tary and intelligence personnel. 

Internally, the SSC was organized into four branches. These 
had responsibility for security strategy — developing strategic 
options and monitoring overall government policy; for 
national intelligence — reviewing, evaluating, and interpreting 
information produced by other agencies; for strategic commu- 
nication — considering problems associated with the govern- 
ment's psychological and public-relations campaigns; and for 
administration. 

Below this national command center was a hierarchy of Joint 
Management Centers (JMCs), generally corresponding to 
SADF area commands. Twelve JMCs were operating in 1986; 
these were later reduced to nine to coincide with the govern- 
ment's newly designated economic development areas. Head- 
quartered in major cities, the JMCs were chaired by military or 
police brigadiers (between colonel and major general), each 
directing fifty to fifty-five officials and security officers. JMC 
officials also directed the activities of sub-JMCs, or subcenters 
composed of officials from city government, police, and mili- 
tary in the area. At the bottom of the security apparatus pyra- 
mid were approximately 448 minicenters, directed by 
municipal officials, postmasters, fire chiefs, local defense offi- 
cials, and other community leaders. JMC authorities at each 
level were assisted by three advisory committees specializing in 



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South Africa: A Country Study 



communications; in intelligence; and in constitutional, eco- 
nomic, and social affairs. 

In the mid-1980s, the government established the Military 
Area Radio Network (MARNET), a twenty-four-hour very-high- 
frequency system designed to link farmers in rural locations 
with police and military forces in the area. The radio network 
was intended to help protect civilians in emergencies, such as 
an armed uprising or terrorist attack, especially in the far 
northern Transvaal. Other civilian defense measures included 
weapons training, fire-fighting, and first-aid classes provided by 
the military. 

As internal dissent escalated in the mid-1980s, the govern- 
ment again raised minimum national service requirements, 
and new legislation extended military service obligations to 
foreign residents of South Africa. By 1989 the SADF had grown 
to an estimated 103,000 active-duty and 455,000 reserve-duty 
troops. Growing civilian opposition, in the meantime, 
prompted an activist End Conscription Campaign to urge civil- 
ians to resist military service. The number of men who avoided 
conscription each year rose steadily, and the government 
debated instituting a system of conscientious objection (and 
alternative service) to allow a small number of conscripts to 
avoid military service legally, based on their religious beliefs. 
But by the time such a system became law in 1992, several thou- 
sand men each year had refused to be conscripted for military 
service, and a small number were prosecuted and were jailed 
or fined for this offense. 

Regional tensions began to ease in the late 1980s. The gov- 
ernment was reevaluating its commitment to apartheid, and 
expectations of political change were becoming evident in 
South Africa and throughout the region. Moreover, as the 
fighting in Angola began to subside, South African troops with- 
drew from Namibia, and the government began to seek con- 
tacts among former opponents to negotiate a way out of the 
political and economic impasse created by apartheid. National 
Service obligations were scaled back; for example, in 1991 the 
initial mandatory period of military service was reduced to one 
year. 

Specialized Farces 

The SADF increasingly assumed internal security functions 
during the 1970s and 1980s and was deployed to urban areas of 
South Africa, often referred to as the second front, to combat 



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sabotage. In these nontraditional military functions, senior 
officers relied on specialized military and paramilitary units, 
some with unpublicized areas of responsibility. 

The Special Forces were assigned sensitive missions and 
operations inside and outside South Africa, which were often 
closed to public scrutiny. The Special Forces consisted of five 
or six reconnaissance (recce) regiments during most of the 
apartheid era. Other specialized units were sometimes involved 
in clandestine operations, but were not technically included 
among the Special Forces. The reconnaissance regiments' com- 
manders had the authority to initiate operations subject only to 
the approval of the military chief of staff for operations. The 
commanding general of all Special Forces reported directly to 
the SADF chief. 

The oldest of the Special Forces, the First Reconnaissance 
Regiment, known as "One Recce," was formed in 1972 and was 
headquartered in Durban. It was responsible for the initial 
training of all Special Forces members from the mid-1970s on. 
The other reconnaissance units were formed in the late 1970s 
or early 1980s. 

The Second Reconnaissance Regiment was headquartered 
in Pretoria and was deployed largely in that area. Little public 
information exists about the Third Reconnaissance Regiment, 
which reportedly was disbanded during the 1980s. The Fourth 
Reconnaissance Regiment, based at Langebaan, near Saldanha 
Bay, specialized in seaborne operations and saw extensive ser- 
vice in Angola during the early and mid-1980s. 

The Fifth Reconnaissance Regiment, based at Phalaborwa, 
in the northeast, operated primarily in Mozambique in support 
of the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nactional 
Mocambicana — MNR or Renamo), but saw additional action in 
South Africa and Angola. The Sixth Reconnaissance Regiment 
also saw action in Mozambique. Members of the reconnais- 
sance regiments were recruited in Zimbabwe (until 1980, Rho- 
desia), Angola, and Mozambique, and among South Africans 
who opposed the antiapartheid struggle or the ANC, in partic- 
ular, for a variety of political and personal reasons. 

Several other specialized military units provided clandestine 
and open support for the government and its apartheid poli- 
cies. For example, the South-West Africa Territorial Force 
(SWATF), the Forty-Fourth Parachute Brigade, the Thirty-Sec- 
ond Battalion, and the Koevoet ("crowbar," in Afrikaans) coun- 
terinsurgency force had specific responsibilities for preserving 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

the status quo or for defending the government. Some of these 
units — which often included members of all races but were 
usually commanded by whites — earned reputations for particu- 
lar brutality in carrying out their missions. 

Before Namibian independence in 1990, whites in that dis- 
puted territory had the same compulsory military service as in 
South Africa, and they sometimes served in SADF units in 
Namibia. In August 1980, the SADF established SWATF to 
counter the growing South-West Africa People's Organisation 
(SWAPO) insurgency, which had been fighting for indepen- 
dence since the 1960s. SWATF included some SADF units and 
local recruits; its commander, an SADF general, was both 
South-West Africa secretary of defense and general officer 
commanding South African army forces in the territory. 

By 1987 SWATF was a 22,000-member militia, with a reaction 
force element and an area force. The reaction force had a 
motorized brigade composed of three infantry battalions and 
an armored car regiment, and a standing force of six light 
infantry battalions with supporting units recruited and trained 
for service in specific regions, or among specific ethnic groups. 
The area force comprised twenty-six multiracial counterinsur- 
gency forces. Additional specialized units of SWATF included 
engineers, signals personnel, mounted troops, a parachute bat- 
talion, and a commando squadron. Several other multiracial 
units performed territory-wide functions in South-West Africa. 

The Forty-Fourth Parachute Brigade, headquartered at Mur- 
ray Hill near Pretoria, was the SADF's best-qualified rapid 
deployment force. The First Paratroop Battalion, its only stand- 
ing battalion, was based at Tempe, outside Bloemfontein. 
These forces were used extensively in South-West Africa and in 
Angola during the late 1970s, and after 1980 were joined by 
paratroopers from the former Rhodesian army. 

The Thirty-Second Battalion, a black multinational light 
infantry force, was formed in 1976 from remnants of Angolan 
rebel units that had been defeated in that country's civil war. It 
was primarily involved in anti-SWAPO operations in Namibia. 
The Thirty-Second Battalion worked closely with several recon- 
naissance units of the SADF. In April 1989, it moved to Pom- 
fret, in the northern Cape Province, from which it was 
deployed to quell violence in black townships in several urban 
areas. 

During the 1980s, the 3,000-strong Koevoet counterinsur- 
gency force, composed mostly of Ovambo fighters commanded 



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National Security 



by white SADF officers, conducted anti-SWAPO operations in 
Namibia and earned a reputation for ruthlessness and brutal- 
ity. Koevoet was largely disbanded after the territory achieved 
independence in 1990, and some of its members were trans- 
ferred to the Namibian police force. Former Koevoet members 
are widely despised by citizens and, in particular, by former 
SWAPO members who have also joined the country's new 
police force. 

Several other specialized military units were not part of the 
Special Forces, but their particular missions were defined in 
part by legally established racial boundaries. The South African 
Cape Corps (SACC), for example, traced its origins to a small 
force of coloured soldiers who had fought together during 
World War II. In 1965 Cape Corps personnel were permanently 
assigned to the navy, and later some were transferred to air 
force maintenance units. An Indian Corps was set up in 1974 to 
train Asian volunteers, primarily for the navy. During the 1980s, 
these volunteers were trained at the Indian Training Centre at 
Durban for service in the navy or the Marine Corps. 

Until the early 1990s, the military's Catering Corps was 
responsible for enforcing aspects of apartheid related to food 
and dining. As a general rule, caterers in any of the military 
services could serve food only to members of their own racial 
group. They prepared different rations for soldiers of different 
racial identities and for those whose religions enforced food 
prohibitions. The caterers also served special rations to the 
crews of maritime aircraft, ships, and submarines, and to pris- 
oners of war. 

The State President's Guard, established as an elite, specially 
trained unit in May 1967, was disbanded in October 1990. It 
performed both protective and ceremonial functions. As a 
home guard, it protected and staffed the president's homes in 
Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban, and Bloemfontein while the 
president was in residence. It also served as a ceremonial 
honor guard at important events such as presidential inaugura- 
tions and funerals, state visits, and VIP visits. Over the course of 
its twenty-three-year history, it was successively attached to the 
Army Gymnasium in Pretoria, the South African Medical Ser- 
vice Training Centre at Heidelberg (southeast of Johannes- 
burg), the Fourth Provost Company in Wonderboom 
(northeast of Bloemfontein), the Second Signal Regiment in 
Pretoria, and the South African Army College (near Pretoria). 
During the 1980s, a few presidential guard units were deployed 



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South Africa: A Country Study 



to border areas for ten to twelve months, in part because their 
superior training enabled them to serve longer than the nor- 
mal three-month rotation to those regions. 

Homeland Militaries 

Each of the four nominally independent homelands (see 
Glossary) — Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda — 
maintained small defense forces that were effectively under 
SADF control, despite each government's claim to national sov- 
ereignty. (No country except South Africa recognized these 
homelands as independent countries.) The homelands were 
dissolved when the April 1994 elections took place, and their 
military forces were integrated into the new national military 
establishment in 1995 and 1996. 

Bophuthatswana, with a population of 2.4 million, was 
declared "independent" in 1977. The homeland consisted of 
several scattered enclaves near the border with Botswana. 
Bophuthatswana's military, the 3,100-member Bophuthatswana 
Defence Force (BDF), was organized into six military regions. 
Its ground forces included two infantry battalions, possessing 
two armored personnel carriers. The BDF air wing of 150 per- 
sonnel possessed three combat aircraft and two armed helicop- 
ters. 

The BDF was deployed several times in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s to quell popular demonstrations by residents of 
what had been South African territory bordering the home- 
land, when their residential areas were incorporated into 
Bophuthatswana for administrative purposes. South African 
security forces intervened to suppress these demonstrations 
and at least one coup attempt against the unpopular regime of 
President Lucas Mangope, who had been appointed by Preto- 
ria. 

Mangope was removed from office in April 1994, after BDF 
troops had killed at least forty people and had injured 150 
more who were insisting on the right to vote in South Africa's 
upcoming elections, a demand that Mangope refused. Mem- 
bers of South African right-wing white extremist organizations 
arrived to support Mangope and clashed with some members 
of the BDF who had sided with the civilian demonstrators. The 
clash led to the highly publicized executions of two whites by 
the homeland military. The unrest ended when SADF troops 
arrived and placed Bophuthatswana under the control of 



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South Africa's interim executive authority until the elections 
took place. 

Ciskei and Transkei were largely Xhosa-speaking homelands 
in the southern coastal region that became the Eastern Cape 
province in 1994. Ciskei, with a population of only 1 million, 
became "independent" in 1981. The Ciskei Defence Force 
(CDF), consisting of about 1,000 troops, was organized into 
two infantry battalions, possessing one armored personnel car- 
rier, and an air wing company with five light aircraft and four 
helicopters. 

Ciskei's president in the early 1980s, Lennox Sebe, estab- 
lished an elaborate security apparatus to protect his govern- 
ment, but members of his family and his army, nonetheless, 
tried on several occasions to overthrow him. Sebe was ousted in 
a military coup in March 1990 and was replaced by a military 
council led by Brigadier Joshua Gqozo. Tensions rose as the 
new Ciskei government debated the reincorporation of the 
homeland into South Africa, and the Gqozo government was 
ousted in early 1994, only weeks before the historic South Afri- 
can national elections and the dissolution of the homelands. 

Transkei, the second Xhosa-speaking homeland, was 
declared "independent" in 1976. It had a population of about 
4.4 million. The Transkei Defence Force (TDF) numbered 
about 2,000, including one infantry battalion and an air wing 
with two light transports and two helicopters. The Transkei 
government of the 1980s had a strained relationship with 
South Africa, largely because of the existence of armed strong- 
holds of the ANC and other antiapartheid organizations in the 
homeland (which included within its territory the birthplace of 
ANC leader Nelson Mandela). 

In 1987 Major General Bantu Holomisa — a staunch ANC 
activist — led a bloodless coup against the Transkei govern- 
ment; he then suspended the civilian constitution and refused 
South Africa's repeated demands for a return to civilian rule, 
insisting that a civilian government would be a puppet con- 
trolled by Pretoria. When the homeland was dissolved in 1994, 
Holomisa was named deputy minister of housing in President 
Mandela's cabinet. 

Venda, a tiny homeland in the northern Transvaal, had a 
population of about 665,000 and was declared "independent" 
in 1979. Venda's 900-member military force consisted of two 
infantry battalions with one armored personnel carrier, one 
engineering unit, and an air wing with three helicopters. These 



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South Africa: A Country Study 



forces and their equipment were incorporated into the 
national military in 1995. 

Women in the Military 

South African women have a long history of service in the 
military. Women served in auxiliary roles in the SADF in World 
War I and World War II, and were assigned to active, non-com- 
bat duties after 1970. The army established a volunteer nursing 
service in 1914 and sent 328 nurses to serve with South African 
troops in Europe and East Africa in World War I. The Women's 
Auxiliary Army Service began accepting women recruits in 
1916. Officials estimated that women volunteers relieved 
12,000 men for combat in World War I by assuming clerical and 
other duties. During World War II, South Africa had five ser- 
vice organizations for women — the South African Military 
Nursing Service, and women's auxiliaries attached to the army, 
the navy, the air force, and the military police. 

In 1970 the SADF began to accept women volunteers into 
the Permanent Force, and to assign them to duties that would 
release men for combat and operational duties. One year later, 
the South African Army Women's College initiated women's 
military training programs for jobs in military finance, person- 
nel, intelligence, and medical units. No women were trained 
for combat. Women were not assigned to duties that presented 
a high risk of capture by foreign enemies. 

During the late 1970s and 1980s, women were active in civil 
defense organizations and were being trained as part of the 
country's general mobilization against possible terrorist 
attacks. In 1989, for example, the Johannesburg Civil Defence 
Program provided training for 800 civil defense volunteers, 
about one-half of whom were women. These classes included 
such subjects as weapons training for self-defense, antiriot pro- 
cedures, traffic and crowd control, first aid, and fire-fighting. 
An unreported number of women also received instruction in 
counterinsurgency techniques and commando operations. 
Women also served in military elements of liberation militias in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, and women were accepted into the 
ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, 
also known as Umkhonto — MK), throughout the antiapartheid 
struggle. 

In 1995 women of all races were being incorporated into the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and a woman 
officer, Brigadier Jackie Sedibe, was appointed to oversee the 



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National Security 



implementation of new SANDF policies concerning the treat- 
ment of women. Women had been promoted as high as war- 
rant officers and brigadiers in the Permanent Force by the 
early 1990s, but only ten women were SADF colonels in 1994. 
In 1996 Brigadier Sedibe became the first woman in the mili- 
tary to be promoted to the rank of major general. Widespread 
cultural attitudes in the 1990s still oppose the idea of women in 
combat, but officials are debating ways to assign women an 
equitable share of the leadership positions in the military. 

Global and Regional Issues 

Since the arrival of seafaring European powers in the fif- 
teenth century, South Africa has never been isolated in a strate- 
gic sense. The Cape of Good Hope initially served as a 
reprovisioning depot for Portuguese, English, and Dutch trad- 
ers on their way to and from the Orient (see Southern African 
Societies to ca. 1600, ch. 1). After the mid-seventeenth century, 
southern Africa attracted Dutch and French Huguenot traders 
and settlers, whose troops engaged in a series of wars with 
indigenous Africans. In the late eighteenth century, the region 
was caught up in the Napoleonic wars and passed to British 
imperial control. An influx of Indian laborers and traders in 
the nineteenth century added an Asian dimension to South 
Africa's increasingly complex multicultural society. During the 
twentieth century, South Africa fought on the side of the victo- 
rious allies in the two world wars and in the Korean War; after 
that, it was caught up in the global strategic contest between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 

Despite the strong international presence over several centu- 
ries, South Africa's strategic position has been peripheral 
rather than central. World powers have sought access to, or 
control of, its remote subcontinental location and its mineral 
resources as a means of furthering their own global or imperial 
designs. Their arrivals and departures in southern Africa paral- 
leled their countries' rise and fall in the international political 
and economic hierarchy. 

After World War II, international interest in South Africa 
centered on its mineral wealth and its location along southern 
trade routes and lines of communication between the Eastern 
and the Western hemispheres. South Africa's potential interna- 
tional importance was nonetheless limited because domestic 
conditions, specifically its apartheid policies, made it the object 
of international scorn. Its diplomatic isolation was com- 



349 



South Africa: A Country Study 

pounded by international embargoes and by a wide range of 
Western economic sanctions during the 1980s. Paradoxically, 
this nation with a long history of trade, with a strategic loca- 
tion, with overwhelming military and economic power in the 
region, with strong cultural roots on three continents, and with 
hard-earned international stature, became a pariah. Then as 
East-West and United States-Soviet tensions eased, southern 
African regional conflicts ended and domestic political 
reforms reduced Pretoria's isolation. In the early 1990s, South 
Africans negotiated a peaceful end to apartheid and began to 
build new ties to the region and to the rest of the international 
community. 

Arms Trade and the Defense Industry 

Growth of the Defense Industry 

South Africa's domestic arms industry originated in 1940 
with the appointment of an Advisory Committee on Defence 
Force Requirements to study and to assess the country's mili- 
tary-industrial potential. Relying on its recommendations, the 
government, with British assistance, established six factories to 
produce or to assemble ammunition, bombs, howitzers, mor- 
tars, armored vehicles, and electronic equipment. A number of 
private companies also produced weapons during World War 
II. Most weapons factories were dismantled in the late 1940s. 

Seeking long-term military research and development capa- 
bilities, the government in 1945 established the Council for Sci- 
entific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to study the country's 
overall industrial potential. The Board of Defence Resources, 
established in 1949, and the Munitions Production Office, 
established in 1951, oversaw policy planning concerning arma- 
ments. In 1953 the first rifle factory was established, and the 
Lyttleton Engineering Works, formerly the Defence Ordnance 
Workshop, collected technical data and information on manu- 
facturing methods. In 1954 the government established the 
National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) to assess and 
to improve the fledgling defense industry. 

In 1960 the increasingly security-conscious National Party 
(NP) government stepped up programs to improve the arsenal 
of the armed forces. Pretoria raised arms production levels, 
sought new foreign sources of weapons, and began to acquire 
new defense technology systems. These efforts intensified after 
the 1963 United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 



350 



South African-built armored vehicles 
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington 

restricting the sale of arms, ammunition, or military vehicles to 
South Africa. The Armaments Act (No. 87) of 1964 established 
an Armaments Production Board to manage the Lyttleton 
Engineering Works and a state-owned ammunition plant. The 
board assumed responsibility for coordinating arms purchases 
among government, military, and private agencies. 

The Armaments Development and Production Act (No. 57) 
of 1968 established a special production unit, the Armaments 
Development and Production Corporation (Armscor), to con- 
solidate and to manage public and private arms manufactur- 
ing. Through Armscor's efforts, South Africa soon achieved 
self-sufficiency in the production of small arms, military vehi- 
cles, optical devices, and ammunition. During the mid-1970s, 
Armscor reorganized as the Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa (still Armscor), expanded existing arms industries, and 
assumed control over most research and development done by 
NIDR. Before the voluntary UN arms embargo was declared 
mandatory in 1977, South Africa received military technology 
through licensing agreements, primarily with West Germany, 
Italy, Israel, France, Belgium, and Canada. Licensing and 
coproduction agreements in the 1970s and 1980s made it diffi- 
cult to distinguish between fully indigenous military manufac- 



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South Africa: A Country Study 

tures and those that relied on foreign manufacturing 
capabilities. 

During the 1980s, Armscor was a central feature of South 
Africa's military-industrial complex, a state corporation that 
depended on private industry for specific processes and com- 
ponents. Armscor's financial autonomy was evident in its access 
to the capital market for loans, but at the same time, many of 
its functions were closely tied to the government. Armscor 
executives reported directly to the minister of defense. Arms- 
cor's ten-member corporate board had overlapping member- 
ship with the ministry's Defence Planning Committee and 
included leading businessmen, financiers, and scientists, as 
well as the government's director general of finance and the 
chief of the SADF. In addition, Armscor was represented on the 
government's high-level military planning and policy bodies. 

Armscor's marketing and sales department, Nimrod, under- 
took an aggressive arms export promotion campaign in the 
1980s. It participated in international arms exhibitions, in 
Greece in 1982, in Chile each year from 1984 through the end 
of the decade, and in Turkey in 1989 (displaying its G-5 howit- 
zer and Rooikat armored vehicle). Armscor also displayed its 
manufactures at numerous demonstrations and trade fairs in 
South Africa. Despite the UN ban on arms sales to Pretoria and 
a 1984 UN ban on the purchase of arms from South Africa, 
Armscor's business flourished. The corporation did not dis- 
close export figures or customers during the 1980s, but the 
United States government estimated South Africa's arms sales 
at US$273 million (in constant 1989 dollars) over the five-year 
period from 1984 to 1988. The best year was 1985, when it 
earned roughly US$102 million. 

Armscor did experience the effect of the cutback in weapons 
sales in the late 1980s. Its work force had increased from 10,000 
to 33,000 between 1974 and 1984, but had declined to about 
20,000 by 1989. At that time, Armscor purchased most of its 
manufacturing components from twelve subsidiary companies 
and an estimated 3,000 private contractors and subcontractors, 
representing a total work force of more than 80,000 employees. 
The government began to privatize parts of the arms industry 
in the early 1990s. Under a major restructuring that began in 
April 1992, a segment of Armscor and several of its manufac- 
turing subsidiaries were reorganized as an independent weap- 
ons manufacturing company, Denel. Denel and several other 
manufacturers produced equipment on contract with Armscor, 



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National Security 



which retained overall responsibility for military acquisitions. 
Armscor also acted as the agent of the state, regulating military 
imports and exports, issuing marketing certificates, and ensur- 
ing adherence to international agreements. 

Defying International Embargoes 

Despite the numerous international embargoes against arms 
trade with South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, it nonetheless 
developed the most advanced military-industrial base on the 
continent. In the late 1970s, it ranked behind Brazil and Israel, 
among developing-country arms suppliers. The reasons for this 
apparent irony are evident in South Africa's defense produc- 
tion infrastructure, which had developed even before the first 
UN embargo in 1963; in the incremental, haphazard, and 
inconsistent ways in which the arms embargoes were imposed 
and enforced; in the deliberate refusal by several countries to 
comply with the embargoes; in Pretoria's use of clever and 
covert circumvention techniques; and in its ability to develop 
and to exploit advanced commercial and "dual-use" technolo- 
gies for military applications. By the late 1960s, South Africa 
had acquired at least 127 foreign production licenses for arms, 
ammunition, and military vehicles. South Africa had pur- 
chased fighter aircraft, tanks, naval vessels, naval armaments, 
and maritime patrol aircraft, primarily from Britain. After that, 
military equipment was carefully maintained, upgraded, and 
often reverse-engineered or copied, after the embargo made it 
difficult to obtain replacements or replacement parts. 

During the 1970s, South Africa expanded and refined its 
ability to acquire foreign assistance for domestic military pro- 
duction. Its broad-based industrial growth enabled it to shift 
imports from finished products to technology and components 
that could be incorporated into locally designed or copied mil- 
itary systems. Through this maneuver, multinational firms and 
banks became major sources of technology and capital for 
South Africa's defense industry, even during the embargo era. 
Dual-use equipment and technology — such as electronics, com- 
puters, communications, machine tools, and industrial equip- 
ment — and manufacturing techniques were not subject to 
embargo and were easy to exploit for military applications. 
South African engineers also were able to modify, to redesign, 
to retrofit, and to upgrade a wide range of weapons using for- 
eign technology and systems. 



353 



South Africa: A Country Study 

South Africa also invested in strategic foreign industries; 
recruited foreign technicians to design, to develop, and to 
manufacture weapons; rented and leased technical services, 
including computers; and resorted to cover companies, decep- 
tive practices, third-country shipments, and outright smuggling 
and piracy to meet its defense needs. By the 1980s, the defense 
industry, as extensive as it was, was nonetheless incapable of 
designing and producing some advanced military systems, such 
as high-performance combat aircraft, tanks, and aerospace 
electronics. 

Even as Pretoria's diplomatic isolation increased in the 
1980s, as many as fifty countries — including several in Africa — 
purchased Armscor's relatively simple, dependable, battle- 
tested arms for their own defense needs. The Johannesburg 
Weekly Mail, citing government documents, disclosed arms 
shipments in the mid-1980s to Iraq, Gabon, Malawi, Chile, 
France, Belgium, and Spain. Morocco and Zaire obtained Ratel 
armored vehicles from Pretoria, and South Africa's mobile 
razor-wire barrier, used for area protection and crowd control, 
was exported to at least fifteen countries, including several in 
Africa, and to United States forces in West Germany. 

Reports of the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980s and of the Per- 
sian Gulf War of early 1991 highlighted Pretoria's previous sales 
to several countries in the Middle East. Armscor had sold G-5 
towed howitzers to both Iran and Iraq, and G-6 self-propelled 
howitzers to the United Arab Emirates. South Africa also pro- 
vided vaccines to Israel, for that country's use as a precaution 
against the possible Iraqi use of biological weapons. Numerous 
other reports of South African arms sales to the Middle East, to 
Peru, to several leaders of breakaway Yugoslav republics, and to 
other countries indicated the international awareness of the 
strength of South Africa's arms industry. The London-based 
humanitarian organization, Oxfam, criticized South Africa in 
1992 for having sold automatic rifles, machine guns, grenade 
launchers, and ammunition to war-torn Rwanda. Military sales 
to Rwanda continued in the mid-1990s, even after that coun- 
try's genocidal outbreak of violence in 1994. 

The new Government of National Unity in 1994 faced the 
dilemma of whether to dismantle the defense industry many of 
its leaders had reviled for two decades or to preserve a lucrative 
export industry that still employed tens of thousands of South 
Africans. After some debate, President Mandela and Minister 
of Defence Joe Modise decided to maintain a high level of 



354 



National Security 



defense manufacturing and to increase military exports in the 
late 1990s. The industry, they argued, would benefit civil soci- 
ety in areas such as mass transportation, medical care, mobile 
services, information management, and other areas of infra- 
structure development. Increasing defense exports, they main- 
tained, would bolster foreign currency reserves and would help 
reduce unemployment. Moreover, they pledged that military 
exports to other countries would require cabinet approval and 
verification by Armscor; and, they promised, arms would not 
be sold to countries that threatened war with their neighbors. 

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 

The international fear of nuclear proliferation made South 
Africa the focus of intense concern during the 1980s. Although 
Pretoria initially would not confirm it was developing, or pos- 
sessed, nuclear weapons, it had large natural deposits of ura- 
nium, as well as uranium enrichment facilities and the 
necessary technological infrastructure. In addition, until the 
late 1980s South Africa had the deeply entrenched fear of its 
adversaries and the insecurity about its borders that were 
important incentives in other nations' nuclear programs. After 
1981 South Africa was able to produce annually about fifty kilo- 
grams of highly enriched uranium, enough to make two or 
three twenty-kiloton nuclear bombs each year. With the coop- 
eration of Israel — another technologically advanced, militarily 
powerful, nuclear-capable nation surrounded by hostile neigh- 
bors — South Africa developed at least six nuclear warheads, 
which it later acknowledged, along with a variety of missiles 
and other conventional weapons. 

In 1987 President Botha announced that South Africa was 
considering signing the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and would begin discussions with other countries 
toward that end. In September 1990, Pretoria agreed to sign 
the NPT, but only "in the context of an equal commitment by 
other states in the Southern African region." After intensive 
diplomatic efforts, especially by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, Tanzania and Zambia agreed to sign the treaty. 
South Africa signed the NPT in July 1991, and an International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement in Sep- 
tember of that year. In addition, the government banned any 
further development, manufacture, marketing, import, or 
export of nuclear weapons or explosives, as required by the 
NPT. The IAEA declared it had completed its inspection in late 



355 



South Africa: A Country Study 

1994 and that South Africa's nuclear weapons facilities had 
been dismantled. 

South Africa's nuclear parastatal, the Atomic Energy Corpo- 
ration (AEC), which changed its emphasis from nuclear deter- 
rents to industrial and economic needs, assists in the marketing 
of more than 150 products and services in the mid-1990s. 
These products have applications in mining and aerospace 
development, food production, transportation, and environ- 
mental preservation. Some examples are air filters for motor 
vehicles, a measuring device for minerals industry flotation 
processes, radio-isotopes for medical and industrial use, and a 
biogas unit to recover methane from refuse for use as vehicle 
fuel. These sales generated more than US$28 million between 
March 1993 and March 1994, according to official reports. 

Although these developments represented a dramatic break- 
through in the international campaign to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons, and a marked change in South Africa's own 
position, they did not permanently foreclose Pretoria's nuclear 
options. Pretoria could withdraw from its treaty obligations — 
NPT signatories may do so on ninety days' notice simply by cit- 
ing "supreme interests." Moreover, South Africa could resume 
the production of weapons-grade uranium, although this prod- 
uct would be under IAEA safeguards and could not be used for 
nuclear explosives as long as South Africa chose to abide by the 
NPT. 

South Africa's Council for Nuclear Safety, a statutory body 
set up to safeguard citizens and property against nuclear haz- 
ards, announced on September 27, 1994, an agreement 
between South Africa and the United States to exchange infor- 
mation about nuclear safety. This agreement, the first of its 
kind for South Africa — the twenty-ninth for the United 
States — enables signatory governments to remain abreast of 
the latest research information in the field of nuclear safety. 

South Africa developed the ability to produce and to deploy 
chemical and biological weapons during the mid-1980s, 
although Pretoria then acknowledged only that it was develop- 
ing defensive countermeasures against such weapons. Military 
officials then believed that chemical or biological weapons 
were being used by Angolan government forces in that coun- 
try's festering civil war. In 1993, after South Africa's involve- 
ment in that war had ended, President de Klerk ordered the 
destruction of any remaining chemical and biological sub- 
stances. His government also joined more than forty other Afri- 



356 



National Security 



can nations in signing the international Convention on 
Chemical Weapons. In October 1994, South Africa hosted the 
first conference in Africa on the implementation of the Con- 
vention on Chemical Weapons. 

Regional Issues 

South Africa was increasingly isolated, diplomatically and 
politically, after the early 1960s. Its system of apartheid, con- 
structed to exclude blacks and to subordinate their concerns to 
white interests, made it a pariah on the continent. It was the 
only African country to be excluded from the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU); it became the target of a campaign 
intended to punish, to isolate, and to overthrow the govern- 
ment in Pretoria. A few OAU members tried unsuccessfully to 
mobilize a pan-African military force, which, they had hoped, 
would oust the NP government and would install the ANC in 
power in South Africa. 

The climate of regional hostility intensified against a chang- 
ing background of African politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Sev- 
eral dozen former European colonies and protectorates 
became independent African countries. After 1972 South Afri- 
can police units tried to bolster the illegal Rhodesian regime of 
Ian Smith against Zimbabwean national liberation armies, but 
by 1980 the new nation of Zimbabwe had achieved a new gov- 
ernment with international legitimacy. Pretoria also assisted 
the Portuguese in their unsuccessful struggles against libera- 
tion movements in Angola and Mozambique; these two coun- 
tries won independence from Portugal in 1975. In South-West 
Africa, the only other white-minority stronghold in the region, 
the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) contin- 
ued its independence struggle, which had begun in 1966. 

By the early 1980s, Pretoria's former regional "buffer zone" 
against an enemy onslaught had become a hostile region of 
"front-line states" opposing Pretoria. South Africa's neighbors 
welcomed its dissidents, giving them political sanctuary and 
asylum, organizational headquarters, and military training 
facilities. South Africa found itself the lone white-ruled state in 
an unstable region. Civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, 
exacerbated by large-scale foreign intervention, drew Pretoria 
into protracted regional conflicts. It confronted an influx of 
Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Cuban armed forces and weaponry 
into the region, and saw mounting dissent within its own bor- 
ders. 



357 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Despite the regional animosities, no African army posed a 
serious or immediate challenge to South Africa's military might 
during this time, and its domestic enemies were not well 
enough organized or equipped to confront the power of the 
state. But the government in Pretoria often failed to distin- 
guish between external and internal enemies. It saw itself as 
besieged, caught in a pernicious cycle of low-intensity, uncon- 
ventional warfare from within and without — a Total Onslaught 
against which only a Total Strategy could ensure survival. This 
strategy required military and economic self-sufficiency; small, 
mobile, offensive-oriented armed forces; air superiority and at 
least a modest naval capability, backed by a large reserve force; 
a military doctrine of deterrence, including the use of preemp- 
tive and retaliatory force, as well as large-scale interventions in 
neighboring states; and an extensive intelligence and security 
network, both inside and outside South Africa. 

South Africa's four-pronged strategy of alliance, accommo- 
dation, deterrence through defense, and counterthreat has 
been outlined by David Albright, a specialist in international 
security affairs. Pretoria's de facto alliances with Angola and 
Mozambique ended with their independence in 1975, and its 
informal cooperation pact with Southern Rhodesia (later, Rho- 
desia) ended soon after that. Then, lacking the option of forg- 
ing open security alliances with neighboring states, Pretoria 
still tried to lessen regional tensions through nonaggression 
pacts, such as its agreements with Swaziland in 1982 and with 
Mozambique and Angola in 1984. It sought accommodation 
with regional states that were small, weak, or geographically 
remote, such as Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mada- 
gascar, and — to a lesser degree — Zambia. 

Two elements of South Africa's regional strategy, deterrence 
and counterthreat, which were increasingly important after the 
regional "buffer zone" had been eliminated, were only possible 
because South Africa had engaged in a massive security 
buildup over two decades. Beginning in the 1960s, Pretoria 
had extended military obligations for white males, had 
enlarged its permanent and reserve military forces, had 
increased its defense spending, had invested heavily in military 
industrialization, and had expanded and diversified its military 
arsenals. 

Pretoria's most aggressive and open intervention in a neigh- 
boring state, in Angola in the mid-1970s, was believed to be 
necessary to avoid a communist onslaught in South-West Africa 



358 



National Security 



and, eventually, perhaps in South Africa. South African officials 
also estimated that competing Angolan nationalist armies 
would continue their power struggle after Portugal granted 
Angola independence in November 1975. Therefore, as Portu- 
guese forces withdrew from the region, SADF troops inter- 
vened directly and continued to be engaged there until a 
United States-brokered peace accord was signed in December 
1988 (see Relations with African States, ch. 4). During this 
time, Pretoria launched periodic cross-border military opera- 
tions in Angola against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular 
de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) regime in Luanda. In addi- 
tion, it launched frequent air and ground attacks on opera- 
tional centers and training camps of liberation movements that 
supported the MPLA, including the ANC and SWAPO. 

To counter the ANC threat, South Africa abducted and assas- 
sinated ANC exiles in neighboring states, in some instances. It 
also launched attacks into Mozambique in 1980, 1981, 1983, 
and 1987; into Lesotho in 1982 and 1985; into Botswana in 
1985, 1986, and 1988; into Zambia in 1986 and 1987; and into 
Zimbabwe in 1982 and 1986. On one day, May 19, 1986, South 
African forces attacked alleged ANC bases in Botswana, Zam- 
bia, and Zimbabwe — all members of the British Common- 
wealth of Nations — souring relations with Commonwealth 
leaders who had tried to block international sanctions efforts 
against Pretoria. 

Lesotho became the target of numerous South African coun- 
terinsurgency operations. Completely surrounded by South 
Africa, Lesotho was a natural haven for antiapartheid militants. 
South Africa applied economic and military pressure to quell 
criticism of Pretoria by Lesotho's prime minister, Chief Leabua 
Jonathan. A series of armed raids against alleged ANC strong- 
holds around Maseru in the early 1980s prompted Chief 
Jonathan to declare a virtual state of war with South Africa in 
1983. Finally, in January 1986, Pretoria provided covert support 
for a military coup that ousted Chief Jonathan and installed a 
military government led by Major General Justin Lekhanya; 
then, Lekhanya's government was pressured to prevent any 
ANC activity within its territory. 

South Africa also furnished covert aid to opposition parties 
and to rebel organizations as part of an effort to destabilize 
hostile neighboring governments. For example, it supplied 
extensive aid to the Angolan rebel movement, the National 



359 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA) . South Africa 
also supplied military assistance in the form of sanctuary, sup- 
plies, logistical support, training, and arms to the Mozambican 
National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana — 
MNR or Renamo) during the early 1980s. Assistance to both 
UNITA and Renamo declined in the late 1980s (see Relations 
with African States, ch. 4). 

Also during the 1980s, South Africa enforced border con- 
trols against illegal refugees and guerrilla infiltration by install- 
ing electrified fences, especially along its northeastern border. 
In 1985, for example, it installed 2,800-volt fences along por- 
tions of its borders with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho, 
and with the homelands of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and 
Venda. During 1988, the first year of available records, at least 
seventy people were electrocuted on these fences. 

Regional tensions began to ease by the end of the 1980s, and 
in southern Africa, as elsewhere on the globe, the year 1989 
marked a turning point in political and security relationships. 
The agreement signed in December 1988 linked Namibia's 
independence from South Africa with the cessation of foreign 
military involvement in Angola, and set in motion a series of 
other changes that contributed to dramatically improved pros- 
pects for peace. The Soviet Union slowed, and eventually 
halted, arms shipments to Angolan and Mozambican forces 
and played an active role in seeking political settlements to 
those conflicts. South Africa recognized the reduced regional 
threat by cautiously beginning domestic political reforms, by 
reducing the military's domestic security role, by drawing down 
military personnel, and by reducing military spending in areas 
related to external operations. 

Namibia held national elections in 1989 and achieved for- 
mal independence in March 1990; Pretoria's former nemesis, 
SWAPO, won control over the new government in Windhoek. 
SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma took a conciliatory line toward 
Pretoria, however, and both countries recognized Namibia's 
continued economic dependence on South Africa. In March 
1991, South African and Namibian officials began negotiations 
aimed at transferring to Windhoek control over Namibia's only 
deep-water port, Walvis Bay, as well as the Penguin Islands. 
South Africa's last military battalion was removed from Walvis 
Bay later that year, and that enclave and the islands formally 
became part of Namibia on March 1, 1994. 



360 



National Security 



A number of events in the early 1990s helped to solidify 
South Africa's view of its future leadership role in southern 
Africa. During a serious drought and famine that swept most of 
the region, South Africa was credited with saving thousands of 
lives by shipping domestic and imported corn to neighboring 
states and by providing other forms of drought assistance. The 
government also eased border restrictions, in part to facilitate 
the use of South Africa's developed transportation infrastruc- 
ture by neighboring countries. 

The rest of Africa began to open up formerly covert trade 
relations with South Africa and to welcome it into diplomatic 
circles. President de Klerk paid his first visit to Nigeria in April 
1992, and his warm welcome by President Ibrahim Babangida 
sent a strong signal of acceptance to other African leaders. 
Within weeks, Zambia, Kenya, and Lesotho began preparations 
for establishing formal diplomatic relations. 

While ties with the rest of Africa were being strengthened, 
South Africa's relationship with Angola continued to be uncer- 
tain. Hopes for peace in Angola rose and fell; the signing of the 
Bicesse Accord in May 1991 paved the way for national elec- 
tions in September 1992. After a brief lull, the country 
returned to civil war. In 1994 the MPLA government employed 
military trainers from South Africa — former SADF fighters, 
including some who had fought against the MPLA during the 
1980s — to help it recapture UNITA-held towns. Another peace 
agreement, signed in Zambia in late 1994, gave some hope of a 
UN-monitored peace and of elections in 1995 or 1996. As of 
mid-1996, however, rebel troops were still being disarmed, and 
a date for Angolan elections had not been set. 

The 1980s power struggle in Lesotho had never really 
ended; when violence flared in 1994, Pretoria's response pro- 
vided an indication of the regional role that the new Govern- 
ment of National Unity envisioned for itself for the next few 
years. The Lesotho military had forced the country's reigning 
monarch, King Moshoeshoe II, into exile in 1990, and in 1993 
Lesotho had held its first nationwide elections in twenty-seven 
years. The former monarch was allowed to return, but the new 
prime minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, had allowed his own strained 
relationship with the army to deteriorate to the point that 
South African troops were posted to guard the border between 
the two countries in 1993 and in 1994. In 1994 South African 
officials helped to mediate a compromise between Lesotho's 
government and military, but President Mandela encouraged 



361 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe to take a leading role in 
regional peacemaking, while South Africa worked to reorga- 
nize and train its new National Defence Force. 

Constitutional and Legal Framework 

South Africa's 1984 constitution, the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act (No. 110) of 1983, which remained in 
effect through 1993, affirmed the provisions of the Defence 
Act (No. 44) of 1957 establishing the missions of the armed 
forces. These missions were, and continue to be, to defend the 
country; to fulfill South Africa's international treaty obliga- 
tions; to prevent terrorism and domestic disorder; to protect 
life, health, and property; and to help maintain essential ser- 
vices. The president had the power to declare war, martial law, 
and states of emergency, and to establish peace. The minister 
of defence, under the overall direction of the president and 
with the consent of the State Security Council (SSC), bore 
responsibility for formulating and for executing defense policy. 
During the late 1980s, the military was frequently assigned 
domestic duties as part of the constitutional requirement to 
help the police and local authorities to maintain essential ser- 
vices and domestic order in times of emergency. 

The 1994 interim constitution, the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (No. 200) of 1993, reiterates the pro- 
visions of the 1957 Defence Act that make the president com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces. The constitution reserves 
specific powers related to national security for the president, 
who may, with parliamentary approval, declare a "state of 
national defence." This is, in effect, a state of national emer- 
gency, but the framers of the constitution emphasize their 
reluctance to undertake any offensive military action against 
neighboring states. The constitution also authorizes the presi- 
dent to establish a national defense force to fulfill the responsi- 
bilities formerly assigned to the SADF. It empowers the 
president to employ the military in accordance with constitu- 
tional principles to defend the sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of the republic; to fulfill South Africa's international 
obligations; to preserve life, health, and property; to provide or 
to maintain essential services; to uphold law and order in coop- 
eration with the police; and to support the general social and 
economic improvement of the population. 

The interim constitution states that the new military organi- 
zation, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 



362 



National Security 



will include former members of the SADF, the ANC's 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and the militias of the former 
homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. 
Former members of other militias, such as the Inkatha Free- 
dom Party's Self-Protection Units, were admitted to the SANDF 
after the 1994 constitution was implemented. 

In May 1996, the National Assembly and the Senate, in joint 
session as the Constitutional Assembly, completed a draft of the 
final constitution, to be implemented by the end of the formal 
political transition. Like the interim document that preceded 
it, the 1996 draft constitution calls for civilian control over the 
military. The draft makes no mention of the State Security 
Council or similar overarching security apparatus reminiscent 
of the 1980s. It reaffirms the missions of the armed forces as 
outlined in the Defence Act of 1957 and the role of the presi- 
dent to serve as commander in chief of the SANDF. As of mid- 
1996, the draft was being reviewed by the Constitutional Court, 
and after some revisions, was expected to be implemented in 
phases, beginning in 1997. 

Military Organization 

Four armed services — the South African Army, the South 
African Air Force, the South African Navy, and the South Afri- 
can Medical Service — make up the SANDF, also referred to as 
the National Defence Force. SANDF headquarters are in Preto- 
ria. The SANDF is commanded by the chief of the armed 
forces, who is appointed by the president from one of the four 
branches of the military (see fig. 20). The SANDF chief is 
accountable to the minister of defence, who is a civilian. 

The SANDF chief consults with members of several councils 
and committees and chairs the Defence Command Council 
(DCC), which oversees the defense budget. On the DCC are 
the four service chiefs, the chief of the National Defence Force 
staff, the military inspector general, the chiefs of defence head- 
quarters staff divisions, and other key defense officials. Head- 
quarters responsibilities are allocated among six staff 
divisions — the Finance Division, the Intelligence Division, the 
Logistics Division, the Operations Division, the Personnel Divi- 
sion, and the Planning Division. 

Army 

The army in the 1990s continues to rely on a small Perma- 



363 



South Africa: A Country Study 




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364 



National Security 



nent Force of professional soldiers and a large Citizen Force. 
The Citizen Force consists of volunteers serving an initial 
period of training and active duty, followed by several years of 
reserve status. Reservists rotate into active duty when called 
upon. Volunteers can apply to transfer from the Citizen Force 
to the Permanent Force if they wish to become professional, 
career soldiers. 

The sweeping changes of the mid-1990s allowed varying 
assessments of the strength of the army. The government's 
South Africa Yearbook, 1995 indicated that roughly 95,000 active- 
duty members of the SADF and of the former homeland mili- 
taries, as well as about 27,000 former liberation fighters, made 
up the army in 1995. Many of the active-duty troops were in var- 
ious stages of training or retraining for at least one year after 
that. After the integration of these forces into the SANDF was 
completed, officials planned to reduce army ranks, to a force 
of about 91,000 by the year 1998. Officials were also consider- 
ing further reductions, perhaps to a force of about 75,000 
active-duty troops, by the year 2000. The number of military 
reservists, in a wide variety of reserve duty statuses, was esti- 
mated at more than 360,000 in late 1995. The government's 
South Africa Yearbook, 1995 indicated that more than 500,000 
troops were on part-time or reserve status (see table 20, Appen- 
dix). 

The chief of the army, who holds the rank of lieutenant gen- 
eral, commands all army forces. He is assisted by his general 
staff at the army headquarters in Pretoria. He also is responsi- 
ble for the Army Battle School at Lohatla in the Northern 
Cape, the Defence College (formerly the South African Mili- 
tary College) at Pretoria, and various corps schools, such as the 
Artillery School at Potchefstroom (North-West Province), the 
Infantry School at Oudtshoorn (Western Cape), and the Intel- 
ligence School at Kimberley. 

The army is organized into territorial forces and conven- 
tional forces, both commanded by the chief of the army 
through different command structures (see fig. 21). This divi- 
sion reflects the army's dual mission — to ensure internal secu- 
rity and to defend the country against external threats. The 
territorial forces are organized by region and are primarily 
responsible for internal security tasks, such as helping the 
police ensure law and order, combating terrorism, patrolling 
national borders, protecting strategic sites, providing emer- 
gency and disaster relief, and administering military reserve 



365 



South Africa: A Country Study 



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366 



National Security 



forces within their region. In 1996 most members of the 
former homeland military forces were being incorporated into 
the territorial forces. 

The ten regional military commands are headquartered at 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Durban, 
Bloemfontein, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Nelspruit, and Pieters- 
burg. In 1996 the boundaries of the military regions were 
being changed to conform more closely to the country's new 
administrative regions. 

Like the territorial forces, the army's conventional forces are 
stationed throughout the country, but their training and orga- 
nization are separate from the territorial forces. The conven- 
tional forces fall under the operational control of the army 
headquarters in Pretoria, not under the regional commanders. 
The conventional forces are trained to confront traditional 
security threats, such as a foreign enemy. 

The conventional forces are organized into contingency 
forces and a mobilization force. As of the early and mid-1990s, 
the contingency forces consisted of one mechanized/motor- 
ized brigade and two parachute brigades — the Forty-fourth 
Parachute Brigade and the Forty-fifth Parachute Brigade. The 
mobilization force was organized into three mechanized divi- 
sions — the Seventh Division, the Eighth Division, and the 
Ninth Division. 

Functionally, the army also distinguishes between combat 
corps and support service corps. The combat corps include 
infantry, artillery, antiaircraft, and armored corps. The infantry 
is the largest of the combat corps and has both mechanized 
and airborne units. The artillery corps uses indirect fire guns, 
howitzers, field guns, and multiple rocket launchers, generally 
coordinating operations with the antiaircraft corps to protect 
ground forces. The armored corps relies largely on tanks with 
105-millimeter guns and on a variety of other armored vehicles. 

The support service corps include engineers, signals special- 
ists, and others trained in ordnance, technical services, intelli- 
gence, personnel, and finance, as well as musicians, caterers, 
and the military police. Service units maintain, repair, and 
recondition all equipment, except communications equip- 
ment. The military police serve as the army's internal police 
force and control traffic to and from operational areas. 

The Commandos are formally under the authority of the 
regional commands of the army but are organized and 
deployed in a tradition similar to that of the National Guard in 



367 



South Africa: A Country Study 

the United States. Originally volunteers trained for quick- 
response to local emergencies, they were used to quell unrest 
during the apartheid era; in the 1990s, Commando units are 
assigned to guard important installations, such as industrial 
plants, oil refineries, communication centers, and transporta- 
tion facilities. 

Commandos generally serve a total of 1,000 active-duty days 
over a ten- or twelve-year period. In emergencies, the period of 
active duty is increased in increments of fifty days. Urban Com- 
mando units are generally organized into a single urban battal- 
ion. Rural Commando units are sometimes organized into a 
regional battalion. 

The army's ground forces in the mid-1990s can field an 
imposing array of equipment, most of it produced in South 
Africa. Their arsenal includes tanks, armored reconnaissance 
vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel car- 
riers (see table 21, Appendix). The army also has a wide array 
of artillery pieces, including towed and self-propelled heavy 
artillery, multiple-rocket-launcher systems, as well as mortars 
and antitank and air defense weapons. 

Integrating Armies in the 1990s 

The military's massive reorganization began a year before 
the historic April 1994 elections and was scheduled to be com- 
pleted by late 1996. The process began with the creation of a 
multiservice Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) by 
the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) — the country's 
interim executive authority. The TEC also established a Sub- 
council on Defence to supervise the planning phase of the 
reorganization. The JMCC and the subcouncil worked together 
to set program goals, and in late 1993 the JMCC formed five 
working groups to address specific problems associated with 
finance, intelligence, logistics, operations, and personnel. 
These working groups presented their recommendations to 
the JMCC and the subcouncil in early 1994. 

At that time, the major security challenge for South Africa 
was the need to end the township violence that threatened to 
derail the April 1994 elections. Officials hastily formed a multi- 
racial National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF), including about 
3,500 members of existing military organizations — primarily 
the SADF and MK. In February 1994, the NPKF was deployed 
to several townships around Johannesburg, but its troops, with 
widely varying military backgrounds and training, could not 



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adequately coordinate their operations and standards of behav- 
ior. NPKF units encountered morale and disciplinary prob- 
lems, and, in at least one instance, civilians were killed in 
gunfire between military and paramilitary personnel. The 
NPKF was disbanded soon after the April 1994 elections. 

The failure of the NPKF did not delay the military reorgani- 
zation, however, and other efforts already underway in early 
1994 were more successful. SADF officials and a British Military 
Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) assembled members of 
the former homeland armies and former MK and Azanian Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army (APLA — the military wing of the Pan- 
Africanist Congress) liberation fighters at locations near Johan- 
nesburg, Cape Town, and Bloemfontein to evaluate applicants 
for the new army. The SANDF accepted into its ranks most 
senior officers from both homeland and liberation armies with- 
out extensive testing. In addition, members of the homeland 
armies who had been trained by SADF instructors were gener- 
ally accepted immediately into the new organization. 

Finally, MK and APLA members were considered for admis- 
sion on an individual basis, but these cases proved more diffi- 
cult. Some of the liberation fighters could not meet minimal 
formal education requirements. Many had received uneven or 
inadequate training that left them ill-prepared for either com- 
bat or organizational responsibilities. Some had been trained 
in languages other than English or Afrikaans. A few were dis- 
qualified because of bureaucratic problems, such as lost files, 
or because they were overage. The SADF and BMATT person- 
nel provided three to six months of basic training for many 
former liberation fighters, in order to rectify gaps in back- 
ground qualifications or experience. For some of the new 
SANDF soldiers, training continued through 1996. 

The New Face of the Army 

As the military reorganization proceeded, a multiracial offi- 
cer corps emerged. By early 1996, more than 1,300 former 
members of homeland or liberation armies held officer ranks 
of lieutenant or above. At least eleven black South Africans had 
been promoted to the rank of major general or above. 

As of 1996, military officials had no plans to reinstate con- 
scription as long as there were enough qualified volunteers to 
meet national security needs. They planned, instead, to trans- 
fer some soldiers into the police and others into service bri- 
gades. The latter would act as civic-action teams to work on 



369 



South Africa: A Country Study 



road construction and other infrastructure development 
projects. Military officials chose this tactic over large-scale dis- 
missals in order to avoid flooding the civilian work force and to 
provide some work-related training and job skills for former 
guerrilla fighters. Funds were allocated for this training in late 
1994, and the first three- and six-month training courses began 
in early 1995. 

Military officials were working to maintain continuity in 
SANDF military training, and, at the same time, to inculcate a 
sense of the changing responsibilities of the army in the 1990s. 
Military trainers were preparing for new border control prob- 
lems, as the threat of political infiltration by antiapartheid dissi- 
dents gave way to a tide of political and economic refugees 
hoping to prosper in the new South Africa. Officials also were 
concerned about increased smuggling and other forms of bor- 
der fraud. One of their greatest challenges was the dramatic 
increase in cross-border narcotics trafficking that threatened to 
bring South Africa into the global spotlight as an important 
transshipment point in the late 1990s. Finally, the military con- 
tinued to prepare for the possibility of cross-border hostilities 
with a neighboring state, although this possibility appeared 
remote as of 1996. 

Air Force 

The South African Air Force (SAAF) includes about 7,000 
career active-duty troops and 3,000 active-duty volunteers who 
are fulfilling their national service obligations, as of 1996. 
About 400 air force personnel are women. In addition, about 
20,000 reservists are available to be rotated into active duty as 
ground support personnel; reservists are also assigned to tacti- 
cal air units and to units charged with safeguarding SAAF facil- 
ities (see fig. 22). 

The air force is under the overall command of the chief of 
the air force, a lieutenant general, who is assisted by the chief 
of the air force staff and the air force inspector general. The air 
force's headquarters organization reflects the same six-division 
administrative structure as the entire military establishment, 
with divisions handling finance, intelligence, logistics, opera- 
tions, personnel, and planning. 

All regional commands and functional commands are 
answerable to air force headquarters in Pretoria for all air oper- 
ations. Until 1993, there were two regional commands, the 
Western Command and the Southern Command. The Western 



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Command was dismantled in preparation for South Africa's 
relinquishing control over Walvis Bay in early 1994. The South- 
ern Command, located at Simonstown, has responsibility for 
several territorial command posts and bases in the southern 
coastal area. Air force bases not under the direct control of the 
Southern Command fall under air force headquarters at Preto- 
ria. 

The air force has two functional commands, the Training 
Command and the Air Logistics Command. The Training 
Command, headquartered in Pretoria, oversees programs in 
basic training, flying, navigation, logistics training, and other 
instruction, and controls most major training facilities. The Air 
Logistics Command controls several air force units, including 
airfield maintenance units, repair depots, and supply depots. It 
also provides complete materiel procurement and engineering 
services, including aircraft management and ground systems 
support. 

Two other functional commands, the Air Space Control 
Command and the Tactical Support Command, were disman- 
tled in the early 1990s as part of the overall military downsiz- 
ing. The Air Space Control Command had been responsible 
for air defenses and control of airspace, in conjunction with 
civil authorities. The Tactical Support Command had con- 
ducted formal operational command and control training, as 
well as instruction in other air force operations. These respon- 
sibilities were assumed by other commands and by headquar- 
ters personnel. 

In addition to regional and functional commands, the air 
force has several command posts, which are subordinate to 
commands. One of these, the Main Threat Area Command 
Post, is co-located with the air force headquarters at Pretoria. 
The Main Threat Area Command Post oversees the operations 
of several air bases, air defense radar sites, and other installa- 
tions throughout the region. The Southern Command Post, 
headquartered at Cape Town, oversees operations of bases 
near Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and is responsible for air 
force maritime and other operations in these coastal areas. 

The air force operates an estimated 400 aircraft. The fleet 
includes Cheetah, Mirage, and Impala fighter aircraft, Cessna 
light reconnaissance aircraft, and Oryx and Alouette III heli- 
copters (see table 22, Appendix). The air force in early 1996 
was awaiting the delivery of fifty to sixty Pilatus PC-7 basic 
training aircraft from Switzerland and planned to purchase sev- 



371 



South Africa: A Country Study 



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372 



National Security 



eral locally manufactured Rooivalk combat helicopters. The air 
force is also upgrading its Cheetah fighter aircraft and is devel- 
oping plans to produce short- and medium-range air-to-air mis- 
siles for this purpose. 

Navy 

In the mid-1990s, the South African Navy (SAN) is a 4,500- 
person uniformed force, including 300 women. The navy is 
commanded by a vice admiral, the chief of the navy. The chief 
of the navy is assisted by a chief of naval operations and a chief 
of naval support; the latter two positions are filled by rear admi- 
rals. Naval headquarters are at Pretoria, although most impor- 
tant elements of the navy are at the navy's two bases at 
Simonstown and on Salisbury Island, near Durban. In addition 
to the headquarters organization and bases, the command 
structure includes seven naval units, flotillas, and independent 
ships (see fig. 23). Naval units are stationed in Johannesburg 
and Pretoria and at several of South Africa's major ports. 

Naval officer training is provided at the South African Naval 
College in Gordon's Bay, near Simonstown. Basic training is 
provided at the nearby South African Naval Staff College and 
on the SAS Saldanha. Technical naval training is provided on 
the SAS Wingfield, and advanced combat and other nontechni- 
cal specialist training is provided on the SAS Simonsberg. After 
completing an initial period of service with the navy, voluntary 
service personnel separating from active duty are assigned to 
one of the seven reserve naval units. 

The navy is organized into a submarine flotilla, which pos- 
sesses three Daphne-class submarines, a surface-strike flotilla 
with nine Minister-class 450-ton missile craft, and a mine coun- 
termeasure flotilla with four River-class mine hunters and four 
Ton-class minesweepers. The navy's plans for upgrading and 
expansion include the purchase of four corvette hulls, to be fit- 
ted with a locally manufactured combat system. These are 
expected to be commissioned by the year 1999. The navy also 
plans to acquire six 800- to 1200-ton strike craft by the year 
2003 and four new submarines by the year 2005, and is consid- 
ering the decommissioning of its nine well-worn Minister-class 
missile craft (see table 23, Appendix). 

The navy helped to celebrate South Africa's return to the 
international community in the mid-1990s, when a growing 
number of foreign ships docked at South African ports. The 
January 1994 visit to Simonstown by the HMS Norfolk was the 



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South Africa: A Country Study 




374 



National Security 



first British Royal Navy visit in twenty-seven years. A month 
later, the French frigate FNS Germinal made the first official 
visit by a French vessel in nineteen years. In November 1994, 
two United States vessels, the USS Gettysburg and the USS Haly- 
burton, received a twenty-one-gun salute in Simonstown in the 
first call by United States Navy ships in twenty-seven years. 

South African ships also participated in joint naval exercises 
in 1994, the first in twenty years. In June 1994, a 6,000-ton fleet 
replenishment ship, the SAS Drakensberg, took part in exercises 
with the British Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The South 
African Navy also carried out joint exercises with the Argen- 
tine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan navies in May 1995. In addition, 
maritime training involved ships and aircraft from the United 
States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether- 
lands, Norway, and Spain. 

The navy has performed coast guard duties and search-and- 
rescue missions throughout its history, and is preparing for 
increased responsibilities during the late 1990s, primarily to 
protect the country's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) and to combat smuggling and maritime narcotics 
trafficking. South Africa's navy is also in demand by other Afri- 
can governments; in the early 1990s, for example, South Afri- 
can personnel performed naval facility repairs for Zaire, 
marine surveys for Mozambique, and relief-supply transport to 
Kenya for shipment to Somalia and Rwanda. 

Medical Service 

The South African Medical Service (SAMS) was established 
as a full service branch of the SADF in 1979 to consolidate the 
medical services of the army, the navy, and the air force. The 
SAMS includes full-time army medical personnel, civilian 
employees of the Ministry of Defence, and (until the mid- 
1990s) qualified national service personnel on active duty. 
Reservists from the Citizen Force and from the Commandos 
are sometimes assigned to short-term active duty in the SAMS, 
as well. The military employs roughly 400 medical doctors, and 
private medical specialists are sometimes appointed to supple- 
ment the staff of the SAMS. 

The surgeon general heads the SAMS and has the rank of 
lieutenant general. The SAMS operational units include three 
hospitals — the First Military Hospital near Pretoria, the Second 
Military Hospital at Cape Town, and the Third Military Hospi- 
tal at Bloemfontein. There are also three specialized insti- 



375 



South Africa: A Country Study 



tutes — the Institute for Aviation Medicine, the Institute for 
Maritime Medicine, and the Military Psychological Institute. 
They provide comprehensive medical care for military person- 
nel and their dependents, as well as the police and employees 
of other security-related government departments, and occa- 
sionally to neighboring countries. The SAMS also provides 
occasional veterinary services for animals (mainly horses and 
dogs) used by the security services. The Institute for Aviation 
Medicine and the Institute for Maritime Medicine screen pilot 
candidates for the air force and for civilian aviation certifica- 
tion, as well as divers and submariners for the navy. The mili- 
tary's medical services also include general medical and dental 
care, and specialized rehabilitation services. 

The SAMS is organized into regional medical commands, 
corresponding to the army's regional commands, as well as a 
Medical Logistics Command and a Medical Training Com- 
mand. The regional commands support military units, military 
base hospitals, and military unit sickbays in their region. The 
Medical Logistics Command is responsible for medical logistics 
only, as each service provides for its own logistics support. In 
addition, the Medical Training Command supervises the South 
African Medical Service College, the South African Medical 
Service Nursing College, and the South African Medical Ser- 
vice Training Centre, as well as the military hospitals' training 
programs. The nursing college, in Pretoria, grants a four-year 
nursing diploma in association with the University of South 
Africa. Specialized, in-service training courses for nurses and 
for nursing assistants are also available. 

The SAMS implemented several retrenchment measures in 
the early 1990s. It consolidated all quartermaster stores in the 
Cape Town and the Bloemfontein areas, relocated the SAMS 
training center from Potchefstroom to Pretoria, closed several 
medical supply depots, consolidated computer centers and sys- 
tems, rationalized procedures for procuring medicine and 
medical equipment, discontinued survival training, and 
reduced or closed sickbays and military medical clinics that 
served other armed services affected by retrenchments. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

The SADF has been recognized internationally for its 
emphasis on appearance and strict observance of dress-code 
regulations, and SANDF officers in the mid-1990s indicated 
their determination to maintain these high standards. SANDF 



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National Security 



uniforms are generally functional in design. The army's service 
uniform consists of a brown jacket and tie, and light brown 
shirt and trousers. In warm weather, an open-collared, short- 
sleeved khaki shirt or light jacket replaces the jacket and tie. 
Senior officers' service uniforms are distinguished by poppy- 
red lapel tabs. The army's field uniforms — required for work 
details, for training, and for field exercises — include a brown 
shirt, fatigue trousers, a webbed utility belt, and boots. Camou- 
flage battle dress is authorized for selected units. A peaked cap 
or beret is worn on selected occasions with service uniforms 
and field uniforms. Some combat units are distinguished by 
the color of their berets. Bush hats are also worn in the field, 
but not in public. 

Air force uniforms are steel blue. Like the army and the 
navy, the air force permits open-collared shirts in warm 
weather and shorts and knee socks on occasion. 

The navy wears dark blue uniforms in winter and white, in 
summer. Enlisted ranks in the navy wear jacket-and-tie uni- 
forms in cool weather and white jackets with a high collar in 
summer. 

Military rank is indicated by shoulder or sleeve insignia (see 
fig. 24 and fig. 25). Officer insignia are worn on the shoulder, 
with the exception of naval officers' cool-weather uniforms, 
which display the insignia on the sleeve. Enlisted rank insignia 
are worn on the sleeve. Some military insignia were changed in 
the mid-1990s. For example, the Castle of Good Hope, in sev- 
eral army and air force insignia, was replaced by a nine-pointed 
star, symbolic of the nine provinces of the new South Africa. 

Military awards recognize several categories of service and 
accomplishments. As of the mid-1990s, South Africa's highest 
decoration is the Castle of Good Hope, which is reserved for 
exceptional heroism on the battlefield. The Honoris Crux, 
conferred in four classes, is awarded for valor. The Order of 
the Star of South Africa, conferred in two classes, is restricted 
to general officers who perform meritorious service in promot- 
ing the efficiency and the preparedness of the armed forces. 
Other ranks are eligible for the Southern Cross and the Pro 
Merito decoration, and various medals are given in recognition 
of outstanding service and devotion to duty. 

Military Intelligence and Intelligence Coordination 

The military has a long history of intelligence gathering and 
evaluation, but military intelligence agencies were virtually 



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South Africa: A Country Study 




National Security 




South Africa: A Country Study 



independent of each other and of other government agencies 
for much of this history. In 1962 the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence was established to coordinate the collection and 
the management of defense-related information among the 
military services. In 1969 the government established the 
Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to coordinate military, domes- 
tic, and economic intelligence. During the 1970s, BOSS 
became embroiled in several unethical projects and govern- 
ment scandals that seriously undermined its credibility. In 1978 
President P. W. Botha established the Department of National 
Security to strengthen his control over the intelligence commu- 
nity and to incorporate it into his Total Strategy against opposi- 
tion to the state. Botha himself held the cabinet portfolio on 
national intelligence and continually stressed the need for 
community-wide coordination. 

In 1981 the Department of National Security, renamed the 
Directorate of National Intelligence, increased the emphasis 
on military intelligence and military access to all other forms 
of intelligence. The directorate worked closely with the mili- 
tary, coordinating efforts among intelligence agencies, and 
using directorate analyses and recommendations to formulate 
security policy. 

In the uneasy atmosphere of the mid-1980s, the definition of 
"enemies of the state" expanded rapidly, extending the role of 
the intelligence community. Various intelligence services 
engaged in operations involving harassment, assault, disap- 
pearance, and sometimes the murder of antiapartheid activists. 

In the early 1990s, the government began reorganizing the 
country's intelligence-gathering network. The Intelligence Ser- 
vices Act (No. 38) of 1994, the National Strategic Intelligence 
Act (No. 39) of 1994, and the Parliamentary Committee on 
Intelligence Act (No. 40) of 1994 established a National Intelli- 
gence Coordinating Committee (NICC) to present coordi- 
nated intelligence analyses to the president and the cabinet. 

The NICC oversees the operations of the four arms of the 
intelligence community. These are the National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA), which is responsible for domestic intelligence 
gathering; the South African Secret Service (SASS), which 
manages foreign intelligence; the military intelligence agen- 
cies, and the police intelligence unit. The NICC is chaired by 
the deputy minister of intelligence services, who is appointed 
by the president and who reports directly to the president. 
(There is no minister in charge of intelligence activities.) 



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National Security 



The 1994 legislation also authorizes military intelligence 
units to collect foreign intelligence and, under specific, limited 
circumstances, to collect domestic intelligence. It does not 
authorize any military intelligence agency to conduct domestic 
intelligence gathering on a routine basis. 

One overriding concern among senior government officials 
in the postapartheid era is guaranteeing the protection of the 
individual against interference by the agencies under their 
control. To help protect citizens against such abuse, the presi- 
dent appoints an inspector general for the NIA and for the 
SASS. The two inspectors general report to the Joint Commit- 
tee on Defence, which includes members of both houses of 
Parliament, appointed jointly by the president and the speaker 
of the National Assembly. This committee must report to both 
houses of Parliament at least once each year concerning the 
state of intelligence gathering nationwide. 

Defense Budget 

South Africa's defense budget grew almost tenfold in nomi- 
nal terms between 1975 and 1989, from Rl billion to R9.4 bil- 
lion (for value of the rand — see Glossary). In constant dollar 
value, however, the increase was modest — from US$3 billion 
per year in the early 1980s to US$3.43 billion per year in the 
last half of that decade, based on 1988 prices. Defense spend- 
ing averaged 16.4 percent of government budgets in the 1980s; 
it ranged from a high of 22.7 percent in 1982 to 13.7 percent in 
1987, but rose to 15.7 percent of government spending in 
1989. 

Although South Africa's defense spending was high in com- 
parison with economic output in the 1980s, the "trend toward 
militarization" in that decade, which was noted by many observ- 
ers in analyzing South Africa's apartheid-era spending, was not 
evident in global comparisons. Out of 144 countries surveyed 
by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 
1989, South Africa ranked thirtieth in total military expendi- 
tures, forty-fourth in military spending as a percentage of gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary), and sixty-third in mili- 
tary spending as a percentage of total government spending. 
South Africa also ranked forty-ninth in the size of its armed 
forces and 103d in the size of the armed forces in relation to 
population. 

By the mid-1990s, defense spending had been reduced to 
less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 



381 



South Africa: A Country Study 

sary), and less than 10 percent of total government spending 
(see table 8; table 24, Appendix). Military salaries consumed 
more than half of defense spending, in part the result of the 
military reorganization. Spending on armaments and equip- 
ment had declined, as a portion of defense spending, from 44 
percent in the 1980s to 28 percent in 1994, according to newly 
appointed SANDF chief General George Meiring. Meiring and 
other defense officials in 1995 expressed concern about mili- 
tary preparedness, noting the reduced production and acquisi- 
tion of armored vehicles, the decline in antiaircraft capability, 
the reduction of civil service positions from 144,000 to about 
100,000, the closure of military bases, and the reduction in mil- 
itary training courses. Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kas- 
rils said in 1995 that the government's planned cuts in defense 
spending could also result in the loss of as many as 90,000 jobs 
in defense-related industries. 

The budget for military intelligence in 1994 was R163 mil- 
lion, and of this, R37 million was allocated for clandestine mili- 
tary intelligence gathering, according to a senior military 
intelligence officer reporting to the Joint Committee on 
Defence in October 1994. Spending on clandestine military 
intelligence was about 1 percent of the total military budget, 
according to the 1994 report. 

Internal Security 
Police 

Early Development 

The South African Police Service (SAPS) traces its origin to 
the Dutch Watch, a paramilitary organization formed by set- 
tlers in the Cape in 1655, initially to protect (white) civilians 
against attack and later to maintain law and order. In 1795 Brit- 
ish officials assumed control over the Dutch Watch, and in 
1825 they organized the Cape Constabulary, which became the 
Cape Town Police Force in 1840. The Durban Police Force, 
established in 1846, became the Natal Mounted Police in 1861, 
and gradually assumed increasing paramilitary functions as 
South Africa endured the last in a series of frontier wars that 
had continued for more than a century. 

In 1913 a number of police forces consolidated into the 
Mounted Riflemen's Association, and some members of this 
association established a separate organization, which they 



382 



Officer of the South African 
Police Service 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 



called the South African Police (SAP). Four years later, the 
Mounted Riflemen's Association relinquished its civilian 
responsibilities to the SAP as most of the riflemen left to serve 
in World War I. The SAP and the military maintained their 
close relationship even after the SAP assumed permanent 
responsibility for domestic law and order in 1926. Police offi- 
cials often called on the army for support in emergencies. In 
World War II, one SAP brigade served with the Second Infantry 
Division of the South African Army in North Africa. 

When the National Party (NP) edged out its more liberal 
opponents in nationwide elections in 1948, the new govern- 
ment enacted legislation strengthening the relationship 
between the police and the military. The police were heavily 
armed after that, especially when facing unruly or hostile 
crowds. The Police Act (No. 7) of 1958 broadened the mission 
of the SAP beyond conventional police functions, such as main- 
taining law and order and investigating and preventing crime, 
and gave the police extraordinary powers to quell unrest and 
to conduct counterinsurgency activities. The Police Amend- 
ment Act (No. 70) of 1965 empowered the police to search 
without warrant any person, receptacle, vehicle, aircraft, or 
premise within two kilometers of any national border, and to 
seize anything found during such a search. This search-and- 




383 



South Africa: A Country Study 

seize zone was extended to within ten kilometers of any border 
in 1979, and to the entire country in 1983. 

The Police Reserve, established in 1973, enabled the govern- 
ment to recall former police personnel for active duty for thirty 
to ninety days each year, and for additional service in times of 
emergency. Another reserve (volunteer) force was established 
in 1981, consisting of unpaid civilians willing to perform lim- 
ited police duties. A youth wing of this reserve force reported 
that it had inducted almost 3,000 students and young people to 
assist the police during the late 1980s. 

The police increased the use of part-time, specialized per- 
sonnel, such as the special constables (kitskonstabels) , to help 
quell the growing violence in the 1980s. In 1987, for example, 
the police recruited almost 9,000 kitskonstabels and gave them 
an intensive six-week training course. These "instant" police 
assistants were then armed and assigned to areas of unrest, 
which were often the most turbulent townships. Even with 
training courses extended to three months, the kitskonstabels' 
often brutal and inept performance contributed to the grow- 
ing hostility between the police and the public by the late 
1980s. 

Although the mission of the SAP grew well beyond conven- 
tional policing responsibilities during the 1970s, the size of the 
police force declined relative to population. In 1981 the police 
force of roughly 48,991 represented a ratio of less than 1.5 
police per 1,000 people, down from 1.67 per 1,000 people in 
the 1960s. Alarmed by the increased political violence and 
crime in the mid-1980s and by the lack of adequate police sup- 
port, officials then increased the size of the police force to 
93,600— a ratio of 2.7 per 1,000 people— by 1991. 

The police are authorized to act on behalf of other govern- 
ment officials when called upon. For example, in rural areas 
and small towns, where there may be no public prosecutor 
available, police personnel can institute criminal proceedings. 
The police can legally serve as wardens, court clerks, and mes- 
sengers, as well as immigration, health, and revenue officials. 
In some circumstances, the police are also authorized to serve 
as vehicle inspectors, postal agents, and local court personnel. 

The Police in the 1990s 

After President de Klerk lifted the ban on black political 
organizations and released leading dissidents from prison in 
1990, he met with the police and ordered them help end apart- 



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National Security 



heid, to demonstrate greater political tolerance, and to 
improve their standing in black communities. The police 
accepted these orders, but did so much more slowly and reluc- 
tantly than the military. White police personnel were, in gen- 
eral, ambivalent about the changes taking place and divided 
over strategies for implementing them. For decades the police 
force had been organized around the authoritarian ideal of 
maintaining apartheid. With wide-ranging powers, the police 
had operated without strong institutional checks and balances 
and without serious external scrutiny. For many, the govern- 
ment's new policies represented an abrupt reversal in the ori- 
entation of the police. 

Through the early 1990s, police units were sometimes inte- 
grated, but most police recruits had been trained in single-race 
classes, sometimes in institutions designated for one racial 
group. For example, most black police personnel had trained 
at Hammanskraal, near Pretoria; most whites, in Pretoria; most 
coloureds, at Lavis Bay, near Cape Town; and Asians at Went- 
worth, near Durban. As the apartheid era ended, these pro- 
grams were restructured to emphasize racial tolerance and 
respect for basic human rights. The police also increased 
recruitment among black youth and hired international police 
training experts to advise them on ways to improve race rela- 
tions in the service. 

The basic police training regimen includes courses in crimi- 
nal investigation procedures, self-defense, weapons handling, 
drills, inspections, public relations, and law Specialized courses 
include crowd and riot control, detective skills, horsemanship 
and veterinary training, and advanced-level management skills. 
Since 1990, South Africa also has provided training for police 
from Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Zaire. 

Police officers on duty generally carry a pistol or revolver 
and a truncheon. To quell disturbances, police use a variety of 
arms, including 37-millimeter stopper guns, which can shoot 
tear gas, rubber bullets, or signal colors; twelve-gauge Brown- 
ing semiautomatic and Beretta pump shotguns; and R-l semi- 
automatic rifles. Through the early 1990s, the police were also 
equipped with smoke and tear-gas dispensing vehicles, tank 
trucks with water cannons, vehicles that dispensed barbed wire 
or razor wire to cordon off areas rapidly, and a small number of 
helicopters capable of dropping "water bombs" on crowds of 
demonstrators. Riot-control forces deployed in specially 
designed buses or Casspir armored personal carriers. 



385 



South Africa: A Country Study 

The climate of escalating violence in the early 1990s often 
posed even greater challenges to the police than they had 
faced in the 1980s, as violence shifted from antigovernment 
activity to a mosaic of political rivalries and factional clashes. At 
the same time, many South Africans feared that the police were 
causing some of the criminal and political violence, and they 
demanded immediate changes in the police force to mark the 
end of apartheid-era injustices. 

To meet the new challenges, the 91,000 active police person- 
nel in 1991, including administrative and support personnel, 
were increased to more than 110,000 by 1993 and 140,000 by 
1995. Throughout this time, police reserves numbered at least 
37,000. In 1996 the combined active and reserve police repre- 
sented a police-to-population ratio of almost 4.0 per 1,000. 

As part of the overall reorganization of the police, the gov- 
ernment merged the formerly dreaded Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) and the police security branch to form a 
Crime Combatting and Investigation (CCI) Division. The new 
CCI, with responsibility for reversing the rising crime rate, 
combined the intelligence and operational resources of the 
security police with the anticrime capabilities of the CID. 

Minister of Law and Order Hernus Kriel in 1991 also 
appointed an ombudsman to investigate allegations of police 
misconduct. He increased the recruitment of black police per- 
sonnel, formed a civilian riot-control unit that was separate 
from the SAP but worked with it, developed a code of police 
conduct agreed upon by a number of political parties and com- 
munities, and substantially increased police training facilities. 
In 1992 Kriel began restructuring the SAP into a three-tiered 
force consisting of a national police, primarily responsible for 
internal security and for serious crime; autonomous regional 
forces, responsible for crime prevention and for matters of 
general law and order; and municipal police, responsible for 
local law enforcement and for minor criminal matters. He also 
established police/community forums in almost every police 
station. 

By the time the April 1994 elections were held, the SAP had 
undergone a significant transformation, in keeping with the 
nation's sweeping political reforms. It was a more representa- 
tive force, with greater dedication to protecting citizens' rights. 
The SAP was renamed the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) , and the Ministry of Law and Order was renamed the 
Ministry of Safety and Security, in keeping with these symbolic 



386 



National Security 



reforms. The new minister of safety and security, Sydney Mufa- 
madi, obtained police training assistance from Zimbabwe, Brit- 
ain, and Canada, and proclaimed that racial tolerance and 
human rights would be central to police training programs in 
the future. By the end of 1995, the SAPS had incorporated the 
ten police agencies from the former homelands and had reor- 
ganized at both the national level and at the level of South 
Africa's nine new provinces. 

The SAPS headquarters in Pretoria is organized into six divi- 
sions. These are the Crime Combatting and Investigation Divi- 
sion, the Visible Policing Division, the Internal Stability 
Division, the Community Relations Division, the Supporting 
Services Division, and the Human Resource Management Divi- 
sion. 

The Crime Combatting and Investigation Division holds 
overall responsibility for coordinating information about crime 
and investigative procedures. It administers the SAPS Criminal 
Record Center, the SAPS Commercial Crime Unit, the SAPS 
Diamond and Gold Branch, the South African Narcotics 
Bureau, the Stock Theft Unit, the Inspectorate for Explosives, 
murder and robbery units located in each major city, and vehi- 
cle theft units throughout the country. In addition, the division 
manages the National Bureau of Missing Persons, which was 
established in late 1994. 

The Visible Policing Division manages highly public police 
operations, such as guarding senior government officials and 
dignitaries. Most government residences are guarded by mem- 
bers of the division's Special Guard Unit. The division's all-vol- 
unteer Special Task Force handles hostage situations and other 
high-risk activities. The Internal Stability Division is responsible 
for preventing and quelling internal unrest, and for assisting 
other divisions in combatting crime. The Community Relations 
Division consults with all police divisions concerning account- 
ability and respect for human rights. The Supporting Services 
Division manages financial, legal, and administrative aspects of 
the SAPS. The Human Resource Management Division helps 
to hire, to train, and to maintain a competent work force for 
the SAPS. 

Three police unions are active in bargaining on behalf of 
police personnel and in protecting the interests of the work 
force, as of 1996. These are the Police and Prisons Civil Rights 
Union (Popcru), which has about 15,000 members; the South 
African Police Union (SAPU), which has about 35,000 mera- 



387 



South Africa: A Country Study 

bers; and the Public Service Association (PSA), which has 
about 4,000 members. 

Crime and Violence 

Patterns of crime and violence in South Africa have often 
reflected political developments, especially since the 1950s. 
Crime surged to alarming proportions after a new constitution 
was implemented in 1984, granting limited parliamentary rep- 
resentation to coloureds and to Asians, but not to blacks. The 
number of reported murders in South Africa rose to 10,000 in 
1989 and to 11,000 in 1990. The incidence of assault, rape, and 
armed robbery showed similar increases. Police estimated that 
22,000 people died in crime-related violence in the fifteen 
months ending in February 1991. By 1992 South Africa had 
one of the world's highest crime rates, on a per capita basis. 

Waves of serious violence swept through many townships 
around Johannesburg and in Natal Province, where the rivalry 
between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African 
National Congress (ANC) resulted in several hundred — some 
estimated more than 1,000 — deaths each year in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. Officials estimated that 12,000 citizens 
(and 2,000 SADF troops) were involved in ANC-IFP clashes in 
the early 1990s. 

White right-wing terrorists added to the crime rate as they 
were increasingly marginalized from the political process. 
Groups such as the White Liberation Army, the White Republi- 
can Army, the Boer Republican Army, the White Wolves, and 
the Order of the Boer Nation claimed responsibility for more 
than thirty-five bombings. Some of these groups formed an alli- 
ance known as the White People's Front in 1992 and threat- 
ened further violence as the political transition continued. 

Community Response 

Dealing with rising levels of crime and violence became a 
major public preoccupation in the 1990s and resulted in a vari- 
ety of ad hoc security arrangements and alliances. For exam- 
ple, many organizations and a few individuals hired private 
security guards for protection. Civilians volunteered to monitor 
street crime in several turbulent townships. The ANC, after ini- 
tially opposing these groups as "vigilantes," formed its own Self- 
Defense Units to help protect ANC supporters in the town- 
ships. Their political rivals in IFP strongholds responded by 



388 



National Security 



forming Zulu Self-Protection Units, especially in and around 
workers' hostels. 

During the apartheid era, black South Africans had been 
legally barred from owning guns, but many whites considered 
gun ownership a normal defensive measure and a cherished 
right. Gun owners were legally required to register their weap- 
ons with the police, and a record 123,000 firearms were regis- 
tered in 1990. By 1992 more than 2.5 million firearms had 
been registered nationwide. Police officials estimated that one- 
half of all white families owned at least one firearm, and at least 
100,000 white households owned more than five registered 
weapons. Many more people were arming themselves illegally, 
according to police estimates. 

Weapons thefts were extremely common. More than 7,700 
firearms were reported stolen during 1990 alone. More than 
5,000 guns were turned in to the police during a six-week 
amnesty in late 1990, and another 1,900, during a second 
amnesty in 1992. Although firearms and explosives were the 
cause of more than one-half of the deaths in the early 1990s, 
spears, knives, and axes — so-called Zulu traditional weapons, 
which were legal — were responsible for about 20 percent of vio- 
lent deaths. 

Government Response 

Under strong pressure to end the township violence of the 
early 1990s, the police undertook numerous security sweeps 
through townships and squatter camps. During one of the larg- 
est of these, Operation Iron Fist, in late 1990, some 1,500 SAP 
and several hundred SADF troops swept through workers' hos- 
tels around Johannesburg and recovered several thousand ille- 
gal weapons. More than 30,000 SAP and SADF personnel 
conducted routine crime sweeps after that, and they made 337 
arrests in one operation alone in 1991. By 1993 more than 
10,000 people had been arrested, and large quantities of illegal 
drugs and weapons had been confiscated. 

President de Klerk's credibility was severely damaged in July 
1991, when official documents leaked to the public confirmed 
long-standing rumors of police support for the Zulu-domi- 
nated IFP in its rivalry with the ANC. A burst of publicity, 
dubbed "Inkathagate" by the press, threatened to derail consti- 
tutional negotiations after evidence linked senior government 
and police officials with funds secretly channeled to the IFP's 
labor activities and membership drives, which many believed 



389 



South Africa: A Country Study 

had fueled the violence. Public anger rose, both because of the 
politicization of the police and because the government then 
appeared incapable of halting the violence as the scandal 
intensified. 

The September 1991 National Peace Accord marked a des- 
perate effort by both the government and the ANC to end the 
killing and to ease anxiety about official involvement in it. The 
accord, signed by more than two dozen leaders of government 
and political organizations, established committees and chan- 
nels of communication at national, regional, and community 
levels to try to avert bloodshed arising out of political disagree- 
ments. Under this accord, the government established the 
Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation, chaired by a respected jurist, Rich- 
ard Goldstone, to investigate the causes of the violence. The 
Goldstone Commission's interim report in early 1992 attrib- 
uted most of the killing to the political battle between support- 
ers of the ANC and the IFP, but it also confirmed suspicions 
that elements of the security forces, especially the police, had 
contributed to the unrest. 

Then ANC leader Mandela, who was vocal in his criticism of 
the government for its failure to quell the unrest of the early 
1990s, insisted that international attention be given to the issue 
of state-sponsored violence. In June 1992, Mandela, Foreign 
Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha, and IFP leader Mangosuthu (Gat- 
sha) Buthelezi addressed the United Nations concerning this 
issue. After that, other countries increased their involvement in 
South Africa's political reform. In August of that year, former 
United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance went to South 
Africa as United Nations special envoy. Acting on his sugges- 
tion, the United Nations sent political monitors to South Africa 
to demonstrate international support for the institutions that 
had arisen out of the National Peace Accord. At the same time, 
South Africa's political leaders implemented another of 
Vance's recommendations — to speed up the pace of progress 
toward nationwide elections. 

Then, in late 1992, the Goldstone Commission concluded 
that secret cells within the police force had, with the coopera- 
tion of military intelligence officials, "waged a war" on the 
ANC, primarily because of its commitment to armed struggle 
to end apartheid and its association with the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). The commission's report also 
implied that elements in the security forces were continuing to 



390 



National Security 



provoke or commit violent acts. In response to rising pressures, 
President de Klerk persuaded twenty-three senior military offi- 
cers to retire, including the heads of the SADF and military 
intelligence. 

Despite significant progress, there were at least 4,300 politi- 
cally motivated deaths in 1993, according to the South African 
Institute of Race Relations, and each new round of violence 
brought a new sense of urgency to the task of preparing for 
elections. More than 2,000 murders were in Zulu-inhabited 
areas of KwaZulu and Natal Province. The Goldstone Commis- 
sion later concluded that some of the weapons used in the vio- 
lence against ANC supporters had been supplied by the police. 

The police arrested a few whites who advocated violence to 
block the elections, including Afrikaner Resistance Movement 
(Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging — AWB) leader Eugene Terre- 
blanche. In most cases, the accused were fined for their activi- 
ties or were granted immunity in return for information about 
their organizations and activities. White extremists were 
arrested for the April 1993 murder of a popular SACP leader, 
Chris Hani, and two were sentenced to death for that crime. 
(The death penalty was abolished before their sentences were 
carried out.) 

Prison System 

In the mid-1990s, South Africa's Department of Correctional 
Services operates 234 prisons. Of these, 226 are primarily or 
solely for male prisoners, and 119 of these have separate 
women's sections. The department also operates twenty prison 
farms. 

There were roughly 114,000 prisoners nationwide — nearly 
92,000 serving prison sentences and about 22,000 not yet sen- 
tenced — as of 1995. Some 70 percent of prisoners were black, 
25 percent were coloured, 4 percent were white, and less than 1 
percent were Asian. This prison population constituted 
roughly 130 percent of prison capacity. More than 400,000 peo- 
ple were jailed at some time during 1995, most for periods 
ranging from a few days to several months. Nearly 26,000 peo- 
ple per day were on parole. 

The Department of Correctional Services has roughly 
22,500 employees, at least 4,500 fewer than its workload 
requires, according to official estimates. Severe staff shortages 
are sometimes ameliorated by employing some of the 1,500 



391 



South Africa: A Country Study 



members of the Prisons Service Reserve Force (mostly retired 
prison staff) and as many as 1,000 military reservists. 

Four categories of prisoners are held: unsentenced prison- 
ers, most of whom are detained pending a hearing or sentenc- 
ing; short-term prisoners, who are serving terms of less than 
two years; long-term prisoners; and juvenile prisoners, who are 
under twenty-one years of age. Through 1994 women made up 
about 4 percent of the prison population, but late that year, the 
new government granted an amnesty to all female prisoners 
with children under the age of twelve, if they had been con- 
victed of nonviolent crimes. In late 1994, 250 prisoners over 
the age of sixty also had their sentences remitted and were 
released from prison. 

In 1995 the prison population included 1,278 children 
under the age of eighteen, half of them awaiting trial, accord- 
ing to the Department of Correctional Services. The number 
represented less than half the number of juveniles in prison in 
1992. A small, but unknown, number of children under age 
fourteen were among the juveniles in prison, according to 
international human rights observers. 

Literacy training and vocational courses are offered in some 
prisons. Parole supervision is generally strict, and parole viola- 
tors are returned to prison, where they must serve out their 
original terms and sometimes additional periods of incarcera- 
tion. Some jurisdictions instituted a system of correctional 
supervision as an alternative to prison sentences in the early 
1990s, partly in response to prison overcrowding. Correctional 
supervision entails community service, victim compensation, 
house arrest, treatment sessions, a prohibition of alcohol con- 
sumption, or a combination of these programs. The depart- 
ment also established correctional boards in 1992 to provide a 
communication link between its officials and residents of local 
communities. In addition, the department established a 
National Advisory Board on Correctional Services to advise 
prison authorities on legal and policy concerns. The National 
Advisory Board is chaired by a Supreme Court judge, and its 
members include specialists from the court system and the 
police, as well as social welfare authorities, and business and 
community representatives. 

Penal Code 

South Africa's courts are empowered to impose punishments 
of death (through early 1995), imprisonment, periodic impris- 



392 




The Castle of Good Hope, 
pentagonal fortress built in 
1666, later served as a prison. 
Courtesy Embassy of South 
Africa, Washington 



onment for a total of between 100 and 2,000 hours over a 
period of weeks or months, being declared a "habitual crimi- 
nal," commitment to an institution other than prison, fines, 
and whipping. Those convicted of lesser crimes are often given 
a choice of punishment — for example, a fine or imprisonment. 
During the apartheid era, the courts imposed prison terms of 
several days to several weeks for pass law violations, and ten to 
twenty years for membership in the ANC or the SACP, which 
were banned organizations until 1990. Other typical prison 
sentences are terms of two to ten years for robbery; up to 
twenty years for assault or rape; ten to fifteen years for possess- 
ing an illegal firearm; ten to twenty years for attempted mur- 
der; and twenty years to life in prison for murder. 

Murder and treason were capital crimes through the 1980s, 
although whites often received light sentences for crimes 
against black people, and they were almost never sentenced to 
death for murdering blacks. All executions were suspended in 
early 1990, and although more than 240 people were sen- 
tenced to death between 1990 and early 1995, no one was exe- 
cuted during that time. Parliament abolished the death penalty 
in early 1995. 

Whipping is frequently used to punish juveniles for public 
misbehavior, but may only be imposed on male offenders 
under the age of thirty. The punishment may not exceed seven 



393 



South Africa: A Country Study 



strokes of a cane. Whipping is done in private, although the 
parents of a juvenile can be present. This punishment was 
imposed on more than 30,000 juveniles and young men each 
year in the early 1990s. 

Human Rights and National Reconciliation 

South Africa's record on human rights came under frequent 
attack during the apartheid era, and improving it became a 
high priority for achieving national reconciliation and interna- 
tional legitimacy in the 1990s. South Africa had more than 
2,500 political prisoners in 1990, according to the UN Human 
Rights Commission. Responding to criticism on this sensitive 
subject during the early 1990s negotiations, then President de 
Klerk agreed to review all cases of crimes against state security, 
and as a result, the government released 933 political prisoners 
by April 1991. It rejected 364 appeals for release because of the 
nature of the crimes involved. In September 1992, based on 
special requests by ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and through 
the intervention of UN special representative, former United 
States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the government released 
an additional 400 political prisoners as a further step toward 
successful negotiations. Officials went ahead with election 
preparations even though the issue of political prisoners was 
not fully resolved, and the new government in mid-1994 
released from prison several hundred people who had been 
convicted of nonviolent crimes. Among them were an unre- 
ported number whose offenses were considered political. 

The ANC faced its own internal accusations of human rights 
violations during the early 1990s. Former detainees from ANC 
prison camps alleged that they had been held in harsh condi- 
tions in Angola, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, or Zambia. Human 
rights monitors confirmed that prisoners in these camps had 
sometimes been tortured and, in a few cases, had been exe- 
cuted. Moreover, they alleged that some of the camps contin- 
ued to be in operation, even after the ANC had announced the 
suspension of its armed struggle against apartheid. Mandela 
promised to investigate and to end these practices, but would 
not agree to air the allegations in public. 

The interim constitution's chapter on fundamental rights 
guarantees freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, 
and religion, as well as the freedom to travel and to live where 
one chooses, and the protection of minority rights. The 
interim constitution repealed Section 29 of the Internal Secu- 



394 



National Security 



rity Act, which had allowed the government to detain individu- 
als for indefinite periods without charging them with a crime. 
Subsequent legislation established an independent Human 
Rights Commission and Office of the Public Protector, both to 
be appointed by the parliament. The public protector is 
charged with investigating allegations of abuse or incompe- 
tence against members of the government, including the 
police. 

Despite obvious improvements in human rights policies and 
practices in the mid-1990s, several forms of human rights abuse 
continued at unacceptable levels and appeared to involve high- 
level police officials. Thirty-one unexplained deaths occurred 
in police custody in 1994, according to the private South Afri- 
can Human Rights Committee. This number was eight fewer 
than in 1993, and fifty-six fewer than in 1990. Pathologists' 
reports confirmed instances of police abuse in some of the 
1994 deaths, and a team of international human rights moni- 
tors and independent experts uncovered a pattern of torture 
of detainees by some police personnel in the Johannesburg 
area. 

The Goldstone Commission's investigations had unearthed 
prima facie evidence implicating senior police officials in sup- 
plying weapons to the Zulu-based IFP in 1993 and 1994, and 
had noted that some of these weapons had surfaced at the 
scene of IFP attacks on political opponents. These conclusions 
had resulted in the retirement of several senior police officers; 
one police training unit commander was charged with murder 
and later sentenced to life in prison. 

Soon after the new government was in office in 1994, it 
began investigating allegations of "hit squads" within the Kwa- 
Zulu police (predominantly IFP supporters) and launched an 
investigation into ANC-instigated violence in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Despite some initial reluctance, the provincial government 
cooperated with the international human rights monitors and 
allowed them access to prisons and detainees. 

Violence against women continued to occur with regularity 
through the mid-1990s. The Department of Justice issued chill- 
ing statistics in 1994: more than one-half of all women who 
were murdered had died at the hands of their male partners. 
About 43 percent of women questioned in one study said they 
had been the victim of marital rape or assault. The police 
received reports of more than 25,200 rapes between January 1 
and October 31, 1994 — a 17 percent increase over the same 



395 



South Africa: A Country Study 

period in 1993 — but estimated that most such incidents were 
not reported and only about 25 percent of reported rapes 
resulted in convictions. Numerous laws were passed, both 
before and after the April 1994 elections, aimed at protecting 
women against abuse, but these laws were often ignored or 
bypassed. The new government pledged stricter legislation and 
stronger efforts to establish fair treatment for women. 

The new government's promises of an improved human 
rights record and of security forces that are accountable to the 
population helped to set the tone for democratic reforms in 
1994 and 1995. But the security forces faced even greater chal- 
lenges than the political leaders in trying to implement these 
reforms. Members of the police, in particular, had to abandon 
their apartheid-related agendas — enforcing or opposing the 
old order — while, at the same time, upholding the changing 
laws that apply to the entire population. They had to establish 
"instant legitimacy," as several South African scholars observed, 
in the midst of change. 

Legislation in 1995 established a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to deal with grievances arising out of human 
rights violations of the apartheid era. The commission's goals 
are to establish the truth about such crimes, to identify victims 
and determine their fate, to recommend reparation for victims 
and survivors, and to recommend to the president amnesty or 
indemnity under limited circumstances. Any grant of amnesty 
initially applied only to politically motivated acts committed 
before October 8, 1990, and subsequent legislation extended 
the cut-off date to May 10, 1994. 

President Mandela appointed Anglican Archbishop Des- 
mond Tutu to chair the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and a respected jurist, Alex Boraine, as his deputy. The com- 
mission began hearing testimony in March 1996, and it sched- 
uled hearings in each province to enable South Africans from 
all regions to testify or to apply for amnesty. By mid-1996 sev- 
eral hundred testimonies had been heard, most of them con- 
cerning brutality or other mistreatment by the former security 
forces. 

With less than one-half of its hearings completed in mid- 
1996, the commission was generally viewed as a positive step 
toward national reconciliation. A few outspoken critics dis- 
agreed, however, and charged the commission with impeding 
justice. Among these were relatives of ANC activists who had 
been killed by the security forces; some survivors criticized the 



396 



National Security 



commission for even considering amnesty applications from 
those who might otherwise have been brought to justice in the 
courts. Some former members of the security forces, for their 
part, criticized the commission for its apparent willingness to 
accept allegations against them. A few others who had testified 
before the commission complained that they had received little 
or no compensation for their losses, although most requests for 
compensation had not yet been acted upon by mid-1996. 
Despite these complaints, it appeared likely that the hearings 
would contribute to a broader public understanding of the vio- 
lence that had bolstered the implementation of apartheid. 

* * * 

South Africa has an extensive military history literature. 
Official accounts are available in numerous publications by 
Neil D. Orpen, such as The History of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, 
1904-1974; The Cape Town Rifles: The 'Duke, ' 1856-1984; War in 
the Desert; East African and Abyssinian Campaigns; and Prince 
Alfred's Guard, 1856-1966. Helmoed-Romer Heitman's The 
South African War Machine, South African Arms and Armour, and 
War in Angola: The Final South African Phase also cover important 
areas of military history. Different historical viewpoints are 
found in A. N. Porter's The Origins of the South African War: Joseph 
Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1895-1899 and Car- 
man Miller's Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African 
War, 1899-1902. An interesting comparative perspective is 
found in James O. Gump's The Dust Rose like Smoke: The Subjuga- 
tion of the Zulu and the Sioux. Jacklyn Cock's Women and War in 
South Africa presents a gender-related view of the subject. 

The climate of domestic violence of the 1980s is analyzed in 
publications of the South African Institute of Race Relations, 
such as the annual Race Relations Survey, and in John Kane-Ber- 
man's Political Violence in South Africa. Political Violence and the 
Struggle in South Africa, edited by N. Chabani Manganyi and 
Andre du Toit; Policing the Conflict in South Africa, edited by 
Mary L. Mathews, Philip B. Heymann, and Anthony S. 
Mathews; and Policing South Africa: The South African Police and 
the Transition from Apartheid, by Gavin Cawthra, are also valu- 
able. 

South Africa's regional security policies since the early 1980s 
are discussed in numerous periodicals and monographs. High 
Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood by 



397 



South Africa: A Country Study 

Chester A. Crocker, and Toward Peace and Security in Southern 
Africa, edited by Harvey Glickman, discuss Western points of 
view on that era. The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in 
Southern Africa by Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman 
with Robert Davies reviews regional clashes and peacemaking 
efforts in recent decades. 

The changing security situation in the mid-1990s is outlined 
in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Year- 
book, 1995; "Prospects for Security and Stability in the New 
South Africa" by Carole Birch in Brassey's Defence Yearbook; and 
"Current Trends in South Africa's Security Establishment" by 
Annette Seegers in Armed Forces and Society. Jane's Information 
Group's special report of July 1994, Whither South Africa's War- 
riors?, is a valuable contribution. The South African National 
Defence Force periodical, Salut, conveys brief insights into mil- 
itary concerns in the mid-1990s. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



398 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population by Province, 1994 

3 Number of Pupils and Teachers by Province, 1995 

4 Major Institutions of Higher Learning and Research, 1995 

5 Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 

1948-93 

6 Key Economic Indicators, 1991-95 

7 Sources of Government Revenue, 1994, 1995, and 1996 

8 Government Expenditures, 1995 and 1996 

9 Major Imports, 1992, 1993, and 1994 

10 Major Exports, 1992, 1993, and 1994 

11 Distribution of Employment in the Formal Economy, 1994 

12 Selected Mining Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994 

13 Selected Agricultural Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994 

14 Selected Industrial Production, 1992-95 

15 Foreign Tourist Arrivals, 1991-95 

16 Political Party Representation in National Government, 

1995 

17 Political Party Representation in Provincial Government: 

Executive Officials, 1995 

18 Political Party Representation in Provincial Government: 

Legislative Assemblies, 1995 

19 Major Newspapers, 1995 

20 Composition of South African National Defence Force, 1996 

21 Major Army Equipment, 1996 

22 Major Air Force Equipment, 1996 

23 Major Naval Equipment, 1996 

24 Defense Budget, 1995 and 1996 



399 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


04 


inches 


Centimeters 


39 


inched 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 




62 


miles 


Hectares 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) . . 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 




and add 32 




Table 2. 


Population by Province, 1994 


Province 


Population 1 


Density 2 


Eastern Cape 


6,665,400 


38.2 


Free State 


2,804,600 


21.5 




6,847,000 


374.7 


KwaZulu-Natal 


8,549,000 


94.5 




2,838,500 


38.4 


Northern Cape 


763,900 


2.1 


Northern Province 


5,120,600 


43.8 


North-West Province 


3,506,800 


28.8 


Western Cape 


3,620,200 


28.8 



Estimated. 

Persons per square kilometer. 



Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 5-21. 



401 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 3. Number of Pupils and Teachers by Province, 1995 



Province Pupils Teachers 

Primary Secondary 

(six years) (six years) 

Eastern Cape 1,583,261 741,962 58,254 

Free State 414,826 283,573 23,521 

Gauteng 787,599 621,036 46,335 

KwaZulu-Natal 1,628,679 948,588 63,283 

Mpumalanga 545,312 368,363 23,521 

Northern Cape 110,223 62,333 7,222 

Northern Province 1,050,594 866,428 52,061 

North-West Province 545,841 369,588 30,740 

Western Cape 504,967 331,602 31,716 

TOTAL 7,171,302 4,593,473 336,653 



Source: Based on information from Jacob P. Strauss, Hendrik van der Linde, et al., 
Education and Manpower Development, 1995, Bloemfontein, 1996, 6-10. 



402 



Appendix 



Table 4. Major Institutions of Higher Learning and Research, 

1995 



Institution 



Enrollment 



Location 



Date 
Founded 



Universities 

Medical University of South 

Africa 

Potchefstroom University for 

Christian Higher Education 

Rand Afrikaans University 

Rhodes University 

University of Cape Town 

University of Durban-Westville 

University of Fort Hare 

University of Natal 

University of North-West 

University of Port Elizabeth 

University of Pretoria 

University of South Africa 

(correspondence) 

University of Stellenbosch 

University of the North 

University of the Orange Free 

State 

University of the Western Cape 

University of the Witwatersrand 

University of Transkei 

University of Venda 

University of Zululand 

Vista University 

(correspondence) 

Technikons 2 

Border Technikon 

Cape Technikon 

Mangosuthu Technikon 

M.L. Sultan Technikon 

Peninsula Technikon 

Technikon Natal 

Technikon Northern Transvaal 

Technikon Orange Free State 

Technikon Port Elizabeth 

Technikon Pretoria 



S 4Q7 
o,^y / 


Pretoria 


n.a. 


10,408 


Potchefstroom 


1869 


20,145 


Auckland Park 


1966 


4,594 


Grahams town 


1904 


14,672 


Cape Town 


1829 


10,626 


Durban 


1961 


5,200 


Alice 


1916 


14,093 


Durban/Pieter- 


1910 




maritzburg 




4,918 


Mmabatho 


1979 


5,600 


Port Elizabeth 


1964 


24,435 


Pretoria 


1908 


130,350 


Pretoria 


1873 


14,608 


Stellenbosch 


1918 


19,012 


Turfloop 


1959 




Witzieshoek 






Giyani 






Phuthaditjhaba 




9,446 


Bloemfontein 


1855 


14,650 


beliville 


1960 


17,428 


Johannesburg 


1922 


7,325 


Eastern Cape 


1976 


7,166 


Sibasa 


n.a. 


7,997 


KwaDlangezwa 


1960 


34,014 


Pretoria 


1982 


1,366 


East London 


n.a. 


9,360 


Cape Town 


1979 


4,648 


Umlazi 


1978 


6,359 


Durban 


1946 


6,773 


Beliville 


1967 


7,551 


Durban 


1907 


6,764 


Pretoria 


1979 


5,895 


Bloemfontein 


1981 


7,864 


Port Elizabeth 


1925 


16,509 


Pretoria 


1906 



403 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 4. ( Continued) Major Institutions of Higher Learning and 

Research, 1995 



Institution 



Enrollment 



Location 



Date 
Founded 



Technikon SA 

Technikon Setlogalo 

Technikon Witwatersrand 

Transkei Technikon 

Vaal Triangle Technikon 

Research organizadons 

Agricultural Research Council 

Atomic Energy Corporation of 

South Africa 

Council for Geoscience 

Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research 

Hartebeesthoek Radio Astronomy 

Observatory 

Human Sciences Research 

Council 

Insdtute for the Study of Man 

in Africa 

M INTER 4 

Municipal Botanic Gardens 

National Zoological Gardens of 

South Africa 

South African Institute for Medical 

Research 

Learned societies 

Africa Institute of South Africa 

Classical Association of South 

Africa 

Economic Society of South Africa 

Foundation for Educadon, Science 
and Technology 

Genealogical Society of South Africa . . . 

Heraldry Society of Southern Africa . . . 

Royal Society of South Africa 

South Africa Foundadon 

South Africa Institute of International 
Affairs 

South African Academy of Science 

and Arts 

South African Archaeological 

Society 

South African Association of the 

Arts 

South African Geographical Society. . . . 

South African Insdtute for Librarianship 
and Information Science 



83,741 


1^1 oriH a 

1 lUi lUd 


1980 


1,958 


Rosslyn 


n.a. 


10,976 


Doornfontein 


1925 


2,181 


Butterworth 


n.a. 


7,856 


Vanderbijlpark 


1966 


3 


Pretoria 


1992 


— 


Pretoria 


1982 




Pretoria 


1912 




Pretoria 


1945 


_ 


Krugersdorp 


1961 




Pre toria 


1969 




Johannesburg 


1960 




Randburg 


1934 




Durban 


1849 


— 


Pretoria 


1899 




Johannesburg 


1912 




Pretoria 


1960 




Bloemfontein 


1956 





Pretoria 


1925 




1 1C Ll/1 Id 


1950 





Kelvin 


1963 


— 


Cape Town 


1953 




Cape Town 


1877 




Johannesburg 


1959 




Johannesburg 


1934 




Pretoria 


1909 




Vlaeberg 


1945 




Pretoria 


1945 




Witwatersrand 


1917 




Pretoria 


1930 



404 



Appendix 



Table 4. ( Continued) Major Institutions of Higher Learning and 

Research, 1995 



Institution 



Enrollment 



Location 



Date 
Founded 



South African Institute of Race 

Relations — Johannesburg 1929 

South African Museums 

Association — Sunnyside 1936 

Van Riebeeck Society — Cape Town 1918 

1 n.a. — not available. 

2 Postsecondary technical training. 
5 — not applicable. 

4 Mineral science and mining technology. 

Source: Based on information from The World of Learning, 1995, London, 1995, 1348- 
75; and South Africa, Department of Education, Annual Report, June 1994- 
December 1995, Pretoria, 1996, Appendix. 



Table 5. Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1948- 

93 

(in millions of rands) 1 



Year 


Primary Sector 2 


Secondary Sector 3 


Tertiary Sector 4 


Total 5 


1948 


14,463 


10,738 


26,151 


51,352 


1953 


17,197 


15,007 


30,966 


63,169 


1958 


22,536 


19,534 


37,844 


79,914 


1963 


30,094 


26,042 


45,412 


101,548 


1968 


34,588 


40,094 


60,974 


135,656 


1973 


33,410 


58,125 


78,418 


169,953 


1978 


35,155 


66,887 


91,812 


193,853 


1983 


33,205 


77,164 


110,029 


220,399 


1988 


36,745 


82,033 


124,447 


243,225 


1993 


36,451 


76,895 


128,655 


242,001 



For value of the rand — see Glossary. Figures at factor cost and in constant 1990 prices. 

2 Includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying. 

3 Includes construction, electricity, gas, manufacturing, and water. 

4 Includes accommodations, business services, catering, communications, community services, finance, insurance, 
real estate, social and personal services, storage, transport, and wholesale and retail trade. 

5 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from South African Institute of Race Relations, Race 
Relations Survey, 1 994-95, Johannesburg, 1995, 379-80. 



405 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 6. Key Economic Indicators, 1991-95 
(in billions of United States dollars unless otherwise indicated) 

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 



Gross domestic product 












(GDP) 1 


310.1 


341.0 


383.1 


432.8 


485.9 


Real GDP growth 2 


-1.0 


-2.2 


1.3 


2.7 


3.3 


Consumer price inflation 2 


15.3 


13.9 


9.7 


9.1 


8.7 


Gross domestic fixed invest- 












3 

ment 


50.1 


47.5 


45.9 


50.1 


55.2 


Exports, f.o.b. 4 


23.3 


23.6 


24.1 


25.1 


27.9 


Imports, c.i.f. 5 


18.9 


19.8 


20.0 


23.4 


29.4 


Current account balance 


2.2 


1.4 


1.8 


-0.6 


-3.1 


Gross reserves 6 


3.0 


3.0 


2.7 


3.1 


4.4 


External debt 


25.6 


27.2 


25.5 


27.9 


30.8 


Exchange rate 7 


2.76 


2.85 


3.26 


3.55 


3.64 


Population 8 


38.0 


38.6 


39.5 


40.4 


41.2 



In billions of rands at current market prices; for value of the rand — see Glossary. 

2 In percentages. 

3 In billions of rands at constant 1990 prices. 

4 f.o.b. — free on board. 

5 c.Lf. — cost, insurance, and freight. 

6 Includes gold. 

7 In rands per United States dollar; annual average. 

8 In millions. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: South 
Africa [London] , No. 1, 1996, 3, 5. 



Table 7. Sources of Government Revenue, 1994, 1995, and 1996 
(in millions of rands) 2 





1994 


1995 


1996 3 


Income taxes: individuals 


37,786 


44,763 


49,755 


Income taxes: companies 


11,917 


15,502 


17,368 


Value-added tax 


25,425 


28,975 


32,750 


Customs and excise duties 


18,074 


19,124 


20,446 


(Less payment to Southern African Customs 








Union) 


-3,089 


-3,250 


-3,890 


Other taxes and revenues 


6,741 


6,436 


6,562 


TOTAL 


96,854 


111,550 


122,991 



For years ending March 31 . 

2 For value of the rand — see Glossary. 

3 Estimated. 



Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 239. 



406 



Appendix 



Table 8. Government Expenditures, 1995 and 1996 

1995 1996 
Value 2 Percentage Value 2 Percentage 



Economic services 



Agriculture, forestry, and 

fishing 


3,645 


2.5 


2,764 


1.8 


Fuel and energy 


433 


0.3 


138 


0.1 


Manufacturing 


o\JZ 


().o 




U.4 




99% 


ft 9 


208 


1 




ftl 1 

Ol / 


ft (\ 


yo / 


ft fi 
u.o 


L l CLLIJLJKJL LcLllKJ 11 a.H\JL 

muni cation 


6,701 


4.5 


6,357 


4.1 


Water projects 


1,208 


0.8 


1,309 


0.8 


Export promotion and 

tourism 


3,947 


2.6 


3,321 


2.2 


Total economic services 


17,776 


12.0 


15,655 


10.2 


General government services 










Foreign affairs 


1,320 


0.9 


1,321 


0.9 


General research 


506 


0.3 


510 


0.3 


Administration and'Other 


11,321 


7.6 


8,816 


5.7 


Total general government 


13,147 


8.9 


10,647 


6.9 


Security services 










Defense 


12,908 


8.7 


11,025 


7.2 


Judiciary 


1,601 


1.1 


1,705 


1.1 


Police 


10,168 


6.9 


11,614 


7.5 


Prisons 


2,584 


1.7 


2,862 


1.9 


Total security services 


27,261 


18.4 


27,206 


17.6 


Social services 












31,428 


21.2 


32,616 


21.2 


Health 


15,565 


10.5 


16,885 


11.0 


Housing 


1,648 


1.1 


4,226 


2.7 


Community development 3 


2,192 


1.5 


785 


0.5 


Recreation and culture 


668 


0.5 


833 


0.5 


Social security and welfare 


13,672 


9.2 


16,713 


10.8 


Total social services 


65,173 


44.0 


72,058 


46.7 




24,863 


16.8 


28,604 


18.6 


Government enterprises 


9 


0.0 


7 


0.0 


TOTAL 


148,229 


100.0 


154,177 


100.0 



For years ending March 31 . Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

2 In millions of rands; for value of the rand — see Glossary. 

3 Includes sewage and sanitation services. 

Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 238. 



407 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 9. Major Imports, 1992, 1993, and 1994 
(in millions of rands) 1 



Commodity 


1992 


1993 


1994 2 


Machinery and appliances 


15,010 


17,131 


24,805 


Vehicles and transportation equipment 


6,619 


8,916 


11,284 




5,789 


6,599 


8,292 


Base metals and articles 


2,502 


2,606 


3,399 


Professional and scientific equipment 


2,243 


2,716 


3,299 


Tex dies 


2,437 


2,654 


3,295 


Plastics and rubber articles 


2,250 


2,639 


3,256 


Paper products 


1,463 


1,740 


2,183 


Precious and semiprecious stones and 

precious metals 


351 


1,467 


1,847 


Vegetable products 


2,570 


1,928 


1,365 



For value of the rand — see Glossary. 
Preliminary figures. 



Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 224; and Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 908. 



Table 10. MajorExports, 1992, 1993, and 1994 
(in millions of rands) 1 



Commodity 


1992 


1993 


1994 2 




9,484 


9,905 


11,853 


Precious stones and precious metals 


7,160 


10,138 


10,213 




7,083 


8,444 


7,712 


Chemicals and plastics 


3,221 


3,378 


4,757 


Vegetable products 


2,291 


2,437 


4,197 


Prepared foodstuffs and tobacco 


1,857 


1,813 


2,826 


Machinery and appliances 


2,151 


2,811 


2,567 


Vehicles and transportation equipment 


2,329 


2,701 


2,265 


Paper and paper products 


1,896 


1,937 


2,042 


Textiles 


1,809 


1,812 


1,923 



For value of the rand — see Glossary. 
Preliminary figures. 



Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 223; and Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 908. 



408 



Appendix 



Table 11. Distribution of Employment in the Formal Economy, 1994 
(in percentages) 



Economic Activity 


Regular Employment 1 


Casual Employment 


Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 


12.2 


8.3 


Armed forces 


2.3 


0.2 


Construction 


5.6 


12.6 


Domestic services 


8.5 


26.6 




7.8 


2.8 


Electricity and water services 


1.9 


1.6 




4.2 


1.6 


Legal services 


2.0 


0.3 


Manufacturing 


16.6 


9.8 




5.6 


1.6 


Mining 


7.3 


0.7 


Hotels and restaurants 


2.6 


6.4 


Transportation and communications .... 


6.7 


4.2 


Wholesale and retail trade 


10.9 


16.7 


Other 


5.8 


6.6 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 



Total labor force estimated at 123 million, excluding agriculture, forestry, and fishing. 

Source: Based on information from South African Institute of Race Relations, Race 
Relations Survey, 1994-95, Johannesburg, 1995, 473. 



409 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 12. Selected Mining Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994 
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 



Mineral 1992 1993 1994 



Iron ore 28,226 28,912 32,321 

Diamonds 1 10,177 10,324 10,812 

Manganese ore 2,462 2,504 2,851 

Chrome ore 3,000 2,563 3,590 

Gold 2 611 616 580 

Copper 167 157 165.2 

Asbestos 124 97 92.1 

Platinum 2 69 90 164.8 

Lead 75.4 100.2 95.8 

Silver 2 172 195 n.a. 3 

Uranium oxide 2 2,222 2,008 1,913 

Coal 174,072 182,262 190,672 



In thousands of carats. 

2 In tons. 

3 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1994, Pretoria, 1995, 59; and South Africa, South 
African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 
122,125. 



Table 13. Selected Agricultural Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994 
(in thousands of tons) 



Commodity 1992 1993 1994 ] 



Barley 265 230 275 

Corn 3,125 9,668 12,143 

Grapes 1,450 1,249 1,284 

Potatoes 1,215 1,127 1,306 

Sorghum 98 478 520 

Sugarcane 12,955 11,244 15,683 

Wheat 1,269 1,984 1,782 

Wool 124 111 106 



Initial estimates. 

Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 108; and Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 905. 



410 



Appendix 



Table 14. Selected Industrial Production, 1992-95 



Product 


1992 


1993 


1994 


1995 


Automobiles, assembled .... 


206,600 


227,700 


227,000 


228,400 


Cement 1 


5,850 


6,135 


7,065 


7,437 


Cigarettes 2 


35,563 


34,499 


n.a. 3 


n.a. 


Electrical energy 4 


154,083 


159,505 


165,985 


171,301 


Petroleum products 5 










Gasoline 


7,234 


8,113 


8,720 


8,947 


Kerosene 


703 


916 


980 


935 


Distillates 


5,893 


5,915 


5,736 


6,551 


Rubber tires 6 


7,333 


7,676 


8,111 


8,947 


Steel, crude 7 


9,061 


8,610 


8,300 


8,000 


Sugar, refined 7 


1,316 


1,098 


1,246 


n.a. 


Wheat flour 7 


1,833 


1,867 


1,872 


n.a. 


Wine 8 


3,779 


3,647 


2,150 


n.a. 



In millions of tons. 

2 In millions of cigarettes. 

3 n.a. — not available. 

4 In millions of kilowatt-hours. 

5 In millions of liters. 

6 In thousands. 

7 In thousands of tons. 

8 In thousands of hectoliters. 

Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 124; and Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 906. 



Table 15. Foreign Tourist Arrivals, 1991-95 



Region of Origin 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 



Africa 1,193,700 2,328,000 2,698,100 3,125,958 3,452,164 

Europe 367,600 395,300 429,900 463,477 721,878 

North America and 

South America . . 67,100 75,000 91,700 115,621 160,473 

Asia 59,300 67,500 87,500 113,724 158,463 

Oceania 20,000 24,800 30,100 36,658 61,085 

Other 2,300 2,200 32,500 41,109 130,001 

TOTAL 1,710,000 2,892,800 3,369,800 3,896,547 4,684,064 



Source: Based on information from Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, London, 1995, 882. 



411 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 16. Political Party Representation in National Government, 

1995 



Political Party 




Executive 




Legislature 


X 1 CjIUCU l 


Deputy 
Presidents 




Nadonal 
Assembly 


Senate 


African National Congress . . 


1 


1 


18 


252 


60 


National Party 




1 


6 


82 


17 


Inkatha Freedom Party 






3 


43 


5 


Freedom Front 








9 


5 


Democratic Party 








7 


3 


Pan-Africanist Congress .... 








5 




African Christian Democratic 












Party 








2 





Plus one nonpartisan portfolio. 



Table 1 7. Political Party Representation in Provincial Government: 
Executive Officials, 1995 



Province Premier Executive Council 

ANC 1 NP 2 IFP 3 FF' 

Eastern Cape ANC 9 1 — — 

Free State ANC 9 1 — — 

Gauteng ANC 7 3 — — 

KwaZulu-Natal IFP 3 1 6 — 

Mpumalanga ANC 9 1 — — 

Northern Cape ANC 5 4 — 1 

Northern Province ANC 9 — — 1 

North-West Province ANC 9 1 — — 

Western Cape NP 4 6 — — 



African National Congress. 

2 National Party. 

3 Inkatha Freedom Party. 

4 Freedom Front. 



412 



Appendix 



II H I I I I 



I I 



I I I I 



H I HH I I I I 



I I 



I ~ I 



ffvf <N rH r-H 



5 I I I I I 



2 U 



3 3 
O £ 



■5 -5 -S 



ft. 

S 

H 



. c 

& 



2 .2 

2 < 



z JS ti: q £ 



413 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 19. Major Newspapers, 1995 



Newspaper 



Place of 
Publication 



Frequency Language Grculation 



The Argus Cape Town Daily English 82,774 

Beeld (Image) Johannesburg Daily Afrikaans 111,958 

Die Burger (The Citizen) Cape Town Daily Afrikaans 94,193 

Business Day Johannesburg Daily English 37,085 

The Cape Times Cape Town Daily English 48,685 

The Citizen Johannesburg Daily English 136,848 

City Press Johnannesburg Weekly English 261,057 

Daily Dispatch East London Daily English 37,485 

TheDailyNews Durban Daily English 75,960 

Diamond Fields Advertiser Kimberley Daily English 8,000 

EP Herald Port Elizabeth Daily English 30,484 

Evening Post Port Elizabeth Daily English 16,827 

Ilanga (The Sun) Durban Biweekly Zulu 1 125,761 

Imvo Zabantsundu (Voice King William's Weekly Xhosa 1 14,401 

of the Black People) Town 

The Natal Mercury Durban Daily English 42,690 

The Natal Witness Pietermaritz- Daily English 27,500 

burg 

Post (Natal) Durban Weekly English 47,667 

The Pretoria News Pretoria Daily English 23,006 

Rapport (Dispatch) Johannesburg Weekly Afrikaans 375,723 

Sowetan Johannesburg Daily English 207,849 

The Star. Johannesburg Daily English 165,171 

Sunday Nation Johannesburg Weekly English 49,300 

Sunday Times Johannesburg Weekly English 467,745 

Sunday Tribune Durban Weekly English 115,418 

Umafrika Marianhill Weekly Zulu 40,500 

Die Volksblad (The People's 

Paper) Bloemfontein Daily Afrikaans 21,453 

Weekly Mail Johannesburg Weekly English 28,220 

1 Some articles are in English. 

Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Ser- 
vice, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 296; and Financial Mail [Johan- 
nesburg] , February 23, 1996, 85. 



414 



Appendix 



Table 20. Composition of South African National Defence Force, 

1996 1 



Service Active Duty Reserve 



Army 118,000 377,000 s 

Air Force 8,400 20,000 

Navy 5,500 1,700 

Medical Service 6,000 n.a. 3 

TOTAL 137,900 398,700 



Reorganization incomplete. 

2 Excluding Commandos (estimated 76,000). 

3 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 
264-65. 



415 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 21. Major Army Equipment, 1996 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inventory 



Main battle tanks 

Olifant 1A and IB 1 South Africa Approximately 250 

Tank technology demonstrator South Africa Being developed 

Armored reconnaissance vehicles 

Eland-60 and -90 South Africa 1,100 

Rooikat-76 South Africa 160 

Armored infantry fighting vehicles 

Ratel-20, -60, and -90 South Africa 1,500 

Armored personnel carriers 

Buffel, Casspir South Africa 1,500 

Mamba South Africa 160+ 

Towed artillery 

G-l (88mm) South Africa 30 

G-2 (140mm) South Africa 75 

G-4 (155mm) South Africa n.a. 2 

G— 5 (155mm howitzer) South Africa 75 

Self-propelled artillery 

G-6 (155mm howitzer) South Africa 20 

Multiple rocket launchers 

Bataleur (127mm, 40-tube) South Africa 120 

Valkiri-22 (self-propelled, 24-tube) South Africa 60 

Valkiri-5 (towed) South Africa n.a. 

Mortars 

M3 (81mm) South Africa 4,000 

Brandt (120mm) South Africa 120+ 

Antitank guided weapons 

ZT-3 Swift. South Africa n.a. 

Milan South Africa n.a. 

Rocket launchers 

FT-5 (92mm) n.a. n.a. 

Recoilless launchers 

M^OAl (106mm) n.a. n.a. 

Air defense guns 

20mm, self-propelled n.a. 600 

23mm, self-propelled n.a. 36 

35mm South Africa 150 

Surface-to-air missiles 

SA-7 and SA-14 Soviet Union 3 n.a. 

1 Olifant 1A and IB manufactured in South Africa; derived from Centurion (Britain). 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 Some captured in regional conflicts. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 
264; and Jane's Defence Weekly [London], 23, No. 17, April 29, 1995, 23-41. 



416 



Appendix 



Table 22. Major Air Force Equipment, 1996 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inven 



tory 



Fighters, ground attack 

Mirage F-1AZ 

Impala II 

Cheetah C 

Cheetah E 

Fighters 

Mirage F-1CZ 

Tanker/early warning 

Boeing 707-320 

Transport aircraft 

C-130B 

HS-125 and -400B 

Super King Air 200 

Citation 

C-47 

Liaison/fighter aircraft 

Cessna 185 

Helicopters 

SA-316/-319 (some armed) 

SA-330 C/H/L Puma 

BK-117 

CSH-2 Rooivalk 

Training aircraft 

C-47TP 

Cheetah D 

T-6G Harvard HA/HI 

Impala I 

PilatusPC-7 

SA-316/-330 helicopters. . . 
Unmanned aerial vehicles 

Seeker 

Scout 

Missiles 

Air-to-surface 

AS-11/-20/-30 

Air-to-air 

R-530 

R-550 Magic 

V-3C Darter 

V-3A/B Kukri 

AJM-9 Sidewinder 

Python 3 



France 
South Africa 
South Africa 
South Africa 

France 

Israel 

United States 
Britain 
United States 
United States 
United States 

United States 

France 

France 
_2 

South Africa 

United States 
South Africa 
United States 
South Africa 
Switzerland 
France 

n.a. 3 
n.a. 



20 
75 
38 1 
11 

11 



7 
3 
2 
1 
19 

24 

63 
63 
19 
12 1 

12 
14 
130 
114 
60 
37 

n.a. 
n.a. 



n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 



n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 



417 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 22. ( Continued) Major Air Force Equipment, 1996 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Ground equipment 

Armored personnel carriers (Rhino) South Africa n.a. 

Radar 

Fixed n.a. 3 

Mobile n.a. Several 

Surface-to-air missiles 

Cactus (Crotale) n.a. 20 

SA-8/-9/-13 n.a. n.a. 

1 Some on order. 

2 Some acquired from former "independent" homelands. 
9 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 
241 , 265; and A.D. Baker, comp., Combat Fleets of the World, 1995: Their Ships, Air- 
craft, and Armament, Annapolis, Maryland, 1995, 676-79. 



418 



Appendix 



Table 23. Major Naval Equipment, 1996 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 
Submarines 

Daphne class France 3 

(550mm torpedo tube) 1 

Missile craft 

Minister class Israel 9 

Inshore patrol craft 

Hydrofoils n.a. 2 3 

(Coastguard T2212 class) 

Harbor craft n.a. 28 

(Namicurra class) 

Mine warfare ships 

Coastal minesweepers Britain 1 4 

(Ton class) 

Minehunters n.a. 4 

(River class) 

Support and miscellaneous 

Combat/logistic support vessels 

(Drakensberg) South Africa 1 

(Outeniqua) Ukraine 1 

Hydrographic survey vessel n.a. 1 

Diving support vessel n.a. 1 

Antarctic transport with two 

helicopters n.a. 1 

Tugs n.a. 3 

Frigates 

(1,500-ton to 1,800-ton) South Africa 4 3 

1 Modified. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 Construction to begin late 1990s. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 
264-65. 



419 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Table 24. Defense Budget, 1995 and 1996 
(in millions of rands) 2 



Budget Allocation 


1995 


1996 




3,687 


3,095 


Air defense 


1,633 


1,777 


Maritime defense 


649 


686 


Medical services 


857 


720 


Command and control 


397 


420 


General support 


320 


323 


Special defense account 


3,093 


3,514 


TOTAL 


10,636 


10,535 


Percentage of GDP 3 


3.4 


2.2 



Years ending March 31. 

For value of the rand — see Glossary. 

GDP — gross domestic product. 



Source: Based on information from Helmoed-Romer Heitman, "R2.9b Defence Budget 
Marks End to Decline, "Jane 's Defence Weekly [London], 23, No. 12, March 25, 
1995,5. 



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483 



Glossary 



Afrikaner — South African of Dutch ancestry, often with Ger- 
man, French, or other European forebears; member of 
white community tracing its roots to the seventeenth-cen- 
tury Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope. 

apartheid — "Separateness," (Afrikaans, Dutch); policy imple- 
mented by National Party government (1948-94) to main- 
tain separate development of government-demarcated 
racial groups; also referred to as "separate development," 
and later "multinational development"; abolished by Con- 
stitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993. 

Bantu — Literally, "human beings," in more than 300 Bantu lan- 
guages of equatorial and southern Africa. Bantu languages 
are classified within the central branch of the Niger-Congo 
language family; characterized by a system of noun classes 
marked by prefixes, so that each dependent word in a sen- 
tence carries a prefix of the same class. Outsiders often 
simplify by omitting prefix; for example, the amaZulu 
(people) are known as the Zulu; their language, isiZulu, is 
also referred to as Zulu. Speakers of seSotho, the BaSotho, 
are often referred to simply as Sotho peoples. Four major 
subgroups of Bantu languages — Nguni, Sotho, Tsonga- 
Shangaan, and Venda — are widely represented in South 
Africa. They include nine of South Africa's official lan- 
guages — isiXhosa, isiZulu, isiNdebele, sePedi, seSotho, 
seTswana, siSwati, tshiVenda (also luVenda), and xiTsonga. 
During the apartheid era, the term Bantu was often used 
in government regulations, official statements, and some- 
times in conversation to designate people of black African 
descent. Because this group was particularly disadvantaged 
by apartheid, the term Bantu assumed pejorative connota- 
tions in many apartheid-era contexts. 

Bantustan — An area reserved for an officially designated 
Bantu-speaking ethnic group during the apartheid era; a 
term generally supplanted by "homeland," national state, 
or self-governing state during the 1970s and 1980s. 

Boer — Farmer (Afrikaans); generally used in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century to refer to white South African settlers 
of Dutch, German, and French Huguenot origin; gener- 
ally supplanted by the term Afrikaner (q.v.) in the twentieth 



485 



South Africa: A Country Study 

century. See also Trekboer. 
coloureds — Those "of mixed race," in apartheid terminology; 
usually referred to people with African and Dutch ances- 
try. 

European Community (EC) — ^European Union (EU). 

European Union (EU) — Formerly, the European Community 
(EC), established as the EU by the Treaty on European 
Union, November 1, 1993. The EU comprises three com- 
munities: the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
Each community is legally distinct, but since 1967 the 
three bodies have shared common governing institutions. 
The EU forms more than a framework for free trade and 
economic cooperation: EU signatories have agreed in 
principle to integrate their economies and ultimately to 
form a political union. EU members in early 1996 were 
Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger- 
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether- 
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 

fiscal year (FY) — In South Africa, April 1-March 31. For exam- 
ple, FY 1997-98 includes the period from April 1, 1997, to 
March 31, 1998. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by a domestic national econ- 
omy during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by 
adding the value contributed by each sector of the econ- 
omy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, 
and depreciation (consumption of capital). Only domestic 
production is included, not income arising from invest- 
ments and possessions owned abroad, hence the use of the 
word domestic to distinguish GDP from the gross national 
product (GNP — q.v.). Real GDP is the value of GDP when 
inflation has been taken into account. 

gross national product (GNP) — The total market value of all 
final goods and services produced by an economy during a 
year. Obtained by adding gross domestic product (GDP — 
q.v.) and the income received from abroad by residents 
and then subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonres- 
idents. Real GNP is the value of GNP when inflation has 
been taken into account. 

Highveld — High-altitude grassland, generally between 1,200 
meters and 1,800 meters above sea level. 



486 



Glossary 



homeland or reserve — A primarily residential area set aside for 
a single officially designated black ethnic group during the 
apartheid era. Some of the ten homelands in the 1980s 
consisted of more than a dozen discrete segments of land. 
Homeland boundaries shifted as the government assigned 
additional groups of people to the often crowded home- 
lands or as neighboring jurisdictions successfully pressed 
claims to territory within a homeland's boundary. 

import substitution — An economic development strategy that 
emphasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by 
import protection using tariff and nontariff measures. Pro- 
ponents favor the export of industrial goods over primary 
products. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized 
agency, affiliated with the United Nations, that is responsi- 
ble for stabilizing international exchange rates and pay- 
ments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of 
loans to its members (including industrialized and devel- 
oping countries) when they experience balance of pay- 
ments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions 
that require substantial internal economic adjustments by 
the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

lineage — A group, the members of which are descended 
through males from a common male ancestor (patrilin- 
eage) or through females from a common female ancestor 
(matrilineage). Such descent can in principle be traced. 

mfecane — "Crushing" or "hammering" (isiZulu); refers to early 
nineteenth-century upheaval in southeastern Africa 
caused by expansion of Zulu society under the military 
leadership of Shaka and combined economic and popula- 
tion pressures throughout the region; difeqane, in seSotho. 

parastatal — A semi-autonomous, quasi-governmental, state- 
owned enterprise. 

Paris Club — Informal name for a consortium of Western credi- 
tor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United States) that have made loans, or have guaran- 
teed export credits, to developing nations and that meet in 
Paris to discuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. Paris Club 
deliberations often result in the tendering of emergency 
loans to countries in economic difficulty or in the resched- 
uling of debts. Formed in October 1962, the organization 



487 



South Africa: A Country Study 

has no formal or institutional existence. Its secretariat is 
run by the French treasury. It has a close relationship with 
the International Monetary Fund (q.v.), to which all of its 
members except Switzerland belong, as well as with the 
World Bank (q.v.), and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club is 
also known as the Group of Ten (G-10). 

polygynous — having more than one wife at the same time; 
polygynous marriages are allowed by tradition in many 
African societies. 

rand (R) — Unit of currency. A decimal currency of 100 cents, 
the rand replaced the South African pound in 1961. The 
official exchange rate of the rand against the United States 
dollar was R1=US$1.40 until December 1971, and from 
September 1975 to January 1979, R1=US$1.15. From 1972 
to 1975, and after 1979, the government allowed market 
forces to determine the value of the rand. The exchange 
rate averaged R3.55=US$1 in 1994 and R3.64=US$1 in 
1995. On April 30, 1996, R4.34=US$1; conversely, Rl= 
US$.23. Financial rands were issued only to foreign buyers 
for capital investment inside South Africa. They were avail- 
able periodically until 1983 and again in September 1985, 
but were abolished in March 1995. 

Rand — Local contraction of Witwatersrand (q.v.). 

Trekboer — Migrant farmer, in Afrikaans; signifies participation 
in nineteenth-century population migrations eastward 
from the Cape of Good Hope. See alsoRoer. 

Witwatersrand — Literally, "Ridge of White Waters" (Afrikaans), 
often shortened to Rand; mining region south of Johan- 
nesburg known primarily for rich deposits of gold and 
other minerals. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions that provide advice and 
assistance on long-term finance and policy issues to devel- 
oping countries: the International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established 
in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans 
at market-related rates of interest to developing countries 
at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a 
legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the 



488 



Glossary 



IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest 
developing countries on much easier terms than those of 
conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, sup- 
plements the activities of the IBRD through loans and 
assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of 
productive private enterprises in the less developed coun- 
tries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The MIGA, 
which began operating in June 1988, insures private for- 
eign investment in developing countries against such non- 
commercial risks as expropriation, civil strife, and 
nonconvertibility of currency. The four institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe 
their capital. To participate in the World Bank, member 
states must first belong to the International Monetary 
Fund (q.v.). 



489 



Index 



AAC. See All-African Convention 
Aasac. See All African Student Commit- 
tee 

Abacha, Sani, 315 

Abdurahman, Abdullah, 45 

Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of 

Documents Act (No. 67) (1952), 56 
abortion, lxiii 

ABSA. See Amalgamated Banks of South 
Africa 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), lxiii-lxiv, 159-60; deaths 
from, 159; education campaign, lxiii- 
lxiv, 159-60; number of cases of, 159 

Advisory Committee on Defence Force 
Requirements, 350 

Africa Muslim Party, 146, 292 

African Christian Democratic Party: in 
elections, 275, 292; in National Assem- 
bly, 275 

African Democratic Movement, 292-93 
African Development Bank, 245 
African Explosives and Chemical Indus- 
tries, 227 

African Independent churches, 135; 
healing dances of, 136; theology of, 
135, 136-37 

African languages: as languages of 
instruction, 64; newspapers in, 304; as 
official languages, 109-111, 114; radio 
broadcasts in, 237-38; television 
broadcasts in, 237 

African Metals (Amcor) , 225 

African Methodist Episcopal Church 
(AME), 37 

African Mineworkers Union (AMWU), 
53; membership of, 53; strikes by, 53 

African Moderates Congress Party, 293 

African National Congress (ANC) (see 
also South African Native National 
Congress), lii, 202, 276-80; armed 
forces campaign against, 82, 359; 
armed struggle of, lvi, lviii, 61-62, 65, 
76, 78, 81, 84, 175, 249, 277; banned, 
xlvii, lv, 61, 276; cabinet appoint- 



ments, 261, 262, 279; conflict of, with 
Inkatha, Ix, 257, 274, 275, 287-88, 
388-89; in Congress of the People, 59; 
cooperation of, with Communist 
Party, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 
299; cooperation of, with National 
Party, 298; crackdown on, lvi, 70; defi- 
ance campaigns of, liv-lv, 59, 276; 
economists of, 177; in elections, xlvii, 
lxi-lxii, 84, 249, 275; ethnic distribu- 
tion in, 300; foreign relations by, 305; 
formation of, 45-46, 276; generation 
gap in, 298-99, 300-301; in House of 
Assembly, 278; human rights viola- 
tions by, 279, 394; in government, 177, 
268, 279; and labor unions, 297; lead- 
ers of, 59, 276; materiel for, 277; mem- 
bers of, liii, 276; military wing, 277; in 
National Assembly, 275; national con- 
ference of, 277; organization of, 277; 
platform of, 52, 75-76, 252, 278; polit- 
ical succession in, Ixv, 279; recruit- 
ment for, 277-78; schism in, 76; secret 
meetings of, with National Party, 256; 
supporters of, 116, 274, 277; symbols 
of, 3; transition proposals by, 81, 256, 
257; transition talks, lix-lx, 250; 
unbanned, lix, 75, 332; in United 
Nations, 277; violence by, 395 

African National Congress Women's 
League, 166-67; reactivated, 278 

African National Congress Youth 
League, 281, 298-99; founded, 276; 
reactivated, 277-78 

African Organisation for Women 
(AOW), 292 

African Political Organisation, 45 

African Resistance Movement, 61 

Africans. See blacks 

Africa Travel Association, 241 

Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. See Afri- 
kaner Trade Institute 

Afrikaanse Patriot, Die (The Afrikaner 
Patriot), 39 

Afrikaans language, 129; as language of 



491 



South Africa: A Country Study 



instruction, lvii, 43, 64, 149, 152; news- 
papers in, 304; as official language, 49, 
109; promotion of, 47; radio broad- 
casts in, 237-38; speakers of (see also 
Afrikaners, coloureds), 129-32, 131, 
132; television broadcasts in, 237 

Afrikanerbond, 39, 294 

Afrikaner Broederbond {see also Afrikan- 
erbond), 48, 50, 130, 284, 293-94; 
founded, 293; membership, 293-94; 
organization of, 294; and transforma- 
tion of apartheid, 294 

Afrikaner cultural organizations, lii, 130, 
284, 293; women's, 166 

Afrikaner nationalism, lii-liii, 46-48, 
130, 335; attempts to strengthen, 47- 
48; development of, lii, liii, 4, 39 

Afrikaner Resistance Movement (Afri- 
kaner Weerstandsbeweging — AWB) , 
lxi, 83, 391 

Afrikaners (see also Boers, whites), 129- 
31; ancestors of, 129-30; cattle farm- 
ing by, 3-4; as "chosen people," lii, 3; 
conflict of, with British settlers, 4, 130; 
conflict of, with nonwhites, 4, 126, 
129-30; conflicts among, 131; and 
education, 149; expansion by, 126; 
hunting by, 3-4; in Mozambique, 313; 
National Socialism embraced by, 52, 
250; opposition of, to reform, 250; 
political affiliations of, 250; in political 
elite, 297, 298, 301; population of, 
129; poverty among, lii, 47, 50; voting 
by, xlvii; women, 166 

Afrikaner state, proposed, 264-65, 289 

Afrikaner Trade Institute (Afrikaanse 
Handelsinstituut — AHI) , 296 

Afrikaner Volksfront, 288-89 

Afrikanervroue-Kenkrag, 166 

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. See Afri- 
kaner Resistance Movement 

Agence France Presse, 304 

agricultural extension services, 217 

agricultural production, 31, 214, 245 

agricultural products (see also under indi- 
vidual crops), 215, 217-18; barley, 217- 
18; cereals, 217-18; corn, 19, 118, 176, 
214, 215, 217; export of, 215, 217; 
food crops, 91, 214, 215; fruits, 218; 
grain, 14, 15, 31, 91, 217; import of, 
175; legumes, 218; peanuts, 215, 218; 
sorghum, 118, 217; subsidies for, 176; 



sugar, 29, 91, 215, 218; tobacco, 118, 
215; wheat, 31, 176, 217; wine grapes, 
14, 15, 31, 91, 218; wool, 31, 215, 219 

agricultural reform, 215 

agriculture, 222; by Africans, 31, 118, 
122, 127, 129; ancient, 9; assistance in, 
306; consolidation of, 176; employ- 
ment in, 198-99, 217; export crops, 
215; input costs of, 216; in interior pla- 
teau, 91; irrigation for, 91, 95, 215, 
218; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 180, 214-15; problems in, 
101, 216; subsidies for, 187; swidden 
(slash-and-burn) , 8-9; by Voortrek- 
kers, 31 

AHI. See Afrikaner Trade Institute 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force, 336-37, 370-73; aircraft of, 
337, 371-73; chief of, 370; command 
posts, 371; commands of, 370-71; cre- 
ation of, 336-37; insignia, 377; mate- 
riel, 371; number of personnel, 337, 
370; organization of, 370; ranks, 377; 
reserves, 370; training, 337-38; uni- 
forms, 376-77; violence against, 72; 
women in, 337, 348, 370 

airlines, 234-35; deregulation of, 235 

airports, 234 

Albright, David, 358 

Alexander, Benny, 292 

Algeria: relations with, 324 

Aliens Act (No. 1) (1937), 51-52; opposi- 
tion to, 52 

All-African Convention (AAC), 52 

All African Student Committee (Aasac), 
292 

Alliance Airlines, 235 
Allied Bank, 242 

Amalgamated Banks of South Africa 

(ABSA), 242 
amaNdebele. SeeNdebele people 
amaTshawe. S^Tshawe dynasty 
Amawasha. See Zulu Washermen's Guild 
amaXhosa. See Xhosa people 
amaZulu. See Zulu people 
Am cor. See African Metals 
AME. See African Methodist Episcopal 

Church 

AMWU. Sa? African Mineworkers Union 
ANC. Se* African National Congress 
Anglican Church: and apartheid, 143; 



492 



Index 



members of, 135 

anglicization, 42; failure of, 43 

Anglo American Corporation, 70, 208, 
220, 225 

Anglo American Platinum, 208 

Anglo-Boer Wars. See South African War; 
War of Independence 

Angola, 66-67; civil war in, 306, 343, 356, 
357, 360; Cuban troops in, 67, 318, 
357; elections in, 314; independence 
for, lvi-lvii, 67, 357; intervention in, 
306, 357, 358-59, 360; invasion of, 67, 
343; relations with, 314-15, 331, 361; 
in Southern African Development 
Community, 306 

Angola-Namibia Accord (1988), 314 

antiapartheid resistance {see also political 
violence), 4-5, 58, 61, 255, 332; crack- 
downs on, lv, 62, 67, 70, 380; groups 
promoting, 294-95, 305 

antimony, 210 

AOW. See African Organisation for 
Women 

apartheid, 54—65, 297; arrests under, lv, 
57, 60, 61, 62, 70, 73; bannings under, 
57, 61, 64, 65, 70; consolidation of, 
62-63; costs of, 131, 173-74, 176-77, 
185-86, 203-4; dismantling of, 5, 74- 
85, 285; economic problems under, 5, 
185-86; education under, 56, 131, 146, 
150-53; elections under, 272; employ- 
ment under, 199; geographic distribu- 
tion under, 63, 66, 107, 109; health 
care under, 156, 160-61; human rights 
violations under, 394; implementa- 
tion of, liii, 4, 54-58, 91, 130-31, 335; 
international reaction to, 5, 67-68, 80, 
91; and labor unions, 296; legal system 
under, 269-70; opposition to, liv-lv, 
lvi, lvii, lviii, 4-5, 58, 61, 131, 133, 146, 

165, 166, 255, 276, 296; origins of, 90- 
91; principles of, 150; and religion, 
133, 135, 141-44, 145; signs for segre- 
gation, 56; in South- West Africa, 310; 
support for, 128, 131, 141, 144, 150, 

166, 296, 331, 336, 345, 368; telecom- 
munications under, 236-37; tribes 
imposed under, 107; universities 
under, 154; and women, 56, 165-66 

apartheid reform (see also Reconstruc- 
tion and Development Programme), 
lviii, 69-71, 73-74, 153, 174, 177, 285; 



Afrikaner participation in, 294; inter- 
national reaction to, 173; National 
Party in, 285-86; opposition to, 84, 
250, 251, 285, 385, 396; police under, 
385, 396; problems in, 257; support 
for, 251, 257, 285; talks for, lix-lx, 250, 
251 

APLA. SeeAzanian People's Liberation 
Army 

Apostolic Faith Mission of Southern 
Africa Church: members of, 1 35 

Arabs: trade with, 33 

Arap Moi, Daniel, 315 

archaeological research, 5, 9, 89; art in, 
6,9 

Argentina: joint military exercises with, 
375 

Argus Printing and Publishing Company, 
304 

Armaments Act (No. 87) (1964), 351 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa 
(Armscor), 319, 351; board of, 352; 
employees, 352; marking department, 
352; privatization of, 352; product 
exhibitions, 352; restructuring of, 352 
Armaments Development and Produc- 
tion Act (No. 57) (1968), 351 
Armaments Development and Produc- 
tion Corporation (Armscor), 351, 
Armaments Production Board, 351 
armed forces (see also paramilitary orga- 
nizations; Union Defence Force): Afri- 
kanerization of, 335; apartheid 
defended by, lviii, 331, 336, 345, 368; 
buildup of, 358; Cadet organization, 
334; campaign of, against African 
National Congress, lviii, 82, 359; 
Catering Corps, 345; Citizen Force, 

334, 335, 337, 365; civic-action role of, 
362, 369-70; clandestine death squads 
of, 77; commander in chief, 363; Com- 
mandos, 336; conscription in, 335, 
369; under constitutions, 362-63; dec- 
orations of, 377; demobilization of, 
335; ethnic distribution in, 334, 336, 
344, 345; headquarters of, 343, 363; 
history of, 334-39; homeland, 346^8; 
integration of, 257, 332, 334, 362-63, 
365, 367, 368-69; internal security by, 

335, 337, 340, 342-43; invasion of 
Angola by, 67, 331; invasion of 
Mozambique by, 359; invasion of 



493 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Namibia by, 67; invasion of Zimbabwe 
by, 67; medical service, 336; missions 
of, 343, 362, 363; number of person- 
nel in, 334, 335, 336, 342; organiza- 
tion of, 336, 343; Permanent Force, 
334, 363-65; President's Guard, 345- 
46; reserves, 336, 365; restructuring 
of, 332; retrenchment, 339; service 
obligations of, 336, 342; specialized 
forces, 342-46; support for police by, 
lviii, 383; training, 335, 343, 370; uni- 
forms, ranks, and insignia of, 376-77; 
women in, 336, 337, 348-49; in World 
War I, 334-35 

Armscor. See Armaments Corporation of 
South Africa 

Armscor. See Armaments Development 
and Production Corporation 

arms embargo. See materiel 

army, 363-70; chief of, 365; Citizen 
Force, 365; combat corps, 367; Com- 
mandos, 367-68; conscription in, 369; 
conventional forces, 367; deployment 
of, 237; headquarters of, 367; histori- 
cal origins of, 334-36; insignia, 377; 
integration in, 365, 367, 368-69; inter- 
nal security by, 337, 368; materiel of, 
368; military commands of, 367; mis- 
sion of, 365-67; number of personnel 
in, 365; organization of, 365; Perma- 
nent Force, 363-65; qualifications, 
369; ranks, 377; reduction of, 365; 
reserves, 365; service brigades, 369- 
70; support service corps, 367; territo- 
rial forces, 365-67; training of, 365, 
369, 370; uniforms, 376-77; women 
in, 348 

Army Battle School, 365 

art: prehistoric, 6 

Artillery School, 365 

asbestos, 95; production of, 205 

Asia: Mandela's visit to, 77 

Asians, 133-34; in armed forces, 345; 
classification of, liii, 55, 133-34; con- 
flict of, with Afrikaners, liii, 4; and dis- 
ease, 158; geographic distribution of, 
133; immigration of, 90; languages of, 
133; occupations of, 35, 134; in police 
force, 385; political affiliations of, 59; 
political representation for, lviii, 71, 
254; population of, 44, 105, 133; reli- 
gions of, 133-34, 146; schools for, liv, 



56; as students, 154-55; voting by, 
xlvii, 254 

Assembly of God Church: members of, 
135 

Associated Press, 304 
Atomic Energy Corporation, 356 
Augrabies Falls, 240 
Augrabies Falls National Park, 240 
Australia: teachers from, 149 
Australopithecus africanus, 5 
Autonet (transport authority), 229 
AWB. See Afrikaner Resistance Move- 
ment 

Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu) , 
292 

Azanian People's Liberation Army 
(APLA, formerly Poqo), 291; integra- 
tion of, into armed forces, 365, 367, 
369 

Azanyu. See Azanian National Youth 
Unity 



Babangida, Ibrahim, 361 
Bach, Lazar, 281 
Baha'is, 135 

Bahrain: relations with, 305 
balance of payments, 197-98, 242; cycle, 
198 

Bambatha, 42, 115 
banishment, 57 

banking, 183, 241-42; diversification of, 
241-42; reorganization of, 242 

banks, 241-42; Afrikaner, lii, 47, 50; and 
building societies, 242; commercial, 
241; discount, 242; foreign, 183; gen- 
eral, 242; investment by, 242; mer- 
chant, 242 

Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68) (1951), 
55, 254 

Bantu Education Act (No. 47) (1953), 

56,150, 188,203 
Bantu Labour Act (No. 67) (1964) {see 

also Native Labour Regulation Act) , 

188 

Bantu languages, 5, 111; number of 
speakers of, 111 

Bantu people {see also blacks, native peo- 
ple): classification of, liii, 55; religion 
of, 137-38 

Bantu society: education in, 147; organi- 
zation of, 89-90 



494 



Index 



Bantu speakers: history of, 7-1 0, 89, 332; 

number of, 111; population of, 32; 

social organization of, 9-10 
Bantustans. See homelands 
Baptist Church: members of, 135 
barley, 217-18 
BaSotho. SeeSotho people 
Basters, 335 

BaTswana. S£<?Tswana people 

Batavian Republic, 18 

BaTlhaping. S#?Tlhaping people 

Battle of Blood River (1838), 28 

Battle of Majuba Hill (1881), 38, 39 

BBB. See White Protection Movement 

Belgium: arms shipments to, 354; immi- 
gration from, 129; materiel licensing 
agreements with, 351 

Berger, Iris, 165 

Berlin airlift, 338 

Beye, Alioune Blondin, 314-15 

Bicesse Accord (1991), 361 

Biko, Steve, 63-64; banned, 64; killed, 65 

Bird Island, 94 

birth: rate, 105; registration of, 104; rites, 
137 

birth control, Ixiii 
Bisho, 266 

black consciousness, lii, liii, 63-65 
Black Consciousness Movement of Aza- 

nia, 292, 298, 307 
black market: oil bought on, 185 
Black People's Convention (BPC), 64; 

banned, 65 
blacks {see also discrimination): in armed 
forces, 344; banishment of, 57; birth 
rate of, 105; under Botha, 71; under 
British colonial government, 4; cattle 
farming by, 3-4, 31; conflict of, with 
Afrikaners, 4; death rate of, 105; and 
disease, 156-57, 158-59; education of, 
lxii, 67, 71, 147, 148-49, 150, 203; 
elite, 299; employment of, 199, 203; as 
entrepreneurs, 244-45; farming by, 
35, 175, 176, 215; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 32, 66, 104; gold mining by, 1, 
33; and homelands, 62-63, 66, 103, 
104; hunting by, 3-4, 31; investment 
by, 208, 244-45; in labor unions, lvii, 
lviii, 69, 72, 115, 200, 201, 296; land of, 
55, 175; life expectancy of, 105; living 
standards of, 177; migration by, for 
work, 1, li, 34; migration of, to South 



Africa, 3; and missionaries, 140; pasto- 
ralism by, 31; as percentage of popula- 
tion, 70; in police force, 385; political 
activities of, 36-38; political affilia- 
tions of, 59, 280; in political elite, 298; 
population of, 32, 44, 103; population 
growth of, 105; poverty among, lii, lxii, 
186, 203; as professionals, 119; reli- 
gions of, 142, 145; resistance by, lii, 
58-61, 177; restrictions on, 65; schools 
for, 56; segregation of, 55-56, 63; self- 
help projects, 64; socialization of, 147; 
strikes by, 72, 200; as students, 154-55; 
trade by, 33; tribal labels for, 107; in 
urban areas, lvii, 63, 66, 109, 123, 166; 
violence among, 74; voting by, xlvii, 
51, 254; wages of, xlviii, 65, 174, 199, 
202; as workers, 65, 115, 123, 147, 176, 
199 

Black Sash, 165-66; legal assistance by, 
270 

Blacks Only. SeePoqo 

Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging. See White 

Protection Movement 
Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond. See 

White Workers' Protection Association 
Bleek, Wilhelm, 136 

Bloemfontein, 266; airport at, 234; man- 
ufacturing in, 224; military headquar- 
ters in, 367 

Bloemfontein Convention (1854), 30 

Blue Train, 231 

Board of Censors, 57 

Board of Defence Resources, 350 

Board of Trade and Industry, 194 

Boerestaat Party (Boer State Party) , 289 

Boere Weerstandsbeweging. See Boer 
Resistance Movement 

Boer State Party. See Boerestaat Party 

Boer Republican Army, 388 

Boer Resistance Movement (Boere Weer- 
standsbeweging— BWB) , 289 

Boers (farmers) (see also Afrikaners, 
Trekboers), xlix, 14, 175; in Great 
Trek, 1, 26; in Mozambique, 313; ten- 
sions of, with British, li, lii, 26, 38, 130, 
175, 333; violence by, 175 

Boesak, Allan, 72 

Bondelswart-Herero, 335 

Bophuthatswana homeland (see also Sun 
City), 62, 126, 265; armed forces of, 
346, 363; border with, 360; coup 



495 



South Africa: A Country Study 



attempt in, 346; economy of, 181; eth- 
nic groups in, 126-27; geographic dis- 
tribution of, lv-lvi; independence for, 
62, 66, 107-9, 126, 254, 346; political 
harassment in, 274; population of, 
104, 126, 346; poverty in, 127; transi- 
tion of, from apartheid, 80, 83; vio- 
lence in, 72; voting in, 274 
Boraine, Alex, 396 

borders, 94; control of, 370; with 
Lesotho, 361; natural, 99, 100 

border security, 361; deterioration of, 
66-67; against illegal immigration, 

360 

BOSS. See Bureau of State Security 
Botha, Louis, 43 

Botha, Louis, government: attempted 

coup against, 47 
Botha, Michael C, 64 

- * 

Botha, P.W.: objections of, to apartheid 
reform, 285; as prime minister, 69; res- 
ignation of, lix, 74, 285; speech 
announcing apartheid reform, lviii, 
153; as state president, 71 

Botha, P.W., government (1978-89): 
privatization under, 190; reform 
under, lviii, 69-71; security under, 340, 
380 

Botha, Roelof "Pik", 212, 263, 285, 390; 

visit of, to Kenya, 315 
Botshabelo, 125 

Botswana: ethnic groups in, 122, 126, 
134; independence of, 67; invasion of, 
359; language in, 111; rail service, 231; 
relations with, 307, 358; religion in, 
136; repatriation of exiles from, 307; 
in Southern African Customs Union, 
196, 307; in Southern African Devel- 
opment Community, 306; trade with, 
307; transportation links with, 307; 
workers from, 204-5 
Botswana Defence Force, 127 
BPC. See Black People's Convention 
Brazil: joint military exercises with, 375 
Breede River, 99 

bridewealth compensation (lobola), 9, 
140 

Britain: de Klerk's visit to, 77; immi- 
grants from, xlix-1, 132, 148; invest- 
ments from, 183; loans from, 183; 
materiel from, 353; military assistance 
from, 350; opposition of, to apartheid, 



68; police training assistance from, 
387; relations with, 320-21; South 
Africa conquered by, xlix, 4, 17-18; 
teachers from, 149; trade with, 195 

British colonial government, 1, 24-26, 
117, 175; Africans' lands seized by, 
126; Boer lands annexed by, lii, 29, 30, 
38, 130; concentration camps of, 40- 
41, 130; diamond fields annexed by, 
33; education under, 148; judicial sys- 
tem under, xlix-1; police under, 25; 
racial discrimination under, xlix-li, 4, 
25, 43; religion under, 140-41; restric- 
tions on natives, 4; taxes imposed by, 1, 
30, 126; tensions of, with Boers, li, 26, 
38, 130, 175, 333; wars of, with Afri- 
cans, 1, 25, 26, 30, 36, 115 

British Commonwealth of Nations: elec- 
tion observers from, 83, 275; reinstate- 
ment in, 325; withdrawal from, lv, 58 

British High Commission, 117 

British merchants: trade by, 1 1 

British Military Advisory and Training 
Team, 369 

British Royal Air Force, 375 

British Royal Navy, 338; joint exercises 
with, 375; visit to South Africa, 375 

British settlers, 90; conflict of, with Afri- 
kaners, 4, 130, 175; violence by, 175 

British South Africa Company, 34; pri- 
vate army of, 39 

Broederbond. See Afrikaner Broeder- 
bond 

Buddhists, 135 

budget deficit, 191 , 192; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 192 

Buffalo River: port on, 233 

building societies, 242 

Bulgaria: relations with, 324 

Bunting, Sidney Percival, 280 

Bureau of Information, 301 

Bureau of State Security (BOSS), 62, 
380; established, 380; scandals in, 380 

Burger, Die (The Citizen) , 47 

burghers, 13, 14; discontents of, 17 

Bush, George, 318 

Bushmen. See San people 

Bushveld, 95-98; elevation of, 95; miner- 
als in, 98, 205, 209, 210, 211 

business sector: black, 244-45 

Buthelezi, Mangosuthu (Gatsha), 3, 
287; background of, 299-300; chief 



496 



Index 



minister of KwaZulu, 115-16, 257; 
clashes of, with Mandela, 116, 288; 
meeting of, with Mandela, 79; as min- 
ister of home affairs, 116, 263; policies 
of, 66; in transition process, 251, 252, 
390 

BWB. See Boer Resistance Movement 



cabinet: appointments, 261, 279; under 
interim constitution, 259, 261-63; 
portfolios, 261, 262; sessions of, 262; 
women in, 262 

Gaetano, Mar cello: coup against, 67 

Caledon River, 99 

Calvinist Synod, 139 

Canada: materiel licensing agreements 
with, 351; police training assistance 
from, 387; teachers from, 149 

Cape Colony, 24; population of, 31; 
schools in, 147-48 

Cape Communist Party, 280 

Cape Constabulary, 382 

Cape Malays, 132 

Cape Middleveld, 98; elevation of, 98 
Cape of Good Hope: ceded to British, 17 
Cape of Good Hope Province, 255 
Cape Province, 255, 265 
Cape Ranges, 98-99 

Cape Town, 91, 174, 266; airport at, 234; 
climate in, 100; crime in, Ixiv; fishing 
near, '222; manufacturing in, 223; mili- 
tary headquarters in, 367; Muslims in, 
146; naval installation, 339; port of, 
232-33; squatter communities near, 53 

Cape Town Police force, 382 

capital: export of, 198; inflow, 184; out- 
flow, 244 

Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites, 
50 

Carrington, Lord, 84 

Carter, Jimmy, 68, 316 

Catholic Church, Roman: and apart- 
heid, 143; members of, 135; schools 
run by, 56 

cattle: diseases, 130; herding, 118; hold- 
ings, 6, 113, 134, 219, 333; sacrifice of, 
31, 141; value of, 9, 118 

CCI. See Crime Combatting and Investi- 
gation Divison 

Ceausescu, Nicolae, 323 

Cederberg Mountains, 98 



censorship, 57; abolished, 301 

census: of 1911, 103; of 1980, 104; of 

1991, 104; of 1996, lxiii; problems 

with, 103-4 
Central Selling Organisation, 209 
Central Statistical Service, 181 
Chamberlain, Joseph, 39-40 
Channel Africa Radio, 302 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 73, 183 
children: health care for, 161; immuniza- 
tion for, 161; as prisoners, 392 
Chile: arms shipments to, 354 
China: immigrants from, 90 
China, People's Republic of: relations 

with, 324, 325 
China, Republic of (Taiwan): fishing 

rights of, 222; investments by, 324; 

relations with, 324 
Chissano, Joaquim, 312 
Christian College (see also Potchefstroom 

University), 149 
Christianity (see also under individual 

denominations): distribution of, 18; 

encouragement of, 135; introduction 

of, 138-41 

Christian League of Southern Africa: 

and apartheid, 144 
Christian missionaries. See missionaries 
Christian National Education, 149, 150; 

support of, for apartheid, 150 
Christians: African, 37-38, 129; Asian, 

134; percentage of, in population, 135 
chromium, 98; deposits, 210; export of, 

210; production of, 205; reserves, 210 
churches, African, 37-38 
Church of the Province of South Africa, 

143 

CID. See Criminal Investigation Depart- 
ment 

Ciskei homeland, 119, 265; armed forces 
of, 346, 347, 363; coup attempt in, 
347; economy of, 181; independence 
for, 66, 107-9, 254, 347; political 
harassment in, 274; population of, 
104, 347; transition of, from apart- 
heid, 80; voting in, 274 

CITES. See Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora 

City Press, 304 

civil aviation, 234-35 

civil disobedience: against apartheid, 



497 



South Africa: A Country Study 



58, 59, 60, 276, 295 

climate, 100-101; Marion Island weather 
station, 94; rainfall, 100-101, 215; 
rainfall line, 101; snowfall, 100; tem- 
perature, 100 

Clinton, William J., 318 

CNETU. See Council of Non-European 
Trade Unions 

coal, 95, 212-13; effect of sanctions on, 
213; exports of, 213; production of, 
205, 212; reliance on, 173; reserves, 
212, 225 

coastline, 95 

Codesa. ^Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa 

Coetsee, Hendrik "Kobie," 256 

Coloured People's Congress: in Con- 
gress of the People, 59 

Coloured Persons' Representative Coun- 
cil, 254 

coloureds, 131-32; ancestors of, 89, 134; 
classification of, liii, 55; conflict of, 
with Afrikaners, liii, 4; discrimination 
against, liii, 45; and disease, 158; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 131; histories 
of, 135; languages of, 131, 132; occu- 
pations of, 35; in police force, 385; ori- 
gins of, 16; political affiliations of, 59; 
political representation for, lviii, 70, 
71, 254; population of, 32, 44; popula- 
tion growth of, 105; religions of, 132, 
135, 142, 146; revolt by, 335; rights of, 
132; schools for, liv, 56; students, 154- 
55; voting by, xlvii, 55, 132, 254 

Comintern. See Communist Interna- 
tional 

Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Alleged Murders (Harms Commis- 
sion), 77 

Commission of Inquiry into Labour Leg- 
islation (Wiehahn Commission), 69, 

200, 296 

Commission of Inquiry into Legislation 
Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower 
(Riekert Commission), 69 

Commission of Inquiry Regarding the 
Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation (Goldstone Commis- 
sion), 82, 84, 390-91; report of, 390- 
91, 395 

Commission on Gender Equality, 259 
Commission on Restitution of Land 



Rights, 189, 259 

Commission on the Demarcation of 
States/Provinces/Regions, 265 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 

communism: apartheid definition of, liv, 
57; campaign against, 131, 340; and 
labor unions, 296 

Communist International (Comintern), 
280 

Communist Party of South Africa 
(CPSA) {see also International Socialist 
League of South Africa; South African 
Communist Party), 48; banned, liv, 
281-82; cooperation of, with African 
National Congress, 276, 277, 281, 282; 
founded, 280; members of, 281; mili- 
tary wing, 277; name changed, 282; 
outlawed, 57; purged, 281; Stalinist 
faction, 281 

Comoro Islands: investment in, 197 

concentration camps, British: Boers in, 
40-41 , 1 30; deaths in , 41 , 1 30 

Concerned South Africans Group 
(Cosag), 82 

Confucians, 135 

Congregationalist Church: members of, 
135 

Congress Alliance, 276 

Congress of Democrats: in Congress of 
the People, 59 

Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS), 295 

Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), 72, 201-2, 279, 295; estab- 
lished, 201; members of, 201-2, 296 

Congress of the People, 59-60; constitu- 
ency of, 59 

Congress Youth League, 58-59; formed, 
58; leaders of, 58; platform of, 58 

Conservative Party of South Africa (CP), 
70, 285, 289; in elections, 74, 331 

Constitutional Assembly, 252-53; under 
constitution of 1993, 259 

Constitutional Court: under constitution 
of 1993, 259, 270-71; established, 272; 
proposed constitution submitted to, 
lxii-lxiii, 268, 363 

Constitutional Guidelines for a Demo- 
cratic South Africa, 278 

constitution of 1909. See South Africa Act 

constitution of 1961, 253-54; executive 



498 



Index 



under, 253; judiciary under, 253; legis- 
lature under, 253 

constitution of 1983, lviii, 71; armed 
forces under, 362; community affairs 
under, 254-55, 262; executive under, 
254; general affairs under, 255, 262; 
legislature under, 254; president 
under, 362 

Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (No. 200) (1993) (interim con- 
stitution), 249, 258-59; armed forces 
under, 362-63; cabinet under, 259, 
261-63; criticisms of, 290; deputy pres- 
idents under, 259, 261; draft, 82, 83; 
electoral system under, 259; executive 
under, 259-61; freedoms under, 259, 
271; human rights under, 394; imple- 
mented, 252, 257; judiciary under, 
259, 270; languages in, 109; negotia- 
tions for, 76-77, 78, 301; parliament 
under, 259, 263-64; police under, 259; 
president under, 259, 362; provinces 
under, 259; ratified, 257; rights under, 
394 

constitution, final (draft), 249, 252-53; 
armed forces under, 363; bill of rights, 
lxiii; labor under, 269; legislature in, 
268; majoritarian government in, 268; 
preparation of, 268-69; president 
under, 363; revisions to, lxii-lxiii, 268- 
69 

consumer goods, 227-28; demand for, 
176, 181 

Convention on Chemical Weapons, 357 

Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (Codesa), lx, lxi, 80, 249, 257 

Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), 238; exceptions 
to, 239-40 

copper, 95, 98; deposits, 210; economic 
importance of, 173; mining, 205; pro- 
duction of, 205, 211-12; reserves, 211 

corn, 118; cultivation of, 176; export of, 
215, 217, 361; import of, 217; intro- 
duction of, 19; production, 217 

Cosag. See Concerned South Africans 
Group 

COSAS. See Congress of South African 
Students 

COSATU. See Congress of South African 
Trade Unions 



Council for Nuclear Safety, 356 
Council for Scientific and Industrial 

Research, 350 
Council of Non-European Trade Unions 

(CNETU),53 
Council on the Environment, 238 
coups d'etat: in Lesotho, 308, 359; in 

Transkei, 347 
coups d'etat, attempted: in Bophutha- 

tswana, 346; in Ciskei, 347; of 1914, 47 
courts: constitutional, 259; land claims, 

164; lower, 270; segregation of, 35; 

supreme, 259, 270 
CP. See Conservative Party of South 

Africa 

CPSA. See Communist Party of South 

Africa 
Creswell, F.H.P., 284 

crime, 388-91; community response to, 
388-89; deaths from, 388; government 
response to, 389-91; political, 272; 
rate, xlviii, 388; during transition, 250, 
388-91; weapons used in, 389 

Crime Combatting and Investigation 
(CCI) Division, 386, 387 

Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID), 386 

criminal justice system (see also judicial 
system; see also under courts): detention 
in, 62, 73; punishment in, 392-94 

Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 8) 
(1953), 57 

Crocker, Chester, 317 

Cuba: relations with, 305, 320; troops 
from, in Angola, 67, 318, 357 

currency, 242-44; blocked rands, 244; 
commercial rands, 188, 244; deprecia- 
tion of, lix, 185, 242-44; devaluation 
of, 191, 208; exchange rate, 177, 242; 
financial rands, 188, 244; reserves, 
198, 244; value of, lxiv, 183, 194 

current account, 198; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 198 

Customs and Excise Act (1955), 57 



Dadoo, Yusuf, 59 
da Gama, Vasco, 10 
dams, 101 
Dassen Island, 94 
Day of the Vow, 28 

death: in British concentration camps, 



499 



South Africa: A Country Study 



41; from disease, 157, 158-59; of 
Khoikhoi, 12, 14; rate, 105; registra- 
tion of, 104; religious beliefs about, 
138; rites, 137; by starvation, 31, 141 

de Beer, Zach, 289, 290 

De Beers Consolidated Mines Company, 
33, 209; cartel of, 209; relations of, 
with Soviet Union, 209, 322 

Defence Act (No. 13) (1912), 334, 336- 
37 

Defence Act (No. 44) (1957), 335-36, 
362 

Defence Act (No. 12) (1961), 336 
Defence Act (No. 85) (1967), 336 
Defence Command Council, 363; staff, 
363 

Defence Ordnance Workshop, 350 
defense budget, 381-82; growth of, 381; 
for military intelligence, 382; as per- 
centage of government budget, 381, 

382 

defense industry, domestic, 68, 176, 319, 
350-53, 355; circumvention of 
embargo by, 353-54; employment in, 
382; expansion of, 350; under Man- 
dela, 354-55; origins of, 350 

defense spending, 192; cuts in, 382; 
increase in, 358; on military salaries, 
382; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 381; as percentage of gross 
national product, 381 

Defiance Campaign, 59, 276 

de Klerk, Frederik W.: credibility of, 77; 
as deputy president, lxii, Ixiii, 85, 261; 
in foreign relations, 310, 312; interna- 
tional tour of, 77; reform speech, 256, 
332; resignation of, lxiii; as state presi- 
dent, lix, 74, 285; talks of, with Man- 
dela, lix-lx, 75, 82, 153, 251; in 
transition process, 252, 257, 283; visit 
of, to Kenya, 315; visit of, to Nigeria, 
361 

de Klerk government (1989-94): armed 
forces under, 332; financial scandals 
in, 81; reforms of, lix, 74-76, 153; state 
of emergency under, 84; transition 
proposals by, 81 

Democratic Party (see also Progressive 
Federal Party), 289-90; in elections, 
xlvii, 275, 290, 331; in National Assem- 
bly, 275; platform of, 290; support for, 
290 



demonstrations. See political demonstra- 
tions 
Denel, 352-53 

Department of Correctional Services, 
391-92; employees of, 391-92 

Department of Education and Training, 
152 

Department of Environmental Affairs, 
239, 240 

Department of Industry and Trade, 240 
Department of Industry, Trade, and 

Tourism, 240 
Department of National Security, 380 
Department of Posts and Telecommuni- 
cations, 235 
Deposit Taking Institutions Act (1991), 
242 

deputy president, 85, 261 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, 

104, 107, 178 
de Villiers, Dawie, 263 
D.F. Malan Accord (February 1991), 256 
Dhlakama, Alfonso, 312 
Diamond Express Train, 231 
diamond fields: annexed by British, 33; 

geographic distribution of, 209; at 

Kimberly, 208; at Venetia, 209 
diamonds, 95, 208-9; cartel for selling, 

209; discovery of, 1, 4, 33, 90, 175, 205, 

208; economic importance of, 173; 

exports of, 33, 175, 195; prices of, 209; 

production of, 205, 209 
Dias (Diaz), Bartholomeu, 10, 138 
diet, 9; and malnutrition, 162, 186; of 

San people, 134; of Venda people, 

128-29 

difaqane ("time of troubles") , 19 
Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa, 293 
Dingane, 23; killed, 28; massacre of 

Voortrekkers by, 28 
Dingiswayo, 20, 114; death of, 21; rela- 
tionship of, with Shaka, 21 
diplomatic corps, 304-5 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (see 
also intelligence services; military 
intelligence) , 340, 380 
Directorate of National Intelligence, 380 
discrimination: against blacks, 174, 199; 
antimiscegenation laws, 54, 55; by Brit- 
ish, 1-li, 4, 25, 43; calls for eradication 
of, 37, 43; against coloureds, 45; in 
employment, 200; against Jews, 51, 



500 



Index 



133; in Kimberly, 35-36; in land distri- 
bution, 45, 51; legal structure of, 44- 
45; in mining industry, 48, 49; opposi- 
tion to, 52; pass laws, 4, 35, 42, 56, 57, 
60; prohibition of, 271; against 
women, 56; against workers, 65 

disease: AIDS, 159-60; cancer, 159; 
deaths from, 157, 158-59; diphtheria, 
158; effect of, on Africans, 12, 14; 
heart disease, 159; HIV infection, 159; 
incidence of, 156-59, 160; leprosy, 
158; malaria, 157-58; measles, 158; 
sexually transmitted, 159, 160; small- 
pox, 14, 135, 158, 174; tuberculosis, 
156-57, 160; typhoid, 158 

divorce: registration of, 104 

Doman, 13 

dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 314-15 

Drakensberg Mountains, 98 

drought, 176, 215; of 1800-10, 19; of 
1910s, 130; of 1960s, 176-77; of 1980s, 
177, 181; of 1990s, 216, 217, 306, 361 

drugs, 389; addiction to, 164; trafficking 
in, 164, 370, 375 

Dubejohn L.,45 

Durban, 91; airport at, 234; climate in, 
100; ethnic groups in, 133; fishing 
near, 222; manufacturing in, 223; mili- 
tary headquarters in, 367; Muslims in, 
146; naval installation, 339, 373; port 
of, 232 

Durban Marxist Club, 280 

Durban Police Force, 382 

Durr, Kent, 322 

Dutch East India Company (Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie — VOC), 
xlviii-xlix, 11-12; conflicts of, with set- 
tlers, 14; slaves imported by, 12; supply 
station for, xlviii, 11-12, 138, 174 

Dutch merchants: trade by, 1 1 

Dutch Reformed Church Act (1911), 44 

Dutch Reformed churches, 129; and 
apartheid, 141-43; branches of, 141; 
Indian, 142; introduction of, 141-42; 
members of, 132, 135, 141; missionar- 
ies from, 139; organization of, 142; 
schools of, 148; theology of, 141, 142 

Dutch Reformed Mission Church (Send- 
ing Kerk), 142 

Dutch settlers, xlix, 12, 90, 129; expan- 
sion by, 12, 15, 17; free burghers, 13, 
14, 17; immigration of, 14; violence by, 



175; wars of, with Khoikhoi, xlix, 12, 

13, 15, 349 
Dutch speakers: conflicts of, with British, 

26; Griqua as, 18 
Dutch Watch, 382 
duToit, S.J., 39 



East Africa: in World War I, 334-35; in 

World War II, 338 
Eastern Cape Province: agriculture in, 

218; capital of, 266; livestock in, 219; 

manufacturing in, 226; representation 

of, in parliament, 263 
East Germany. See German Democratic 

Republic 

East London: airport at, 234; manufac- 
turing in, 223; naval installation, 339; 
port of, 232, 233 

EC. See European Community 

economic activity: of foreign nationals, 
188; restrictions on, 188-89 

economic growth: mining support for, 4, 
175; in 1960s, 180; in 1970s, 180 

economic policy, 1 75; of interim govern- 
ment, 187 

economic problems: under apartheid, 

5, 177, 185-86 
economic recession: of 1970s, 180; of 

1990s, 177 
economic sanctions, 192, 249, 316, 321, 

350 

economy, 181-82; historical develop- 
ment of, 174-77; and homelands, 
185-86; influences on, 173; informal, 
181, 199; role of government in, 186- 
92; slave, 11-13; structure of, 180-86 

education (see also schools) , 146-56; 
adult, 156; in African societies, 147; 
under apartheid, 56, 131, 146, 150-53; 
for Asians, liv, 152-53; assistance in, 
306; for blacks, lxii, 56, 71, 150, 152, 
188, 203; budgets for, 153; for 
coloureds, liv, 152-53; compulsory, 
152, 154; curriculum, 149, 150; dis- 
crepancies in, 153; early development 
of, 147-50; and employment, 203-5; 
expansion of, lxiii; goals of, 146; gov- 
ernment responsibility for, 152; gov- 
ernment spending on, 148; languages 
of, 43, 64, 148, 149, 150; postsecond- 
ary, 149, 154-56; reform, 153-54, 178, 



501 



South Africa: A Country Study 



204; and religion, 147; segregation of, 
56, 131; spending on, 150, 192, 203; 
subsidies, 179; teachenpupil ratios in, 
153; for whites, 152,203 
Education Co-ordination Service, 153 
Education Foundation, 147, 204 
EEC. See European Economic Commu- 
nity 

Eiselen, W.M., 150 

elections: under apartheid, 272; of 1924, 
284; of 1948, liii, 53-54, 130-31, 284, 
335; of 1953, 58; of 1958, 58; of 1961, 
58; of 1970, 69; of 1974, 69; of 1983 
(reform referendum), 70-71; of 1984, 
71; of 1987, 74, 127; of 1989, 272, 285, 
331; of 1992 (reform referendum), 
81; voter turnout in, 71 

elections of 1994, xlvii, lxi, 5, 84-85, 249, 
250, 272-75; accusations of fraud in, 
84; African Christian Democratic 
Party in, 275, 292; African National 
Congress in, lxi-lxii, 249, 275; cam- 
paign for, 274, 286; coloureds in, 132; 
Democratic Party in, 275, 290; ethnic 
distribution in, xlvii; Freedom Front 
in, lxii, 275, 289; Inkatha Freedom 
Party in, lxii, 275, 288; Muslims in, 
146; National Party in, lxii, 132, 249, 
275, 286; observers for, 83, 275; Pan- 
Africanist Congress in, lxii, 275, 292; 
participation in, 84; political parties 
in, 292; preparations for, 83-84, 274- 
75; procedures for, 272-74, 275; 
united States assistance for, 318; voter 
turnout in, xlvii 

Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom), 
189, 223, 224-25; capital investment 
in, 224; coal used by, 212; imports by, 
226; privatization of, 190 

electric power, 173, 224-25; coal for, 212, 
224; distribution of, lxiii, 177, 178; 
generation, 103; in homes, 224; hydro, 
101-2, 225; imported, 225; nuclear, 
223, 224; parastatals for, 176, 222, 223; 
in rural areas, 224 

employment, 198-205; in agriculture, 
91, 198-99, 217; under apartheid, 199; 
of blacks, li-lii, 199, 203; of domestic 
workers, 199; and education, 203-5; in 
fishing, 221; in homelands, 199; and 
job creation, 178, 223; in manufactur- 
ing, 53; in mining, 199; in prisons, 



391-92; restrictions on, li-lii, 65, 69; in 
services sector, 199; in telecommuni- 
cations, 237; in tourism, 240; by 
United States companies, 193; of 
whites, li-lii, 199 
End Conscription Campaign, 342 
energy production (see also under individ- 
ual energy sources), 212-14; environ- 
mental problems caused by, 101; 
minerals for, 212-14 
English language: as language of instruc- 
tion, 43, 64, 148, 149; newspapers in, 
304; as official language, 109; radio 
broadcasts in, 237-38; speakers of, 
118, 131, 132-34; television broadcasts 
in, 237 

English speakers (see also Asians, Europe- 
ans), xlvii, 297 

environment, 101-3, 238-40; air pollu- 
tion, 102-3; effect of population on, 
239; impact assessments, 239; opposi- 
tion to protection of, 239; problems 
in, 101, 102; protection of, 238-39; 
studies of, 239; and uranium, 356; 
water pollution, 102, 239 

Environment Conservation Act (No. 73) 
(1989), 238 

Eskom. See Electricity Supply Commis- 
sion 

ethnic identity: and language, 111 

ethnicity: reaction to, 109; of Xhosa peo- 
ple, 117-18 

EU. See European Union 

Europe: opposition of, to apartheid, 68; 
in World War I, 335 

Europe, Central: relations with, 305 

Europe, Eastern: relations with, 305; set- 
tlers from, 90, 133 

European Community (EC): sanctions 
of, 81,350 

European Economic Community (EEC): 
sanctions of, 192, 193, 350 

Europeans, 132-33; ancestors of, 132- 
33; exploration by, 90; investment by, 
175; and missionaries, 140; population 
of, 14, 15, 132; settlement by, xlix, 10- 
18, 24-33, 90, 135, 174, 333; trade 
with, 19, 33; violence by, 175 

European Union (EU): election observ- 
ers from, 83, 275; financial assistance 
from, 160; investment by, 320; rela- 
tions with, 320-22; trade with, 195, 



502 



Index 



196, 320 

exchange, lxiv; rate, 177, 242; restric- 
tions, 188 

executive branch (see also president): 
under constitution of 1961, 253; 
under constitution of 1983, 254 

exiles, 40, 61; return of, 76, 79, 307 

expansion, 12, 15; barriers to, 17 

explosives, 226-27 

Export Administration Amendment Act 
(1985), 316 

exports (see also under individual products) , 
33, 187, 223; of crops, 215, 217; of dia- 
monds, 33, 175, 195; of food, 214, 215, 
217; of gold, 53, 175, 180, 187, 194; 
income from, 53; industrial, 196; of 
materiel, 354-55; of minerals, 194, 
207, 210, 211, 214; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 195; ratio of, 
to foreign debt, 184; revenues from, 
180, 207; value of, 195; of wool, 33, 
215, 219 

Extension of University Education Act 

(No. 45) (1959), 56, 154-55 
external debt, 182-84; growth of, 182-83 
Eye of the Nation. Seelso Lesizwe 



Factories, Machinery, and Building 

Works Act (No. 22) (1941), 188 
Fagan, Henry, 54 

FAK. See Federation of Afrikaner Cul- 
tural Organisations 

families: nuclear, 6; of San people, 6; of 
Xhosa people, 118; of Zulu people, 
113 

famine: 1800-1810, 19; of mfecane, 24; of 
1990s, 361 

farmers: black, 175, 176, 215; debts of, 
216; in Mozambique, 313; white, 175- 
76,215 

farming: by Africans, 35, 215; dairy, 219- 

20; by Europeans, 175, 215 
farms: size of, 215 
Federal Party, 293 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, Federal Republic of 

Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurve- 
reniginge. See Federation of Afrikaner 
Cultural Organisations 

Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organi- 
sations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kult- 



uurvereniginge— FAK), 130, 284 
Federation of South African Women 

(FSAW),60 
fertility rate, 105 
Financial Mail, 304 

financial sector: contribution of, to econ- 
omy, 180; employment in, 199 
First, Ruth, 282 

First National Bank (Barclays), 242 

Fischer, Abraham, 43 

fishing, 127, 220-22; catches, 221-22; 

employment in, 221; exports, 221; 

official harbors for, 222; quotas, 222; 

rights, 222 
fluorspar, 98; deposits, 210; production 

of, 205 

food: in armed forces, 345; export of, 
214, 215, 228; import of, 216; process- 
ing, 228, 356; subsidies, 228 

Food and Allied Workers' Union, 202 

Ford, Gerald, 67-68 

Ford Motor Company, 226 

foreign assistance: to African countries, 
180, 306; from European Union, 160; 
from Republic of China, 324; from the 
United States, 318 

foreign debt, 68; and agriculture, 216; 
crisis, 183, 223, 242; in 1980s, 184; in 
1990s, 184; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 184; ratio of, to 
exports, 184; repayment of, 183, 184; 
rescheduling of, 183 

foreign loans, 197; from Britain, 183; 
called in, lix, 183, 190, 192; embargo 
on, 192; refusal to roll over, 73, 177 

foreign investment, lvi, lxiv, 63, 192-93, 
245; from Britain, 183; decline in, 68; 
dependence on, 245; embargo on, 
192, 350; by European Union, 320; in 
manufacturing, 196-97; in mining, 1, 
175, 196-97; by Republic of China, 
324; solicitation of, 83, 179; by United 
States, 197, 318, 320; withdrawal of, 
lvii.lix, 73, 192-93 

foreign policy: principles of, 305-6 

foreign relations, 304-25 

forestry, 91 , 220 

forests: depletion of, 239; plantations of, 
220; reserves, 220 

Foskor. See Phosphate Development Cor- 
poration 

fourth force, 289 



503 



South Africa: A Country Study 



France: arms shipments to, 354; immi- 
grants from, xlix, 129, 133, 349; mate- 
riel licensing agreements with, 351; 
missionaries from, 24, 139; relations 
with, 321-22; trade with, 321 

Freedom Alliance, 82; decline of, 83; 
opposition by, 83 

Freedom Charter (1955), lv, 59-60, 276, 
291 

Freedom Front, 250, 288-89; in elec- 
tions, lxii, 275, 289; formed, 289; in 
government, 268, 275; support for, 
289 

Free State: agriculture in, 217, 218; capi- 
tal of, 266; diamonds in, 209; gold in, 
207; livestock in, 219; representation 
of, in parliament, 263; topography of, 
95 

FRELIMO. See Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique 

Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique. 
See Front for the Liberation of Mozam- 
bique 

Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(Frente de Libertacao de Mozam- 
bique— FRELIMO), 311-12 

fruit, 218 

FSAW. See Federation of South African 
Women 



Gabon: arms shipments to, 354 
Gandhi, Mohandas: passive resistance 

campaigns, 45 
Garvey, Marcus, 49 

gas, natural: deposits, 99; exploration, 
212; synthetic, 214, 227 

Gastrow, Shelagh, 298 

Gauteng: age dependency ratio in, 105; 
capital of, 266; diamonds in, 209; pop- 
ulation of, 106-7; population density 
of, 106-7; representation of, in parlia- 
ment, 263; urbanization rate in, 107 

Gazankulu homeland, 128, 265; econ- 
omy of, 128; government of, 128; 
malaria in, 158; population of, 128; 
self-government for, 66, 254; violence 
in, 128 

Gcaleka Xhosa: chiefdom of, 119; home- 
land of, 119 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
Gencor, 220 



General Export Incentive Scheme, 194 
General Law Amendment Act (1963), 62 
geographic regions, 95-99; rainfall line, 
101 

geology, 94-95 
George: airport at, 234 
George, Lloyd, 46 
geostrategic situation, 349 
Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika 

(Reformed Church of South Africa), 

142 

German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many): materiel from, 277 

Germany: immigration from, xlix, 14, 
129, 133; missionaries from, 139; rela- 
tions of, with Republic of South 
Africa, 39; relations of, with Union of 
South Africa, 49; trade with, 195 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany): materiel licensing agree- 
ments with, 351; trade with, 354 

Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van 
ons Volk (du Toit) , 39 

ghettos, li; in Kimberly, 35 

Ginwala, Frene, 167 

Glasgow Missionary Society, 1 39 

GNP. See gross national product 

gold, 95, 98, 207-8; deposits, 95, 207; dis- 
covery of, 1, 4, 34, 90, 175, 205; distri- 
bution of, 33, 34; export of, 53, 175, 
176, 180, 187, 194; importance of, 33, 
42, 173, 176, 245; mining of, 33, 34, 
102, 128, 207; price of, lix, 173, 177, 
180, 181, 191, 194, 208; profits, 207, 
208; production, 34, 205, 207; 
reserves, 198, 207; revenues from, 53, 
194 

gold industry, 42; importance of, 187; 
protections for, 42; and Reserve Bank, 
241; taxes on, 191; wages in, 245 

Goldstone, Richard, 390 

Goldstone Commission. See Commission 
of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation 

Goodwill Zwelithini, King, 116, 257, 266, 
288 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 322 
Gore, Albert, 320 

government: controls on industry, 227; 
ethnic distribution in, 297; loans by, 
189; role of, in economy, 186-92 

government, interim. See Government of 



504 



Index 



National Unity 
government, local, 266-68; elections, 
266-68 

government, provincial, 265-68; powers 
of, 266; representation in, 265-66 

government budget, 190-92; defense 
budget as percentage of, 381, 382; def- 
icit, 191, 192; for 1995-96, 192; for 
1996-97, 192; surplus, 190-91 

Government of National Unity, 78-79, 
83, 249, 252-69; African National 
Congress in, 279; Communist Party in, 
283; economic policies of, 187; for- 
eign policy of, 305-6; foreign relations 
of, 305; formation of, 80, 83; National 
Party resignation from, lxiii, 269; 
privatization under, 190; proposals for, 
81; rules for forming, 78-79; support 
for, 257-58 

government services: improvements in, 
177 

government spending: on defense, 192; 

on education, 150, 153, 192; on 

police, 192; on reconstruction and 

development, 156 
Gqozo, Joshua, 347 
Graaff-Reinet College, 149 
Gramm Amendment (1983), 316 
Great Depression, 50-52; National Party 

in, 50 

Great Escarpment, 95, 98; elevation of, 
95 

Great Karoo, 99; elevation of, 99 

Great Trek (see also Voortrekkers) ,1,26- 

29, 90; commemorative reenactment 

of, 50-51 

Great Winterhoek Mountains, 98-99 
Great Zimbabwe: gold mining at, 33 
Greece: immigrants from, 133 
Greek Orthodox Church: members of, 
135 

Grey, George, 149 

Grey College (see also University of the 
Orange Free State) , 149 

Grey Institute, 149 

Greyshirts, 52; support for, 52 

Griqua people, 18, 131; alliance of, with 
Voortrekkers, 28; conflicts of, with 
Dutch, 30; culture of, 18; language of, 
18, 131; migrations of, 131; popula- 
tion of, 131; religion of, 18; wars of, 36 

Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990), 256 



gross domestic product (GDP), 180-82; 
in 1980s, 181; in 1990s, 181; per cap- 
ita, 181 

gross domestic product fractions: agri- 
culture, 180, 214-15; budget deficit, 
191, 192; current account, 198; 
defense spending, 381; exports, 195; 
foreign debt, 184; mining, 180, 205; 
services sector, 1 80 

gross national product (GNP): defense 
spending as a percentage of, 381 

Group Areas Act (No. 41) (1950), 55, 
188; racial zones under, 62; repealed, 
lix, 79 

Growth, Employment and Redistribution, 

lxiv-lxv 
Gumede, James T., 281 



Hala dynasty, 120 

Hani, Chris, 280; murdered, lx, 82, 283, 
391 

Harare Declaration (1989), 278 

Harms Commission. See Commission of 
Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders 

Harris, John, 61 

health (see also disease), 156-62 

health care: under apartheid, 156, 160- 
61; assistance in, 306; for children, 
161; emergency, 161; improvements 
in, 178; in rural areas, 156 

health care professionals, 161; in armed 
forces, 336, 348, 375; black, 161; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 161; training 
for, 161,376 

health facilities, 160-61; apartheid in, 
160-61; military, 375 

health insurance, 162 

helpmekaar (mutual aid) , 47-48 

Helpmekaar (social service organiza- 
tion), 284 

Hendrickse, Allan, 71 

Herenigde (Reunited) National Party 
(HNP) (see also National Party), 53, 
284; in elections, 53-54; formed, 53; 
platform of, 54 

Herstigte Nasionale Party. See Reconsti- 
tuted National Party 

Hertzog, Albert, 68 

Hertzog, James "Barry" Munnik (J.B.M.), 
43, 53, 284; opposition by, to World 
War I, 47; as prime minister, 48-49, 50; 



505 



South Africa: A Country Study 



resignation of, 52 
Hertzog (J.B.M.) government: "civilised 
labour" policy of, 49; discrimination 
under, 49, 51-52; parastatals under, 
187 

Het Volk (The People) party, 43; 

formed, 43 
Highveld, 95; climate in, 101; elevation 

of, 95 

Highveld Steel and Vanadium, 211, 225 
Hindi, 133 

Hindus, 134; number of, 135 

history: anthropological, 5; importance 

of, 3 

History of our Land in the Language of our 
People (duToit) , 39 

HNP. See Herenigde (Reunited) 
National Party; Reconstituted 
National Party 

Holland, Kingdom of, 18 

Holomisa, Bantu, 347 

homelands: armed forces of, 346-48, 
365, 369; blacks removed to, 62-63, 
103, 121, 185; citizenship in, 109; and 
economy, 186-86; employment in, 
199; establishment of, li, liii-liv, 62; 
ethnic distribution in, 107; geographic 
distribution of, Iv-lvi; independence 
for, 62, 66, 107-9, 126, 254; land deg- 
radation in, 102; manufacturing in, 
224; opposition to, 66; population of, 
63, 66; population density of, 66, 104, 
106, 265; poverty in, 66, 185; self-gov- 
ernment for, 66, 121, 254; support for, 
70; television in, 237; transition of, 
from apartheid, 80, 265; violence in, 
72, 78 

Homo sapiens: fossils of, 89 
Hottentot Code (1809), 25; abolished, 
26 

Hottentots. See Khoikhoi 

House of Assembly (white), 71, 254; Afri- 
can National Congress representa- 
tives in, 278 

House of Delegates (Asian), 71, 254 

House ofPhalo: A History of the Xhosa People 
in the Day of Their Independence 
(Peires), 119 

House of Representatives (coloured), 
71, 254 

housing: construction, 178, 220; demand 
for, lxiii; subsidies, 179 



Hout Bay: fishing in, 222 
Huguenots: immigration of, 14, 218 

Huisgenoot, 304 

human rights, 272; abuses, 279, 394, 395, 
396; under apartheid, 394, 395; and 
national reconciliation, 394-97; by 
police, 395; reparations, 396 

Human Rights Commission, 259, 395; 
established, 272 

hunter-gatherers, 6 

hunting: by Africans, 31, 118; by Nguni, 

113; by Voortrekkers, 29, 31 
Hurutshe people, 126 
hydroelectric projects, 101-2 

ICU. See Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union 

IEC. See Independent Electoral Commis- 
sion 

IFP. See Inkatha Freedom Party 

Imbumba Yama Nyama, 37 

IMR See International Monetary Fund 

immigration, 1, 33, 43, 90; from African 
countries, 180; encouragement of, lvi, 
148, 175; illegal, 263, 360; restrictions 
on, 15, 133; by whites, 1, 63, 175 

Immorality Act (No. 5) (1927), 55 

Immorality Act (No. 21) (1950), 55 

imperialism, 33-44 

imports: of agricultural products, 175; 
dependence on, 222; of food, 216, 
217; industrial, 194-95, 226; of oil, 
180, 185, 195; pattern of, 194-95; 
restrictions on, 194; tariffs on, 176, 
191, 192, 194; value of, 195 

Imvo Zabantsundu (Native Opinion), 37 

income: from gold, 53 

indentured laborers: from China, 42; 
from India, 29; number of, 42 

Independent Broadcasting Authority, 
237, 303-i 

Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 
(No. 153) (1993), 303^ 

Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC), 83, 257, 274; administration of 
1994 elections by, 274-75; electoral 
fund, 274; voter education by, 274 

Independent Media Commission, 257 

Independent Party, 289 

India: immigrants from, 90, 349; inden- 
tured laborers from, 29, 90, 349; Man- 



506 



Index 



dela's visit to, 77; relations with, 305 
Indians. See Asians 
Indonesia: immigrants from, 90 
Industrial and Commercial Workers 

Union (ICU), 49-50; membership of, 

49; platform of, 49 
Industrial Conciliation Act (1924), 49, 

188, 200 

Industrial Conciliation Act (1937), 188 
Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 28) 

(1956), 56, 188 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 

(1979), 200 
industrial development: stagnation in, 

173 

Industrial Development Corporation, 
176, 189 

industrialization, 34-88; local, 187 

industry: chemicals, 226-27; clothing, 
228; decentralization of, 187; effect of 
apartheid on, 176-77; ethnic distribu- 
tion in, 297; exports by, 196; heavy, 
225-26; heavy-engineering, 226; in 
homelands, 128, 129; imports for, 
194-95; import-substitution, 187, 189; 
modernization of, 200; monopolies in, 
187; nationalization of, lx; pollution 
by, 102, 239; revenue of, 191; state- 
owned, 186 

infant mortality, 1 05 

Infantry School, 365 

inflation, lix, 73, 177, 185, 191, 223; and 

agriculture, 216 
initiation rites, 137 

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 66, 74, 
202, 286-88; cabinet appointments, 
261; conflict of, with African National 
Congress, lx, 257, 274, 275, 287-88, 

388- 89; in elections, xlvii, lxii, 84, 275, 
288; formed, 286; members of, 287; 
military wing, 363; organization of, 
287; in National Assembly, 275; plat- 
form of, 286; police support for, 82, 

389- 91, 395; resistance of, to reform, 
84, 250, 252, 286; violence by, 81, 84 

Inkatha ya kwa Zulu (Organization of 

the Zulu), 286-87 
Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National 

Cultural Liberation Movement), 116, 

287 

Inkatha Youth Brigade, 287 
Inkatha Women's Brigade, 287 



Institute for Aviation Medicine, 376; 
Institute for Maritime Medicine, 376 

insurance services: Afrikaner, lii, 47, 50, 
242, 284; from banks, 242; contribu- 
tion of, to economy, 1 80; employment 
in, 199 

Integrated Environmental Manage- 
ment, 238 

Intelligence school, 365 

intelligence services, 340, 380 

Intelligence Services Act (No. 38) 
(1994), 380 

interest groups, 293-97 

internal security, 382-94; intelligence 
services, 340; as mission of armed 
forces, 335, 337, 340, 342-43 

Internal Security Act, 394-95; repealed, 
394 

interior plateau, 95 

International Atomic Energy Agency: 
inspection by, 355 

international community: and apart- 
heid, 5, 305; isolation from, 305, 338, 
349-50, 357 

International Development Research 
Centre (Canadian), 239 

International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
loans from, 182, 183, 192 

international organizations, 325-26 

international sanctions, 249, 350; and air 
travel, 235; and coal industry, 213; 
opposition to, 321, 323 

International Socialist League of South 
Africa (see also Communist Party of 
South Africa), 48, 280 

investment: by banks, 242; by blacks, 208, 
244-45; in manufacturing, 224; in 
Namibia, 311 

investment, foreign. See foreign invest- 
ment 

Iran: arms shipments to, 354; oil from, 
68, 190, 192, 320, 322; relations with, 
320, 322-23 

Iraq: arms shipments to, 354 

iron, 98; deposits, 210; mining, 205; pro- 
duction of, 205, 211, 225; reserves, 
211 

irrigation, 91, 95, 99, 215, 218 

Iscor. See South African Iron and Steel 

Corporation 
isiNdebele. SeeNdebele language 
isiXhosa. SeeXhosa language 



507 



South Africa: A Country Study 



isiZulu. See Zulu language 
Islam, 145-46 

Iso Lesizwe (Eye of the Nation), 288 

Israel: arms shipments to, 354; fishing 
rights of, 222; military cooperation 
with, 323, 351; relations with, 323-24; 
trade with, 323 

Italy: materiel licensing agreements with, 
351; relations with, 324; trade with, 
195; in World War II, 335, 338 

ivory: of Voortrekkers, 29; trade in, 19, 
174 



Jabavu, John Ten go, 37 

Jameson, Leander Starr, 39 

Jameson Raid (1895) , 39 

Japan: fishing rights of, 222; Mandela's 
visit to, 77; trade with, 195, 210 

JCI Limited, 208 

Jewish Socialist Society, 280 

Jews: discrimination against, lii, 51, 52, 
133; population of, 133, 135, 323 

Johannesburg, 266; airport at, 234; 
crime in, Ixiv; ethnic groups in, 133; 
gold mining in, 34, 95; manufacturing 
in, 223, 226; military headquarters in, 
367; Muslims in, 146; population of, 
34; squatter communities near, 53 

Johannesburg Civil Defence program, 
348 

Johannesburg Consolidated Invest- 
ments, 208 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 192, 242; 
foreign purchases on, 197; trading on, 
173, 197, 244 
Johannesburg Weekly Mail, 354 
Johnnies Industrial Corporation, 208 
Joint Air Training Scheme, 337-38 
Joint Committee on Defence, 381 
Joint Management Centers, 341-42; 
advisory committees, 341-42; hierar- 
chy of, 341 
Joint Military Coordinating Council, 368 
Joint Planning Council, 59; Defiance 

Campaign of, 59; formed, 59 
Jonathan, Leabua, 307, 359; ousted, 359 
Jones, David Ivon, 280 
Jordan: relations with, 305 
journalists: detention of, 301-2 
judges: appointment of, 270; sent to Swa- 
ziland, 309 



Judicial Services Commission: estab- 
lished, 272 

judiciary: under constitution of 1961, 
253 



Kadalie, Clements, 49, 50 

Kalahari Desert, 98; elevation of, 98; resi- 
dents of, 5, 134 

Kalahari Gemsbok National Park, 240 

KaNgwane homeland, 265; self-govern- 
ment for, 66, 254; and Swaziland, 117; 
Swazi population of, 116-17 

Kappiekommando, 166 

Kaunda, Kenneth, 285, 313 

Keep It Straight and Simple Party 
(KISS), 292 

Kenya: military cooperation with, 375; 
relations with, 315, 361 

Keys, Derek, 261, 263 

Khoi people. SeeKhoikhoi people 

Khoikhoi people, 6-7; extermination of, 
12, 134, 135; geographic distribution 
of, 7, 118; in Great Trek, 26; histories 
of, 135; labor by, 16, 25; migrations of, 
13-14; occupations of, 6; origins of, 
89; population of, 7, 32; religion of, 
139; settlements of, 7; as slaves, 135, 
139, 174; social structure of, 7; trade 
by, 7, 11, 12, 174; wars of, xlix, 1, 12, 
13,15,129-30,335,349 

Khoisan languages, 134-35 

Khoisan people, 89; descendants of, 89; 
education of, 147; geographic distri- 
bution of, 1 0; religion of, 1 36 

Kimberly, 266; airport at, 234; diamonds 
in, 208; established, 33; locations 
(ghettos) in, 35; manufacturing in, 
224; migration to, for work, 34; mili- 
tary headquarters in, 367; racial dis- 
crimination in, 35-36 

KISS. See Keep It Straight and Simple 
Party 

Kissinger, Henry, 67-68, 84 
Koeberg nuclear power station, 223, 225 
Koevoet counterinsurgency force, 344- 
45 

Komati River, 99 
Korean War, 338, 349 
Kriel, Hernus, 386 
KrigeJ.D., 124 

Kruger, Paul, 38, 39; assaults by, on Afri- 



508 



Index 



cans, 120-21; exiled, 40; monopolies 
under, 187 

Kruger National Park, 98, 240 

KwaNdebele homeland, 121, 265; popu- 
lation of, 121; self-government for, 66, 
121, 254; violence in, 72 

KwaZulu homeland, 62, 115-16, 265; 
under apartheid reform, lx, 78; gen- 
der ratio in, 105; independence for, 
62, 254; political conflict in, 257, 274, 
391; self-government for, 66, 254; state 
of emergency in, 84; violence in, lx; 
voting in, 274 

KwaZulu-Natal province: agriculture in, 
217; capital of, 266; elections in, 268; 
ethnic distribution in, 131, 133; min- 
ing in, 211, 212; representation of, in 
parliament, 263; timber plantations 
in, 220; violence in, 395 

Kwena people, 126 



labor (see also workers; work force): costs, 
223; demand for, 4; distribution of, 
199; laws, 175-76; policies, 208; and 
politics, 199-203; productivity of, 223; 
under proposed constitution, 269; 
unrest, 65, 202 

labor unions, lxii, 295-97; Afrikaner, 
130; antiapartheid, 296; black, lvii, 
lviii, 69, 72, 115, 200, 200, 201, 296; 
communist, 295; membership in, 201, 
296; organization of, 200, 295; police, 
387-88; political activities of, 293, 297, 
298; proapartheid, 296; recognition 
of, 200-201; restrictions on, 54, 200; 
rights of, 117; white, 200 

Labour Party: in elections, 71 , 284; mem- 
bers of, 48, 71 

lakes, 99; artificial, 99 

Lake Saint Lucia, 99 

land: arable, 95; area, 94; for blacks, 
xlviii, 55, 175; cultivated, 215; degra- 
dation, 101, 102, 239; distribution, 
xlviii, 45, 55, 175; irrigated, 215; pollu- 
tion of, 102; restrictions on distribu- 
tion of, 15; segregation, 45, 51; 
seizures, lii, 120, 126, 174, 333; short- 
ages, 101; of whites, 175, 189 

Land Bank: loans from, 175 

Land Claims Court, 164, 188 

land reform, 215 



Langa protest, 276 

Langeberg Mountains, 99 

languages (see also under individual lan- 
guages), 109-11; click, 5, 118, 125; and 
ethnic groups, 111; families of, 111; of 
instruction, 43, 64, 148, 149, 150; offi- 
cial, 109-11; in parliament, 264 

lead, 210 

Leballo, Potlako, 292 

Lebowa homeland, 121, 124, 265; econ- 
omy of, 124; malaria in, 158; politics 
of, 124; population of, 124; self-gov- 
ernment for, 66, 254; violence in, 72, 
128 

Legal Aid Society, 270 

legal system, 269-72; under apartheid, 
269-70; attorneys general in, 270; 
judges in, 270; lawyers in, 270; origins 
of, 269; of Tswana, 126 

legislative branch: under constitution of 
1961, 253; under constitution of 1983, 
254; under proposed constitution, 268 

Lekganyane, Engenas, 144 

Lekhanya, Justin, 359 

Lekota, Patrick "Terror,", 300 

Lembede, Anton, 58, 276 

Lesotho, 32, 111; annexed by British, 30; 
border with, 360, 361; coup in, 308; 
defeated by Orange Free State, 30; 
elections in, 361; independence of, 
67, 307; intervention in, 306, 308, 359, 
361-62; military revolt in, 306; origins 
of, 23; police training in, 385; rela- 
tions with, 307-8, 358, 361; in South- 
ern African Customs Union, 196, 307; 
in Southern African Development 
Community, 306; trade with, 307, 308; 
transportation links with, 307; workers 
from, 204-5 

Lesotho Highlands Water Project, 101-2, 
308 

Libya: relations with, 305, 320, 324 

limestone: production of, 205 

Limpopo River, 94, 1 00 

Limpopo River Valley, 98 

Limpopo Train, 231 

literacy: classes, 156, 392; rate, 146, 177 

Little Karoo, 99 

livestock, 122, 219-20; cattle, 6, 9, 127, 
134, 219, 333; farming, 14; goats, 9, 
127; holdings, 6; of Khoikhoi, 6; pigs, 
219; poultry, 127, 219; sheep, 6, 9, 31, 



509 



South Africa: A Country Study 



134, 215,219 
living standards: attempts to improve, 

177; of blacks, 177; decline in, 181; of 

whites, 91, 177 
Lobedu people, 124 
lobola. See bridewealth compensation 
Local Government Transition Act (No. 

209) (1993), 267 
locations {see also ghettos; homelands; 

townships): under British, 4; in Kim- 

berly, 35 

Lome Convention: qualified member- 
ship in, 196 

London Missionary Society, 139 

London Stock Exchange, 197 

Lowveld, 99 

Lupton, Malcolm, 102 

Luso-South Africa Party, 293 

Luthuli, Albert, 59; arrested, 60; impris- 
oned, 61; Nobel Prize of, 61 

luVenda. S«?Venda language 

Lyttleton Engineering Works, 350 

Mabuza, Enos, 117 

Machel, Samora, 312 

Madagascar: investment in, 197; rela- 
tions with, 358; in World War II, 335, 
338 

Madhiba, Moses, 283 

Maharaj, "Mac," 300 

Mahlangu dynasty, 122 

Major, John, 321 

Make, Vusumazi, 292 

Makwetu, Clarence, 83-84, 292 

Malan, Daniel F. (D.E), 47, 50, 53, 284; 
retirement of, 58 

Malan, Magnus, 340 

Malan, Wynand, 289 

Malan Accord (February 1991), 256 

malaria, 157-58; geographic distribution 
of, 157-58; rate of infection, 158 

Malawi: arms shipments to, 354; police 
training in, 385; relations with, 358; in 
Southern African Development Com- 
munity, 306; trade with, 307; transpor- 
tation links with, 307; workers from, 
204-5 

Malaya: immigrants from, 90 
Malaysia: relations with, 305 
malnutrition, 162, 186 
Mandela, Nelson (Rolihlahla), liv, 5, 58, 



59, 276, 281, 394; arrested, 60, 61; 
clashes of, with Buthelezi, 116; ethnic 
background of, 299; in foreign rela- 
tions, 310, 314-15; imprisoned, xlvii, 
lvi, 61, 277; inauguration of, 324; 
international tour of, 77; meeting of, 
with Buthelezi, 79; as president, lxii, 
85, 354; released from prison, lix, 75- 

76, 256, 332; state visits of, 313; succes- 
sors to, xlviii, Ixv, 279; talks of, with 
Botha, 256; talks of, with de Klerk, lix- 
lx, 75, 153, 251; in transition process, 

77, 79, 82, 252, 256, 257, 390; transi- 
tion proposals by, 81, 256 

Mandela, Winnie, lx, 167, 262, 279-80; 
controversy surrounding, 279, 300- 
301; support for, 279 

Mandela government. See Government 
of National Unity 

manganese: deposits, 210; prices, 210; 
production of, 205, 210; reserves, 210 

Mangope, Lucas, lxi; ousted, 83, 127, 346 

manufacturing, 128, 173, 222-28; capac- 
ity, 223, 224; capitalization of, 223; 
employment in, 53; foreign invest- 
ment in, 196-97; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 223-24; growth in, 176, 245; 
investment in, 224; output, 222, 223; 
sales, 223 

Mapungubwe: gold mining at, 33 

Marine Corps, 339 

Marion Island, 94; weather research sta- 
tion, 94 

marketing boards, 176, 215; for milk, 
219-20 

MARNET. See Military Area Radio Net- 
work 

marriage: arranged, 118; bridewealth 
compensation, 9, 140-41; mixed, 54, 
55; of Nguni people, 123; registration 
of, 104; rites, 137; of Sotho people, 
123; of Xhosa people, 140-41 

Masire, Quett, 310 

Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), 
293, 295 

Matabele people. SeeNdebele people 
materiel: for African National Congress, 
277; air force, 371; army, 368; from 
Belgium, 351; biological, 355-57; 
from Britain, 353; from Canada, 351; 
chemical, 355-57; dual-use technol- 
ogy, 353; from East Germany, 277; 



510 



Index 



embargo on, lvi, 68, 192, 316, 325, 

350, 353, 354; from France, 351; from 
Germany, 351; from Israel, 323, 351; 
from Italy, 351; licensing agreements, 

351, 353; nuclear, 214, 355-57; police, 
385; sales of, 354-55; self-sufficiency 
in, 351 

Mauritania: relations with, 324 

Mauritius: in Southern African Develop- 
ment Community, 306 

Mbeki, Govan, 277, 320 

Mbeki, Thabo, 326; as deputy president, 
lxii, 85, 190, 261; as successor to Man- 
dela, lxv, 279 

Mda, Peter, 58 

MDM. S*<?Mass Democratic Movement 

media: censored, 301-2; ethnic distribu- 
tion in, 297; removal of restrictions 
on, 75 

Meiring, George, 382 

men: circumcision of, 129; life expect- 
ancy of, 105; migration of, for work, 
147; Nguni, 147; San, 6; status of, 6; 
wages of, 154; Zulu, 113, 333 

Methodist Church: and apartheid, 143; 
members of, 135; missionaries from, 
139 

Mexico: relations with, 324 
Meyer, Roelf, 263 

mfecane ("crushing"): background to, 19- 
20; causes of, 19; missionaries in, 140; 
outcomes of, 20-24, 127; refugees 
from, 24,120,124,140, 333 

Mfengu people, 120, 140 

Mhlakaza, 141 

migration: by blacks, xlviii, xlix, li, 3, 8-9, 
332; caused by mfecane, 24, 333; quali- 
fications for, 148; restrictions on, 19, 
56; by whites, xlix, 1, 3, 63, 148 

Military Area Radio Network (MAR- 
NET), 342 

military assistance: from Britain, 350 

military conscription, 335, 369 

military cooperation: with Israel, 323; on 
technology, 351 

military intelligence, 340, 377-81, 380, 
381; budget for, 382 

military officers, 369; from homeland 
armies, 369; from liberation armies, 
369 

military police: women in, 348 
Military Psychological Institute, 376 



military strategy: under Shaka, 21, 115, 
333 

military training, 370 

Milner, Alfred, 39-40, 149 

Milner's Peace, 41-43; failures of, 43 

minerals, 95, 98; discovery of, 1, 4, 33-34; 

economic importance of, 173; export 

of, 194, 207, 210,211,214 
miners: Sotho, 123; strikes by, 48, 337; 

Zulu, 115 

mines: closing of, 208; development of, 
194; geographic distribution of, 205, 
210, 211, 212; migration to, for work, 
1, li, 34-35, 129, 147; number of, 207; 
taxes on, 191 

Mines and Works Act (No. 12) (1911), 
li-lii, 44, 188 

Mines and Works Amendment Act 
(1926), 49, 188 

Mineworkers' Union, 296 

mining: of copper, 205; of coal, 212-13; 
of diamonds, 95, 205; foreign invest- 
ment in, 175, 196-97; of gold, 33, 34, 
95, 180, 205; of iron, 205; as percent- 
age of gross domestic product, 180, 
205; of platinum, 95, 98; procedures, 
207; of uranium, 214, 356 

mining industry, 173, 205-14; color bar 
in, 48, 49, 130; electricity for, 224; 
employment in, 199, 213; environ- 
mental problems caused by, 101, 102; 
expansion of, 175, 205; importance of, 
91, 175, 245; revenues of, 207; wages 
in, 207 

Ministers' Council, 254 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 304; Depart- 
ment of Foreign Affairs, 304 

Ministry of Information, 262 

Ministry of Law and Order, 262, 386 

Ministry of Native Affairs, 56 

Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, 
and Broadcasting, 262 

Ministry of Safety and Security, 262, 386 

Ministry of Transport, 228, 234; Chief 
Directorate of Civil Aviation, 234 

Ministry of Transport, Posts, and Tele- 
communications, 228 

Minority Front, 293 

missionaries, 119, 138; American, 139; 
British, 25, 139; Dutch, 139; French, 
24, 139; German, 139; message of, 
139-40; and mfecane, 140; Muslim, 



511 



South Africa: A Country Study 



138; relations of, with Africans and 
Europeans, 140; Scandinavian, 139; 
schools of, 146, 148, 149 

Mitterrand, Francois, 321 

mixed-race people. See coloureds 

MK. See Umkhonto we Sizwe 

Mlambo, Johnson, 292 

Mlangeni, 141 

Mmabatho, 266 

M-Net, 237, 302 

MNR. See Mozambican National Resis- 
tance 

Mobuto Sese Seko, 315 
Modise, Joe, 300, 354 
Mokhehle, Ntsu, 361 
Molopo River, 94, 1 00 
Mondale, Walter, 68 
Mondi paper manufacturing, 220 
Montreal Protocol, 238 
Mopeli, Kenneth, 125 
Mormons, 135 

Morocco: arms shipments to, 354; rela- 
tions with, 324 

Moroka, James, 59 

Moseneki, Dikgang, 292 

Moshoeshoe, King, 23-24, 124; religion 
under, 140; wars of, with British, 30 

Moshoeshoe II, King, 361 

Mossel Bay: fishing near, 222; manufac- 
turing in, 224; port of, 233 

Mothopeng, Zephania, 76 

Mounted Riflemen's Association, 382-83 

mountains, 98 

Mountain Zebra National Park, 240 

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola 

Mozambican National Resistance 
(Resistencia Nacional Mocamb- 
icana — MNR; Renamo), lvi-lvii; sup- 
port for, 67, 310, 312, 343, 360 

Mozambique, 66-67; Afrikaner farmers 
in, 313; border with, 360; civil war in, 
357, 360; electricity imported from, 
225; ethnic groups in, 127; indepen- 
dence for, lvi-lvii, 67, 357; interven- 
tion in, 357, 358, 359; investment in, 
197; language in, 111; Mandela's visit 
to, 313; migrant workers from, 163; 
military cooperation with, 375; mili- 
tary support for, 309-1 0, 343; rail ser- 
vice, 231; refugees from, 163, 312-13; 



relations with, 311-13; in Southern 
African Development Community, 
306; trade with, 196; workers from, 
204-5 

Mpande, 28 

Mpanza, James, 53 

MPLA. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola 

Mpondo (Pondo) people, 112, 117, 120; 
social system of, 1 

Mpumalanga: agriculture in, 217, 218; 
capital of, 266; livestock in, 219; manu- 
facturing in, 226; representation of, in 
parliament, 263 

Mswati, 23 

Mthethwa people, 18, 20, 114; incorpo- 
rated into Zulu state, 21; social system 
of, 10; Zulu among, 18 

Mufamadi, Sydney, 300, 387 

Mugabe, Robert, 67; in foreign affairs, 
310,312,362 

Mulder, Connie, 70; purged, 69 

Multiparty Negotiating Council, 265 

Munitions Production Office, 350 

Muslims {see also Islam), 132, 134; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 146; number 
of, 135, 145 

Muslim Student Association, 146 

Muslim Youth Movement, 146 

Mzilikazi, 24; defeated by Voortrekkers, 
28 



Nactu. See National Council of Trade 
Unions 

Namaqua (Nama) people, 135 
Namibia {see also South-West Africa): 
dependence of, on South Africa, 360; 
elections in, 318, 360; ethnic groups 
in, 134, 135; independence of, 311, 
318, 331, 360; invasion of, 67, 70; 
investment in, 311; rail service, 231; 
religion in, 136; South African control 
of, 67, 310, 331, 342; in Southern Afri- 
can Customs Union, 196, 307, 311; in 
Southern African Development Com- 
munity, 306; trade with, 311; troops in, 
318, 344; United Nations administra- 
tion of, 310 
Nasionale Pers (National Press) , 284 
Natal colony: agriculture in, 218; blacks 
in, 32, 115; education in, 148; popula- 



512 



Index 



tion of, 31 

Natal homeland. See KwaZulu homeland 

Natalia, Republic of (see also Natal col- 
ony), 28; annexed by British, 29; estab- 
lished, 28; population of, 28 

Natal Mounted Police, 382 

Natal province, 255; political conflict in, 
257, 391 

National AIDS Convention of South 
Africa, 160 

National Assembly: under constitution 
of 1993, 259, 263; distribution of par- 
ties in, 275, 280; members of, 263; 
women in, 167 

National Council of Trade Unions 
(Nactu), 202, 292, 296 

National Council on Alcoholism and 
Drug Dependence, 164 

National Cultural Liberation Move- 
ment. See Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe 

National Defence Force. See armed 
forces 

National Democratic Movement (NDM), 
74, 289 

National Education and Training 

Forum, 153 
National Education, Health, and Allied 

Workers' Union, 202 
National Institute for Defence Research, 

350 

National Institute for Economic Policy, 
178 

National Intelligence Agency, 380, 381 
National Intelligence Coordinating 

Committee, 380-81 
National Iranian Oil Company, 322 
National Manpower Commission, 204, 

296 

National Milk Board, 219-20 

National Parks Board, 240 

National Party of South Africa (NP): 
formed, lii, 47; in Great Depression, 
50; members of, 48; merged with 
South African Party, 50, 284 

National Party (NP) {see a&oHNP), 283- 
86; and apartheid reform, lxiii, 285- 
86; cabinet appointments, 261; coop- 
eration of, with African National Con- 
gress, 298; education under, 150; in 
elections, xlvii, liii, lxii, 58, 84, 130, 
132, 249, 275, 284, 286, 331, 335; in 
government, lxiii, 268, 269; in 



National Assembly, 275; opposition of, 
to reform, 70; organization of, 284- 
85; platform of, liii, 54, 130, 149, 284; 
recruitment for, 286; and religion, 
141; secret meetings of, with African 
National Congress, 256; splits within, 
285; support for, 58; transformation 
of, 283-84, 285; transition talks, lix-lx, 
250, 257 

National Peace Accord (September 

1991), 80, 257, 390 
National Peacekeeping Force, 368-69; 

deployed, 368; disbanded,369 
National Peoples' Party: in elections, 71; 

members of, 71 
National Petroleum Refiners of South 

Africa, 322 
National Policy for General Affairs Act 

(No. 76) (1984), 152, 188 
National Riflemen's Reserve, 335 
national security, 339-48; civilian 

defense, 342; management system, 

340-12 

National Socialism: Afrikaner support 
for, 52, 150 

National Strategic Intelligence Act (No. 
39) (1994), 380 

National Tourist Bureaus, 240 

National Union for the Total Indepen- 
dence of Angola (Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de 
Angola— UNITA), lvi-lvii, 314; aid to, 
359-60 

National Union of Metalworkers of 
South Africa (NUMSA), 202; labor 
actions of, 202 

National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) , 
72, 202 

National Union of South African Stu- 
dents (NUSAS), 63, 295 

National Welfare Act (No. 100) (1978), 
162 

Native Administration Act (No. 42) 
(1956), 57 

Native Educational Association (NEA), 
37 

Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15) 

(1911), 44, 188 
Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) 

Act (No. 48) (1953), 200 
Native Laws Amendment Act (1937), 51; 

opposition to, 52 



513 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Native Laws Amendment Act (No. 54) 
(1952), 51 

Native Laws Commission, 54 

Natives Land Act (No. 27) (1913), li-lii, 
45, 175, 188; extended, 55, 175; oppo- 
sition to, 45, 46; repealed, lix, 79 

Natives Representative Council, 51; abol- 
ished, 55 

Native Trust and Land Act (No. 18) 
(1936), 51, 175, 188; opposition to, 
52; repealed, 79 

Naude, Beyers, 143 

navy, 338-39, 373-75; control of, 373; 
fleet of, 373; headquarters of, 373; 
insignia, 377; installations, 339, 373; 
joint exercises of, 375; marine corps, 
339; missions of, 375; number of per- 
sonnel in, 373; origins of, 338; ranks, 
377; repairs, 375; reserves, 373; 
retrenchment of, 339; training, 373; 
uniforms, 376-77; women in, 348, 373 

Ndebele language (isiNdebele), 120; as 
official language, 109; speakers of, 
112-13 

Ndebele people (amaNdebele) , 23-24, 
111, 120-22; ancestors of, 120; con- 
flicts of, with Voortrekkers, 27-28, 
120; geographic distribution of, 121, 
122; under Kruger, 120-21; migra- 
tions of, 120, 121; population of, 121, 
122; ruled by Cecil Rhodes, 34 

NDM. See National Democratic Move- 
ment 

Ndwandwe people, 18, 20; annihilated 

by Shaka, 21 
NEA. See Native Educational Association 
Nedbank, 242 

Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk. See 

Dutch Reformed Church 
Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, 142 
Nelspruit, 266; military headquarters in, 

367 

neo-Nazi groups, 52, 83 
Netherlands: de Klerk's visit to, 77; rela- 
tions with, 324; settlers from, xlix, 133 
New Africa Investment, Ltd., 244 
New Order party, 52 

newspapers (see also journalists; media), 
304; languages of, 304; suspension of, 

302 

New Zealand: teachers from, 149 
Ngqika Xhosa: chiefdom of, 119; home- 



land of, 119 

Ngqika, Chief, 140 

Ngubane, Jordan, 58 

Nguni languages, 111-22 

Nguni people, 111-22; age-groups of, 
147; economy of, 113, 333; education 
of, 147; geographic distribution of, 10; 
history of, 90; households of, 113; 
political organization of, 113; popula- 
tion of, 111; settlement patterns of, 
113; social system of, 10, 147; sub- 
groups of, 111 

Ngwane I, 117 

Ngwane people, 18, 23 

nickel, 98; deposits, 210 

Niger-Congo language family, 111 

Nigeria: relations with, 315-16, 361 

Nixon, Richard, 67-68 

Nkobi, Thomas, 300 

Nkomati Accord (1984), 312 

Non-Aligned Movement: membership 
in, 325 

Nongqawuse: prophecy of, 31, 141 

North Africa: in World War I, 334-35; in 
World War II, 338, 383 

Northern Cape: agriculture in, 218; capi- 
tal of, 266; ethnic distribution in, 131; 
livestock in, 219; mining in, 205, 210, 
211; representation of, in parliament, 
263; urbanization rate in, 107 

Northern Province, 98; age dependency 
ratio in, 105; agriculture in, 217, 218; 
capital of, 266; representation of, in 
parliament, 263; urbanization rate in, 
107 

North-West Province: agriculture in, 217; 

capital of, 266; representation of, in 

parliament, 263 
NP. See National Party 
Nsanwisi, Hudson, 128 
Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South 

Africa, 214 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), 

214, 355 

nuclear power plants, 223, 224, 225 
nuclear weapons, 214, 355-57 
Nujoma, Sam, 360 

NUM. See National Union of Minework- 
ers 

NUMSA. See National Union of Metal- 
workers of South Africa 
NUSAS. See National Union of South 



514 



Index 



African Students 
Nyawuza dynasty, 1 20 
Nzo, Alfred, 262, 305 



OAU. See Organization of African Unity 
Office of the Public Protector, 259, 395; 

established, 272, 395 
Official Secrets Act (No. 16) (1956), 57 
oil (see also petroleum): deposits, 99; 
embargo on, 68, 81, 192, 350; explora- 
tion, 212; fields, 212; imports of, 180, 
185, 190, 195, 212; from Iran, 68, 190, 
192, 320, 322; processing of, 212, 322; 
production, 176; reserves, 212; sup- 
plies of, 68, 173; synthetic, 214, 227 
Olifants River, 100 

OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries 

Operation Iron Fist, 79 

Oppenheimer, Harry, 70 

Orange Free State, 130, 255, 265; agri- 
culture in, 217; defeat of Lesotho by, 
30; education in, 148; established, 1, 
29; independence of, 30; political 
organization of, 29; populations of, 
30; relations of, with Republic of 
South Africa, 39; residence restric- 
tions of, 133; topography of, 95 

Orange River, 94, 99 

Orange River Colony: incorporated into 
British Empire, 41 

Orange River Sovereignty, 30 

Orange Union. S^Oranje Unie 

Orange Workers. See Oranjewerkers 

Oranje Unie (Orange Union) party, 43 

Oranjewerkers (Orange Workers), 289 

Order of the Boer Nation, 388 

Ordinance 50 (1828), 26; opposition to, 
26 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
82; election observers from, 83, 275; 
exclusion from, 357; membership in, 
305, 325; Pan-Africanist Congress rec- 
ognized by, 291; trade ban of, 192 

Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC): embargo by, 
68, 185, 192, 350 

Organization of the Zulu. S^Inkatha ya 
kwa Zulu 

Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinel) 
paramilitary organization, 52 



Ovambo people, 335, 344 
Oxfam, 354 

Oxwagon Sentinel. See Ossewabrandwag 
paramilitary organization 



PAC. See Pan-Africanist Congress 

Pahad, Aziz, 262, 305 

Pakistan: relations with, 305 

Palestine: in World War I, 335 

Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), 60-61, 
291-92; activities of, 291; armed strug- 
gle of, lvi, lviii, 61-62, 65, 249, 291, 
292; banned, lv, 61, 291; in elections, 
lxii, 275, 292; foreign relations by, 305; 
formed, 60, 276, 282, 291; interna- 
tional recognition of, 291; in National 
Assembly, 275; platform of, lx, 291; 
reaction of, to reforms, lx, 76, 83, 83- 
84; reorganized, 292; unbanned, lix, 
75, 292, 332 

Pan-Africanist Students' Organisation 
(PASO), 292 

paramilitary organizations, 52, 382; inte- 
grated into armed forces, 257 

parastatals, 176, 186, 189-90; administra- 
tion of, 189; defense, 340, 352; elec- 
tricity, 176, 222, 224; government 
loans to, 189; industrial, 186, 225; pri- 
vate-sector participation in, 189; ser- 
vice, 186; shares in, 189-90; for 
shipping, 231-32; steel, 222 

Paris Club: loans from, 183 

parliament (see also under individual 
houses): bills in, 264; candidates for, 
263; under constitution of 1993, 259, 
263-64; dress code, 264; languages of, 
264; members of, 263; separate houses 
by race, lviii, 70, 71, 254; sessions of, 
264; women in, 167 

Parliamentary Committee on Intelli- 
gence Act (No. 40) (1994), 380 

PASO. See Pan-Africanist Students' 
Organisation 

passes (identity papers): abolished, 56; 
British institution of, 25 

pass laws: abolished, 70; under apart- 
heid, 56; arrests under, 57; under Brit- 
ish, li, 4, 35, 42; enforcement of, 42, 
69-70; in Kimberly, 35; protests 
against, 60, 165, 166 

pastoralism: of Khoikhoi, 6, 31; of 



515 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Nguni, 113; of Voortrekkers, 29, 31 
patron-client relationship: of Tswana, 
126 

peace committees, 80 

Pedi language (sePedi, seSotho sa 

Leboa), 123; as official language, 109 
Pedi people {see also Sotho people), 122, 

123-24 

Pedi state, 32; wars of, 36, 124 
Peires, Jeffrey B., 119 
penal code, 392-94 
Penguin Islands, 360 
People against Gangsterism and Drugs, 
lxiv 

Peres, Shimon, 324 
periodicals, 304 
Perskor, 304 

Peru: arms shipments to, 354 
petroleum {see also oil), 212-14; imports 

of, 212; pipelines, 229; processing of, 

212; reserves, 212 
Petronet, 229 

PFP. See Progressive Federal Party 

Phatudi, Cedric, 124 

Phosphate Development Corporation 

(Foskor), 189, 227; privatization of, 

190 

Phuthaditjhaba, 125 

Pietersburg, 266; military headquarters 

in, 367 
pipelines, 229, 235 
Pirow, Oswald, 52 
Plaatje, Solomon X, 46 
platinum, 95, 98, 209-10; discovery of, 

209; geographic distribution of, 209; 

production of, 205; reserves of, 209 
Pokelajohn, 292 

police, 164, 340, 382-388; and apartheid 
reform, lviii, lxiv, 385, 396; attacks on, 
lviii, 72; under British, 25; brutality, 
384, 395; complicity in violence, 84, 
395; ethnic distribution in, 25, 385; 
headquarters, 387; history of, 382-84; 
intelligence, 380; materiel of, 385; mil- 
itary support for, lviii, 383; misconduct 
by, lxiv, 386; municipal, 386; national, 
386; number of personnel in, 384, 
386; organization of, 387; powers of, 
liv, 383-84; recruitment for, 386; 
regional, 386; reorganization of, 386; 
reserves, 384, 386; special constables, 
384; spending on, 192; supplemental 



duties of, 384; support by, for Inkatha 

Freedom Party, 82, 84, 389-91, 395; 

training, 385, 387; unions, 387-88; 

youth wing, 384 
Police Act (No. 7) (1958), 383 
Police Amendment Act (No. 70) (1965), 

383 

Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 

(Popcru) , 387 
Police Reserve, 384 
political crimes, 272 

political demonstrations, 174; against 
apartheid, lviii, 255, 276, 368; against 
pass laws, 60 

political elites, 297-301; Afrikaner, 297, 
298, 301; black, 298, 299; evolving, 
298; from labor, 298; white, 298 

political harassment, 274 

political parties (see also under individual 
parties), 275-93; Afrikaner, 250, 288- 
89; fourth force, 289; neo-Nazi, 250; 
reorientation of, 275; unbanned, lix, 
275, 332 

political reform, 69, 70, 332; coloureds 
under, 132; international pressure 
for, 5; negotiations for, 5; opposition 
to, 70, 72; reaction to, 75, 77 

political repression, 4; of journalists, 
301-2 

political sanctions, 249, 350 

political violence {see also violence), lxiv, 
78, 81, 83, 177, 250; by African 
National Congress, lvi, lviii, 395; 
among blacks, 74, 386; attempts to 
contain, 80, 368; deaths from, 72, 74, 
391; in homelands, 72, 127, 128; by 
Pan-Africanist Congress, lvi, lviii; 
police complicity in, 84, 395; and 
press censorship, 301-2; by students, 
146; in townships, 72, 368-69 

Pondo (Mpondo) people, 117, 120 

Popcru. See Police and Prisons Civil 
Rights Union 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- 
tacao de Angola — MPLA) , lvi-lvii, 359 

population, 103-7; age distribution in, 
105; density, 66, 104, 106, 265; distri- 
bution of, 106-7, 185; environmental 
impact of, 239; growth, 1, 15, 33, 63, 
104-5, 239 

population counts: of Africans, 44, 103; 



516 



Index 



of Afrikaners, 129; of Asians, 44, 133; 
of Bantu speakers, 32; of Bophutha- 
tswana, 104, 126, 346; of British, 133; 
of Cape Malays, 132; of Ciskei, 104, 
347; of coloureds, 44, 131, 132; of 
Europeans, 14, 15, 133; of Greeks, 
133; of Griqua, 131; in homelands, 63, 
104; of Indians, 44, 133; of Jews, 133; 
in Johannesburg, 34; of Khoikhoi, 7, 
15, 32; of mixed-race people, 32; in 
1980, 104; in 1989, 272; in 1991, 104; 
in 1992, 104; in 1994, 104; in 1996, 
lxiii; of Portuguese, 133; of slaves, 14, 
15; in Sotho state, 24; in Union of 
South Africa, 44; in urban areas, 107; 
of whites, 31, 44, 63; Afrikaners, 129; 
Asians, 104; blacks, 70, 104; Christians, 
135; coloureds, 104; in poverty, 186; 
whites, lvii, 70, 104 

Population Registration Act (No. 30) 
(1950), 55; repealed, lix, 79-80 

population statistics: age dependency 
ratio, 105; birth rate, 105; death rate, 
105; fertility rate, 105; infant mortality 
rate, 105; life expectancy, 105; sex 
ratio, 105 

Poqo (Blacks Only), 61, 291 

port authority. See Portnet 

Port Elizabeth: airport at, 234; fishing 
near, 222; manufacturing in, 223; mili- 
tary headquarters in, 367; naval instal- 
lation, 339; port of, 232, 233 

Portnet (port authority) , 222, 229, 232 

ports, 231-33; development of, 194; for- 
eign visits to, 373-75 

Portugal: colonies of, 66-67; explorers 
from, 10, 90; fishing rights of, 222; 
immigrants from, 133; traders from, 
11; trade with, 19, 33 

postal service, 235, 238; privatization of, 
190; in Universal Postal Union, 238; 
upgraded, 238 

Potchefstroom: military headquarters in, 
367 

Potchefstroom University for Christian 
Higher Education (see also Christian 
College), 149 

poverty, 200; among Afrikaners, lii, 47, 
50; attempts to alleviate, 177; among 
blacks, lxii, lii, 186, 203; in homelands, 
66, 185; population in, 186 

president (see also executive branch): 



under constitutions, 259-61, 362-63; 
election of, 259-61; as head of armed 
forces, 362 

president, state, 71; Botha as, 71; cabinet 
of, 254; de Klerk as, lix, 74, 285; pow- 
ers of, 254; term of, 254 

President's Council, 254, 255 

press (see also journalists; media; newspa- 
pers): censored, 301; suppression of, 
301-2 

Pretoria: climate in, 100; ethnic groups 
in, 133; military headquarters in, 367 

Pretoria Minute (August 1990), 256 

Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 
(PWV; see also Gauteng) province, 292 

Pretorius, Andries, 28 

prices: government influence on, 186 

Prince Edward Island, 94 

Prior, Andrew, 293 

prisoners: categories of, 392; children as, 
392; ethnic distribution of, 391; liter- 
acy training for, 392; number of, 391; 
parole of, 392; political, 394; women 
as, 392 

prison sentences, 392-94; correctional 
supervision, 392; death penalty, 393; 
whipping, 393-94 

Prisons Service Reserve Force, 392 

prison system, 391-92 

private sector: participation in parastat- 
als, 189 

privatization, 178; under Botha, 190; 
debate over, 187; under Mandela, 190; 
opposition to, 190; revenues from, 190 

professional class, 119 

Programme of Action, 59 

Progressive Federal Party (PFP) (see also 
Democratic Party), 70, 289; in elec- 
tions, xlvii, 74; formed, 58 

Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No. 
55) (1949), 55 

property: right to own, 79 

Protection of Information Act (1982), 
302 

Protestantism (see also under individual 
denominations), 135; missionaries of, 24 

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) 
(1987), 238 

provinces, 255 

provincial councils, 255 

PSA. See Public Service Association 



517 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Publications Act (No. 42) (1974), 302 
Publications Control Board, 302 
Public Safety Act (No. 3) (1953), 57 
Public Service Association (PSA) , 388 
Public Service Commission, 259 
Purified National Party, 50, 284 
PWV. See Pretoria-Witwatersrand- 

Vereeniging 
PX (parcel delivery), 229 



Queenstown: manufacturing in, 224 
QwaQwa homeland, 125, 265; gender 
ratio in, 105; population of, 125; self- 
government for, 66, 254 

racial discrimination. See discrimination 
radio, 237-38, 302-4; languages of 
broadcast, 237-38; receivers, 302; sta- 
tions, 237, 303-4 
Radio RSA, 238 
Rajbansi, Amichand, 71 
railroad authority. See Spoornet 
railroads, 229-31; administration of, 229; 
commuter, 229-30; construction of, 
194; electrification of, 229; freight, 
230-31; luxury, 231; modernization 
of, 230; private, 230; unification of, 
229, 231 

Ramaphosa, Cyril, 72, 300; as successor 

to Mandela, 279 
rand (currency). Sounder currency 
Rand, the. See Witwatersrand 
Randgold, 208 
Rapport, 304 

RDP. See Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment Programme 

Reconstituted National Party (Herstigte 
Nasionale Party— HNP), 68, 289; in 
elections; platform of, 68 

Reconstruction and Development Pro- 
gramme (RDP), 156, 177-80; 
adopted, 178; environment under, 
239; foreign contributions to, 324; 
housing under, 220; industry under, 
211; priorities of, 178; spending on, 
156, 178; taxes to support, 178-79 

Record of Understanding (1992), 82, 
257; protests against, 82 

reference book (see also passes) , 56-57 

refugees, 370; illegal, 360; internal, 164; 



from mfecane, 24; from Mozambique, 
163; number of, 164; repatriation of, 
164,312-13 
regional provincial councils, 255 
religion (see also under individual sects), 
135-46; and apartheid, 133, 135, 141- 
44; and death, 138; historical back- 
ground, 136^11 
religion, African, 136-38; beliefs, 144- 
45; and education, 147; healing 
dances of, 136 
Rembrandt tobacco group, 242 
Renamo. See Mozambican National 

Resistance 
Representation of Natives Act (No. 12) 
(1936), 51 

Republic of South Africa: established, lv, 
253 

Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act (No. 110) (1983). See constitution 
of 1984 

Republic Unity Movement, 289 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 

(No. 49) (1953), 56, 188; repealed, lix, 

78, 256 

Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana. See 
Mozambican National Resistance 

Restitution of Land Act (No. 22) (1994), 
188-89 

Retief, Piet, 28 

Reunited National Party (HNP). See 
Herenigde (Reunited) National Party 

Reuters, 304 

Rharhabe chiefdom, 119 

Rhodes, Cecil: diamond mining by, 33; 
gold mining by, 34; invasion of South 
African Republic by, 39; political activ- 
ities of, 34, 39-40 

Rhodesia (see also Southern Rhodesia), 
357 

Rhodes University, 154 

Richards Bay: naval installation, 339; 
port of, 232 

Riekert Commission. See Commission of 
Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the 
Utilisation of Manpower 

rivers, 99-100; pollution of, 102, 239 

Rivonia trial, 61, 277 

roads (see also Autonet), 233-34; con- 
struction of, 178; fatality rates on, 234; 
system of, 233; vehicles on, 233-34 

Robben Island, 94 



518 



Index 



Rolong kingdom, 18 

Rolong people, 126; alliance of, with 

Voortrekkers, 28; social system of, 10 
Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic 

Church, Roman 
Romania, 323 
Roos, Tielman, 47 

rural areas: education in, 148; electricity 
in, 224; ethnic groups in, 133; health 
care in, 156; manufacturing in, 224; 
telephones in, 237 

Russian Federation: relations with, 305, 
322 

Russian Orthodox Church: members of, 
135 

Rwanda: arms shipments to, 354 



SABC. See South African Broadcasting 

Corporation 
SABC Radio, 302 
SABC Television, 302 
SACP. See South African Communist 

Party 

SACTU. See South African Congress of 

Trade Unions 
SADF. See armed forces 
Safmarine. See South African Marine 

Corporation 
Sage Bank, 242 

SAIC. See South African Indian Congress 
Saldanha Bay: fishing in, 222; port facili- 
ties at, 211, 232, 233; rail facilities at, 
211 

Salisbury Island: naval base, 373 
Samcor. See South African Motor Corpo- 
ration 

SANAC. See South African Native Affairs 
Commission 

Sand River Convention (1852), 30 

sangoma (diviner), 137, 144 

Sanlam. See South African National Life 
Assurance Company 

San people {see also Khoisan people), 5- 
7, 125; diet of, 134; economy of, 134; 
family structure of, 6; geographic dis- 
tribution of, 7, 134; labor by, 16; occu- 
pations of, 6; origins of, 89; religion 
of, 136-37; social organization of, 134 

Sansco. See South African National Stu- 
dent Congress 

San tarn. See South African National Trust 



Company 
SAP. See South African Party 
Sappi paper manufacturing, 220 
SAPU. See South African Police Union 
Sarowiwa, Ken, 315 

SASO. See South African Students' 

Organisation 
SASOL. See South African Coal, Oil, and 

Gas Corporation 
Sasolburg oil refinery, 322 
SASS. See South African Secret Service 
Satour. See South African Tourism Board 
Sauer, Paul, 54 
Savimbi, Jonas, 314 

schools: under apartheid, 146; denomi- 
national, 56, 148; destruction of, 152; 
district, 148; enrollment in, 154; Euro- 
pean, 147-48; government, 154; inte- 
gration of, 154; mission, 146, 148, 149; 
number of, 154; private, 154; reli- 
gious, 150; secondary, 148; segrega- 
tion of, liv, 56, 148-49; teachenpupil 
ratios in, 153; technical, 155; ward, 
148 

Seaward Defence Force, 338 
Sebe, Lennox, 347; ousted, 347 
secret societies, 48 

security concerns. See internal security 

security legislation, 57 

Sedibe, Jackie, 348-49 

segregation: under apartheid, liv, 55-57; 

in closed compounds, 35; of courts, 

35; of land, 45, 51; origins of, 90-91; 

of schools, liv, 56; signs for, 56; 

unequal resources in, 56-57 
Sekhukhune, 32 
Sekwati, 124 

Seme, Pixley Ka Isaka, 46, 276 

Senate: under constitution of 1993, 259, 
263; members of, 263-64 

Sending Kerk. See Dutch Reformed Mis- 
sion Church 

Senzangakona, 21 

Separate Amenities Act. See Reservation 

of Separate Amenities Act 
Separate Representation of Voters Act 

(No. 46) (1951), 55-56 
Separate Representation of Voters 

Amendment Act (No. 30) (1956), 56 
sePedi. See Pedi language 
Serfontein, Hennie, 294 
services sector: employment in, 199; 



519 



South Africa: A Country Study 



growth of, 180; parastatals in, 186; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
180 

seSotho. SeeSotho language 
seSotho sa Leboa. See Pedi language 
settler society: origins of, 13-18 
seTswana. SeeTswana language 
Seventh Day Adventist Church: members 

of, 135; schools run by, 56 
Shaka Zulu, 3, 20, 114-15, 333; assassina- 
tion of, 23; career of, 20-23; as chief, 
20, 21; life of, 20-21; military strate- 
gies of, 21, 115, 333; relationship of, 
with Dingiswayo, 21; wars of, 21-22, 
115 

Shangaan people, 127, 128; geographic 
distribution of, 127; homeland of, 128; 
population of, 111 

Sharpeville massacre, lv, 276 

sheep, 6, 9, 31, 134, 215, 219; number of, 
219 

shipping, 231-33 

Shona people: ruled by Cecil Rhodes, 34 
Shoshangane, 21 
Sigcau, Botha, 300 
Sigcau, Stella, 300 
silver: production of, 205 
Simonstown: naval base, 373; port of, 
233 

Singapore: relations with, 324 
Sisulu, Walter, 58, 59, 276, 281; arrested, 
60, 61; imprisoned, 61, 277; released 
from prison, 256, 332 
siSwati. SeeSwzui language 
Slachter's Nek Rebellion (1815), 25 
slavery, 135; end of, 25, 26; initiation of, 

12-13, 174 
slaves, 16; freedom for, 1, 139; importa- 
tion of, 3, 11-13; population of, 14, 
15; reliance on, 15, 24; and religion, 
139; sources of, 12-13; treatment of, 25 
Slovo, Joe, 167, 278, 280, 282; career of, 
282-83; as minister of housing, 283; 
philosophy of, 283; in transition, lx 
Smith, Harry, 30; recalled, 30-31 
Smith, Ian, 66-67, 309; support for, 357 
Smuts, Jan C, 43, 284; as deputy prime 
minister, 50; as defense minister, 334; 
education under, 149; as prime minis- 
ter, 48, 52 

Smuts government: parastatals under, 
187; strikes under, 48 



Sobhuza, 23 

SobhuzaII,Kingll7 

Sobukwe, Robert, 60, 292; death of, 61; 

imprisoned, 61 
Sobukwe Forum, 292 
SOCCER. See Sports Organisation for 

Collective Contributions and Equal 

Rights 

Social Democratic Federation, 280 
Soekor. See Southern Oil Exploration 

Corporation 
Sofasonke ("We shall all die together") 

Party, 53 
Solomon ka Kinuzulu, King, 286 
sorghum, 118, 217 
Soshangane, 128 

Sotho languages, 111, 125; as official lan- 
guage, 109 

Sotho people (BaSotho), 122-27; ances- 
tors of, 90; customs of, 129; education 
for, 155; ethnic identity of, 23; families 
of, 123; geographic distribution of, 
111, 122; occupations of, 123; popula- 
tion of, 111, 122, 124; resistance 
against British, 30; and San people, 
125; Southern, 124-25 

Sotho state, 23-24; origins of, 23; popu- 
lation of, 24; refugees in, 23; wars of, 
36 

Sotho-Tswana people, 125-27; ancestors 
of, 122; geographic distribution of, 10; 
migrations of, 122; occupations of, 
122; political system of, 122-23; social 
system of, 10, 122 
South Africa Act (1909), 253 
South African Agricultural Union, 189 
South African Airways, 190, 229, 234-35; 
administration of, 234; fleet, 234; ser- 
vice, 235 

South African Army Women's College, 
348 

South African Aviation Corps. See air 
force 

South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC), 237, 302; board, 302-3; reor- 
ganization of, 237 
South African Cape Corps, 345 
South African Catholic Defence League, 
143 

South African Central Statistical Service, 
105 

South African Chamber of Mines, 159- 



520 



Index 



60, 207 

South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corpo- 
ration (SASOL), 189, 223; govern- 
ment investment in, 227; imports by, 
226; stock offerings of, 190; and syn- 
thetic fuels, 214, 227 

South African College (see also University 
of Cape Town) , 1 49 

South African Communist Party (SACP), 
liv, 82, 202, 276, 277, 280-83; armed 
struggle of, 249; cooperation of, with 
African National Congress, 278, 280, 
282, 299; founded, 280; members, 
282; in National Assembly, 280, 283; 
racial distribution in, 280; support for, 
283; unbanned, lix, 75, 282, 332 

South African Confederation of Labour, 
296 

South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU),59, 296 

South African Council of Churches, 144 

South African Defence Forces (SADF). 
See armed forces 

South African Employers' Consultative 
Committee on Labour Affairs, 296 

South African Human Rights Commit- 
tee, 395 

South African Indian Congress (SAIC), 
59; in Congress of the People, 59 

South African Indian Council, 254 

South African Institute of Medical 
Research, 159 

South African Institute of Race Rela- 
tions, 104, 391 

South African Iron and Steel Corpora- 
tion (Iscor), 49, 189, 225; privatization 
of, 190; stock offering of, 189-90, 225 

South African Marine Corporation (Saf- 
marine), 231-32 

South African Media Council, 293 

South African Medical and Dental Coun- 
cil, 161 

South African Medical Service, 336, 375- 
76; organization of, 376; retrench- 
ment of, 376; veterinary services of, 
376 

South African Medical Service College, 
376 

South African Medical Service Nursing 

College, 376 
South African Medical Service Training 

Centre, 376 



South African Military College, 365 
South African Military Nursing Service, 
348 

South African Motor Corporation (Sam- 
cor),226 

South African National Defence Force. 

See armed forces 
South African National Life Assurance 

Company (Sanlam), 47, 50, 242, 284 
South African National Student Con- 
gress (Sansco), 295 
South African National Trust Company 

(Santam) , 47, 50 
South African National Tuberculosis 

Association, 157 
South African Native Affairs Commission 

(SANAC),42 
South African Native College at Fort 

Hare {see also University of Fort Hare) , 

154, 155 

South African Native Convention 
(1909), 45 

South African Native National Congress 
(see also African National Congress): 
formed, 45,276 
South African Naval College, 373 
South African Naval Staff College, 373 
South African Nursing Council, 161 
South African Party (SAP), 43, 284; 

merged with National Party, 50, 284 
South African Police. See police 
South African Police Service. See police 
South African Police Union (SAPU), 387 
South African Politics (Thompson and 

Prior), 293 
South African Press Association, 304 
South African Press Council, 301 
South African Rail Commuter Corpora- 
tion, 230 

South African Railways and Harbours 
Administration, 228, 234 

South African Red Cross, 161 

South African Republic (Zuid Afrikaan- 
sche Republiek) , 29; annexed by the 
British, 38, 130; established, 29; inde- 
pendence of, 30; political organiza- 
tion of, 29; populations of, 30; 
relations of, with Germany, 39; rela- 
tions of, with Orange Free State, 39; 
Rhodes's invasion of, 39; suffrage in, 
38-39, 40 

South African Reserve Bank, 241; direc- 



521 



South Africa: A Country Study 



tors of, 241; functions of, 241; and 
gold-mining industry, 241; policies of, 
241 

South African Secret Service (SASS), 
380, 381 

South African Students' Organisation 
(SASO), 63-64; banned, 65; estab- 
lished, 63; platform of, 63-64 

South African Tourism Board (Satour) , 
240 

South African Transport Services (see 

also Transnet) , 228 
South African War (1899-1902), li, 40- 

41, 43, 90, 333; consequences of, 130, 

149; origins of, 124 
South African Welfare Council, 162 
South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation 

Zone, 326 

Southern African Customs Union, 196, 
307, 309, 311 

Southern African Development Commu- 
nity: members of, 306; membership 
in, 305, 306, 326 

Southern African Development Coordi- 
nation Conference, 326 

Southern Namib Desert, 98 

Southern Oil Exploration Corporation 
(Soekor), 189, 212 

Southern Rhodesia (see also Rhodesia; 
Zimbabwe) , 67, 358; independence of, 
309, 357; relations with, 309 

South-West Africa (see also Namibia): 
apartheid in, 310; invasion of, 334, 
337, 358-59; South African control of, 
67, 310, 335, 357; war in, 338 

South-West Africa People's Organisation 
(SWAPO), 67, 70, 311, 344, 357, 359, 
360 

South-West Africa Territorial Force, 343, 
344; number of personnel in, 344; 
organization of, 344 

Soutpansberg Mountains, 98 

Soviet Union (see also Russian Federa- 
tion): materiel from, 277, 360; rela- 
tions of, with De Beers, 209, 322; 
relations with, 322; trade with, 195 

Sowetan, The, 304 

Soweto: pollution in, 103; uprising 

(1976), lvii, 64-65, 150-52 
Spain: arms shipments to, 354; fishing 

rights of, 222 
Spear of the Nation. See Umkhonto we 



Sizwe 

Special Forces, 343; ethnic distribution 
in, 3 44 - 4 5; missions of, 343-45; organ- 
ization of, 343, 344, 345 
Spoornet (railroad authority) , 229 
Sports Organisation for Collective Con- 
tributions and Equal Rights (SOC- 
CER), 292 

squatter communities, xlviii, li, 53, 103- 
4, 279; attempts to eliminate, 62; eth- 
nic distribution in, 107; security 
sweeps in, 389 

Stals, Chris, 244 

Standard Bank of South Africa, 242 
Star, The, 304 

state of emergency: of 1985, lviii, 73; of 
1994, 84 

State Security Council, 340-41; members 
of, 341; organization of, 341; role of, 
341; secretariat, 341; work committee, 
341 

Status of Union Act (1934), 253 
Statute of Westminster (1931), 253 
steel industry, 176, 211, 222, 226; pro- 
duction, 225 
Stellenbosch: agriculture in, 15 
strikes, 65-66, 202; by blacks, 72, 200, 
202; costs of, 203; deaths in, 202; by 
miners, 48, 53, 72, 337; by students, 
64, 146; suppression of, 334, 337 
structural adjustment program, 194 
Strydom, J.G.: as prime minister, 58 
Strypoortberg mountain range, 98 
student associations (see also South Afri- 
can Students' Organisation), 64; 
strikes of, 64 
students: percentage of black, 155; segre- 
gation of, 154-55; strikes by, 64, 146 
Subcouncil on Defence, 368 
subsidies: for agriculture, 176, 187; for 

bread, 228 
suffrage. See voting 
sugar, 29, 31,91, 218; export of, 215 
Sunday Times, 304 

Suppression of Communism Act (No. 

44) (1950), liv, 57 
Supreme Court, 259; decisions of, 55; 

divisions of, 270; judges in, 270 
Sun City, 1 27 

SWAPO. See South-West Africa People's 

Organisation 
Swartberg Mountains, 99 



522 



Index 



Swaziland: background of, 23, 117; inde- 
pendence of, 67, 117; judges in, 309; 
and KaNgwane, 117; language in, 111; 
police training in, 385; population of, 
116; rail service, 231; relations with, 
308-9, 358; in Southern African Cus- 
toms Union, 196, 307, 309; in South- 
ern African Development Community, 
306; trade with, 307; transportation 
links with, 307; workers from, 204-5 

Swazi language (siSwati), 111; speakers 
of, 112-13 

Swazi people, 111, 116-17; ancestors of, 
90; geographic distribution of, 111; 
migrations of, 117; population of, 116 

Swazi state, 23-24, 32-33; origins of, 23; 
social system of, 117 

Sweden: relations with, 324 

Swellendam: agriculture in, 15; social 
organization of, 15 

Switzerland: trade with, 195 



Table Bay: Dutch supply station in, 11- 
12; economy of, 15; expansion of com- 
munity at, 13-14; social organization 
of, 15 

Taiwan. See China, Republic of 
Tamil, 1 33 

Tambo, Oliver, liv, 58, 59, 276; arrested, 

60; exiled, lvi, 61 
Tanzania, 355; airlines, 235; in Southern 

African Development Community, 306 
Tau, 18 

Taung people, 18 

taxes: base, 191; corporate, 191; excise, 
191, 192; on gold mines, 191; on 
imports, 176, 191, 192, 194; imposed 
by British, 1, 30, 42, 126; income, 192; 
to support Reconstruction and Devel- 
opment Programme, 178; value-added 
(VAT), 191 
teachers: importation of, 149; numbers 
of, 154; ratios of, to students, 153; 
rural, 148; salaries of, 154; shortages 
of, 146; training of, 155 
TEC. See Transitional Executive Council 
technikons (technical schools), 155 
telecommunications, 235-38, 301-4; 
data transmission, 237; employment 
in, 237; privatization of, 190 
telephones: under apartheid, 236-37; 



cellular, 236, 237; number of, 236; in 
rural areas, 237; service, 236-37; sys- 
tem, 236 

television, 237, 302-4; in homelands, 
237; languages of broadcast, 237; sets, 
302; stations, 303-4 

Telkom, 190, 235-36; earnings, 235; ser- 
vices, 235 

Tembu National Church, 37 

Terreblanche, Eugene, lxi, 391 

terrorism: against apartheid, 61, 70; 
crackdown on, 70; by whites, 388 

Thailand: relations with, 324 

Thembu people, 112, 117, 119-20, 299; 
royal clan of, 120; and Xhosa, 119-20 

Thompson, Leonard, 293 

Thonga people, 127 

Threads of Solidarity: Women in South Afri- 
can Industry, 1900-1980 (Berger) , 165 

Tile, Nehemiah, 37 

Times Media, 304 

titanium, 210 

Tlhaping people, 18, 126 

tobacco, 118, 242; exports of, 196, 215; 
taxes on, 191, 192 

Tomlinson Commission, 55 

Tonga people, 127 

topography, 95-98 

Total Onslaught, 131, 340, 358 

Total Strategy, 131, 340, 358, 380; imple- 
mentation of, 341 

tourism, 197, 240-41; attractions, 240; 
investment in, 197; number of visitors, 
240 

townships: crackdown on, 79; ethnic dis- 
tribution in, 107, 109, 128; security 
sweeps in, 389; tribal designations for, 
109; violence in, lviii, 72, 368-69 

trade {see also exports; imports), 192-96; 
with African countries, 196, 306-7, 
307-8, 311, 313-14, 361; by Africans, 
33; with Arabs, 33; by Bantu speakers, 
9; balance, 195; with Britain, 195; and 
copyright infringement, 319; depen- 
dence on, 193-94; employment in, 
199; with Europeans, 19, 33, 195, 196; 
with Germany, 195; with Italy, 195; in 
ivory, 19, 29, 174; with Japan, 195, 210; 
by Khoikhoi, 7, 11, 174; routes, 11; 
sanctions, 192, 350; solicitation of, 
179; with Soviet Union, 195; with Swit- 
zerland, 195; with United States, 195, 



523 



South Africa: A Country Study 



196, 210, 316, 318, 320; of Voortrek- 

kers, 29 
trade unions. See labor unions 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC), 

82, 249, 257, 257; armed forces under, 

368; installation of, 83 
Trans-Karoo Train, 231 
Transkei homeland, 62, 119, 265; armed 

forces of, 346, 347, 363; border with, 

360; coup in, 347; economy of, 181; 

independence for, 62, 66, 107-9, 254; 

population of, 104; transition of, from 

apartheid, 80 
Trans-Natal Train, 231 
Transnet, 228-29; airlines under, 234; 

divisions of, 229 
Trans-Oranj Train, 231 
Transport and General Workers' Union, 

202 

transportation, 173, 228-35; airports, 
234; boycotts of, 60; contribution of, 
to economy, 180; by commuters, 229- 
30, 233-34; links with southern Africa, 
307, 361; motor vehicles, 226, 233-34; 
ports, 194, 231-33; privatization of, 
190; roads, 233-34; subsidies, 179; ura- 
nium for, 356 

Transvaal, 1; agriculture in, 217; educa- 
tion in, 148; incorporated into British 
Empire, 41; malaria in, 158; mining 
in, 205, 209, 211 

Transvaal Province, 255, 265 

Treaty of Amiens (1802) , 18 

Trekboers (see also Boers) , 14-18; discon- 
tents of, 17; expansion by, 17, 175; 
labor practices of, 25; social organiza- 
tion of, 16-17; wars of, with Africans, 
15, 17, 115 

Trekkers. S&eVoortrekkers 

Treurnicht, Andries, 64, 70, 75, 285 

tribe, 107, 109 

Trust Bank, 242 

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
272, 396-97; criticisms of, 396-97; tes- 
timony to, lxiv 

Tshawe dynasty, 119 

tshiVenda. SeeVenda. language 

Tsonga language (xiTsonga) , 1 28; as offi- 
cial language, 111 

Tsonga people, 127-28; ancestors of, 
127; education for, 155; geographic 
distribution of, 127; homeland of, 128; 



occupations of, 127; population of, 
111, 127; social structure of, 127; sub- 
groups of, 127; under Zulu, 127-28 
Tsonga-Shangaan language group, 111, 
128 

Tswana language (seTswana), 126; as 

official language, 111 
Tswana people (BaTswana) (see also 

Sotho-Tswana people), 122, 125-27; 

culture of, 126; education for, 155; 

geographic distribution of, 126, 127; 

legal system of, 126; population of, 

111, 126; social system of, 126; wars of, 

36, 126 

tuberculosis, 156-57; among blacks, 
156-57; deaths from, 157, 160; intro- 
duction of, 156; rate of infection, 156- 
57, 160; spread of, 156 

Tugela River, 100 

Tunisia: relations with, 324 

Tutu, Desmond, lxiv, 72, 144, 396 



UDE See United Democratic Front 

Uganda: airlines, 235 

Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the 

Nation; Umkhonto; MK), 61, 277, 307; 

integration of, into armed forces, 363, 

365, 367, 368-69; women in, 348 
Umzimvubu River, 100 
unemployment, xlviii, 146-47, 199, 200, 

204 

UNHCR. See United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees 

Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola. See National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola 

Union Defence Force, 334; conscription 
in, 335; established, 334; number of 
personnel in, 334, 335; organization 
of, 334 

Union of South Africa, 130, 253; estab- 
lished, li, 43-44, 253; government 
style of, 44; population of, 44 

Union Steel (Usco), 225 

UNITA. ^National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola 

United Arab Emirates: arms shipments 
to, 354 

United Bank, 242 

United Democratic Front (UDF), 72, 
293, 294-95; affiliates of, 295; banned, 



524 



Index 



74, 295; disbanded, 295; members of, 
72, 295; platform of, 72, 294; 
unbanned, lix, 75, 295, 332 

United Nations, 82; administration of 
Namibia, 310; African National Con- 
gress in, 277; arms embargo by, lvi, 68, 
192, 325, 350-51, 353; election observ- 
ers from, 275; membership in, 305, 
325; opposition of, to apartheid, lvi, 
68; Pan-Africanist Congress recog- 
nized by, 291; peacekeeping missions, 
306; sanctions, 81, 192, 350 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 79, 164, 307 

United Nations Human Rights Commis- 
sion, 394 

United Nations Observer Mission in 
South Africa (UNOMSA) , 83, 325 

United Nations Operation in Mozam- 
bique (UNOMOZ),312 

United Nations Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG), 310-11 

United Party, 74, 284 

United Press International, 304 

United South African Party (UP), 50; in 
elections, 53-54, 58; platform of, 54 

United South Africa National Party, 284 

United States: constructive engagement 
of, 317; de Klerk's visit to, 77; invest- 
ment from, 197, 320; missionaries 
from, 139; naval visit to South Africa, 
375; relations with, 316-20; sanctions 
by, 73, 80, 192, 193, 316, 350; tensions 
with, 318-20; trade with, 195, 196, 
210,316, 320,354 

United States Bureau of the Census, 104 

United States Committee on Refugees, 
164 

United States Comprehensive Antiapart- 
heid Act (1986), 192, 318; conditions 
of, 77-78, 318; sanctions of, lifted, 80 

United States Export-Import Bank: pro- 
hibition on loans from, 192 

United States Intelligence Authoriza- 
tion Act (1987), 318 

United States-South Africa Binational 
Commission, 320 

United Workers' Union of South Africa, 
202, 296 

Universal Postal Union, 238 

universities: administration of, 155-56; 
under apartheid, 154; black, 154-55; 



coloured, 154-55; desegregation of, 
155; enrollment in, 155; faculty and 
staff of, 155, 297; Indian, 154-55; inte- 
grated, 154; religious, 149; segrega- 
tion of, 56, 149, 154-55; strikes in, 64; 
types of, 155; white, 154 

University of Cape Town {see also South 
African College), 149, 154, 156 

University of Fort Hare, 155 

University of Natal, 154 

University of the North, 155 

University of the Orange Free State {see 
also Grey College), 149 

University of the Witwatersrand, 154, 
156 

UNOMOZ. See United Nations Opera- 
tion in Mozambique 
UNOMSA. See United Nations Observer 

Mission in South Africa 
UNTAG. See United Nations Transitional 

Assistance Group 
Upington: airport at, 234 
uranium, 212, 355; exports of, 214, 323; 

highly enriched, 214; mines, 214; 

prices, 214; production of, 205, 213- 

14, 214; reserves, 213, 225 
urban areas: blacks in, lvii, 63, 66, 109, 

123, 166; ethnic distribution in, 107; 

growth of, 176; manufacturing in, 

223-24; population in, 107; whites in, 

63, 109; workers in, 166 
Urban Foundation, 107, 265 
urbanization, 53; rates of, 107 
urban migration, xlviii 
Uruguay: joint military exercises with, 

375 

Usco. See Union Steel 



Vaal River, 99 

Vambo (Ovambo) people, 335, 344 
vanadium: deposits, 210; exports, 211; 

prices, 211; production of, 205, 211; 

reserves, 21 1 
Vance, Cyrus, 390, 394 
van den Bergh, HendrikJ. (H.J.), 62, 69 
Vanderbijl Engineering (Vecor), 225 
van Riebeeckjan, 11, 138-39 
van zyl Slabbert, Frederik, 70 
VAT. See tax, value-added 
VaVenda. See Venda people 
Vecor. See Vanderbijl Engineering 



525 



South Africa: A Country Study 



Venda chiefdoms, 18 

Venda homeland, 265, 347-48; armed 
forces of, 346, 347-48, 363; border 
with, 360; economy of, 129, 181; inde- 
pendence for, 66, 107-9, 254, 347; 
malaria in, 158; migrant remittances 
to, 129; population of, 104; transition 
of, from apartheid, 80 

Venda language (luVenda, tshiVenda), 
111, 128; as official language, 111 

Venda people (VaVenda), 128-29; cul- 
ture of, 128, 129; education for, 155; 
population of, 111, 128; religion of, 
129; social system of, 129 

Venetia: diamonds in, 209 

Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. See 
Dutch East India Company 

Verwoerd, Hendrik R, 150; assassination 
of, 62; as minister of native affairs, 56; 
as prime minister, liv, 58, 150 

Victoria Falls Power Company, 224 

Viljoen, Constand, 288-89 

violence, lxiv, 388-91; community 
response to, lxiv, 388-89; government 
response to, 389-91; patterns of, 388; 
state -sponsored, 389-91, 395; against 
women, 395-96 

VOC. See Dutch East India Company 

Volkskas (People's Bank), 50, 242, 284 

Volkstaat Council, 264-65 

Volkstaat Council Act (No. 30) (1994), 
264 

Voortrekker Monument, 51 

Voortrekker republics, 1, 28-29; blacks 
in, 32; incorporated into British 
Empire, 41; occupations in, 29; popu- 
lations of, 30, 31 

Voortrekkers ("Trekkers"), 1; alliances of, 
with Africans, 28; conflicts of, with 
Africans, 27-28, 30, 120, 124; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 27; occupa- 
tions of, 31; taxes imposed on, 30; 
Zulu massacre of, 28 

Voortrekkers (scouting organization), 
284 

Vorster, John, 53, 62; as prime minister, 
62, 68 

Vorster government, 68-69; scandal in, 
69 

voters: education of, 274; eligible, li-lii, 
274; harassment of, 274; number of 
registered, 272; turnout of, xlvii 



voting: by coloureds, 55, 132; pressure to 
expand, 68; restrictions on, 51, 55, 
272; in South African Republic, 38-39, 
40; by women, 49 



Wage Act (1925), 49 

wages: adjustment of, 245; of agricultural 
workers, 91; of blacks, xlviii, 65, 127, 
129, 174, 199, 202; of men, 154; of 
miners, 207; of whites, xlviii, 199; of 
women, 154, 166 

Walvis Bay, 360; administration of, 311, 
371 

War of Independence, First, 38 
War of Independence, Second, 43 
wars, 332-34; of Africans and British, 25, 
26, 30; of Africans and Dutch, 12, 13, 
17, 27-28; of mfecane, 24; weapons in, 
333 

Washington, Booker T., 45 

Washington Star, 69 

water: distribution, lxiii, 178, 306, 311; 

pollution, 102, 239; shortages, 99, 101, 

333; use, 101 
Waterberg mountain range, 98 
Wegener, Alfred, 94 

welfare, 162-64; for the aged, 162-63; 
demand for, lxiii; for the disabled, 
162-63; food programs, 186; improve- 
ments in, 178; pensions, 162-63; for 
refugees, 163-64 

Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 
139 

Western Cape province: agriculture in, 
217, 218; capital of, 266; elections in, 
268; ethnic distribution in, 107, 131; 
manufacturing in, 226; mining in, 
205, 211; representation of, in parlia- 
ment, 263; urbanization rate in, 107 

West Germany. See Germany, Federal 
Republic of 

wheat: imports of, 217; production of, 
31,176,217 

White Liberation Army, 388 

White People's Front, 388 

White Protection Movement (Blanke 
Bevrydingsbeweging— BBB), 289 

White Republican Army, 388 

whites (see also Afrikaners; British): birth 
rate of, 105; classification of, liii, 55; 
death rate of, 105; and disease, 158- 



526 



Index 



59; divisions among, 68-71; employ- 
ment of, 199; farming by, 175-76, 215; 
land of, 175, 189; life expectancy of, 
105; living standards of, 91, 177; 
migration of, to South Africa, 1, 3, 63; 
opposed to apartheid, 61; as percent- 
age of population, lvii, 70, 104; in 
police force, 385; political affiliations 
of, 59, 280; in political elite, 297, 298; 
political representation for, lviii, 71, 
254; politics of, 57-58; population of, 
31, 44, 63; population growth of, 105; 
privileges for, 175; religion of, 135; 
segregation of, 55-56, 63; terrorism 
by, 388; voting by, xlvii; wages of, xlviii, 
199 

White Wolves, 388 

White Workers' Protection Association 
(Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond) , 
296 

Who's Who in South African Politics (Gas- 
trow), 298 

Wiehahn, Nicolas, 296 

Wiehahn Commission, 69, 200, 296 

wine: grapes for, 14, 15, 31, 91, 218; pro- 
duction of, 31, 218, 222 

wine country, 240 

Witsenberg Mountains, 98 

Witwatersrand ("the Rand"): gold in, 34, 
207; mining in, 205, 209, 212; topogra- 
phy of, 95 

Wolf son, Tony, 102 

Wolton, Douglas, 281 

Wolton, Molly, 281 

women, 164-67; Afrikaner, 166; and 
apartheid, 56, 165-66; in armed 
forces, 336, 337, 348-49, 371, 373; in 
cabinet, 262; discrimination against, 
56; employment of, 166, 204; as house- 
hold heads, 147; influence of, 165; life 
expectancy of, 105; Nguni, 147; in pol- 
itics, 167; as prisoners, 392; rights of, 
167, 278; San, 6; status of, 6, 164-65; 
violence against, 395-96; voting by, 49; 
wages of, 154, 166; Zulu, 113 
Women's Auxiliary Air Force, 337 
Women's Auxiliary Army Service, 348 
Women's Defence of the Constitution 

League {see also Black Sash) , 165-66 
Women's Rights Peace Party, 292 
wool: exports of, 33, 215, 219; produc- 
tion of, 31 



workers (see also labor): African, 65, 115, 
123, 147, 176, 199, 280-81; agricul- 
tural, 91; domestic, 199, 203; foreign, 
163-64, 204-5; illegal, 164; inden- 
tured, 29, 42; rights of, 203; training 
for, 204; treatment of, 25, 176; urban, 
166; white, 280-81 

Worker's List Party, 292 

work force (see also labor) , 198-99; Sotho 
in, 123; women in, 166, 204; Zulu in, 
115 

World Tourism Organization, 240-41 
World War I, 46-48, 334-35, 349; casual- 
ties in, 335; opposition to, 46-47 
World War II, liii, 52-53, 281, 335, 337, 
337, 339, 349, 383; casualties in, 335, 
338 

Worrall, Dennis, 289 



Xhosa lands: annexed by British, 30 

Xhosa language (isiXhosa): grammar 
book for, 119; as official language, 
109; speakers of, 112-13, 118, 119-20 

Xhosa people (amaXhosa), 17, 18, 111- 
12, 117-20; ancestors of, 118; destruc- 
tion of, 30-31; economy of, 118; edu- 
cation of, 148, 155; geographic 
distribution of, 126; homelands for, 
119; languages of, 118; livestock of, 
219, 333; marriage of, 140-41; migra- 
tions of, 118, 332; origins of, 90; politi- 
cal organization of, 118-19; 
population of, 117; in professional 
class, 119; religion of, 119, 137; rulers 
of, 119; social system of, 10, 118; sub- 
groups of, 18, 117-18; and Thembu 
people, 119-20; wars of, with Boers, 
17, 129-30; wars of, with British, 25, 
27, 30, 36; witch hunts by, 140 

Ximoko Progressive Party, 292 

xiTsonga. S^Tsonga language 

Xuma, Alfred, 59 



You, 304 

Yugoslav republics: arms shipments to, 
354 



Zaire: arms shipments to, 354; military 
cooperation with, 375; police training 



527 



South Africa: A Country Study 



in, 385; rail service, 231 
Zambia, 355; intervention in, 359; rail 
service, 231; relations with, 313-14, 
358, 361; in Southern African Devel- 
opment Community, 306; trade with, 
196, 307, 313-14; transportation links 
with, 307 

ZANU-PF. See Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front 

Zimbabwe {see also Southern Rhodesia), 
309-10; border with, 360; ethnic 
groups in, 122, 127; independence of, 
lvii, 309; invasion of, 67, 343, 359; lan- 
guage in, 111; police training assis- 
tance from, 387; relations with, 309; in 
Southern African Development Com- 
munity, 306; trade with, 196, 310; 
transportation cooperation with, 231 

Zimbabwe African National Union-Patri- 
otic Front (ZANU-PF) , 67 

zinc, 210 

Zion Christian Church, 144-45; and 
apartheid, 145; established, 144; mem- 
bers of, 144; theology of, 144-45 

zirconium, 210 

Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek. See South 

African Republic 
Zulu consciousness, 21-22; under apart- 



heid reform, 78 
Zulu Kingdom, 116 
Zululand, 115 

Zululand Planters' Union, 115 

Zulu language (isiZulu), 128; as official 
language, 109; speakers of, 112-13 

Zulu people (amaZulu), 111, 113-16, 
299-300; age-groups of, 333; armed 
uprising by, 42, 115; autonomy for, 
288; geographic distribution of, 127; 
livestock of, 219; military operations 
of, 114, 333, 334; origins of, 18, 90; 
political affiliations of, 116; popula- 
tion of, 113; religion of, 137-38; social 
system of, 10, 113; values of, 116; in 
work force, 115 

Zulu state, 32; cleavage of, 28; decline of, 
115; expansion of, 22, 90, 114-15, 
127-28; migration of, 90; political 
organization of, 21, 114; under Shaka, 
20-23; wars of, 22, 36, 115, 130, 333 

Zulu Washermen's Guild (Amawasha), 
115 

Zuma, Jacob, 300 
Zuma, Nkosazana, 1 62 
Zwangendaba, 21 
Zwide, 20 



528 



Contributors 



Rita M. Byrnes is Senior Analyst, African Studies, Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress. 

Nancy L. Clark is Associate Professor of History, California 
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, California. 

Joshua Sinai is Senior Analyst, International and Security Stud- 
ies, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 

Joseph P. Smaldone is Chief, Weapons and Technology Control 
Division, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
and adjunct professor, Georgetown University and Univer- 
sity of Maryland. 

Robert Thornton is Professor and Chairman of the Depart- 
ment of Anthropology, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. 

William H. Worger is Associate Professor of History, University 
of California, Los Angeles. 



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